COMBAT ACTIONS IN THE
The 2nd
Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division
By
I read with
great interest Frank Harris’s diary entries on the battle of Yong Dong. As S-3 of the 2nd Battalion, 8th
Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, I was intimately involved in
that operation. Accordingly, I am able
to recount the course of events from our deployment in Japan, to the F and H
Companies’ return to friendly lines south of Yong dong and on to the Naktong
line. Perhaps this will provide a broader view of those events. I hope my memory serves me well. It has been fifty years since those difficult
times. Readers who wish to provide
corrections or additions are most welcome.
In July of 1950, the
Division was alerted to move to
Major Gerald Robbins, the 2nd
Battalion’s Executive Officer, was responsible for moving the Battalion to the
east-coast Korean town of Pohang Dong, and then by rail to Yong Dong. Yong Dong was a communication center south of
the position of the 24th Division, which was being overwhelmed by a
superior North Korean force. Lt. Colonel
Eugene Field, the Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, and I
were to fly to
Fortunately, the landing on July 18th
was unopposed. Col. Field and I met the
Battalion on the beach at
The mission of the Regiment was to
establish a blocking position to cover the withdrawal of the 24th
Division on the two roads leading into Yong Dong—one from the north and the
other from the west. The 1st
Battalion was to block on the north road and 2nd Battalion was to
block on the west road.
The gap between the blocking positions was
approximately five miles. These were
untenable dispositions since the Battalions could not provide mutual
support. Historical records indicate
that General Gay, the Division Commanding General, objected to that plan, but,
to no avail. He was ordered by the 8th
Army to deploy the Regiment as directed.
I can only assume that General Gay objected to having to split the
Regiment in this fashion. The Regiment
had no reserve as the so-called "Johnson Cuts" in defense appropriations left
all regiments short one battalion. That
Johnson, Louis A. and not Lyndon, was Secretary of the Army under President
Truman.
The 8th Army provided trucks,
and the Battalion arrived in Yong Dong the night of our first day in
The photographic tribute of Frank Curtin at
Fort Hood in your recent newsletter brought back fond memories of that fellow
officer. Frank was among the first
casualties of the 1st Cavalry Division in the Korean War. At the time of his death, I was with the
Battalion artillery liaison officer at his Observation Post. We were directing artillery fire on the NPKA,
which was attacking through the gap between our battalions. I saw, in the valley behind the operations
point, Frank’s jeep back up over a land mine.
My last memory of him was of his torso blown above the destroyed
jeep.
That day, July 19, ended in multiple
disasters. Line communications were out,
the wire having been cut by the enemy.
An NKPA roadblock was established to our rear. Our Battalion CO, LtCol. Field, was seriously
wounded. Despite this, he broke through
the NKPA roadblock in order to get to the Regimental command post and appraise
the Regimental Commander, Colonel Palmer, of our dire situation and the
imminence of being cut off.
Earlier that day several staff members of
Major General Dean’s 24th Division came through our command post
inquiring if we had seen the General.
(As you may recall, General Dean was the highest-ranking officer
captured during the war.) By then, the
major NPKA force was rapidly moving south, having completely overrun General
Dean’s division.
Maj. Robbins, now the Battalion Commander
in place of LtColonel Field, was instructed by radio to get back to friendly
lines as best he could. The Regiment
could no longer provide any support or reinforcement.
Late that afternoon, Maj. Robbins met with
the Company commanders and Battalion staff to outline his plan to break the
roadblock. As I recall it, the plan was
as follows: Major Robbins, with
two-thirds of the Battalion, would attack along the axis of the road leading to
Yong Dong. At the same time, F and H
Companies and a light tank platoon would envelope the left flank of the
roadblock, thereby providing support to Major Robbins’ forces. I would accompany the enveloping force
commanded by Captain Terry Field, the former F Company commander and now
Battalion Executive Officer replacing Major Robbins.
We attacked at daylight on July 20th. Major Robbins’ force attacked and broke
through the roadblock, and then assembled south of Yong Dong. Each time the enveloping force, led by
Captain Field, attempted to attack to the east, it encountered stiff resistance. Seven of our M-24 tanks became bogged down in
rice paddy mud; four others reached the road and drove on to Yong Dong. The NKPA was to our front and rear. We were devoid of artillery support, routes
of communication and evacuation.
Moreover, we were sustaining casualties, including stretcher cases and
walking wounded. At the end of that day,
Captain Field, Captain Hal Maness, the commander of H Company, and I met to
determine how to exploit the enemies’ left flank, avoid sustained combat and
return to friendly lines as an intact unit.
On the second day, July 21, an artillery observation plane spotted our
column. The pilot dropped messages that
guided us to friendly lines. On the
third day, July 22, we joined our Battalion south of Yong Dong.
Following a very brief rest, the Battalion,
along with the rest of the Regiment, fought a delaying action on several
successive positions south of the Naktong River to the Pusan Perimeter. It was during these delaying actions, I
believe in Hwangang that Lieutenant Matta, Captain Field’s replacement as
commander of F Company, was killed. He
was a friend and a fine and courageous soldier.
There was an inadequate flow of
replacements. Hastily-trained South
Korean soldiers joined our Companies to fill some of the squad and platoon
vacancies. In addition, a provisional
Battalion was formed, which was composed of rear area personnel.
It was here, at the Naktong Perimeter, that
General Walker, the 8th Army commander, issued his famous "Stand or
Die" order. Our Battalion was on the
west of the main north-south road leading to Taegu, about seven miles south of
our position. That area became known as
the "bowling alley" and, despite General Walker’s order, we were overrun and
forced to give ground.
I was ambushed by an enemy patrol on that
road, during which Sgt. John Burt, my Battalion operations sergeant, was
killed. A couple of days later, I took a
volunteer patrol and recovered his body.
That patrol included PFC Harry Mendoza, the S-3 clerk who took over for
Sergeant Burt. Only 18 years of age, PFC
Mendoza readily assumed his new responsibility and did an outstanding job. (I recently assisted Harry Mendoza in being
awarded a much-deserved, and delayed, Bronze Star Medal for his effort.
It was also in the bowling alley that our
Regiment’s 3rd Battalion, fresh from the States, went into position
on our right flank. Lt. Colonel Harold
Johnson, a survivor of the Baatan Death March, commanded the Battalion. He was later to become the Army Chief of
Staff under President Johnson. However,
the 3rd Battalion’s actions on our right flank are the subject of
another narrative.
My last day with the Battalion was on Sept.
15, the day of the Inchon Landing.
I was hit on Hill 570 directing an E Company attack to secure the final
portion of the Ridge 570. This was the 2nd
Battalion’s sixtieth day of heavy combat.
It had sustained many casualties.
During the battle for Yong Dong, two Battalion commanders, CO Field and
Major Robbins, a Battalion executive officer, Captain Field, the S-3 (myself)
and the transportation officer. Lt. Carl Millar, were wounded. And, Lieutenant Woodruff, the Battalion’s
S-2, was killed. This attests to the
intensity of the combat. The records
similarly reflect heavy casualties sustained by the soldiers in the entire
Battalion.
By April of 1951, I was recovered from my
wounds and fit for duty. I rejoined the
Regiment, this time as Regimental S-3. I
served the remainder of my tour with the newly promoted Regimental Commander,
Colonel Field, who had recovered from his wounds.
Concerning the Nogun-ri press exploitation
I will categorically state that at no time did the 2nd Battalion
receive any orders that would violate the Geneva Convention’s rules of land
warfare. Nor did any of the units in the
Battalion violate the provisions of the Geneva Convention in their treatment of
non-combatants. As I recall, our orders
were to allow no line crossing during hours of darkness. During daylight we were to search the
refugees for concealed weapons, and if none allow them to continue.
Most of my comrades are now gone: Ed
Breslin, Gene Field, Terry Field, Carl Millar, and Gerry Robbins. I was pleased to hear that Hal Maness is
still holding on and I see Bill McClain’s name appear in Cavalry and POW
newsletters. I am in frequent contact
with Art Gerometta, one of the USMA’s Class of ’50 who was rushed to Korea
following his graduation. Because so
many of that class died in action, a policy was established to limit the number
of Academy graduates from the same class sent to combat.
As a note of interest, during WWII, I
served with the 3rd Battalion, 164th Infantry Regiment,
Americal Division in three Pacific campaigns.
Our attitude about the 1st Cavalry at that time, with some
resentment, was that it got great press coverage—almost equal to that of the
Marines! When I joined the 1st
Cavalry in 1949, I naturally, put those thoughts aside. However, it is very hard to divide one’s
loyalties between two combat divisions like the Americal and the 1st
Cavalry.
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