Martin O’Brien, Augusta, ME – October 12, 1999

We have heard from Colonels Dave Hughes, Bud Biteman and Carl Bernard, all three American heroes. Col. Carl presents a very professional, forceful, retrospective look at how things were, should have been and must be in future military operations – and why the lessons of the past must be heeded. He should be listened to today in the highest circles.

In my opinion, the blame for the lack of training, equipment, manning and leadership in our post-World War II Army must fall squarely on the Truman Administration and the senior officer corps of the Army.

But Colonels Dave and Bud more directly address the conflicting problem we are having today to sort out the muddled story of what really happened at No-Gun-ri, and to make sure that the media doesn’t get carried away in their journalistic zeal to intentionally or unintentionally slander the entire Korean War veteran community.

The investigation by the Pentagon will proceed and hopefully in a short period of time we’ll get an accurate portrayal of the circumstances surrounding the occurrence.

The troops in Korea in the 1950s did an adequate—perhaps not the best—but an adequate job under very difficult circumstances. If the refugees had overwhelmed Taegu and the Pusan Perimeter that summer, our Army would really have been disgraced—for then we would have had to evacuate Korea. If there, in fact, was a "military imperative" to prevent that from happening, then the upper tier brass may have been justified in issuing the orders that indeed were issued.

Let’s wait for the investigation to take its course before we make final judgments. We don’t know all the facts. In the meantime, we need to do everything in our power to defend the honor and reputation of the vast majority of our troops in the field in the early days of 1950 in Korea.

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