An Attempt to Unravel this Mystery
"Was it not ironic that Task Force Faith came to its final stop just short of the
site of Drake's 31st Tank Company bivouac and the 31st Infantry Rear CP? Thirty hours earlier there had
been 16 operable tanks and 325 soldiers in a perimeter within a stone's throw of where the convoy
died--they had been there since the evening of November 27. Then on November 30 an order came for them to
withdraw to Hagaru-ri. Who ordered that withdrawal to Hagaru-ri?...And why was the order issued?"
- Appleman, East of Chosin, p.322
In the 1950's, there was a popular song titled, "What a Difference a Day Makes." This
chapter covers several days and an important difference relating to each one of them--the 7th Division's
relocation to East of the Chosin Reservoir.
Movement of Troops
Day One -11/24/50: 1/32 Infantry units in transit
Day Two -11/25/50: 1/31st RCT units in transit
Day Three - 11/26/50: Other units in transit
Day Four - 11/27/50: End of Army units' relocation above Hagaru-ri, to this date. Enemy attacks in force
Killed in Action - Casualties east Of Chosin
Day Five - 11/28/50: 77
Day Six - 11/29/50: 48
Killed in Action - Casualties in the tank withdrawal
Day Seven - 11/30/50: 82
Day Eight - 12/1/50: 114
Day Nine - 12/2/50: 333
Final Night of Lt. Colonel Faith's task force battle: total destruction of our column of
wounded and the final demise of the task force.
Day Six (29 November, 1950) - an extremely eventful and fateful day
What happened before the close of Day Six (unknown to General Almond) relates directly to
a fateful and frightful 1st Marine Division reaction concerning Almond's late night X Corps order. That
order placed General Smith in full (OPCON) operational control over all Army forces at Chosin. It was an
order intended to secure, rather than seal, the fate of Task Force Faith on the east side of the reservoir.
The pending Marine removal order of Colonel MacLean's Army tank command that day meant that Lieutenant
Colonel Don Carlos Faith's forces would be totally abandoned, isolated, and trapped east of the reservoir.
The tank removal order abandoned four miles directly northeast of Hagaru-ri to Hudong-ni, adding those
additional four miles to another four miles forward, thereby trapping all 7th Division units of the 1/32nd,
3/31st (-) 57th FA Bn (-). and the 15th AAA-AW Bn(-). The minus symbols are a military indication of
any unit that lacked its full strength. For example, the 1/32nd (Faith's regiment) was a complete unit as
originally sent to Chosin. The 3/31st (-) was also a complete unit inclusive of the other units trapped at
Hudong-ni behind it. Removing those rear units therefore left 3/31st as an incomplete unit as ordered to
Chosin, per OPN O 25. The 57th FA was likewise never complete per OPN O 25 as scheduled for the Chosin
Campaign. It lacked its Service Battery, also withdrawn to Hagaru-ri with the tank command, as well as
its own C Battery, and B Battery of the 31st FA BN (155mm Howitzers). The 15th Anti-aircraft Artillery,
Automatic Weapons Battalion was only one (D) Company from that 15th AAA-AW Battalion, lacking its battalion
support. It was also attached to the 57th FA. Bn per Opn O 25.
Click on each link below to find a map which shows the tank command location between Hudong-ni and
No friendly force remained between Task Force Faith and Hagaru-ri for a total of eight
miles. That eight mile enemy trap, already partially in place, was reinforced and consolidated by a reaction
over the X Corps OPCON transfer order to the sole command of General Oliver P. Smith, USMC--a transfer of
command over the Army task force and all others Army forces within the Chosin Reservoir. Effective as of
292027 November, those 7th Division forces were exclusively under the sole command and responsibility of the
1st Marine Division.  However, prior to that transfer event, one should clarify what division (Army
or Marine) was previously in charge of that area of operations.
For that information we must consider the Marine recorded history, a history which is
directly in conflict and contradiction to Operation Order #25 (1.b). The 7th Infantry Division was to
seize Mupyong-ni, as written by Colonel Allan D. MacLean in his own regimental instructions concerning his
five objectives labeled "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", to be seized without delay toward the town of Changjin.
Both sets of objectives were previously assigned to the Marines, but then changed under the latest order of
0 7, 25 November issued by MacArthur. It was an order that therefore superseded all Marine objectives
in the Hagaru-ri area.
The Marine Corps' own history and its own public relations campaign distorts these facts,
retaining and locking in their sole objective as Mupyong-ni.  We have a conflict of orders. Until that
OPCON timeline change, the Marine G-3 had absolutely nothing whatsoever to do concerning that new X Corps
order issued directly to and binding on all Army forces. The point is that MacLean's 31st RCT mission east
of Chosin, inclusive of Lt. Colonel Faith's 1/32nd Infantry, was firmly locked within a 7th Division, 31st
Infantry Regimental Combat Team (RCT) Order #25. That order had absolutely no connection to the Marine G-3
section between OPN 0 7 25 November and prior to 292027 November 1950. Colonel MacLean's mission prior to
that timeline belonged exclusively to the 7th Infantry Division as given by the authority of X Corps and its
commanding officer. Its later removal from all records, namely OPN O 25, totally and completely removed
MacLean's RCT from all active Army history on this side of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. Those men
involved within its mission were classified "secret," and listed as merely missing in action. Recall Smith's
earlier PUC remarks on excluding this Army force as making no contribution whatsoever to the withdrawal of
his remaining forces from Hagaru-ri back to the coast of Hungnam. Where did the 7th Division force
come from and where did they go via this timeline? They were completely vanished, erased, vaporized, and
suddenly gone, along with their records and credentials--a phantom force lost to history. They no longer
legally existed within this area on Army maps or official Army records.
However, a few of those records were securely transferred and guarded under a classified
label within the National Archives just outside Washington D.C. There they remained until they were
declassified and OPN O 25 was copied on 9 January, 1979. This now creates an enormous problem between the
Army and Navy, indicting that General Almond turned over the full responsibility of a non-existent Army
force to the Department of the Navy, via its Marine Corps. How can and should this situation and fiasco be
handled? For over five decades, history failed to explain this farce. But it now seems that military history
has come full circle in re-establishing those lost or misplaced credentials, now public knowledge through
OPN O 25. It would also seem evident that General Almond has his personal revenge at last. The Navy and
Marine Corps now have the problem of explaining, correcting, and recording military history within this
area. How do they do that? How do they make their records coincide with those of X Corps? There were no
credentials or records for this Army forces (until now--the purpose of this research) east of the reservoir.
However, the Department of the Navy become fully aware and involved over these facts in this controversy
within the upcoming years by extending their own opposition in denying the PUC award to forces east of
Chosin for forty-nine years (1950-1999), while at the same time issuing it to the 1st Marine Division. The
Department of the Army is on record via a Ninth Endorsement (1952) to included all forces east of Chosin in
that PUC Award (see chapter endnote).
The real story and facts may show the Marines Corps in a bad light. Let the chips fall
where they may by reviewing a direct report of Marine G-3 records. What did they do with their (classified)
copy of OPN Order 25, sent to the Marine SP's per MacLean's order listed as: "(4. b.) C1 V 1st Mar Div SP,
Opns Overlay, Annex 1"? This information (1.b) also verifies that it was the 7th Infantry Division's zone of
operations, plus this road overlay was to provide prior priority road clearance for all MacLean's forces
moving from Pukchong through the Marine road network between Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and northward to
Hagaru-ri. Any research should include those X Corps orders within their independent Marine Division, as
those records of the X Corps Army history should include all X Corps orders to the Marine Division within
that same time frame. It should also be inclusive of that Marine order to replace the 7th Marines by
the 5th Marines at Yudam-ni. That move alone left no forces on the east of the reservoir (see General
Ridgway's map and Navy maps 17 & 18). The last two Navy maps verify the full 7th Division was well
east of the Pujon (Fusen) Reservoir. Yet, in all fairness, the Navy doesn't really seem to have access to
these orders. "A search of the 1st Marine Division G-3 Journal, November 30, 1950, fails to disclose an
entry concerning an order of any kind to the 31st Rear CP and the Tank Company at Hudong-ni. Yet that
command would be the one authorized to issue it." 
The removal of Task Force MacLean (not Faith) made all Changjin history as recorded
unreliable. The death of Colonel MacLean prior to the X Corps transfer of his command to the Marine command
opens the door to his entire command being referenced as Faith's command from start to finish. Lt. Colonel
Faith interacted directly with the Marines; however, it is an existing fact that Colonel MacLean never did.
Still, Faith had no individual credentials of his own except through reference within OPN O 25 as well. But
Faith commanded his own 1/32nd Battalion at the start, and the two extra battalions at the finish--the
3/31st Infantry and 57th FA.Bn--were remnants of MacLean's larger force of men.
Yet, Colonel MacLean's standing orders left instructions to his tank commander, Captain
Robert Drake, to move his tanks forward. Under the changing circumstances, Colonel MacLean's orders remained
in effect until rescinded by someone in authority. Faith could not do that. He was never in command of
that tank command unit. Plus, they remained blocked four miles south of his perimeter. However, the
Marine commander's new OPCON order then superseded any prior Army order. The Marine history, while fully
verifying this OPCON transfer, still is highly vague on the issue of those tanks returning into Hagaru-ri.
Without dispute, they withdrew well during that timeline under Marine operational control.
One should place this in light of those earlier forces that the Marine commander assumed
command over-- those (1/B/31) 7th Division forces who were "attached" to Task Force Drysdale earlier (28
Nov) and totally outside of Smith's authority at Koto-ri. They had their own orders under their own
commander and were never "attached" to the Marines--however, they were linked to MacLean's orders.
Drysdale's British force had an "attached" United Nations status directly to the 1st Marine Division. 
This latter is of no big issue except to verify my point of the chain of command. The commander in
charge (in charge being the key issue) has every right to appoint any commander over another unit. At
Changjin, the Marine commander (Colonel Puller) delegated and appointed the British UN commander of a small
unit (250 men) to be attached to the Marines, as the leader of his own titled force to break through from
Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri. There is no disputing that or the fact that the British commander's newly assigned
authority should supersede any ranking Marine commander placed under him, and those Army units as
well--again, assuming that the Marine officer placing that Army force in that unit had the legal authority
to assign that force to that task. In this case, Colonel Puller did not. General Smith PUC version disputes
Colonel Puller's authority to attach that Army unit, supported by Smith's individual disclaimer that the
Army force simply "attached themselves" to that column.
But while that may be another moot issue, as that Army force had to move forward towards
Colonel MacLean anyway, the Marine command reaction over our tank force behind us is an entirely different
issue. Our rear tank and CP command was transferred and "officially attached" to the Marine commander prior
to its withdrawal. MacLean's records were "lost," but not those of the units behind him. The rear tank force
was placed under command of the Marine commander, and their records of its movements under that Marine G-3
section should fully document the orders given by them. That seems to be lacking, or highly vague. The
distance between MacLean's two units was only four miles, and another four miles back to Hagaru-ri. Moving
that tank force added those additional four miles to the journey of Task Force Faith. That move severely
jeopardized the task force and sealed its fate. "What commander in his right mind could order such a
move in the circumstances without deliberately running the risk of sacrificing the task force, and how could
he be willing to take that risk?" Appleman, East of Chosin, p.323.
My attempt to unravel this mystery is to lock in on the mission east of Chosin after the
Marine commander (MG Smith) was placed in charge. That timeline from 292028 hours Nov. ‘50 was one minute
past the Marine recorded time frame of the change of operational control and full command to them. "At 2027
that night, all troops in the Chosin Reservoir area, including the three Army battalions, were placed under
the operational control of the Marine commander by X Corps."  Here at long last the Marine commander had
total and exclusive control--not only of his own Marine division--but the additional command over all Army
units within his immediate area. This brings to mind General Bradley's remarks: "This is no time for fancy
Dans who won't hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals."
Here, at long last, General Smith was calling the signals. Almond's commands to him
were then merely suggestions and options of what to do. In the end, it would be Smith's call alone to decide
what course of action to take--or in this case, to totally ignore. No matter what transpired beyond that
timeline (292028 November), the Marine commander and his designated officers were in full and complete
charge of all Army forces. This indicates that those Marine officers, delegated to various responsibility
within the 1st Marine Division, then had whatever new authority over Army forces as Smith assigned to them.
For example, the Marine tank commander, when given authority over the Army tank command, had independent
authority of operational control over that force and could place them where he wanted them. He could allow
them to remain in place as rear guard support for Task Force Faith, or he could order them back to Hagaru-ri
and place them in any defensive position of his choice. Unfortunately, at the expense of Task Force Faith,
he picked the second option. As to the question of who ordered our rear tanks withdrawn, that answer has
just been given.
Per National Archive reports on the Army CP command: "On the night of 29 Nov the rear CP
received orders to withdraw to Hagaru-ri and that we would now be under the control of the 1st Marine
Division."  It is unclear who issued that order or what later hour of that night it was issued. But we do
know that this order was not activated until the afternoon of the next day (the 30th). Therefore,
another question is posed. Why the delay? In the U.S. Army, "An order calls for instant compliance, a
view sometimes difficult for the American soldier to understand.... Once an order was published it could not
be changed except by the issuing authority." 
Here I restate the question: Why the delay over the tank force returning to
Hagaru-ri? In East of Chosin, Appleman states that the OPCON order was not effective until 0800 of
the 30th. Still, the tanks did not move out until around 301600 hours. Again why the eight-hour delay? The
answer should lie within the very basic training and knowledge of the lowest private in the Army. One does
not surrender his post or command assigned without proper authorization. Captain Robert Drake was a graduate
of West Point (Armor, Class of ‘44). In my opinion, he was not going to surrender his full armor
command, plus severe his connection to his own regiment trapped above him, solely on the strength of a
relayed, unreliable, radio message. He required confirmation from someone higher in division command.
As it happened, the 7th Division Commander General David Barr arrived that same morning
for a scheduled afternoon meeting at Hagaru with CG Almond, MG Smith, and 7th ADC BG Hodes. While some other
authors may imply that General Barr ordered Captain Drake to relocate his command at Hagaru-ri, MG Barr was
no longer the one responsible as he had lost full operational control over these forces in the Chosin arena.
All MG Barr was authorized to do was to explain that prior night's order (in reference footnote 6 above).
It was and still remained a fully lawful order by the new issuing authority. He did not have to detail what
Captain Drake was to do next. That action was obvious. Case closed. Legally, that tank command, plus the
medical holding team, artillery service battery, and the rear CP forces belonged at Hagaru-ri, as ordered.
However, were they really needed there?  But new credentials and separation from MacLean's command-for
the Army tank command, medical detachment, artillery service battery, and the rear CP forces were
established there as part of a new provisional force then fully and physically attached to the 1st Marine
Division. The overwhelming fact here was the connection to Task Force Drysdale and the need for more tanks
to defend Hagaru-ri. That condition created an emergency for the 1st Marine Regimental commander to rush
more forces and equipment to Hagaru from wherever he can get them.
"The reinforcements ordered up from Koto-ri had a difficult time of it on the road.
Only a part had managed to get through, and the night of 30 November brought further heavy attacks at Hagaru
and against the Army battalions."  This indicates that the entire Task Force Drysdale from Koto-ri was
needed at Hagaru. To compensate for the difference of only one-third of Drysdale's force getting through to
Hagaru, it would seem logical that the 31st Tank Armor would also be required to fill that void. That would
be further indicated by its withdrawal order issued on the night of 29th November that they were needed to
"reinforce Hagaru! (see Marine Map 20). RED FLAG: But why not state that up front? This verified Smith's
important error in not placing that free battalion of the 5th Marines at Hagaru-ri. Had MG Smith pulled them
in there, neither would Colonel Drysdale's force ever have been needed at Hagaru, or would it have been
necessary to sacrifice Task Force Faith due to that tank withdrawal from Hudong-ni.
The larger remaining issue
The major-point here is not that a withdrawal order was ever issued to the tank unit in
the first place. The point is, why did it not coincide with the same timeline withdrawal notice to Task
Force Faith on the night of 29 November? Why the time delay? It was no big secret that the Chinese
forces--exclusive of those CCF forces at Yudam-ni--always attacked after dark to avoid close-in air strafing
and bombardment of their forces. Any withdrawal would have to be during daylight hours for our use of those
planes. To prepare for that breakout, those orders would have to have been issued the prior night. These
also should have been issued with the tank withdrawal order. Task Force Faith had much-needed M19 40mm
shells erroneously dropped at Hudong-ni. An order to Faith to withdraw first (and only then to the tank
company), and then for them both to withdraw to Hagaru should have been the order of the day.
The 29th and the 30th slid into history without Task Force Faith being issued those
orders. Why? While Appleman disputes that there was ever a withdrawal order issued by General Smith to
Colonel Faith until Faith and his forces were well on the road back towards Hagaru-ri, the Army history
within Ebb & Flow records as follows:
"Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith at 1100 on the 1st. By that time
Smith had dropped all plans for sending a rescue force to Faith, whose forces had taken strong assaults
around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of 30th. Although they had defeated these attacks, it
was doubtful they could withstand more. Hence, Smith judged, waiting to dispatch reinforcements to Faith
until the Yudam-ni troops returned to Hagaru-ri would be too late." (Mossman, p. 132)
Any intelligent rationalism should conclude that a withdrawal of any friendly force four
miles above one's own defensive area would remove that much flank protection above--provided, of course,
that one had any plans whatsoever at that time to retrieve that road after reclaiming those four miles
surrendered to the enemy. That reason is out of sync with military logic because it would leave the forward
unit stranded and deserted, as well as giving the enemy a free staging area a full eight miles between that
unit while simultaneously blocking Faith's withdrawal path. This became a reality and tragic end result for
Task Force Faith. However, that task force continued to "contribute" to the security of Hagaru-ri, in spite
of Smith's (PUC) claim to the contrary. The companion question arises, "Why did Smith not issue an early
withdrawal to Fox Company of the 7th Marines in the rear of Yudam-ni defense? Instead, he ordered his
forward greater units of three regiments (5th, 11th, and 7th) to fall back and collect Fox Seven on the
One of many unreliable factors within this drama is the lack of records by the Marine G-3.
Entirely too many are connected to "Smith's Chronicles" & "Notes." Maybe that explains why he is separated
from the Marines so many times within this drama to his own personal exclusive connection. (Always Smith did
this or Smith failed to do that.) While it is understood that orders can be verbally given, their execution
can relate to a timeline of events and movements. The 1st Marine tank commander may not have known exactly
who issued that tank withdrawal order, but he knew full well when those tanks arrived at Hagaru-ri and were
attached to his personal command. Per Army archives, Captain Drake's report stated: "Company arrived
Hagaru-ri 301750, was attached to the 1st Marine Division, and immediately placed in the perimeter defense
of Hagaru area...."  It was still not too late to inform Faith to "prepare to break out" ASAP.
Such a message could have been air dropped with a parachute flare into our area of entrapment, since the
reports were that all radio communications to Faith were out--a claim I totally dispute.  Better late
than never. So why still delay that vital order some additional 17 hours after the tank force was reassigned
within Hagaru (6 hours of the 30th and 11 hours of the 1st)? The answer may well be found within Eric
Hammel's reference that "O.P. Smith was not a demonstrative leader.... he rarely gave an order, but always
pointed in the direction he thought things ought to be heading." 
That quote may have additional credence within Mossman's accounting in the Army history,
Ebb & Flow. It stated, "On 1 December,... General Smith now commanding all forces in the
reservoir area, had given the two regiments at Yudam-ni their withdrawal order the previous evening
following his afternoon conference with Almond." [RED FLAG] Smith placed neither Colonel Litzenberg
nor Colonel Murray in charge, but merely directed both to "expedite.... movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to Hagaru
prepared for further withdrawal south. Destroy any supplies which must be abandoned during this withdrawal."
Female correspondent Marguerite Higgins stated as well, "The 7th and 5th Regiments were
now operating for the first time under joint orders and without benefit of division guidance."  Adding
to all this command confusion, the Marine assistant division commander was not in Korea at that time. Still,
one vital fact remains. Those Marine forces had received orders twice before 1 December to withdraw
from Yudam-ni back to Hagaru-ri. They needed one extra day added to each individual order (28th and 29th) to
realign their forces for either withdrawal, and they were engaged within that final withdrawal at 010800
December. (Three additional days to close at Hagaru-ri, on 4 November.) Also, an air drop of supplies and
close air to ground support was already in operation on the west side of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.
Point of importance: Faith still had three hours to wait for his official withdrawal authorization, plus
another two hours for a total of five hours for any air to ground support. Of more importance is the fact
that there were no air drops or other supplies dropped prior to our moving out.
Again, why would Faith be overlooked this same date and hour?
What seems so contradictory in all of this is the praise attributed to General Smith by
others. In Appleman's East Of Chosin, he rated him highly, saying, "...Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith was
a model of coolness, caution, and tactical and planning abilities."  And as I have stated, General
Ridgway--in spite of his own later problems with delays by Smith--seemed impressed by him. Why those
discrepancies exist mystifies me. Appleman seems to me to fault Smith's judgment at times (see quotes within
this chapter). Ridgway praised him in spite of the thing he himself detested--failure to move
"together, together." Yet all those things were after thoughts of reports by others. Maybe I'm missing
something here. I have previously stated, "A general's persona is complex." It seems that everyone but
General Almond admired General Smith, yet all others were outside of the arena where the critical action and
the main performance was being played out in a real life drama. And only within that real arena can it be
fairly and accurately judged for history.
Afternoon conference at Hagaru-ri
On this same fateful afternoon at Hagaru (30 November), generally speaking the "stars"
were out in force. Per Marine history: "On the afternoon of the 30th a command conference was held at Hagaru
in the Division CP. Generals Almond, Smith, Barr and Hodes were informed at the briefing session that a
disaster threatened the three Army battalions..."  RED FLAG - As outlined below, those three Army
battalions no longer included the entire 31st RCT, the new, renamed Task Force Faith having been reduced to
three Battalion Combat Team (BCT) strength only. What is so significant about this? The Hudong-ni force four
miles to the rear was already in the process of returning to Hagaru under prior withdrawal orders while this
meeting was being conducted.  "Blowing the ammo and ration dump"--and no one from the Marine command
informed General Almond of that fact. Nor is it recorded that General Almond was informed that Hagaru had
just been reinforced by those remnants of Task Force Drysdale, an increase of tanks by 17 heavy Pershing
tanks from Drysdale's force, added to those assigned to the 5th & 7th Marine Regiments, tank platoons of at
least four tanks each (17 + 8 = 25 + Drake's 16 = 41 tanks at Hagaru-ri). The timeline for that meeting
started at 1410hrs (2:10 p.m.). It ended after 1 hour and 20 minutes, or 1530 hours. [RED FLAG] Two
hours later at 1730 hrs, all Hudong-ni 31st Army units had closed on Hagaru. There were then some forty-plus
tanks at Hagaru. However, none of these were ever ordered back to assist a breakout by Task Force Faith the
next afternoon, thereby severing that rear guard connection to Task Force Faith and making this following
statement totally irrelevant.
"Almond directed Smith and Barr to draw up a plan and time schedule for extricating the
Army battalions east of the Reservoir. These two generals agreed, however, "that not much could be done
until the Yudam-ni Marines arrived at Hagaru," and the conference ended on an inconclusive note."
This last part adds a continuous connection within this meeting, but in reality the
decision between the two generals occurred after Almond had left the meeting. "Almond directing General
Barr and Smith to draw up a plan for extricating the cutoff units...have the plan ready for him by six
o'clock (1800hrs) that evening.." Considering that Almond left at 1530 hours, also that the cut-off units
included the tank command, however, two hours later at 1730hrs, the rear CP and Tanks from Hudong-ni were
secure at Hagaru, and Faith was totally cut-off. (RED FLAG] Thirty minutes (1800) later was the deadline for
the plan to be submitted to Almond for the total withdrawal. As this day ended, so did any decision about
assisting Task Force Faith. Conclusion: "Not much could be done." Translation: Nothing was done.
Solution: So what could have been done that wasn't? (1) Assure that the Marine air
controller located at Hagaru insure the next day's (1 December) scheduled priority air drop of ammunition be
delivered prior to the breakout of Task Force Faith instead of being re-routed to the Marines west of
Chosin. Task Force Faith was out of 40mm and extremely low on .50 caliber ammo for the quad 50's, both
essential self-propelled weapons. These were reduced to using two barrels (instead of four) on the night of
30 November. All men were scrounging for all types of much-needed ammo. After all else, it was reported MG
Smith assured MG Barr that LTC Faith would have "air priority," but this is a claim that cannot be fully
(2) A second alternative: Hagaru forces merely use our tanks and turn their guns, which
were under full Marine operational control, towards Hill 1221. That hill was within extreme range of
those 76mm tank guns or our two 31st tanks that had 105mm mounted cannons. The latter two 105mm weapons were
definitely within range. An artillery air observer plane was overhead for observation and should have been
used for coordination and accuracy of rounds.
(3) Consider, too, the Marines were using their six tubes of 105mm howitzers from H/11 at
Hagaru for fire missions at extreme range to cover 7th Regiment Fox Company at Toktong Pass, providing
shells to defend them during nighttime hours. That extreme range was seven miles. The distance to Hill
1221 was only four miles--well within a ‘comfortable range' of all those 105mm weapons. The average
destruction of artillery by a long range weapon was listed as 60 percent of all enemy casualties in all
wars. It was criminal negligence on MG Smith's command not to use them as support of Task Force Faith
on his withdrawal to Hagaru.  Using only two of the six tubes from Hagaru would not have deprived "F"
company (reorientation) of coverage they could and should have gotten from their other 11th Artillery
Regiment batteries at Yudam-ni. There were 48 total pieces there, minus those six-105mm tubes at
Hagaru. Some units were self-propelled 155mm. We know there were eight tractor-pulled 155mm with
a 10 mile range abandoned at Toktong Pass. MG Smith should have required H/11, FDC to connect to the
frequency of that forward artillery liaison plane over Task Force Faith and that ground observer at Hagaru,
gaining contact with Faith at 1500 hours afternoon of 1 December--that one operator received the message to
Click on the link below to view the breakout route of Task Force Faith 1 December 1950. Again, note the
location of Hudong-ni, as well as the fact that the final break up of our task force was also at Hudong-ni:
It meets and beats all requirement that NO force of any kind was required to leave Hagaru
except howitzer shells. It meets and beats criticism that no forces were available for any attack from
Hagaru to assist us--this without depriving Fox Company of four howitzers standing by to cover them. Those
two howitzers added to the two tank units would have equalized four tubes each for Fox Company awaiting
link-up from 1/7 Marines already outside their perimeter. Fire missions were suspended that night anyway,
for fear of dropping shells on Lt. Colonel Davis' nighttime rescue operation. Here was a partial solution to
Almond's orders: merely reorient those two weapons during daylight hours--a plan which could have been in
operation within 24 full hours of planning, well before needed. No one suggested this plan of
assistance. Rather, they simply write it off as waiting for the Marines to return from Yudam-ni. 
Any assistance would have saved our own ammo. Ironically, those eight 155mm howitzers with their prime
movers later at Toktong Pass, ran out of diesel fuel, and were abandoned on the withdrawal from that point 4
December, and later destroyed via air strikes.
Indeed, those units--and in fact the worth of the Marine 11th Regiment artillery--was
called into question by the Marine priority system used west of the reservoir by some Marines themselves.
The 3/5 battalion commander took issue over the neglect of the 11th Regiment artillery to cover and supply
cover support to his 3/5 battalion. "Every time he called for artillery the priority was elsewhere." 
This indicated that artillery was oriented someplace else. If one eliminates support for F/7 and 3/5,
it just adds more confusion over that so-called Joint Command at Yudam-ni. Lt. Col. Carl Youngdale, equal in
rank to Murray, indicated that the 7th Marines had "priority status". Very little notoriety is given to the
11th Marine Regiment. There was a failure to acknowledge that there were three regiments instead of only the
two infantry ones.
Furthermore, it is not pointed out that three regimental commanders were maneuvering for
leadership and no one commander had exclusive authority over the other one. That asinine "senior officer"
status in Marineland was not an issue in the Army ranks. The man assigned command was in command
‘period.' Colonel MacLean commanded the entire 31st RCT with attached units of the 32nd. Yet MG Smith failed
to act in this case to appoint either one of those three commanders as top dog in command at Yudam-ni. To
hell with the concept of "senior status." It didn't work for Drysdale's command authority, and Colonel
Litzenberg had scrapped that concept with his acceptance of that "joint command." He was the senior
officer--the only full colonel on the scene.
The only artillery unit out of the brawl was How Battery at Hagaru, directly supporting
Fox Company. Since all artillery 11th Marine units were in position to cover Fox Company as well from
Yudam-ni, why weren't those guns used? This question would be entirely none of my business if the Marines on
the west side had not been so critical of our operations on the east side.
Mission change for Lieutenant Colonel Faith--Order to Withdraw
The strange part of this entire campaign was the attempt to praise ALL officers with
credit over disobedience of their orders. This was not only an excepted practice, most officers were
involved and all others were invited to join the club. Ironically, this extended to Task Force Faith--the
insistence that he left his assigned area without proper authorization. The strange part is that the charges
were by some of those very Army officers within his own command.
A) Ebb & Flow, page 132: Smith sent withdrawal instructions to Task Force Faith
at 1100 on the 1st. By that time Smith had dropped all plans for sending a rescue force to Faith, whose
forces had taken strong assaults around their lakeshore perimeter during the night of the 30th. Although
they had defeated these attacks, it was doubtful they could withstand more.
The Navy history verifies this as well, as "On the morning of 1 December, therefore, the
Army troops were ordered to break out to the southward at the earliest possible time, and were advised
that while no troop assistance could be given, owing to the situation at Hagaru, maximum air support would
be provided." (Chapter 9, Part 2)
B) Fact in contradiction: Appleman's book, East of Chosin (p.196) and Escaping
the Trap, (p.134) via those officers named as present on morning at 011100, December 1950. Lt. Col.
Faith stated that he was ordering the withdrawal on his own intuitive. The source for the confusion of Lt.
Col. Faith over his order to withdraw on his own is based in Marine history via a footnote on page 243 of
Volume III, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. [RED FLAG] Based on the research by K. Jack Baur, PhD,
the footnote 20 reads as follows: "The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise
noted, are: Statement by Capt. Edward P. Stamford , n. d, 2-15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n.d;"
(Captain Stamford reported at that meeting 12/1/50 Faith's decision to break out.)
C) Fact in contradiction - Rebuttal: No order reached Faith until 011500 December when
the force was in the clear on the way back to Hudong-ni. All communications, other than through Captain
Stamford who was the Marine TACP controller, were out to any and all sources between Faith and Hagaru.
However, there were communications to Faith through that TACP link shortly before Faith announced his
decision. This dispute proves one vital fact: There were relay communication links to Faith.
D) Fact in contradiction to rebuttal - 14 Apr 1953 Eleventh endorsement on MajGen O.P.
Smith's letter, serial number 9532 of 3 Mar 1952 Section 6: "b. On 30 November Task Force Faith was
advised by the 1st Marine Division that it was now attached to the 1st Marine Division, that it should
make every effort to improve its situation by working toward Hagaru-ri,.... Shortly after acknowledgment
of this order radio communication went out."
We have many more conflict of statements. Remaining with this issue, there was a
related withdrawal order to Faith--although disputed by some Army officers within Faith's own command--that
our withdrawal order was on Faith's own initiative. My opinion is that he would never do that, but he would
have been justified if he had done it. While Marine History does not record any communication to Faith from
the 1st Marine Division, there is one recorded that happened in the afternoon on 011500 December while "in
the clear." But memory of past events fade with time. As exaggerated in the old joke about how far one's
parents had to walk to school in the snow, the mileage and depth increases as the years pass from that
timeline. Likewise, to forget details under pressure in any event is easy without some direct fixation
connecting that event. Non-events are discounted. Faith is not here to tell his side of the story, so
all he may have said is hearsay. To state that this was his direct decision would not have been necessary,
especially in light of those same officers around him urging him to do it. It implies wishful
influence on one's own suggestion and input. Plugging in the information that MG Smith stated was issued on
the 30th, makes "by working toward Hagaru-ri" a standing order. But we do have three reports of
communication links to Faith's command--the one on 30 November, and two other radio links between
010900-011300 December. It is recorded that the one sent on the 30th was "acknowledged" as well.
To state that all communications links were totally cut off is not an accurate statement.
The TACP connection was an active two way channel between nine o'clock and shortly before dark when our
controller destroyed his radio link to the supporting overhead planes. The 1st Marine Division had an
air-to-ground control station dispatcher at Hagaru. That dispatcher could easily monitor the open channel at
anytime to communicate or relay with our forward controller. As stated and never denied, the Hagaru
dispatcher knew what Marine radio equipment our forward air-to-ground controller had, and therefore knew his
frequency as well as his call sign. What was also never denied is the oddity that our TACP controller did
not ask for or request that dispatcher's frequency. That was his one single function above all others--his
main field of expertise.
There was the prime importance and advantage of having that TACP controller from the
Marine Corps rather than one from the 5th Air Force TACP group. One from this latter group was assigned to
the 3/31st Infantry, but he had become a KIA casualty earlier. However, this does not seem to be the
link we had to work with on the breakout date. That morning had heavy cloud cover and fog overcast. The
air-to-ground connection was not to the 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW), which was already heavily engaged in
covering the Marine withdrawal that very same morning starting on the west side of Chosin. Those Marine
pilots were not monitoring Stamford's frequency. They were locked in on the activity at Yudam-ni.
The evidence suggests that the Marine dispatcher assigned our air to ground cover to the
aircraft carrier group Task Force 77. That Marine dispatcher at Hagaru-ri had to also divert whatever air
drops of supplies that were destined for us. Our supplies were diverted hours earlier to the Marine side of
the reservoir. Those supplies were dropped early morning with sorties over Yudam-ni commencing at 010800
December. The air-to-ground defense at Yudam-ni also was under way at this time. 
E) Fact in contradiction as to Marine air priority: As outlined in Appleman's
Escaping the Trap , General Smith had promised General Barr that full air support would be provided.
Because the danger to the 3/5 Marine Battalion was so great to protect the realignment of forces, it
required air support early morning of 1 December at Yudam-ni. That same morning, eight Corsairs supported
"F" Company to Rocky Ridge, while C-119 Flying Boxcars dropped supplies in that Fox Company area. Task Force
Faith received NO air drops. My point in stating this is that Marine Fox Company remained stationary while
Faith was on his move to a breakout. Also at 020200 December, the Marine forward air controller requested
two night fighters around "F" Company. Three additional ones were provided, making a total of five.
 It appears that none of those night fighters had been requested by our TACP controller. A significant
point can be found in this latter action with regards to the CCF timeline (020200) within their mopping up
mode of operations, thereby completing the Task Force Faith total convoy disaster on the east side of the
Our air connection was switched to the aircraft carrier group from the Sea of Japan,
whereas the air-to-ground support for the Marines originated from Yonpo air strip and the Badoeng Strait. It
is a logical concept that a shift of our air-to-ground units to the Navy also shifted the burden of control
to the Naval TACP dispatcher aboard ships. However, those flights were "weathered out" and the Marine Air
Wing was required to supply that action anyway, after the loss of five hours and any needed air supplies
packaged for Faith and his forces. Those ammo supplies directed towards Faith were consequently diverted
during the time delay from Task Force Faith to the Marine side of the reservoir.
But this point, recorded by Appleman, cannot be overlooked. Air-to-ground support
for the west side of the reservoir at Yudam-ni had already commenced and been in continuous operation since
eight o'clock for all Marine forces on their side of the reservoir. Why and where was that so-called
"priority" air-to-ground support that is recorded to have been provided for us? Between eight and one
o'clock, a full five hours of vital daylight time was lost, and during that timeline there was no air drop
of precious supplies and ammo because they were being dropped elsewhere across the reservoir. Who diverted
those exclusive flights to that side of the reservoir? As reported, our controller had contact with an
overhead naval carrier air pilot at nine o'clock. His channel was open and could well be monitored by any
one of those planes from MAW. But as recorded, they apparently were not on line to Captain Stamford's
frequency, our coverage being transferred to the Navy carrier squadrons.
There is a connecting link. Appleman reports in East of Chosin and
Escaping the Trap that on 1 December, a lone plane from the USS Leyte made contact with Captain Stamford
and said that he would return with a flight of planes to cover ground defensive cover if the weather
cleared.  This Task Force 77 was restricted at the time by Fifth Air Force to reconnaissance and
interdiction missions only. The problem within this version is verified via Navy recorded history as
Mission Change - Land to Sea
History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
Chapter 9: Retreat to the South
[Part 1:] On 1 December the weather over eastern Korea was very bad. Morning flights
from the carriers met a solid overcast over the plateau and were diverted to the EUSAK area, where three
missions totaling 23 aircraft found satisfactory control, successfully attacked large concentrations of
enemy troops and abandoned friendly equipment, and blew an ammunition dump at Sinanju. But the weather
which had altered their employment also prevented their return to base, for the task force had been
obliged to cease flight operations late in the morning. Unable to get home, the aircraft landed at Wonsan,
were kicked out again owing to rumors of a deteriorating ground situation in the neighborhood, and finally
spent the night at Kimpo.
[Part 2:] "On the 30th, following General Harris' first request for carrier air, Task
Force 77 had sent 39 sorties to the reservoir, of which 14 struck at Chinese troops surrounding the
isolated Army units while 25 attacked the enemy in the hills about Hagaru. By bad luck, however, [RED
FLAG] the next day brought bad weather both at the reservoir and in the Sea of Japan. Although aircraft
from Badoeng Strait and Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy, the early
flights from Task Force 77 were weathered out of the reservoir, and in late morning the force was obliged
to cancel operations. At midday, the Army troops began their southward movement with 20 fighters overhead,
but in the course of the afternoon a combination of heavy attacks and enemy roadblocks fragmented the
column, most officers and key NCOs became casualties, and as darkness fell the force dissolved. It had
almost made it in: the disintegration took place only four and a half miles from Hagaru; but although a
number of stragglers were brought in across the frozen reservoir, total casualties reached almost 75
Note the phrase, "Marine shore-based squadrons got through to napalm the Chinese enemy."
No soldier of Task Force Faith needs any renewed remainder of our own fateful napalm event. One part of a
friendly mission misdirected. It was an honest error, but nevertheless the napalm was dropped short on
the leading force of our task force. It is a friendly fire mistake that is burned into the memory of
each surviving task force member for the rest of our lives. However, that error was not by the Navy
fighters. Its timeline placed the Marine air cover at 011300 hours. Again, a central mystery. Why did
we have to wait for MAW cover?
As mentioned above, the fear of the weather staying overcast denied us the benefit of any
air drops of much-needed food, medical, and ammo supplies--not only for what we expended during the night
just ending, but for the road trip which remained directly ahead. That air-to-ground cover eventually had to
be supplied anyway from the MAW. But those ammo supply planes had already dropped their supplies and left
the area. That ammo was our life saving ingredient to fight our way back to Hagaru-ri. Without it, any
breakout plan--whether there was one or not--would justly be criticized for what it really was--an effort in
futility. It was a disaster waiting to happen from Day One. Planning on day eight--our fourth day of
entrapment--could not possibly correct all of the roadblocks and obstacles put in place by Marine friendly
forces eight miles behind us. In reality, due to that Marine delay in air cover, we traded daylight for
moonlight. That was not a fair or beneficial exchange for Task Force Faith. The moonlight only
highlighted our positions. We were silhouettes in the moonlight, walking in the snowy white backdrop
of the Chosin Reservoir.
Statement: "Close support requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were
to be reported to the Fifth Air Force."  On 28 November, the forces available to General Harris
consisted of MAG 12 with two fighter and one night fighter squadrons at Wonsan, MAG 33 with one fighter and
one night fighter squadron at Yonpo, and a fighter squadron in Badoeng Strait.  FAFIK on 1 December cut
existing red tape, gave General Harris autonomy in the conduct of air operations in support of X Corps, and
instructed him to proceed without reference to Fifth Air Force except when reinforcements were
needed. The first days of December saw a steady shift of the fast carrier effort toward complete
concentration in the X Corps zone. (That exception rule was not followed. Instead, it was passed on
directly to the Navy, thus bypassing that Fifth Air Force notification order.)
Fact in contradiction: 1st MAW failed to inform Fifth Air Force it needed help, as
required. Up on the plateau, following the attacks of the 27th and 28th, comparative quiet reigned.
But the enemy controlled the roads. Marine and Army units had been separated into a series of isolated
perimeters. In this situation, Marine air commander General Harris had strongly recommended to ComNavFE a
sustained effort by the fast carriers in the X Corps zone, and had stated that Fifth Air Force concurred in
this proposal. But an evening dispatch from FAFIK on the 29th indicated that such concurrence applied only
to that day's operations. In view of the "critical condition" in the EUSAK area, it asked for a
divided effort for the next few days. 
United States Air Force - A slight mission change
"During the time that the 7th Marines was heavily engaged in combat with the CCF 124th
Division, a controversy between General Almond and General Partridge over the control of the 1st Marine Air
Wing came to a head. Under existing procedure, the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center at Seoul
controlled the assignment of missions to the 1st Marine Air Wing. General Almond felt that during a period
of active ground combat when the local ground tactical situation could change drastically within an hour or
two, he, the local commander, should have complete command over the air units supporting the ground troops.
On 4 November, General Partridge flew to Wonsan to hold a conference with General Almond on the subject.
General Almond won his point. The Fifth Air Force ordered the 1st Marine Air Wing to assume direct
responsibility for close support of X Corps without reference to the Joint Operations Center. Close support
requests beyond the capabilities of the 1st Marine Air Wing were to be reported to the Fifth Air Force."
 Without reference to the Joint Operations Center would place any close support under the Marine air
operations center at Hagaru. By not intervening in the Marine monopoly here, Almond had placed more
faith in the Marine Corps (to equate air support) than General Smith ever had in him. That was a huge
mistake on Almond's part, and his Army forces paid with their blood in that time lost.
While highest praise was given to the 1st MAW, the confusion caused by MG Harris'
involvement doomed the MAW's independent actions. On 1 January 1951, the Fifth Air Force reclaimed their
original operational control over the 1st MAW. Whether the Marine Corps liked it or not (and understandably,
they did not), their air-to-ground control was returned to the authorization of the Fifth Air Force. The
Department of the Air Force's "priority" authority was abused and misused, therefore it was recalled.
General Smith tried in vain to recover at least one squadron in South Korea. When he appealed to General
Ridgway, he learned Lesson 101 in the military chain of command. General Ridgway merely replied, "Sorry...I
don't command Fifth Air Force." Case closed. Like Smith, he never commanded the MAW.
What was Smith's "new" plan for compliance with Almond's order to assist Task Force Faith
on his withdrawal? Was it (as all evidence suggests) redundantly delayed or simply ignored? That question
remains without a firm answer. Yudam-ni Marines did not return to Hagaru until 3-4 December. The General
Barr reference, "both general's agree..," has no place in this. Barr was either in a Joint Command
with Smith, or he was merely an observer at Almond's conference involving his own concern, over his
If General Barr was in Joint Command, then he could have delegated his authority to his
ADC Hodes and nothing would had changed, except it would have countermanded Almond's total operational
control to Smith. MG Barr merely recalled BG Hodes from Chosin to avoid any conflict of interest between
Hodes and Smith. So we have another Catch 22 (irrational decision) here. If MG Barr is blamed for the
withdrawal of the tank command, he had to share joint command with MG Smith to do that. Each man was
equal in rank because of different chain of commands. Again, this is a moot point. No indication was
given to Barr regarding that "Joint Command" authority. Without it, Smith did not need Barr's
agreement--or disagreement--one way or the other.
One of the strange and unsolved mysteries in all of this is whether or not General Smith
accepted General Almond's directive that he was in full charge of all forces in the frozen Chosin
area. The reality seems to be that he did not accept full command of all three battalions east of the
reservoir, since there are no clear (only controversial) records to support that he issued any orders
directly concerning our force there.  Nor have any reports connected directly to the Army units
benefiting or "contributing" to his own Marine divisions security directly or indirectly--totally
disregarding the use of our tank connection. Indeed, much to the contrary, MG Smith disputed this over the
PUC Award for the remainder of his life. 
While reports seem to be manipulated to imply that Smith issued a "withdrawal order" to
Task Force Faith, and granted a "priority order" to use "his own" air cover, these two things are lacking in
any detail within Marine Corps recorded history. But that acceptance or non-acceptance of a Marine
commitment for this Marine commander to command an Army force directly overlapped and bound the Department
of the Navy--the Mama & Papa of the Marine Corps--in my opinion just as surely as if those Army forces were
aboard any Navy ship at sea. However, the controversy over MG Smith's apparent withdrawal order to Faith is
of importance here to lock in that question, added to his constant interference between the Department of
the Navy and the Navy's own acquiescence to Smith's position after his death (1977). Merely to now
continuously maintain their own 22-year denial of the PUC award is a relevant issue.
Below are the numbers (per day) recorded in history over the "commitment" Task Force Faith
made to the Changjin (Chosin) Campaign. It is for each reader to judge for him or herself whether that
commitment we made on the east side of the reservoir was or is worth any honorable mention of any kind to
Task Force MacLean-Faith or those men being eligible to qualify for any type of an award. As the Marine
public relations officer stated with regards to Lt. Colonel Don Faith receiving the Medal of Honor, Faith
received it for simply "doing his duty, and not very well at that."  Thus, you the reader of this
research may calculate the situation from these new facts and decide for yourself whether or not there is
justification for these men to receive recognition for their role in the Chosin Reservoir campaign. I
hold fast to the personal knowledge that we did the best we could with what we had to work with.
In closing this research, let me restate one thing that I have repeated several times
within these pages. The group listed in the Days One through Nine made no claim to any fame at Chosin.
Nor did we receive any for being there. That may be unjust, but that is nevertheless the reality. But that
reality stretched farther than it should have. For example, why the innuendos and degradation over our task
force integrity? Where did it originate from and why is it included within such a tragic and fateful event
It certainly did not come from the CCF enemy, for they honor our captured regimental
standard in their capital museum as a military trophy. If not from the enemy and not from the Army
survivors of the Chosin campaign, the answer must originate from the Marines. Then one must consider
what was their purpose in shifting blame to someone else. I view it as their own guilt trip, not ours.
We Army veterans do not need to justify the demise of our truck convoy of wounded due to our tank removal
‘contribution" to the Marine withdrawal. Instead, the Marine Corps should step forward and justify why those
tanks were truly needed at Hagaru-ri and admit who truly bears the larger part of the responsibility,
particularly considering the circumstances created by General Smith in his own failure to locate his
replaced 5th Marine Regiment at Hagaru-ri instead of at Yudam-ni. Why did he fail to relocate this loose
regiment at his weakest point at Chosin?
Also, I pose two other speculative questions to consider, given the years of established
publicity on the Marine Division being the sole force at Chosin. Consider these scenarios. (1) What if
the 7th Division had delayed their relocation by 24 hours? (2) What if the 5th Marines had not been replaced
by that delay? The Marine code is that they take care of their own. What a difference a day would make
in additional air support to them on the east side of the reservoir.
For another reference to a "Phantom Force," see: http://31rct.tripod.com/phantomforce.html. There
is a list of 844 Army KIAs casualties by date. The list is from the American National Battle Monument
Commission. (The Marine total is 556 KIAs, per Navy History.) See the internet source below:
Navy History www.history.navy.mil/books/field/ch9a.htm#top
(Review Chapters 8 & 9.)
Casualties due to the tank withdrawal:
Day Seven - 11/30/50 - 82
Day Eight - 12/1/50 - 114
Day Nine - 12/2/50 - 333. This was the final night of the Task Force battle, resulting in the
destruction of the column of wounded and final demise of the task force.
Unaccounted for and officially added for closure:
Day Ten - 12/3/50 - 58
Day Eleven - 12/4/50 - 9
Day Twelve - 12/5/50 - 4
Day Thirteen - 12/6/50 - 119*
Total = 844 KIAs (See KIA East of Chosin page located on the index of links in this
*Of special note above regarding those KIAs or MIAs on December 3-6, 1950: Of these 119
men, 111 of them were exclusively from the 57th Field Artillery Battalion. The dates were chosen only for
some closure. It can be justifiably assumed that those men were casualties at that final roadblock
at Hudong-ni on December 1 and 2. The 57th Field Artillery (my outfit) was officially disbanded, pending a
reorganization, after that date. Of this group, 98% percent were from Task Force MacLean-Faith's forces.
The rest were located around Hagaru-ri.
The force east of Chosin paid a tremendous price in lives lost for being there. Therefore,
we will not yield that page in military history to anyone who wishes to capitalize upon our action or
continuously seek to claim it as their own. I believe in a quote attributed to Five Star Admiral William
"Bull" Halsey which said, "There are no extraordinary men...just extraordinary circumstances that ordinary
men are forced to deal with." Lieutenant Colonel Faith was forced to deal with his own
extraordinary circumstances east of Chosin, and he played out the hand that fate had dealt to him as best he
could. In the end, he gave his own life in that endeavor. What more could the Marine public relations
officer who degraded Faith's Medal of Honor expect of him?
Remember also that the lowest ranking line soldier or Marine had no idea whatsoever what
his immediate higher command authority was doing behind the front lines. Hopefully, this research may shed
some light on the action behind that higher echelon activity and that it may bring some small sense of
closure over this forgotten Army battle east of Chosin, especially to those related to thee men who lost
their lives there. That tragic event cannot be undone. The dead cannot be restored--only their remains
can be reclaimed. History must be revisited with this in mind and a fresh look at past written history to
finally unravel those mysteries that remain. Remember, too, I did not create all the reported discrepancies
in past histories. I have merely highlighted them in my research.
To all those men assembled at Chosin, regardless of their service branch, I salute you for
your personal service, sacrifice, and hardship in that Frozen Chosin campaign.
Units listed in the Army 9th Endorsement (See Changjin Journal 05.06.00):
- 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (Chinhung-ni with Task Force Dog which relieved the 1/1
Marines at that location) - did not receive PUC
- Company D, 10th Engineer Combat Battalion (Hagaru-ri) - received PUC 1953
- Companies B and C, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion - Company C attached to RCT 31
received PUC 1999; Company B did not receive PUC
- Battery D, 15th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (East of Chosin with
57th FA Bn part of RCT 31) - received PUC 1999
- 31st Infantry Regiment (less Company E and 1st Battalion, except Company B. This
was the base unit of RCT 31 east of Chosin and Koto-ri - All units ( except 1/31 less B, and E2/31)
received PUC either in 1993 or 1999
- 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry (east of Chosin with RCT 31) - received PUC 1999
- Battery A, 50th Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Chinhung-ni
attached to 1/1 Marines) - did not receive PUC
- Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 52d Transportation Truck Battalion (Chinhung-ni
Task Force Dog) - did not receive PUC
- 57th Field Artillery Battalion (east of Chosin with RCT 31) - received PUC 1999
- 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company (element at Koto-ri carried air dropped bridge
components to blown bridge site in Funchilin Pass) - did not receive PUC
- Company A, 73d Engineer Combat Battalion (Chinghung-ni with Task Force Dog) - did not
- 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Chinhung-ni with Task Force Dog; fired in
support of 1/1 Marines) - did not receive PUC
- 185th Engineer Combat Battalion (less Company A - Koto-ri) - received PUC 1953
- 2d Platoon, 512th Engineer Dump Truck Company (Koto-ri) - did not receive PUC
 Appleman, East of Chosin & Escaping the Trap, stated this order was not effect until
0800, next morning.
 See Hammel, Chosin pages, 211-212. Here there is a report that this mission for Mupyong-ni
was reinstated by (suggestion) of X Corps to the 1st Marine Division.
 Appleman, East of Chosin, p. 322.
 See Ebb & Flow, page 29, Chart 2 - Organization of UNC Ground Forces in Korea 23 November
 X Corps 01 19, 29 Nov 50, page 238, Marine G-3
 Captain George A. Rasula, Assistant S-3, 3/31st Battalion, source, enclosure, National Archives
 General Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story, page 138
 Per Marine history, on the evening of the 30th at Hagaru-ri, "The enemy had shot his bolt." There
were no more threatening attacks against Hagari-ri after this night.
 History of United States Naval Operations: Korea by James A. Field, Jr., Chapter 9, Part 2
 Captain Robert Drake, Enclosure 8, National Archives
 An artillery battalion was rich in communications equipment and expertise, in both radio & wire
 Chosin, Eric Hammel, page 143
 Note 8, page 131, Msg, CG 1st Marine Div to COs 5th and 7th Marines, 1920, 30 Nov 50
 War in Korea, 1951, p.188
 East of Chosin, page 340
 Marine History, page 238
 Nov 30 - "During the afternoon we started our withdrawal, blowing the ammunition dump and burning
the ration dump." Archives, Capt. Rasula
 See Roe, The Dragon Strikes, p.358
 The report that the withdrawal order from Smith was received 011500 Dec. via a forward observer's
jeep indicates that the means was there to call in accurate fire mission from that observer.
Artillery liaison planes were flying over head as well. Col. Anderson, archive report
 Other authors' interpret Almond's order to "gain contact" with Task Force Faith by one regiment
withdrawing from Yudam-ni for that purpose. However, Smith's order in that withdrawal from Yudam-ni was
for those two regiments to "Expedite... movement RCT-5 and RCT-7 to Hagaru prepared for further withdrawal
south." (See footnote 12.) But our task force was northeast. Thus, Smith had no intention of sending
any force eastward at the time he issued this order.
 Russ, Breakout, p.306. LTC Taplett, commander of 3rd Battalion 5th Marines.
 This is covered in detail in Appleman's book, Escaping the Trap.
 Appleman, Escaping the Trap, pages 217, 223, and 232. First, we needed that ammo. Our
breakout was delayed from 1100 to 1300 hours for air to ground support on our side of the reservoir.
Action on the west side was already under way. This disputes the "priority status" promised by General
Smith for Task Force Faith.
 See Appleman, Escaping the Trap, p.223
 USS Leyte (CV 32) facts, history, Leyte. After two weeks of preparation, departed 6
September 1950 to join TF 77 in the Far East to support United Nations Forces in Korea. Leyte arrived
Sasebo, Japan, 8 October 1950 and made final preparations for combat operations. From 9 October through 19
January 1951, the ship and her aircraft spent 92 days at sea and flew 3,933 sorties against the North
 Appleman: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 744, June-November 1950
 US Navy History, Chapter 9, Part 2
 Ibid, US Navy History
 Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, page 744
 He did, however, supersede his authority by "attaching" B/31 to Drysdale's Task Force, a point he
denied in the PUC Award by rejecting them, saying that they "attached themselves to this force."
 Captain Capraro's statement per Martin Russ, Breakout, page 334, on another Marine officer
being more worthy of that award.