

U. S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33)
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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 101 Action Report for the period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 14 September 1952 to 20 October 1952 is herein submitted.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

(a) During the period of this report the U.S.S. KEARSARGE operated in company with the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 37), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 31), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) and with various heavy support and screening ships. The composition of carriers in the force varied from two (2) to four (4) carriers.

(b) During the subject period the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51, second revision, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

(c) The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations conflict with North Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

14 Sep: 0552 Underway from Yokosuka, Japan, for Operating Area in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 dispatch 080616Z of September 1952 and COMSEVENTHFLT dispatch 100136Z of September 1952.

15 Sep: Proceeding to operating area. 1315 Conducted AA "Uncle" firing exercise. 1512 Refueled U.S.S. KIDD (DD-661).

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PART II (Continued)

- 16 Sep: Conducted refresher air operations. 1622 Refueled USS KIDD (DD-661). 2322 Joined TF 77. OTC RADM H. E. RYAN, USN, CTF 77 and COMCAR DIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31).
- 17 Sep: Conducted Air Operations. 1844 Refueled U.S.S. HUBBARD (DD 748). 2140 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) departed the Task Force.
- 18 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0942 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.
- 19 Sep: Task Force replenished.
- 20 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1045 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force. 1852 Refueled U.S.S. WEDDERBURN (DD 684).
- 21 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1850 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship, relieved RADM H. E. RYAN, USN, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), as CTF 77. 1904 Refueled U.S.S. HOPEWELL (DD 681). 2030 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) departed the Task Force.
- 22 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1245 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force.
- 23 Sep: Task Force replenished. 0745 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force. 1757 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) departed Task Force.
- 24 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0500 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0830 General Mark CLARK, Commander, United Nations Forces Far East, VADM R. P. BRISCOE, COMNAVFLE, and VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter from the U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) for an official visit. 1253 the above visiting officers returned to U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) via helicopter. 1305 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 25 Sep: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0702 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force, 2000 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force.
- 26 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0525 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.
- 27 Sep: Conducted air operations. 0711 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force. 1008 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 28 Sep: Task Force replenished. 0559 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force. 1320 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Task Force. 1419 Conducted AA gunnery exercise. 2125 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force.

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PART II (Continued)

- 29 Sep: Conducted air operations.
- 30 Sep: Conducted air operations. 1515 LTJG J. W. SHOOK, 521443/1310, in F4U Bureau Number 81277, crashed in water near Songjin. Probable cause unknown, wingman reports no survivors. 1650 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.
- 1 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0825 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter from U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) for conference with CTF 77. 0940 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 0945 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 2 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1447 Conducted AA firing exercise.
- 3 Oct: Conducted Air operations.
- 4 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0930 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 37) joined Task Force. 1015 LT., E. F. JOHNSON, 305780/1305, USNR, in aircraft F4U, Bureau Number 80798, while on scheduled combat mission, was shot down by MIG aircraft near WONSAN, NORTH KOREA. Pilot presumed killed. 1945 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force.
- 5 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1110 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1404 VADM CLARK departed the ship via helicopter. 1747 AD Bureau Number 125712 crashed into water due to failure of catapult sling on take-off. Pilot and crew member recovered, uninjured. 1824 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 6 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1558 Conducted AA firing exercise.
- 7 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1101 F4U Bureau Number 96769, Ensign Lloyd F. TROUTMAN, 109355/1315, USNR, landed with wheels up due to mechanical failure of landing gear. No personnel injured. 1512 AD Bureau Number 123993, Lieutenant C. O. MURPHY, 419504/1315, USNR, crashed in water off WONSAN HARBOR, NORTH KOREA, due to engine failure. Pilot rescued uninjured.
- 8 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0901 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0935 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1041 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 1133 VADM CLARK returned on board. 1259 VADM CLARK departed via helicopter. 1545 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 9 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1010 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force.

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PART II (Continued)

- 10 Oct: Task Force replenished. 0645 U.S.S. HELENA (CA-75) joined Task Force. 1130 RADM W. G. SCHINDLER, CTG 77.1 and COMCARDIV 3, came on board via helicopter. 1340 RADM SCHINDLER departed via helicopter. 1539 Conducted AA firing exercise.
- 11 Oct: Morning air operations cancelled due to weather. Flew 8 sorties during afternoon. 0845 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.
- 12 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0704 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 0839 ADM A. W. RADFORD, CINCPACFLT, VADM R. P. BRISCOE, COMNAVFLE, VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, and RADM J. E. GINGRICH, CTF 95, came on board via helicopter on official visit. 1109 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) joined Task Force. 1130 RADM H. E. REGAN, COMCARDIV 1, came on board via helicopter. 1301 the above visiting officers departed via helicopter. 1339 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force.
- 13 Oct: Conducted air operations. 1115 U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) and U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) departed Task Force to replenish. 1404 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) joined Task Force. 1408 VADM J. J. CLARK, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter for conference. 1700 U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA 119) joined Task Force. 1825 U.S.S. IOWA (BB 61) departed Task Force. U.S.S. ESSEX (CV 9) joined Task Force.
- 14 Oct: Conducted air operations during morning. 0400 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37) departed Task Force to replenish. 0937 RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, COMCARDIV 1, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 0940 RADM R. F. HICKEY, COMCARDIV 5, departed this ship for the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) via helicopter. 1045 U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) departed Task Force to replenish. 1740 RADM HICKEY returned on board via helicopter. 2312 Rejoined Task Force 77. 2318 RADM HICKEY, in this ship assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77.
- 15 Oct: Conducted air operations.
- 16 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0940 AD Bureau Number 123962, pilot Commander B. T. SIMONDS, 100250, crashed while making deck launch. Pilot was not recovered. 1210 U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV 37) departed Task Force.
- 17 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0328 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) departed Task Force to replenish. 1010 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV 31) rejoined Task Force. 1145 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.
- 18 Oct: Task Force replenished. 1345 RADM H. E. REGAN COMCARDIV 1, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 1400 U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV 33) took departure from Task Force 77. proceeding to YOKOSUKA, JAPAN, with COMCARDIV 5 embarked.
- 19 Oct: Enroute to YOKOSUKA, JAPAN
- 20 Oct: Arrived YOKOSUKA, JAPAN for rest, recreation, and yard availability.

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

- (a) Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).
- (b) Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance.

The following ammunition was expended during transit periods and replenishment day firing exercises:

5"/38

Projectile

74 AAC
5 VT Frag.

Powder

74 Non Flashless
5 Non Flashless

3"/50

262 VT Frag.
36 VT Non Frag.

Non Flashless Powder
Non Flashless Powder

(c) Performance of Ship's Ordnance

(1) The ordnance casualties on the 5"/38 caliber battery were: (1) Failure of the train brake switch on mount 56. (2) Break down of the installation of the wires on the firing circuit on all port guns, the port battery has the original guns installed. These casualties are considered of a minor nature and were corrected by the ships force.

(2) Ordnance casualties incurred on the 3"/50 caliber battery were of a minor nature which usually consisted of; (1) Damaged shear pins in the loader mechanisms due to improper loading by personnel. (2) Damaged stud pins, slide bar and gate operating cam levers for the front gate, operating mechanisms due to the rear gate being out of adjustment. These mechanisms were repaired by the ship's force.

(3) Fire control equipment casualties incurred in the Mk 37 GFCS were of a minor nature.

a. The first casualty consisted of the failure of the stop pawl (NO. Z956-197014-3) in the fuze Setter Indicator Regulator MK 8 Mod 9. This is fourth casualty of this type on board this ship since commissioning.

b. The second casualty consisted of the failure of the dowel pins in the spiral gear (No. Z951-209854-3) in the Mk 1A Mod 13 computer. New dowels were installed but did not hold. A new shaft collar was manufactured, press fit and doweled to the Spiral gear. This apparently has corrected this casualty.

(4) Fire control equipment casualties incurred in the Mk 56 GFCS were of a major nature:

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PART III (continued)

a. The first casualty consisted of an open spiral connection in the elevation torque motor in the Gyroscope unit for director 32. Replacement has not been obtained, this director is out of commission.

b. The second casualty consisted of an open Zs pick off coil in the Gyroscope unit for director 33. Replacement has not been obtained, this director is out of commission.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship.

The ship sustained no battle damage.

(b) Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

(c) Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

(a) Performance.

(1) Personnel

Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of navy enlisted personnel was 2072 including marines. During the period of this report, thirteen (13) enlisted men were transferred and six (6) received.

(2) Legal

Legal assistance work for this period has consisted of drafting powers of attorney, special instruments, and various letters on subjects ranging from adoption to naturalization of aliens.

(3) Education

Despite the intensified schedule of operations necessitated by duty with TF-77, the personnel on board the KEARSARGE have demonstrated a keen interest in educational advancement, twenty one (21) GED tests have been administered on board since leaving Yokosuka. Twenty six (26) men have applied for USAFI correspondence courses while ninety eight (98) others have checked out educational manuals for self-study and improvement. Eighty (80) men have taken advantage of Navy Correspondence Courses in order to improve themselves professionally and better prepare for advancement in rating. A total of two hundred fifteen (215) counselling periods have been held in an effort to assist individuals to profitably plan their educational program.

The records of all enlisted personnel have been screened, one hundred forty seven (147) men with a GCT score of thirty five (35) or less have been enrolled in an elementary reading and arithmetic program. These one hundred forty seven (147) men are presently taking a series of USAFI Placement Tests so that they may be placed in the proper grade level.

(4) Divine Services

The religious program on board has been increased since reporting to the line. The schedule totals twenty six (26) Divine Services held each week. Three (3) Catholic Masses are said each Sunday; three (3) Protestant Divine Services, and a service for Latter Day Saints are also conducted each Sunday. Jewish services are conducted on Friday night, and the Jewish High Holidays were observed by special services for New Year and Yom Kippur. Daily Protestant Devotions are held. A daily Mass is said and a Rosary Service is conducted each evening for Catholic men. Protestant Bible class is held each Wednesday and Latter Day Saints class each Thursday.

(5) Welfare and Recreation

Motion pictures constituted the main form of recreation along with reading and small games. On the average twenty one (21) showings of movies per week are held. The library was extensively used, issuing on the average forty (40) books per day. Pocket books were circulated without accountability in great numbers. Sub-libraries in the various messes like the Wardroom, Warrant Officers Mess and Chief Petty Officers Mess furnished much reading matter on which statistics are not available. Daily press news and a bi-weekly ship's paper were published. Approximately three hundred twenty three (323) copies of magazines are distributed on board monthly. A small games tournament including chess, checkers, acey ducey, etc., is now in progress.

Disc jockey programs were instituted as soon as the facilities were completed, and for several weeks volunteers have conducted programs from 1130 to 1300 and from 1600 to 2030 each day. A program at 1900 of ship's news, operational, task force and world news has become very popular.

Arrangements were made to send one hundred ninety (190) officers, principally pilots, and up to forty (40) per cent of enlisted men to Rest and Recuperation Camps.

(6) Work has begun on a Cruise Book, which the ship expects to have ready for distribution and sale by the time the Far Eastern Cruise is completed.

(7) The hobby shop store was opened officially 1 October 1952. A large selection of model airplanes, ships and boats was displayed with the entire stock being sold within two weeks. Near the end of the period leather was made available and numerous belt, billfold and purse kits were purchased by the men. A work shop was opened and leather working tools were made available to be checked out. The present plan is to open the work shop daily from 1600 to 2100 and the store three nights a week from 1800 to 2100.

(b) Casualties.

See Part VI, paragraph (f) (6).

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PART VI

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COMMENTS

(a) Air Department

(1) Flight Deck Landing Problems. No bad barrier crashes or flight deck fires were experienced during this period on the line. However, a serious accident occurred when the helicopter overturned as it was being respotted with its rotors turning. This accident resulted in major damage to the helicopter and four men being killed plus several others injured.

Due to the long deck take off run required for AD-4 type aircraft under minimum wind conditions while carrying a large bomb load it is necessary to spot AD-4's across the flight deck. Outboard wing stubs must be loaded before they are placed into the final respot position.

Carriers with Banshee type aircraft should equip their tractors and tow-bars for towing aft. This can be accomplished by turning the towing lugs on the universal tow-bar 90 degrees, and equipping the tractors with a padded "T" frame to keep the tail from injuring the driver. It is also considered desirable to tow F9F's backwards, especially under high wind conditions, and a tow-bar for that purpose is being manufactured.

(2) Arresting Gear. During the period of this report, the total number of landings was 2132. The number of barrier engagements was four, and a total of twenty-two cross deck pendants were replaced. No barricade engagements (i.e. complete engagements) resulted, although the upper shear pins were sheared in one instance, dropping the webbing on the aircraft.

A more detailed account of the care given the barricade might possibly prove of some value. Difficulty was experienced at first in keeping the lower loading straps in the ramp. While other means are available, it was found that the pieces of barrier adaptor lifter straps including the six snap fasteners could readily be modified to serve as securing straps in this instance. A hole was cut through the center of the strap, an eyelet inserted and a large wood screw used to secure the strap to the deck between the forward and after section of the ramp. Excellent results were obtained.

It was further found that the tape used to secure the two sets of upper loading straps together was rapidly being cracked and dried out due to deck traffic and heat from jet exhausts. Since it requires about eight rolls of tape to completely assemble a double barricade installation, and several more to repair and replace torn tape, it was found that supplies of tape were rapidly being depleted. Accordingly, a substitute was sought and marlin was found to be the answer. Not only is it sufficiently strong, but it seems to have good wearing qualities as well. It certainly is cheaper and plenty is available. Three or four turns of marlin are enough, except towards the center engaging straps where deck traffic during launches and recoveries is extremely high.

The life of bungee straps is quite low, a total of approximately one hundred bungees being used during this operating period. Not only is the

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PART VI (Continued)

bungee itself crimped and stretched by deck traffic, but the snap fasteners (especially the spring snaps themselves) are constantly being broken so that the bungees are falling off the "D" rings as the barricade is raised. No solution has been found as yet, but a modification in manufacture of bungee hold-downs to include "D" rings with an insertable piece would be advantageous in that bungees would not have to be replaced nearly so often - except of course when they are stretched or crimped so that the elastic limit is exceeded.

At this time no excessive stanchion deflection has been noticed in the barricade installation.

With constant attention and barring any engagement, it has been found that the operating life of a barricade is approximately one month. At the end of this time, it has been found that the center engaging straps have been thoroughly darkened by jet exhaust fumes and deck traffic has caused the seams of the straps to become torn.

(3) Catapults. During this period, a total of 1168 catapult shots were fired; 614 aircraft were launched from the Port Catapult and 554 from the Starboard Catapult. No major difficulties were experienced with the equipment during these operations.

One AD was lost during a launch from the Starboard Catapult. The Catapult functioned perfectly. Possible cause was a faulty bridle or plane catapult hook causing the bridle to come apart and the plane to drop over the bow into the water with little or no assistance from the catapult.

During this operational period it was noticed that launching of aircraft would be facilitated by having the forward end of the holdback and release unit track open as well as the after end. This would allow either end to be used for placing or removing holdback units and would speed up the launching interval time between different types of aircraft. U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) alteration request number 5-52 regarding subject change is now being prepared.

(4) Maintenance. During the period of this report the following aircraft engine changes were accomplished:

<u>CHANGES</u>	<u>TYPE</u>
2	3350
3	2800
6	J-34

Some difficulty was experienced in that QEC units obtained at San Diego were in many instances incomplete. The QEC unit for 3350 engines was not obtained until just prior to leaving Yokosuka, and was also incomplete.

Four starter Jeeps were assigned to the Air Group by COMAIRFAC, and VC-11 Detachment brought an additional one. At one time during the operating period, two Jeeps were out of commission due to mechanical difficulties. The resulting shortage caused some delay in operations.

A speed-letter was originated to COMFAIRJAP requesting two additional Jeeps to fill allowance. It is considered necessary that the full allowance of starter Jeeps be provided ships that have Banshee Squadrons aboard. The Banshee takes much longer to start than the F9F, and when it is required to launch about 20 jets at one time, at least 4 Jeeps are required to keep up with the catapults and not have too long a turn up on deck.

The deck edge jet starting units were not used due to the time element involved in rigging extension cords for different type receptacles, and the additional man power required to keep two systems manned. The units were only used as emergency starting equipment.

(5) Ordnance Handling Equipment. Considerable difficulty was experienced with the commercial load binder used in conjunction with the Mark 4 Mod 0 Adapter and the Mark 1 Mod 1 Bomb Skid. These binders are unsatisfactory for sustained usage due to their structural weakness. After twenty days of operation, ninety percent of the 130 new binders were bent or broken. A RUDAOE has been submitted on these binders.

(6) Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditures.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>GASOLINE</u>	<u>OIL</u>
10-30 Sept	578,880 (gal.)	2,758 (gal.)
1-17 Oct	666,421 (gal.) 1243 361	2,968 (gal.) 5726

(7) Oxygen-Nitrogen Plant. Operation of the oxygen-nitrogen plants during this period was satisfactory. However, it was necessary to stop production once in each plant to effect repairs. Total production for the period 10-30 September was 36,142.36 cubic feet and for the period 1-17 October 47,489.32 cubic feet. Sixty-six 220 cubic feet bottles were filled and transferred to the supply ship for use by other carriers operating in the area.

Considerable difficulty was experienced in handling the flexible oxygen service hose during operations. All of the service outlets are on the port side of the ship, and in order to service planes on the starboard side the use of a 200 foot length of hose is necessary. Handling this much hose, with planes, tractors and bomb skids moving about the deck, is difficult and dangerous. Extreme caution is necessary to prevent damaging the hose.

PART VI (Continued)

(b) ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

(1) Main Propulsion

There were no major casualties and all steaming requirements were met without difficulty. The only problems encountered were in boiler maintenance. The operational requirement for full boiler power, combined with the wide range of boiler power used, results in a larger number of economizer header hand hole and superheater hand hole leaks, than normally experienced. These are corrected at night when boilers can be cooled down, and during replenishment days.

(2) Electrical

No major casualties were experienced in the electrical equipment. Continuous maintenance and minor repairs were conducted without difficulty.

(3) Auxiliaries

Considerable difficulty has been experienced with the C.H. WHEELER Electro-Hydraulic Rearming at Sea Winches. This has been reported on Material Data Reports, serials: 1-52, 2-52 and 3-52 and by letter CO, USS KEARSARGE (CV 33) CV33/S20 Ser: 1267 of 9 Oct 1952, to type commander and interested activities. It was discussed with RADM J.B. PEARSON, JR., USN Force Material Maintenance Officer, COMAIRPAC, and CAPT. A.K. ROMBERG, USN, Ships Material Officer on COMAIRPAC's staff during their visit to the Task Force Sept 12-16. CAPT. ROMBERG, moreover, observed the operation of the winches during the replenishment on 14 Oct 1952, and is familiar with the details of the repairs affected, and the actual winch performance when rearming.

(4) Damage Control

This vessel is experiencing growing difficulty with maintenance of a watertight flight deck. It is a combination of two factors. Jet blast is melting the marine glue, and blowing loose the oakum permitting water to work below the wooden deck. Repair facilities at Yokosuka have been requested to recaulk and pitch the wooden flight deck during the forthcoming availability period. The second problem, and the more serious factor, is the apparent thinness of the steel decking below the wood. Wherever the leakage on the O2 level overhead was serious enough to justify tearing out glass insulation to stop leaks by welding, it has been observed that the wood deck securing studs are shot through or close to through the steel, that movement of the deck under heavy aircraft causes the stud to work and leaks develop.

This is particularly true in the area of the catapult flash plating. A more complete study of this problem will be made after observation of the successfulness of curtailing leaks by new caulking and some experience with the deck under winter conditions. At that time a letter report will be forwarded to the type commander if it appears that availability at a west coast shipyard will be required upon return to CONUS.

PART VI (Continued)

(5) Electronics

a. General

No major difficulties have been experienced with the electronic equipment. During replenishment days, every effort has been made to bring preventative maintenance schedules up to date, and correct all potential failures noted during operations on line. Equipments are retuned and "peaked-up" before placing equipment in operational status.

Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal. The following comments are given:

b. Radar. SG-6B The antenna slows and labors considerably in winds of approximately 45 knots or better. It has not stalled or windmilled.

AN/SPS-6B No antenna rotational difficulties have been experienced to date. The AFC unit intermittently dropped out of tune, over a 4/5 day period about once a day. Simple retuning would correct the discrepancy. Complete failure of unit occurred when suppressor grid bypass capacitor, C835, permanently shorted, causing filter choke L8C4 to draw excessive current, and open. It is assumed the intermittent shorting of C835 prior to final breakdown was cause of preceding AFC difficulties.

Considerable interference from similar radars in the force necessitated retuning of equipment. It is recommended that frequency assignments be closely supervised.

Side lobes, 30-40 degrees wide and at 150 and 230 degrees relative to antenna head, were of sufficient strength to smear land targets at a range of approximately 25 miles. No side lobe echoes have been observed at greater or lesser ranges.

Radar was tuned to 1318 MCS. Retuning to a frequency 20 MCS away eliminated all traces of side lobes.

c. Radio.

Considerable intra-ship radio interference has been experienced on the VHF radio nets. This interference has been definitely established as "spill-Over" and crossmodulation. Shifting antennae, and adjustment of transmitter power output, and receiver silencer bias have reduced the interference to an acceptable level. A thorough inspection of antenna insulators, and cable bonding should further reduce interference to the minimum. This will be accomplished during next upkeep period. The RCK receiver has proved very unreliable for long range communications (35 miles plus) with aircraft.

d. Miscellaneous.

It is recommended that a remote start/stop switch for the AN/CPN-6 RACON equipment be located in Air Operations in order to provide for the immediate energizing of the RACON in times of emergency.

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PART VI (Continued)

(c) Gunnery department

(1) Ammunition re-supply.

(a) Replenishment was accomplished three times during the period 17 to 30 September and five times during the period 1 to 20 October as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>	<u>AVERAGE TON PER HR.</u>
9-19-52	USS MR BAKER (AE-4)	147	66.8
9-23-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	239.8	79.95
9-28-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	163.3	45.15
10-2-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	206.5	77.6
10-6-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	239.6	108.9
10-10-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	250.5	125.9
10-14-52	USS PARICUTIN (AE-18)	207.5	81.5
10-18-52	USS MT BAKER (AE-4)	160	81

(2) Ammunition Handling Problems

(a) During the month of September and the first week in October this ship experienced considerable difficulty in burtoning ammunition due to the inoperative status of one or both of the interim winches used in the burtoning operation. Through the continued efforts of the Engineering Force, the winches were repaired and operated satisfactorily except during the replenishment from the U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE-18) on 14 October 1952. The forward winch was temporarily out of commission on two occasions due to blown gaskets during this operation. The wire straps and the beckets on the cargo nets were of such length that the PARICUTIN winch operator was required to hold a strain, and the KEARSARGE winch operator was required to haul against this strain to raise the cargo nets high enough to clear the ships side. This put an overload on this ships winches, which resulted in the blown gaskets. The interim winches installed on board this ship were not designed to take this overload. The gaskets were renewed and loading operations were continued. It has been observed that the presently installed winches operate at a much slower speed than the cargo winches installed on the vessels replenishing this ship.

(3) Recommendations

The interim winches should be replaced by the winches designed for use at the burtoning points, on board this ship, at the first opportunity.

(d) Operations Department

(1) Combat Information Center

a. Operating Procedures. CIC functioned as Flag CIC during the period of this report. Coordination was very effective in the

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performance of ship's CIC functions, Flag functions, and air control. The excellent teamwork which developed was due to a high degree of cooperation between ship and flag watch officers, the type of watches employed for enlisted men, and an effective use of a Radar Control Officer. The ship and flag watch officers worked closely together in the control of all CIC functions regardless of whether any particular function was for the primary support of the force, the ship, or Flag Plot itself. The combined efforts of both the flag and ship watch officers were often required on particular evolutions when operations were heavy.

The enlisted men were divided into three watch sections, two heavy sections of 24 men each and one light section of 14 men. The two heavy sections alternated in manning CIC from 0300 until 2100 and the light section was on from 2100 until 0300. One heavy section worked from 0300 until 0600 and from 1200 until 1800, and the other from 0600 until 1200 and from 1800 until 2100. This arrangement worked excellently. It had the following advantages: The largest number of men were on duty during air operations when the need for them was greatest. Continuity of operations was maintained since watches changed when air operations were at a low level. The watches conformed to meal times as well as peak loads of air activity. This system required no special meal arrangements. Hours were long for the day sections, but sufficient rest was obtained since each man standing day watches had a full night's sleep. Late sleeping privileges were required only for the fourteen men in the night section. The system permitted the establishment of stable and quasi-permanent air control and surface control teams within the sections. The two heavy sections were rotated every two weeks. All the men in the night section will be rotated into day sections every six weeks.

Each section had one Watch Officer and one Surface Control Officer. Three air controllers rotated throughout each day while air operations were in progress.

The primary air control function was in strike control. It was necessary that each returning flight be indentified by flight number as soon as it left the beach or appeared on radar. Air control was accomplished on the VK-3 repeaters facing the Vertical Plot. The use of SX consoles for air control was impractical since the air controller was blocked off from use of the Vertical Plot. His use of the Vertical Plot was absolutely essential due to the large number of returning flights under surveillance at one time. It was found that the air controller, the Radar Control Officer, the two watch officers, and supporting personnel around the Vertical Plot, Raid Tote Board, and the Air Status Board all concentrated around the bank of scopes near the Vertical Plot formed the most effective team for both strike control and CAP control.

The control of jets would have been impossible without Mk 10 IFF. Jets would fail to show on all radars more often than not, and it was usually with IFF that positive control could be maintained with CAP or returning jet strikes. Detection of enemy jet aircraft

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could not be depended upon reliably. Upon one occasion MIG-15's were tracked over the beach at a distance of 120 miles, but this was rare. On another day the MIG's came within sighting distance of the force without being detected by radar.

Air defense exercises were held periodically using returning strike flights as simulated bogeys. The average intercept was made by CAP at about thirty miles. The primary difficulty in interceptions was always in altitude determination. The present equipment is inadequate since it was impossible to obtain reliable altitude determination outside of about 30 miles.

The use of a Radar Control Officer, placed on a VK repeater with IFF near the Watch Officer, has greatly improved the quality of presentation of the Vertical Plot. There was an inadequacy of IFF installation, there being only one VK repeater and one SX console with IFF installed. Air control functions were greatly limited thereby because so much dependence had to be placed on IFF. The problem has been solved temporarily by putting IFF into all scopes through an unused radar switch position from the Radar Switch Board, with a central control box on the VK repeater as originally installed.

b. Equipment Performance. Generally the SPS will pick up a target at a longer range than the SX. However, the SPS will not hold the target every sweep until the target closes to about 60 miles for prop planes and about 30 to 40 miles for jets. The SX will hold a target on the majority of sweeps. The SPS requires more frequent tuning and adjustment than the SX to obtain maximum performance.

The SX radar is highly susceptible to interference from other radars in the force. The only serious interference in the SPS is the abnormally large side lobes inherent in this equipment. When operating close to land this side lobing can render a large portion of the scope unusable.

The SPS radar has been in constant use except when shut down for routine maintenance, and much greater dependence and use has been made of it than the SX radar. The SX has been kept in a standby condition as much as possible when its use was not required, so as to reduce operating time and maintenance difficulties.

c. Communications. The overall operation and adequacy of communications in CIC during this period were average to below a good workable level. The maximum reliable range of the TDQ transmitter was found to be 90 miles. This is considered to be satisfactory for air control. This ship is seriously limited, however, in VHF communications flexibility because of there being a total of only six TDQ VHF transmitters installed and only one AN/ARC-1 available to CIC. At least three additional VHF transmitters and receivers are needed for present operations beyond those permitted by current configuration.

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The RCK receivers were very limited in range reliability and it was necessary to use the AN/ARC-1 and URD-2 receivers for strike control in order to receive the planes' transmissions beyond 45-50 miles. A split headset was used for air control with good results. A Western Electric headset type AU 52 was adapted so that the TDQ/RCK combination could be used with the major component and the AN/ARC-1 or URD-2 audio input coupled to the second earpiece, which was joined to the major component (AU 52) by a common headband. The Western Electric headset is considered to be an excellent piece of equipment for both air control and general CIC usage.

Since there were an inadequate number of VHF transmitters available and since the RCK receivers were undependable, a second AN/ARC-1 unit was piped into CIC from the CCA room. In addition, the audio from three additional AN/ARC-1 receivers was piped into the RRS radio system through the patch board panel in Air Operations. This has improved communications, although still not to an acceptable level.

There was an excessive cross-talk and feedover between antennas on most of the VHF circuits which made air control very difficult.

Communication equipment and frequency assignments were inadequate when more than two carriers were operating or when participation was attempted in any large coordinated operation with the Air Force or with ground facilities. The ship does not have sufficient VHF equipment. Frequencies available were very limited as to number. Such circuits as were available were overloaded and circuit discipline was poor. Upon several occasions the GUARD channel of VHF was used so excessively for routine communications that it was virtually worthless in an emergency.

d. Recommendations: The ultimate IFF installation according to design plans for this ship provides four complete units which is considered adequate at this time. No further recommendations concerning IFF equipment is made, other than local temporary employment mentioned above, pending availability of equipment and the subsequent issue of the ultimate Ship ALT by BUSHIPS.

CincPacFlt Instruction O2810.1 has established an early target date for employment of UHF vice VHF in Pacific Fleet aircraft. This ship has ample UHF transmitters and receivers. It is therefore not desired to recommend permanent alterations in VHF equipment installation. It is felt that temporary local alterations to meet present operations will suffice until the ultimate program is achieved. It is probable that one additional AN/ARC-1 control unit may be piped into CIC from CCA for that purpose, since CCA equipment has been unavailable to this ship.

The Western Electric head set type AV-52 is highly recommended as standard equipment for CIC air control use. It is light in weight and permits the controller the use of both hands for radar manipulation and tracking of targets.

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PART VI (Continued)

(2) Communications

a. Shortages of experienced rated personnel continue to act as the greatest threat to rapid communications. With the high volume of traffic extent in this area, errors in technique become especially onerous and time-consuming in rectification. The Communication Unit has been operating below 50% of rated Petty Officer allowance. A vigorous training program is improving on that figure in spite of continued losses engendered by expiration of enlistment and termination of period of obligated service.

b. The Main Communication Station handles approximately 265 messages per day addressed to or sent from the Embarked staff or ship while operating as part of TF 77. About 50% of this traffic is classified, requiring encryption. It has been found necessary to maintain a continuous officer watch of two persons which is augmented by one or two additional officers as required during peak hours, for cryptocenter operations.

c. Material difficulties of importance occurred in two particulars:

1. Feed-over in CIC between UHF circuits continued through the operating period. Strike, land-launch, and secondary tactical nets were involved.

2. Complete loss of communications was experienced nightly on NDT-CTF 77 duplex RATT circuit, throwing a workload on ComNavFe Command Net (Circuit C18) for which this CW circuit is not designed. Aspects of improper tuning of the TBM radio transmitter utilized, complete check of the transmitter, and alertness on the part of the receiving activity are being investigated.

d. Non-delivery of action and information messages is increasing. Most cases have been traced to NDT, which activity has been found to be in the process of relocation.

e. Interference on ComSEVENTHFlt Command Net (Circuit C16) continues. The TF 77, Joint Operation Center Korea Voice net is similarly subject to annoying but ineffective jamming.

f. The Nancy method of visual signalling is often misused for the transmission of lengthy messages, sometimes of questionable import.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) That increased numbers of communications strikers be provided. Where schooling facilities are sufficient to permit, it is recommended that RMSA and TESA be allocated to afloat commands. Where schooling facilities will not permit, it is recommended that seamen who have in-

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PART VI (Continued)

indicated an aptitude for communications be earmarked for duty in that field by classification centers. If it is considered that, given a nucleus crew, operating vessels are in an excellent position to train and rate young men in communication specialties. The experience of this command points to the paucity of promising strikers assigned to communication duties.

(b) That increased emphasis and continuing attention be directed to the necessity of sending messages by electronic means. Mail should be employed whenever possible. Attention of dispatch originators should be directed to the daily guard mail trip throughout the task force. The concepts of dual precedence and information addressees receiving copies by mail should be thoroughly disseminated.

(c) That nancy method of visual communications be employed sparingly and most judiciously in the case of encrypted traffic.

(3) Photographic Laboratory

During this period seventy seven photographic sorties were flown, shooting a total of 135 rolls of reconnaissance film.

The photographic laboratory delivered 34,067 prints of reconnaissance negatives, 174 plot sheet negatives, 2,715 prints of plot sheet negatives, 234 negatives of mosaics, and 2,019 prints from negatives of mosaics. To accomplish this work it was sometimes necessary to delay Public Information photographs, R.U.D.M. photographs and other photographic work orders, in addition to the photographic quarterly report.

Equipment failure was held to a minimum, but two K-20 cameras, two 16 mm cine magazine cameras, four K-17 camera magazines, one K-17, 24" lens cone and one A-8, modified magazine proved to be mechanically inadequate.

The amount and quality of photographic work produced during this period was greatly hampered due to a shortage of rated personnel, only six of the 10 allowed rating being on board. In addition to the rated men on board, the photographic laboratory has twelve non-rated men. At present two of these are full time assistants to the Photographic Interpreter. The photographic laboratory must operate on two (2) twelve (12) hour shifts in order to complete all the work orders received. The first shift works from 0800 to 2000 and utilizes nine men; the second shift works from 2000 to 0800 and utilizes six men.

The ship at present does not have a camera repairman. It is recommended that one rated photographer assigned to each carrier, be a camera repair school graduate.

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(4) Photo Interpretation

During this operating period 77 photographic sorties were interpreted, consisting of target searches, route surveillances, flak studies, and a limited number of damage assessments and call missions. Because of the de-emphasis of rail interdiction, only 4 touraids were produced. An estimated 25 target studies were prepared and reproduced for dissemination to strike squadrons.

The job of photo interpretation has been handicapped to some degree by a shortage of proper facilities and equipment; but the largest impediment has been the lack of adequate training and experience on the part of both the P.I. Officer and the two enlisted assistants. The unique problem presented by Korean photography renders standardized training inadequate on many points, and indicates a definite need for instruction in the operational area. Also the importance of experience under the conditions imposed by an operating carrier cannot be overstressed. Thus it would be more than desirable that personnel be given the advantage of at least one tour on the line under the guidance of a trained interpreter before assuming unsupervised duty.

PART VI (Continued)

(5) AIR INTELLIGENCE

This ship's Air Intelligence Office has operated on the assumption that squadron AIO's are able to do a more efficient job when they have first-hand access to all latest Air Intelligence information. In putting this idea to practice it has been found that its success depends to a large degree on the physical set-up of the office. Sufficient maps must be prepared with latest information plotted thereon, all latest dispatches must be readily accessible, familiarity with all publications is essential, and squadron AIO's must keep a continuous check on all sources of information which are collected for them in the AI Office. The facilities of the AI Office have been arranged with the primary aim of accomplishing this end.

Flak is plotted on 1:50,000 maps. These maps are available for briefing purposes; a large reproduction of the Air Plan is kept current with the latest changes indicated; sliding map panels are utilized to prepare charts for target information, general situation etc.; dispatches are posted on appropriately marked boards as soon as they are received and read; a "read and initial" system is maintained for all publications. All important information is posted along with dispatches. In short, an attempt is made to assure that by checking the AI Office immediately before each briefing, squadron AIO's will be aware of all the latest intelligence information available to the ship, and will be able to pass it on to their pilots.

During this initial operating period much time has been spent in establishing and ironing out flaws in this system. Its worth has been demonstrated throughout the period, especially in the elaborate preparation for, and execution of, the amphibious training exercise.

During the evening, prior to each operating day, a briefing conference for the Commanding Officer, Executive Officer and all heads of departments was conducted by the ship's AI Officer. This program has served its purpose well in keeping the ships officers informed of the progress of operations and has led to better coordination of ships activities. All information regarding operations is disseminated on a "need to know" basis.

(6) PUBLIC INFORMATION

The task of attempting to do justice to the many directives regarding Public Information continues to be a major one. Inexperienced personnel, working space, and time present the greatest problems. All are at a very high premium. The ship's PIO has a well organized unit of reporters and photographers that are just now becoming experienced enough to start routine production of good PI material.

During the period of this report the following material was produced:

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PART VI (Continued)

- 24 Navy News dispatches.
- 656 Fleet Hometown News stories
- 2 Feature stories
- 59 Still pictures released
- 85 Tape recorded Hometown interviews.

It is highly recommended that if continuing emphasis is to be placed on public information, (and this command believes it should be) experienced personnel should be made available to units of this size engaged in combat activities. The recent visit of CINCPAC's PIO representative served its purpose well in stimulating interest and presenting new ideas but did little to alleviate the difficulties mentioned above, i.e.: inexperienced personnel, working space, and demands on time from other pressing duties.

(e) Supply Department

Aviation Stores

(1) Availability

- a. 4,973 items requested,
- b. 4,544 items furnished from stock which was 91% of the items requested. Of the 429 items not in stock, approximately 70% represented normal replenishment for items issued on a shop store basis.

(2) AOG Requests

AOG requests totaled 27. CV's on the line supplied 18 of the items; 14 of them in less than 24 hours; four within 48 hours.

The principal causes of the AOG's were in order of importance:

- a. Non receipt of initial allowance.
- b. Items not listed in allowance.
- c. Items peculiar to particular Bureau Number series.

(3) On 3 October the main aviation structures storeroom was flooded with ten inches of salt water by the fire sprinkler system. Cause unknown. Fast action by crews from Supply and Maintenance in uncrating, washing all aluminum material with fresh water and oiling all steel surfaces, resulted in negligible loss.

(4) Recommendations

- a. Plane types and Bureau Number series should be firm sufficiently in advance of deployment to insure time to acquire a full allowance for the types concerned. On the Kearsarge the F9F-4 & 5 aircraft on board were

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PART VI (Continued)

replaced by F9F-2 and F2H-2 with insufficient time to acquire a full allowance for the F9F-2 or F2H-2 prior to deployment.

b. Allowance lists should be brought up to date and current usage. The allowance lists proved particularly inadequate for F4U-4 engine seals and gaskets. The VC detachments with a zero allowance for many items operated with an allowance handicap. It is suggested that the allowance for VC squadrons consider the total number of each plane type operating on all CVA's in a given area.

c. Squadrons should be screened prior to deployment to assure that all aircraft inventory logs, flight log books, and squadron allowances are complete.

(f) Medical Department

(1) Medical Department supplies and equipment were adequate. No significant equipment breakdown or supply shortages occurred during this period. Fore-sight in procuring several items of supplies and equipment in excess of allowance and others not listed as initial allowance paid dividends. Due to the great variety of casualties and illnesses and because ships of this type function also as hospital ships, it is strongly recommended that all CVA's be prepared and equipped to handle medical problems of all categories while in the operating area.

(2) Medical Department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. The authorized allowance of 25 men is considered adequate but the present on board count of 19 is considered insufficient to properly accomplish the prescribed mission of the department. Additional losses, by reason of discharge, that will occur in the near future will seriously handicap the overall performance of the remaining personnel and the efficiency of the department.

(3) Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's company

a. For the first 3 weeks of this operating period the general morale and physical well being of both the Air Group and Ship's Company remained good. During the remaining two weeks of this period, it was noted that personnel, particularly those directly associated with air operations, tended to show moderate signs of stress. Some tenseness became apparent and early signs of fatigue began to partially encroach upon the physical vigor previously demonstrated. There was no significant morale problem, individually or collectively, which required specific attention,

b. Although this was the first period of such operations, for this ship, certain personnel developments tend to indicate that repeated operations prolonged over a period of 3 weeks, may well result in physical and morale problems which will merit future consideration.

PART VI (Continued)

(4) Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's company

a.	Admitted to sick list.....	156
b.	Total sick days out of 112850 possible works days.....	296
c.	Officers admitted to sick list.....	2
d.	Total patient visits to sick call.....	3812
e.	Total medical treatments.....	6244
f.	Patients received from other ships.....	5
g.	Patients transferred to hospital.....	7
h.	Number minor injuries treated.....	56
i.	Number major injuries treated.....	14
j.	Number shipboard injuries resulting in death.....	4
k.	Minor surgical procedures.....	106
l.	Major surgical procedures.....	12
m.	Venereal disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total..	69
	1. Gonorrhoea 35, Chancroid 12	
	2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure	22
n.	Penicillin tablets issued last in port period.....	2516

(5) Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

a.	Planes lost; enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered..	1
	Planes lost; operational; pilot not recovered.....	1
	Planes lost; operational; pilot recovered, minor injuries	1
	Planes lost; operational; pilot recovered, uninjured..	1
	Planes lost, operational, crewman recovered uninjured..	1
	Planes damaged; enemy action; crewman injured.....	1
	Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured.....	1
b.	Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons.....	13
	Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation..	1
	Average number days pilots grounded.....	3.7
	Crewmen grounded for medical reasons.....	1

(6) Casualties

a. On 17 September an AD-4N was hit by enemy ground fire which entered the after compartment, struck the radar scope, splattered metal and glass fragments through the compartment. The crewman sustained a fractured skull at the site of entry of several fragments in the left temporal bone. X-rays revealed retained foreign bodies about the left orbit. General condition was good. Transferred to Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

b. On 18 September a hung rocket broke loose from an F2H2, skidded forward on the flight deck and struck two men. One sustained a fracture of the left femur plus a compound comminuted fracture of the tibia and fibula which necessitated amputation of the left lower leg. The other sustained a very severe compound comminuted fracture of the left tibia and fibula which required open reduction with bone plates and screws. Both were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka after the above treatment on board.

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PART VI (Continued)

c. On 30 September LTJG. J.W. SHOOK, while flying an F4U in a strafing and bombing mission off the coast of Korea was seen to go into a sudden inverted dive position following a strafing run. He failed to recover from this position and crashed into the water. Survival was not considered possible and he was reported as killed in action.

d. On 4 October LT. E. F. JOHNSON while flying a combat mission in an F4U was attacked by enemy jet aircraft near the coast of Korea. His plane crashed into the water in a steep dive and survival was not considered possible. He was reported as killed in action.

e. On 5 October LT. F. C. ANDERSON and crewman in an AD4N crashed into the water after a catapult launch. Both LT ANDERSON and crewman were recovered, by helicopter, very shortly after ditching. No injuries of significance were sustained.

f. On 7 October LT. C. O. MURPHY, while flying an AD4 in a bombing mission over Yongpo, developed engine fire and failure after a run. It was not determined whether the engine trouble developed as a result of enemy ground fire. He was forced to ditch his plane, but was recovered and returned to the ship with only minor abrasions and contusions.

g. On 11 October the ship's helicopter, while being parked on deck edge elevator with rotors engaged, suddenly tipped over. Three men were killed instantly due to injuries, multiple extreme and one died 2 hours and 44 minutes after the accident. One man sustained 8 fractured ribs with hemo-pneumothorax, bilateral fracture of the pelvis and kidney and kidney and bladder damage. Six others sustained minor injuries, 3 of whom required prolonged in-patient care. The report of the Board of Investigation, convened immediately after the accident, is now being prepared.

h. On 16 October CDR. B. T. SIMONDS, Commanding Officer of VA-702, while flying an AD4, crashed into the water immediately after an apparently normal deck launch. He was seen floating free of the plane, apparently alive, along the port side of the ship. Observers state that his life vest appeared inflated, but that his parachute was still strapped to his chest. Helicopters and a destroyer were on the scene immediately, but for some unexplained reason did not sight CDR. SIMONDS. A prolonged search was continued, but no recovery was made and CDR. SIMONDS was reported missing.

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USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS BATAN (CVA-29)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
USS BAIROKA (CVE-115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN
Carrier Air Group NINETEEN
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO

CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE (CTF-70, CTF-77)
(2) Commander Carrier Division ONE (CTF-77)
(3) Commander Seventh Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 20 October 1952 to 6 December 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 101 Action Report for the period 20 October 1952 to 6 December 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is submitted herewith

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period of this report the U.S.S. KEARSARGE, with Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, operated for various periods with the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9), the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), and with various heavy support and screening ships.
2. The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) and CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.
3. The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations Troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

- 20 Oct: 1137 Anchored in Berth 132, Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan.
- 21 Oct: 0746 Shifted berth to Berth 12, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.
- 21-28 Oct: Moored port side to Berth 12, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

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- 28 Oct: 1315 Underway from Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 dispatch 240650Z of October 1952. 1503 Formed Task Force 70 with U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) and U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). OTC is RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN CTF 70 and COMCARDIV 5, in this ship. U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined Task Force. SOPA is VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, in the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63).
- 29 Oct: Proceeding to operating area.
- 30 Oct: Conducted air operations. 0854 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN COMSEVENTH FLT, came on board via helicopter. 1444 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, left the ship.
- 31 Oct: Proceeding to rendezvous with Task Force 77. 0205 Dissolved Task Force 70, formed Task Element 77.01, OTC is RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship. 1949 Rendezvoused with Task Force 77, dissolved Task Element 77.01. OTC is RADM H.E. REGAN, CTF 77, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). Heavies present: U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9), U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA 33), U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133), and the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63). 2250 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) departed Task Force.
- 1 Nov: Conducted air operations during morning. Afternoon operations cancelled due to heavy seas. 0710 LT C.O. GLISSON, JR, 485189/1310, in F9F2, Bureau Number 123586, presumed crashed in water off K-50 airfield. Cause unknown, pilot not recovered, listed as missing. 0835 LT R.G. RIDER, 480942/1310, in F4U, Bureau Number 97255, crashed on a scheduled combat mission. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action 1631 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1701 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force. 1730 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77.
- 2 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1405 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.
- 3 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1314 Conducted Anti-aircraft firing exercise.
- 4 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1314 Conducted Anti-aircraft firing exercise. 2100 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) and U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) departed Task Force.
- 5 Nov: Conducted air operations.
- 6 Nov: Conducted air operations.
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(Chronology continued)

- 7 Nov: Task Force replenished. 0607 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1122 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1235 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN departed via AD aircraft. 1721 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force.
- 8 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1009 LCDR F.W. BOWEN, 116326/1310, in F4U, Bureau Number 97100, crashed while on a scheduled combat mission over North Korea. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action. 1325 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) and U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force. 1432 Mrs. ANNA M. ROSENBERG, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, MGEN B. MILBORN, USA, and BGEN J.F. COLLINS, USA, came on board via helicopter. 1550 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1620 Mrs. ANNA M. ROSENBERG, VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, MGEN B. MILBORN, USA, and BGEN J.F. COLLINS, USA, departed via COD aircraft.
- 9 Nov: Morning air operations cancelled due to weather. Conducted air operations during afternoon. 2235 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.
- 10 Nov: Conducted air operations.
- 11 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1230 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.
- 12 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0800 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1638 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.
- 13 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 0926 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1003 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, departed via helicopter. 1012 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 1023 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1410 RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, COMCRUDIV 3, came on board via helicopter. 1533 RADM SCHINDLER departed via helicopter.
- 14 Nov: Air operations cancelled due to weather. 1413 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1506 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, LTGEN W.K. HARRISON, USA, RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, USN, and RADM J.C. DANIEL, USN, came on board via helicopter. 1655 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, LTGEN W.K. HARRISON, USA, RADM W.G. SCHINDLER, USN and RADM J.C. DANIEL, USN, departed via helicopter. 1708 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force. 2000 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.
- 15 Nov: Conducted air operations.
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(Chronology continued)

- 16 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0632 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) joined Task Force. 1111 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force. 1332 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1345 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, came on board via helicopter. 1605 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, departed via helicopter. 1710 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, returned on board via helicopter. 1900 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) and U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force.
- 17 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0825 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT departed via AD aircraft. 2300 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) joined Task Force.
- 18 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1349 General Quarters. CAP from U.S.S. ONISKANY (CVA 34) engaged seven (7) MIG-15 aircraft. Two (2) MIGs and a possible third shot down. 1615 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COM SEVENTHFLT, RADM W.D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV 1, and RADM W.V. OREGAN, COMCARDIV 5, came on board via C-119 aircraft. 1707 VADM J.J. CLARK, USN departed via helicopter. 1745 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB 63) departed Task Force.
- 19 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1204 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force. 1702 U.S.S. ONISKANY (CVA 34) departed Task Force.
- 20 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1730 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.
- 21 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0913 Conducted anti-aircraft firing exercise. 1527 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) joined Task Force. 1553 LCDR R.C. HOPPING, 116741/1310, in F9F2, Bureau Number 125173, crashed on a scheduled combat mission. Probable cause, enemy anti-aircraft fire. Pilot declared missing in action.
- 22 Nov: Conducted air operations. 0723 U.S.S. HELENA (CA 75) departed Task Force. 0819 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) joined Task Force.
- 23 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1357 F9F2, Bureau Number 127175, Pilot LCDR D.W. DAVIS, 114580/1310, caught fire while being catapulted. Pilot made controlled water landing and was recovered by helicopter. Pilot suffered minor injuries.
- 24 Nov: Task Force replenished. 0855 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31) joined Task Force. 1637 U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA 9) departed Task Force.
- 25 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1720 RADM W.D. JOHNSON, USN, COMCARDIV 1, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31), assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 1809 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA 133) departed Task Force.
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(Chronology continued)

- 26 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1304 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) joined Task Force.
- 27 Nov: Air operations restricted due to weather, only 16 sorties flown.
- 28 Nov: Task Force replenished. 1745 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA 135) departed Task Force.
- 29 Nov: Conducted air operations. 1416 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, departed via COD aircraft.
- 30 Nov: Planned air operations cancelled due to weather. Flew weather RECCO and searched for downed Air Force transport plane - negative results.
- 1 Dec: 0858 U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA 124) joined Task Force. Air operations cancelled due to weather.
- 2 Dec: 0817 Task Force rendezvoused with replenishment force, Task Element 92.11. Replenishment postponed due to heavy seas. Flight operations cancelled due to weather.
- 3 Dec: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. 1058 RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, arrived on board via COD aircraft. 1905 Task Force departed replenishment force.
- 4 Dec: 0400 Eight (8) sorties flown by dawn hecklers. 0820 U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA 34) joined Task Force. 0948 detached from Task Force 77, proceeding to Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with CTF 77 CONFIDENTIAL dispatch 301112Z of October 1952. 1652 recovered 3 U.S. MARINE Corps helicopters on board for transportation to Yokosuka, Japan.
- 5 Dec: Proceeding to Yokosuka, Japan, 1101 launched one F2H2P aircraft for NAS Atsugi, Japan.
- 6 Dec: Launched 3 U.S. MARINE Corps helicopters for Yokosuka, Japan at 0753. 1014 moored starboard side to Piedmont Pier, Berth 12, Yokosuka, Naval Yard, Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).

(PART III Continued)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for AA practice.

5"/38

Projectile

Powder

184 AAC
5VT Frag.

184 Non-Flashless
5 Non-Flashless

3"/50

683 VT Frag.

Non-flashless Powder.

3. Performance of Ships Ordnance

a. The performance of ships ordnance is considered good to excellent except that the fuze output of the MK 56 GFCS primary computer MK 42 Mod 13 for director 33 to mounts 52 and 54 was outside the prescribed limits. This was apparently due to a mechanical slippage in the fuze line. The computer could still accurately control the firing of 5" VT projectiles from these mounts, therefore adjustments which would have placed the entire system out of commission, were not attempted while on the line. Assistance of the GENERAL ELECTRIC representative at Yokosuka has been requested to conduct required repairs while in port. There were no other major casualties. A few minor casualties occurred on the 3" battery but were quickly repaired by Gunners Mates. It was noted that constant adjustment of the loader mechanism of the 3" battery was necessary during cold weather.

b. Considerable trouble was experienced with the Mark 25 radar as outlined in PART VI paragraph 2. e. (3) of this report. During the periods the Mark 25 radar was inoperative, optical pointing and training with range-finder ranges were used with good results. An extensive training program has been established for the training of rangefinder operators to meet such a casualty on the Mark 25 radar.

c. During Air Raid drills the ordnance equipment, other than the Mark 25 radar, functioned excellently. During these drills the Mark 25 radar was out of commission 50% of the time, but targets were acquired outside of gun range using optical methods. The GFCS Mark 56 and 63 were in excellent operating condition. It is estimated that 90% of targets were acquired outside of maximum gun range.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship.

The ship was not attacked and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

3. Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

PART VPERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES.1. Performance.a. Personnel

Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 1981 Navy and 59 Marines. There were nineteen (19) enlisted men received and twenty one (21) transferred.

b. Legal

During the period since our last report there has been an alarming increase in the number of domestic relations problems of men serving aboard ship. Special attention has been given to advising the men concerned of their rights under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 and amendments thereto.

The routine preparation and drafting of powers of attorney, wills and special instruments continued as well as the disposition of administrative matters touching legal assistance problems in relation to allotments and dependents.

Disciplinary cases continue at a low level. The offense of unauthorized absence in port supplies the greatest percentage of the total cases.

c. Education

Personnel aboard the KEARSARGE have demonstrated a continued interest in improving their educational background during the present tour of duty on the line. Nineteen GED and end-of-course tests have been administered, thirty five USAFI correspondence courses have been applied for, and one hundred fifty educational manuals have been checked out. Sixty four applications for Navy Correspondence courses have been completed. One hundred seventy seven men have been interviewed in an effort to assist each with his individual educational problem.

A screening and testing program involving one hundred sixty men with GCT scores less than 35 has been completed. Courses in basic grammar, reading, spelling and arithmetic are offered nightly. Participants have shown a keen interest and it is felt that they will profit greatly from these courses of instruction.

Recommendations for service-wide competitive examinations to be conducted in February were received, eligibility determined and examinations requested for 1282 nominees.

The training room has been constantly in use. In addition to the 200 one hour periods utilized for professional advancement instruction and billet training, Catholic Rosary services are held daily and a Protestant Bible Class meets weekly in this compartment.

d. Divine Services.

The number of Divine Services scheduled each week during the ship's second action period on the line was twenty six (26). Three Catholic Masses were said, three Protestant Divine Services, and a service for Latter Day Saints were conducted each Sunday. All Saints and All Souls Day were observed by two additional Masses. Daily Protestant devotions were held each week day from 1240 to 1300. A daily Mass was said each afternoon and a Rosary Service

(PART V Continued)

conducted each evening for Catholic personnel. In addition to these Divine Services, Protestant Bible Class was held each Wednesday and Latter Day Saint class each Thursday. Two Protestant Memorial Services were conducted for pilots who were lost, and one Catholic Requiem Mass was held for a Catholic pilot who was lost. Thanksgiving services were conducted for both Protestant and Catholic personnel on Thanksgiving Day.

e. Character Guidance

Both chaplains gave character guidance talks to the enlisted men in the ship during the second tour on the line. The talks were aimed at the bolstering of the moral character and the sense of responsibility of the men. Each Chaplain covered about one half of the crew during this tour on the line. Thus, the men of all divisions and Squadrons constituting the enlisted population of the ship were given one character guidance lecture during the ship's second tour on the line.

f. Welfare and Recreation

Motion pictures constituted the main form of recreation along with reading and small games. On the average, twenty one showings of movies per week were held. The library was, as always, extensively used, issuing an average of 40 books per day. Pocket, paper bound books were circulated without accountability in great numbers. Sub-libraries in the various messes like the Wardroom, Warrant Officers Mess, and the Chief's mess furnished much reading matter on which statistics are not available. Daily press news and three issues of the ship's paper were published.

Approximately three hundred twenty three copies of magazines per month were distributed. Small games such as chess, checkers, acey ducey and monopoly remained popular among the men. Disc Jockey programs were broadcast from 1130 until 1300 and from 1600 until 2030 each day over the ship's RBO system. At 1900 a program of Task Force and world news continued to be a popular feature.

One happy hour was staged while the ship was returning to Yokosuka after completion of the first tour on the line. Another happy hour was staged while enroute to Yokosuka upon completion of our 2nd tour on the line. One Air Force variety show from Guam played on board while the ship was in Yokosuka. All attending enjoyed the performance greatly. Several divisional parties were held at the EM club or at Japanese establishments in Yokosuka.

In Port recreation included four (4) sightseeing tours; two to Tokyo and two to Kamakura. More tours will be conducted in port as the demand continues. More than sixty officers went to Fujiya Hotel for a 72 hour period of rest and recreation. Somewhat over 10 percent of enlisted personnel went to a rest camp or a rest hotel while the ship was in Yokosuka. Arrangements are in the making for rest camps and hotels on an extensive scale during the ship's next in port period. The Cruise book, which the ship expects to publish on the Far Eastern Cruise is beginning to take shape. Arrangements for printing in Japan have been made. It is planned to have the book ready for distribution during the trip back to the U.S.

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(PART V Continued)

i. Hobby Shop

Despite the low stock of hobby supplies from the states, an increasing number of men are working on hobbies. These men are taking advantage of the workshop and meet regularly to work and discuss new ideas. An exhibit of hobby crafts was on display in hanger bay #1 on 5 Dec. 1952. This included leather carving, model building, photography, sketches, drawings and plastics. After we reach Yokosuka all builders of U-control flying models plan to fly their planes at the base athletic field. The total Hobby Shop sales has dropped considerably due to the lack of supplies. Notice has been received of two large orders of model kits and supplies, but they have not yet been delivered. The hobby program is an excellent morale factor for the crew and could be expanded in many directions as space and supplies permit.

2. Casualties.

See PART VI, paragraph 6.f.

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PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Air Department

a. Flight Deck. Extended air operations during cold weather, and the resultant fatigue and discomfort of personnel, has required that flight deck operations be conducted with a minimum number of personnel for each of the various evolutions during a twenty-four hour period. Night respots were accomplished with three (3) handling crews. Early morning heckler launches were conducted with one (1) crew, three directors, and half of Repair Eight on deck as long as an immediate ready deck was not required.

The pilots ability to see the plane directors was greatly improved by sewing yellow flourescent cloth on the sleeves and fronts of the director's foul weather jackets. This served a twofold purpose of aiding the pilots, and provided increased protection for the directors from the wind.

b. Arresting Gear. During this period, the total number of arrested landings was 1683 and only two (2) barrier engagements occurred.

One barricade engagement (F2H-2) took place during the period. An excessively pitching deck was the primary cause of the accident. The nose was high as the plane approached the barriers and as a result proper barrier engagement did not occur. At the last possible moment, P13 was engaged, but this did not prevent the aircraft from continuing on into the barricade. The runout of the purchase cable was slight (four feet starboard and two feet port). The pilot was uninjured. Damage to the aircraft was slight, and the plane was in an "up" status the following day.

c. Catapults. During the period of this report there were no accidents caused by malfunction of the catapults. One F9F suddenly caught fire on the track after being "fired", and subsequently ditched. There were 1129 aircraft launched during this tour on the line. Of these, 866 were jets and 263 were conventional aircraft. Total number of launches on the Port Catapult was 563 and on the Starboard Catapult was 566.

The F9F forged eye pendant is currently being used with excellent results. This was accomplished only after ensheathing all bungee strands inside a suitable length of fire hose to protect the strands from being cut between the shuttle toe fitting and pendant at the end of the brake stroke. The forged eye has been striking the shuttle causing dents in both shuttle and eye.

A decrease in the crews efficiency due to the awkwardness of winter clothing has increased the catapult launching interval slightly.

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(PART VI Continued)

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d. Maintenance.

* (1) Electronic shop. This ship has received several radio receivers AN/ARC-1 from destroyers in Task Force 77 for routine maintenance and repair. To facilitate transfer, a system has been put into effect whereby a standard AN/ARC-1 radio is set up on the frequencies used by the destroyers and turned into the ship aviation supply storeroom. This set is then available to the destroyer on an exchange basis.

With the help of the ship's electricians, an indicating light was installed in the electronic shop to register whenever the ship's 400 cycle AC generator is operating. This eliminates the possibility of the ship's system operating when the current isn't being used.

(2) Electric Shop. The electric shop has experienced some difficulty with the 28.5 volt D.C. Homelite Auxiliary Power Units in that the battery vents are in an exposed position and are continually being broken. They are made of plastic and there are no spares available. With the help of the metal shop, metal battery covers have been manufactured locally and installed on all Homelite APU's.

* (3) Parachute Loft. Survival gear. The large end of an R2800 engine container was placed under the electric hoist on the after end of the hanger deck and filled with water. The pilots then used these facilities to test out their survival suits. It is not only a good way to test the suits for leakage but also serves to refresh the pilots in ditching and recovery by helicopter. Mae Wests were inflated with the parachute harness in position. The helicopter sling was lowered into the water by the hoist and the pilot was hoisted clear of the water in the sling. The operation was highly successful.

(4) Engine Shop. Quick engine change units were built up as follows:

R-2800	3
R-3350	2
J-34- TE -34	3

Jet engines are left in the shipping container until needed for an engine change.

(5) Metal Shop. The metal shop personnel constructed a wire mesh tool cage on the hanger deck for stowage of special engine build-up tools. Another cage was completed in the engine stowage compartment for stowage of accountable winter clothing being held for Air Department personnel.

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(PART VI Continued)

e. Ordnance Handling Equipment. Seven new Aero Mod 12B Bomb Skids with adapters Mods 8B and 9B were received on 3 December for test and evaluation.

f. Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditures.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Gasoline (gal)</u>	<u>Lube Oil (gal)</u>
28-31 October	44,985	87
1-30 November	858,601	3406
1-6 December	1,450	0

g. Oxygen-Nitrogen Plant. Operation of the oxygen-nitrogen plants during the operating period was satisfactory. Oxygen production figures are as indicated below:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
28-31 October	20,764 SGF
1-30 November	72,188 SGF
1-6 December	None

2 Engineering Department

a. Main Propulsion. The most formidable problem facing the main propulsion group is that of maintenance. This vessel is operating with a task force under difficult engineering conditions. The combination of heavy aircraft and light winds has required the ship to operate 17 days of the 38 day period at speeds in excess of 25 knots for flight operations. This demands an availability of auxiliary machinery to an extent such that even emergency repairs must be done at night or on replenishment days. Since departure from San Diego, the longest period this vessel has had for maintenance has been six days in October, with the prospect of nine (9) days in December. In order to perform even the minimum maintenance, particularly cleaning of boilers in these short periods, it is necessary to work some sections of the department on shifts during rest and recreation periods. The plant experienced one propulsion casualty during this operating period. On completion of the forenoon strike launch at about 0800, 27 Nov 1952, at a speed of 29 knots, a mechanical failure of the differential regulating valve in No. 3 main condensate system caused a loss of deaerating tank head pressure, resulting in loss of feed booster pressure in No. 3 and No. 4 firerooms. Personnel on watch handled the casualty effectively and no damage to machinery resulted. Propulsion was restored to the after plant in approximately thirty (30) minutes; the ship was brought up to 29 knots for succeeding launches with no difficulty.

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(PART VI Continued)

b. Electrical. No major casualties were experienced in the electrical equipment. Continuous maintenance and minor repairs were conducted without difficulty, except in the IC section where heavy attrition losses of experienced maintenance personnel has occurred.

c. Auxiliaries. During a routine inspection of the port steering unit, the oil seal insert on the motor end of the HS pinion shaft was found cracked and partially crumbled. This unit was put on standby service. Inspection of the starboard unit revealed identical cracking, but to a lesser degree. Since the installation entails disassembly of the entire high speed pinion assembly both inserts will be replaced during the in port period at Yokosuka. Material Data reports will be prepared in accordance with existing instruction when details are known. These inserts are not allowance items nor are sufficient details available in the instruction book to permit manufacture. Detail plans have been requested from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard by dispatch. No further major troubles have been experienced with the electro-hydraulic rearming at sea winches. Of interest, is the extreme difficulty of obtaining replacement parts for these winches. A status report from Inspection Material, Philadelphia, on a valve control block assembly ordered prior to deployment in August 1952, indicates the material will be delivered FOB the contractors plant in April 1953. It is doubtful if this part, needed now, will be available even at the next deployment of the KEARSARGE.

d. Damage Control. The difficulty previously reported, of maintaining a watertight flight deck is still present. Additional recaulking and pitching has been requested from SRF Yokosuka during the next in port period. The steel deck below the wood in the area of the catapult flash plating continues to leak badly. The presence of the embarked aircraft, and the short duration of in port periods in the forward area, limits flight deck repairs to patching and caulking only the worst areas. Complete repairs entail yard availability and this subject will be handled by letter to the type commander.

e. Electronics.

(1) General. No major difficulties were experienced with the electronics equipment during the past operational period. During replenishment days, as much equipment as the situation would allow was secured in order to bring up to date the preventative maintenance schedules and to correct any potential failures noticed during the time the equipment was in operation. Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal and routine in nature, except as indicated in the following paragraphs.

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(PART VI Continued)

(2.) Radar AN/SPS6B. The transmitter has been gradually settling on its mountings, causing a misalignment of the coupling where the wave guide joins the transmitter. Hence the standing wave ratio has increased to 1:1.54 causing a subsequent loss of power; as evidenced by ring time reading of 4200 yards. Realignment of the waveguide coupling by shimming up the transmitter has twice been accomplished (June and October 1952), but the transmitter settles over a period of time causing the misalignment to recur. This command will investigate the possibility of a flexible wave guide coupling to eliminate future misalignments. The side lobing mentioned in the previous action report has returned and retuning does not seem to be more than a temporary answer to the problem. On discussing the problem with field Engineers in this area (METU-5 & SRF, Yokosuka) they mentioned that this side lobing appears to be an inherent characteristic of AN/SPS6B antenna with the integral MK 10 IFF antenna. No further information is available at present.

(3.) MK25-3 FC RADAR. During operations on the line it was discovered that Director 52 radar would not shift from conical scan. The difficulty was found to be of a mechanical nature and was corrected by re-adjusting the balance spring and the female clutch lock in the scanner mechanism. Identical trouble was experienced with Director 51 during this period and was corrected as reported above. An intermittent high voltage arc (4.5 KV plus setting on HV variac) developed between the magnetron shield sub-assembly, apparently due to the loss of filament voltage. This was found to be caused by a malfunctioning of the 4 minute time delay relay which was breaking, but not making contact. Normal operation was obtained by adjusting the relay.

(4.) Radio. Inter-Ship interference between the VHF radio circuit continues to be the major electronic problem. As mentioned in the last action report, the interference is definitely "spill over" into receivers from shipboard VHF transmitters, with several cases of cross-modulation noted. Between the most active and important VHF circuits, (141.48 mcs, 142.56 mcs, 142.74 mcs 143.64 mcs and 145.08 mcs) the interference is such as to practically preclude full time simultaneous operation, in that received signals are blocked out or over-riden. As much as 4 volts of RF energy has been detected at the receiver antenna connection, and on one occasion a ME-11/u wattmeter needle has been unpegged by the RF energy from a shipboard transmitter. Transmitters tuned to 116.10 mcs and 121.5 mcs cause some interference with the above mentioned frequencies, key-clicks an occasional breakdown of silencer bias, but not enough of these difficulties have occurred to cause any concern. It has been noted that the interference from a particular transmitter affects higher channels considerably more than the lower ones, and not necessarily the "nearer" higher channel; ie-141.48 mcs can be read much louder and clearer on a receiver tuned to 145.08 mcs, than on a receiver tuned to 142.56 mcs. The type of equipment used seems to have little effect on the amount of interference experienced. It has been observed when using TDQ and RCK, or AN/ARC-1. Transmitter power output and receiver sensitivity and selectivity have their expected effect, but operational requirements practically "fix" these variables. Similarly, channel frequency selection is fixed.

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(PART VI Continued)

(4) Radio Continued

Antenna selection, as expected, has the most marked effect on interference levels and for any one case of interference, possibly two, the interference can be eliminated, however only at the expense of creating it on another channel. The ship's force has been unable, to date, to find an antenna combination that is an all-around improvement. With the proposed shift to UHF in the immediate future, the ship's force went to considerable trouble to set up similar interference problems in the UHF band for study. Very little or no interference was noted, even between adjacent channels. At present, it appears that the only answer to the problem is the maximum physical separation of receiving and transmitting VHF antennae, utilizing multi-couplers to reduce the number of antennae; or the allocation of widely separated frequencies to each of the various commands; or a combination of both. On completion of the forthcoming inport period on 16 Dec 1952, a full letter report on radio interference will be submitted to the type commander.

3. Gunnery Department

a. Ammunition re-supply.

(1) Replenishment was accomplished six times during the period:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>	<u>AVERAGE TON PER HR.</u>
11-3-52	U.S.S. CHARA (AKA 58)	102	85
11-7-52	U.S.S. CHARA (AKA 58)	228	99.1
11-11-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	176	97.2
11-19-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	295	84.3
11-24-52	U.S.S. PARICUTIN (AE 18)	365	97.2
11-28-52	U.S.S. TITANIA (AK 13)	137	60

b. Ammunition Handling Problems.

(1) During the period of this report no major difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition. Minor difficulties are still being experienced with the presently installed interim winches. Through the continued efforts of the Engineering force the winches have been kept in an operational status but with a slower rate of operation.

c. Recommendations.

(1) That the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVL 33) alteration request No. 7-52 be given strong consideration. This request recommends changes at No. 3 loading station. It is believed that by making these changes the tons per hour loading at this station could be greatly increased and that an added improvement in safety to personnel and equipment would result.

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(PART VI Continued)

5. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

a. Combat Information Center.

(1) Operating Procedures. CIC continued to function as the Flag CIC until 25 November, when tactical command was shifted from ComCarDiv FIVE to ComCarDiv ONE in the BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). CIC functioned primarily as air control center for TF 77 from 25 November to 4 December, since the Flag Ship was without air search radars during this period. During normal operations Strike and CAP controls were assumed alternately every other day, and on days of CAP control, strike flights were monitored in case strike control needed to be assumed without notice. From 25 Nov to 4 Dec all air control was assumed, with only an occasional relinquishment of CAP control to a destroyer or cruiser.

Strikes were under positive control with each flight identified at all times between the beach and the Task Force, with the range of control averaging about 70 miles and reaching as far as 100 miles. Positive control and identification was usually accomplished with the combined use of SPS-6B radar, MK 10 IFF, and communications, the latter by using a combination of TDQ transmitters, AN/ARC-1 receivers, and the URD-2 receiver.

The entire period continued to hold the same routine pattern of continuous strikes against land targets from 0400 until 2000, except for the defensive measures taken against enemy aircraft on 18 November. On 17-18 November strikes were conducted against major targets in Northeastern North Korea. The northernmost position of the force was at 41-33N. At 1310 I and for a duration of two and one half hours, enemy aircraft became very active in the seaward areas to the north, approaching to within 25 miles of the force. Effective and continuous radar tracking was accomplished as far as 120 miles against jet and prop targets. One successful interception was made against MIG-15's by the ORISKANY, at 40 miles distance with two enemy aircraft destroyed. A second interception against prop aircraft at a distance of about 45 miles failed due to the lack of altitude determination. A third interception, against MIG-15's, was accomplished by this ship at 45 miles but CAP was broken off when the enemy retired. Difficulty was experienced in breaking CAP off from combat due to fading communications.

This was the first time this ship has experience a true combat situation against enemy aircraft in the vicinity of the force. Coordination of CIC with Flag and with the CIC's of other ships appeared good. CIC changed its mode of operation from surveillance of strike flights to a local combat situation with no appreciable difficulty and with little change in internal organization. It is believed that continuous air defense drills for the past few months have been most productive in this respect.

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(PART VI Continued)

(1) Operating Procedures (continued)

This period comprised the second tour on the line for this ship. It is believed, from the experience gained, that the following major factors are requisite to the efficient operation of CIC:

- (a) Sufficient personnel to man all positions without undue doubling of functions performed by individuals.
- (b) An efficient and cooperative ER division of the Engineering Department.
- (c) Constant training of all enlisted men in more than one CIC function, and assignment of enlisted men to positions of responsibility and control, thereby stimulating interest and raising morale.
- (d) Close cooperation between ship and Flag CIC watch officers without restrictive regard to demarcation of command.

This ship has experienced the advantages of all these factors.

(2) Equipment Performance. The SPS-6B radar was continually used whereas the SX was kept in standby as much as possible to reduce maintenance difficulties and always insure the availability of one air search radar. SPS performance has been excellent although major reliance still is made on IFF for the tracking of jet aircraft. On 18 November SPS performance in tracking MIG-15's was amazing, with reliable tracking reaching 120 miles. The pips on the scopes, reflecting flights of about 6 aircraft, were large and were seldom lost. This was a rare performance and is believed to have been due to atmospheric conditions aloft. Abnormally large side lobes continued with the SIS when operations were near land masses. It is believed that this may be caused by the integral installation of the IFF antenna with that of the SIS.

The SG-6B radar has been reliable except for excessive sea return during heavy weather. The antenna labors considerably in winds above 40 knots.

The SX Height Finder performance was extremely poor, with a maximum reliable range of only 30 miles.

(3) Communications. The scope of operations during this period was not great enough to overtax available circuits. VHF communications were barely acceptable for the type of operations being conducted, due to the lack of sufficient range and due to the excessive feed-over and mutual interference on the ship between difference frequencies. Considerable experimentation has been conducted with VHF equipment to eliminate feed-over. (See Part VI, Par 2.e.(4)). This places communications in a dilemma since it is absolutely essential to get range and also to minimize feed-over. A compromise has not been found. It is believed that a minimum acceptable range for reliable communications is 80 miles. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the frequency range of transmitters, receivers, and antennas is being seriously limited by present installation design.

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(PART VI Continued)

(4) PERSONNEL. The state of training has progressed much more rapidly than was thought possible. This ship reached the line in September with less than 10 percent of enlisted men and only one officer having previous CIC experience and less than half of the non-rated men had any formal CIC training except for a short course in elementary basic functions at CIC Team Training Center, San Diego. There was little opportunity for actual operations prior to September, except for routine ship control functions, routine air control during CarQuals, and mock battle problems. Therefore, the real training conducted has been on the line in Korea. At the end of this second period on the line, it is believed that the air control functions of CIC are very efficiently performed. The Surface Control functions are continually improving.

Sixty-two enlisted watch standers were employed in two heavy sections of 24 men each for air operations and one light section of 14 men for the night watch. Officers included the CIC Officer, three CIC Watch Officers, three air controllers, and three Surface Control Officers. Three men filled a position in AA Control, which is in excess of actual CIC requirements. Flag requirements necessitated the full utilization of eight men. It is considered that the above is the minimum required for efficient CIC operation. A further reduction in personnel will eliminate essential positions and will result in a proportionate loss in efficiency.

Two Ensigns were transferred from CIC to other departments in accordance with the policy of rotating Ensigns every six months. Two Ensigns were received from the Gunnery Department. The new officers are assigned to regular surface watches but stand duties under close supervision for the first month.

One Ensign from a destroyer was trained as Day air controller during the period, and one officer from the Gunnery Department was qualified as air controller. Operations seriously limit training in all weather air controlling.

b. Communications.

(1) Postal Affairs. The volume of postal business conducted by a relatively small Postal Section is such that continual supervisory attention, liaison, and aid is required. About 1800 money orders are issued monthly totalling thousands of dollars, most of which is handled immediately after pay days. About 80 bags of mail, mostly parcel post, leaves the ship each replenishment day. The supply of mail bags becomes a problem which was barely solved by taking 100 empty sacks to sea, where the bulk of gift packages are presented for mailing. It was found that replenishment ships do not carry empty mail sacks for other than their own use. With due regard to Christmas shopping, in addition to the normal heavy souvenir purchasing, it is planned to have not less than 200 mail sacks on board prior to our ~~next~~ departure for the operating area.

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(PART VI Continued)

(1) Postal Affairs continued.

With the aforementioned volume of mail, attendant supplies become critical. It is recommended that the Fleet Post Office, Yokosuka, be equipped to issue money order application forms, lead seals, custom declaration forms, other similar supplies, and to sell stamps in bulk to ships in port. At present, each ship must arrange for and procure these items from the Army ^{Fleet} Post Office at Yokohama, with the attendant transportation and communication difficulties.

By keeping all hands advised of the postal situation at all times via the Plan of the Day, complaints from embarked personnel and their coorespondents have been rare. An interest and understanding of the difficulties encountered in the forward area has been engendered. Especially important, for information of the crew, has been the time normally required for deliver of air and surface mail and parcel post to the U.S., recommended wrapping, customs information, and special fees.

Distribution of incoming Parcel Post at the rate of 80 to 300 bags at a time has been accomplished in a matter of hours by extending the limits of the Post Office to include the Hanger or Mess Decks as convenient, and calling upon properly instructed division Mail Petty Officers to aid in sorting and distributing mail.

(2) Visual Signalling. Nancy signalling at night, difficult under ideal circumstances, becomes unfeasible except for the shortest of plain language messages with the onset of extremely cold weather. Physical discomfort combined with inadequate equipment reduces operating abilities to a point of diminishing return. It is strongly recommended that binocular type Nancy receivers be designed and issued to alleviate the universal eye-strain problem now encountered in all Nancy method signalling. This vessel is equipped with types C-3, C-3A, and CAM type receivers. The latter have proven to be completely without value. It is recommended that procurement and Navy issue thereof be discontinued. A separate letter will be written on this subject.

The inter-task force Ultra High Frequency Radio Teletype net continues to prove its value, especially during hours of darkness and in view of the above remarks.

(3) Registered Publications. Rapid supercession of cryptographic publications plus the extended period of this command on the line necessitated transfer by mail of certain registered publications. Repetition of these circumstances is probable. The effecient, rapid response of the Registered Publications Office at Yokosuka to a message request for superceding publications was noteworthy.

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(PART VI Continued)

(3) Registered Publications continued.

General messages announcing emergency supercession of cryptographic publications are promulgated by deferred message. Due to the large volume of high-precedence traffic handled both by this vessel and relaying commands, little advance notice was actually received in the operating area, and in some cases, notification was received after the effective date of a new edition.

This vessel has been designated as a Minor CRF and has been called upon to furnish services, under emergency circumstances while in the operating area. In each instance, problems have been satisfied by the close attention of officer-personnel to equipment available, and transfer of entire ECM units where a few minutes work by trained enlisted personnel would have repaired minor difficulties. Each problem of this type requires a destroyer to come alongside twice for underway transfer of ECM's with accompanying inconvenience to the entire task force. Further, it is considered most undesirable to transfer this equipment at sea. It is recommended that continued vigorous attention be given to the lack of qualified crypto-repairmen in the fleet. Local shore activities require a minimum of 30 days to service an ECM, which is unacceptable considering the short in-port periods experienced in this area. Noteworthy also, with regard to this problem, is the fact that this vessel, as a flagship, employs two ECMs continuously while on the line with a third in use about eight hours per day, seven days a week. The ideal solution to the cryptographic problem is considered to be the transfer of a crypto-repairman with tools and spare parts kit by helicopter to commands requiring these services.

(4) Radio. The message traffic volume continues to average 250 to 260 messages per day with more than half of these messages classified. In addition, the Force Flagship relays all ship to shore traffic for vessels composing Task Force 77. The efficient handling of traffic at this volume is feasible only by:

- (a) Reduction of message traffic to an absolute minimum.
- (b) The use of radio teletype for shipshore and shore-ship traffic.

Radio teletype continued to prove its value. It is considered that communication effectiveness would drop 25 to 50 percent without the CTF 77-Radio Tokyo duplex RATT circuit and the intra Task Force (heavy ships only) UHF RATT simplex. The latter circuit reduces visual signalling to a role of minor importance employed for relatively un-important messages of low precedence, and for use with destroyers which are excluded from circuit T6 by equipment and manpower limitations.

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(PART VI Continued)

c. Photographic Laboratory. During the last in-port period mechanically defective K-20 cameras, K-17 magazines and a K-17 lens cone were sent to the photographic laboratory, NAS, Atsugi for repairs. Repairs were not effected due to the lack of spare parts. If a competent camera repair school graduate had been assigned to the ship it is felt that some of these cameras and magazines could have been put into operation by an interchanging of parts by the ship's photographic laboratory.

Supplies were ordered and received from Fleet Activities, Aviation Supply depot in sufficient quantity to fulfill all needs during this operating period.

There were a total of sixty seven photographic sorties flown, shooting a total of one hundred forty one rolls of aerial reconnaissance film from 30 October 1952 to 29 November 1952. The photographic laboratory delivered 24,261 9 X 18" Sonne' prints, 4,985 9 X 9" Sonne' prints, 191 plot chart negatives, 1427 plot chart prints, 723 negatives of aerial mosaics, 5009 8 X 10" prints of aerial mosaic negatives, 79 18 X 22" enlargements of aerial mosaic negatives in addition to prints and negatives for public information, RUDM's and identification of personnel.

d. Air Intelligence. This second tour on the line has been free of all but minor difficulties. It is believed that adequate and proper planning prior to departure for forward areas, can assure this result in all cases.

In almost each instance, it has been possible to have all intelligence materials, i.e. brief notes, mosaics, charts, plotted flak, etc., available for Squadron AIO's by 1930 each evening for the next day's operations. This has allowed the flight leaders to make preliminary plans prior to actual briefings.

The following diagram illustrates a satisfactory method to facilitate Squadron AIO's procuring the latest intelligence available prior to each briefing.

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AIO's
READ & INITIAL

(The upper part of this board is used for intelligence of a static nature pertaining to all operations, an entire period of operations, or of a general nature presented primarily for background information. All must be read and initialled by Squadron AIO's and may be checked out for use in Ready Rooms.)

ACTION

FLAK

BOMBLINE

CAS

FRIENDLY SHIPPING

(This portion of the board supports 10 clip boards for dispatches on the indicated subjects. Each dispatch must be read and initialled by each Squadron AIO prior to his briefing. It is essential that officer personnel enter the time of actual receipt on each dispatch.)

INFORMATION

WEATHER

CVA 33 FLASH
REPORTS

OTHER CVA
FLASH REPORTS

AIR PLAN

Briefing Intelligence Board

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(PART VI Continued)

5. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) Availability

2,928 items requested, 2,804 items furnished from stock or 95% of all items requested. Of the 124 items not in stock, approximately 57% represented items for direct turnover.

(2) AOG Requests

AOG requests totaled 30 items. Other Carriers on the line furnished 7 of these items.

U.S.S. KEARSARGE CVA-33

AOG REQUESTS 28 OCTOBER THROUGH 4 DECEMBER

	H	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	TOTAL
	0	4	4	9	2	2	D	D	D	D	
	S	U	U	F	H	H	4	4L	4N	4W	
	3	4	5N	2	2	2P					
NOT ON ALLOWANCE		8			5	5	1				19
NIS		5	1			1	2				9
FLEET CONTROLLED		1	1								2
TOTAL	0	14	2	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	30

(3) On 30 November a salt water main in the main Aviation Structures Storeroom (C-414-a) ruptured, covering the deck with approximately two (2) inches of salt water. All material contacted by salt water was quickly removed, and washed with fresh water; steel surfaces were also oiled. No loss of material was involved.

(4) Line replenishment by U.S.S. CHOURRE ARV 1. 231 requisitions for 477 items were submitted to the CHOURRE between 29 October and 19 November. 206 items or 43% were furnished by the CHOURRE on line replenishment 19 Nov.

(5) Recommendations

It is recommended that advance notice be given of fleet freight to be received during replenishment. An estimate of cube, weight, and number of pieces of such freight, 24 hours in advance of replenishment would greatly facilitate plans for handling and stowage. This matter will be handled by separate correspondence.

b. Provisions

(1) When receiving provisions at sea, damage and breakage of boxes and crates has been excessive. Most canned goods, celery, lettuce, tomatoes and

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(PART VI Continued)

oranges have been delivered in regular commercial containers. The lettuce crates are much too weak to stand the strain which is imposed on them in the nets when being handled from the reefer ship. Many paper containers are opened at the top, split, torn, and crushed in this same process. A heavier overseas pack of all provisions would be extremely helpful in preventing waste when receiving these stores at sea. It was noted during a recent provisioning at sea that V-3 type paper cartons with wire bands hold up unusually well. Large quantities of items such as tomatoes, lettuce and celery have had to be surveyed as a result of rust and decay due to age and their poor keeping qualities.

(2) It was found to be expedient to prepare arm bands in various colors and combinations of colors for use by working parties. Working parties are assigned in units of eleven men - ten men and a petty officer in charge. The men place the colored arm band on their left arm and the petty officer wears two of the same color - one on each arm. Thus, it is very easy for the officer or chief in charge of a particular operation to distinguish his men from other groups working in the same area. It is felt that replenishment has been accomplished more orderly and efficiently by employing this system of identification and responsibility.

(3) Percentage of provisions received on 3 November and 19 November from the U.S.S. GRAFFIAS were as follows:

Date	Tons <u>Ordered</u>	Tons <u>Received</u>	Percent <u>Received</u>
11/3	80	50	62.5%
11/19	136	59	43.4%
Totals	<u>216</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>50.9%</u>

(4) Common usage items such as lamb, grapefruit, American cheese, blackeye beans, tomato paste, blueberries, fruit cocktail, pineapple chunks, jams, jellies, vanilla flavoring, sweet pickles and ripe olives were NIS on 3 November.

White potatoes, tomatoes, grapefruit, apricots, fruit cocktail, jams, jellies, tomato catsup and sweet pickles were NIS on 19 November.

6. Medical Department

a. Medical Department supplies and equipment were replenished during the last inport period. This, together with receipt of a requisition from CLUSA provided adequate supplies and equipment during the operative period. No significant equipment breakdown occurred.

b. Medical Department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. It has been an arduous task to perform the requirements of the department with only 76% of allowance on board.

(PART VI Continued)

c. Medical Evaluation of the Air Group Pilots and Air Crewmen.

(1) The general health, well being and morale of the Air Group pilots and Air Crewmen was excellent for the first 21 to 26 days on the line. With the postponement of return to port there was general let down in morale but no significant alteration in physical well being or efficiency was noted.

(2) Despite the frequency of inclement weather and concomitant increase in upper respiratory infection, exceptionally few pilots and crewmen were grounded. Other illnesses or injuries were very minimal and did not create any medical problem.

(3) Definite mood swings were concurrently observed with combat casualties and successful encounters with enemy aircraft. With each of the four (4) pilots reported missing in action, a noticeable depression and uncertainty was observed. However, this reaction was of a relatively temporary and benign nature. With the completion of a successful mission or engagement with enemy aircraft, a definite resurgence of enthusiasm and vigor was noted.

(4) Although no problems of a significant nature referable to combat and its emotional sequelae were encountered, the prolonged period on the line did create some generalized unrest and languidness which replaced the initial vitality that existed during the first 3 weeks.

d. Medical Evaluation of Ship's Officers and Crew.

(1) In general, the health, well being and morale of the ship's officers and crew followed a pattern similar to that of the Air Group. No significant medical or psychologic problems, directly attributable to the ship's operations, occurred. However, unrest and languidness did become apparent with the prolongation of the operating period.

e. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company.

(1) Admitted to sick list.....	163
Total sick days out of 120,000 possible work days....	275
Officers admitted to sick list.....	6
Total patient visits to sick call.....	4210
Total medical treatments.....	8214
Patients received from other ships.....	2
Patients transferred to hospital.....	14
Number minor injuries treated.....	23
Number major injuries treated.....	2
Number shipboard injuries resulting in death.....	0
Minor surgical procedures.....	85
Major surgical procedures.....	4
Veneral disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total	
.....	114

Gonorrhoea 63

Chancroid 25

Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure.. 26

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(PART VI Continued)

Penicillin tablets issued during last in port period.....5400

- (2) Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing in action..... 3
- Planes lost, operational, pilot missing..... 1
- Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries. 1

- (3) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons..... 2
- Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation.. 3
- Pilot availability..... 98.8%
- Crewmen grounded for medical reasons..... 1

f. Description of Aircraft Casualties.

- 1 November LT Charles O. GLISSON, USN, VF-721, flying a F9F-2, BuNo 123586, enroute on strike mission over North Korea apparently developed engine trouble and presumably crashed into the sea. No other information was available. LT GLISSON was declared missing.

- 1 November LT Richard G. RIDER, USN, VF-884, flying a F4U-4, BuNo 97255, on a strike mission over North Korea was hit by enemy AA fire. His plane crashed into the ground in the vicinity of Chun-Chon. LT RIDER was declared missing in action.

- 8 November LCDR Frederick William BOWEN, USN, CO of VF-884, flying a F4U-4, BuNo 97100, on a close air support mission in the vicinity of Pyongyang, was apparently hit by enemy AA fire and crashed. LCDR BOWEN was declared missing in action.

- 21 November LCDR Robert C. HOPPING, USN, XO of VF-721, flying a F9F-2, BuNo 125145 on a flack suppression mission over North Korea, was hit by enemy AA fire and crashed about five (5) miles west of Yangdok. LCDR HOPPING was declared missing in action.

- 23 November LCDR D.W. DAVIS, USN, ditched his F9F-2, BuNo 127175, after it caught fire during a catapult launch. After two attempts he was rescued by helicopter suffering from immersion, laceration of the right wrist and a simple fracture of the right ulnar styloid. Encumbered by his Mark III exposure suit, he was unable to unbuckle his parachute or inflate his life vest and because of exhaustion he could not enter the helicopter yoke properly. Recommendations for a quick detachable parachute harness and revision of the helicopter rescue yoke were submitted with Medical Officer's Report of Aircraft Accident OPNAV FOHM 3760-22 (Rev 8-51).

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COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV FIVE
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS BATAAN (CVA-29)
USS RENOVATION (CVA-114)
USS BAIROKA (CVA-115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVA-116)
USS SICILY (CVA-118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVA-107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVA-119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVA-64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO
Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group NINETEEN

CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)

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SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
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JAN 21 1953

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 77 (CCD-5)
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 6 December 1952 to 8 January 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 101 Action Report for the Period 6 December 1952 to 8 January 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is submitted herewith:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period of this report the U.S.S. KEARSARGE, with Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, operated for various periods with the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), the U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9), the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), and with various heavy support and screening ships.
2. The U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52, CCD-5 Operations Order 6-52, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.
3. The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations Troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

- 6-16 DEC: Moored alongside Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka Harbor, Yokosuka, Japan
- 16 DEC: 0630 Underway from Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 OpOrder 6-52. 0806 Formed Task Element 77.01 with U.S.S. TWINING (DD-540) screen ship. SOPA ADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5. OTC CAPTAIN L. E. FRENCH, USN.

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- [REDACTED]
- 17 Dec: Proceeding to operating area. 1152 Conducted refresher air operations and special weapons exercises in accordance with COMCARDIV 5 dispatch 150106Z.
- 18 Dec: Proceeding to operating area. 0717 Rendezvoused with Task Force 77; Task Element 77.01 dissolved. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). OTC RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, CTF 77, in the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31). Heavies present U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124), U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9). 1304 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, arrived on board. 1321 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, in this ship, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. 1323 U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31) departed from Task Force. Conducted air operations.
- 19 Dec: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. 0710 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined formation. 0812 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, departed for U.S.S. MISSOURI via helicopter. 1140 U.S.S. MISSOURI left formation. 1857 U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124) left formation.
- 20 Dec: Conducted air operations. Anti-aircraft firing exercises conducted.
- 21 Dec: Conducted air operations.
- 22 Dec: 0658 U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124) joined formation. 0751 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined formation. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT. 0847 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, arrived on board via helicopter from the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63). Anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted. 1053 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, departed via helicopter for the U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63). 1103 U.S.S. MISSOURI departed from the TASK FORCE. SOPA R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5. 1108 LT.C. STILES, 477377/1310, USN VA 702, engaged barrier in AD aircraft Bureau Number 128928. Aircraft sustained Class "C" damage. No personnel injuries.
- 23 Dec: Conducted air operations. 1730 U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124) departed from the Task Force.
- 24 Dec: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. 1300 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) joined the Task Force. 1708 U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) departed from the Task Force.
- [REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED]
- 25 Dec: Conducted air operations. 1734 U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) departed from the Task Force.
- 26 Dec: Anti-aircraft firing exercises and Air operations were conducted
- 27 Dec: 0915 LT D.A. GRANDALL, 424643, USNR, VF 884, in F4U, Bureau Number 80966, ditched in water near formation due to engine failure. Pilot recovered uninjured. 1136 LTJG R.J. PETERSON, 521770, USN, VF 721, in F9F-2, Bureau Number 125117 engaged barrier. Class "C" damage to aircraft. No personnel injuries.
- 28 Dec: 0917 LTJG F.J. PESTER, 508336, USN, VF 721, in F9F-2, Bureau Number 123636, crashed in water near formation. Pilot recovered uninjured. 1135 Francis Cardinal Spellman arrived on board via aircraft from Korea. 1200 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the formation. SOPA VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT. 1353 Francis Cardinal Spellman departed via helicopter for the U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA-9).
- 29 Dec: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. 1603 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) departed from the Task Force. SOPA RADM R.F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5.
- 30 Dec: 1150 LT James F. LEE, 485810, USN, VF 11, in F2H-2, Bureau Number 125060, crashed about 15 miles West of WONSAN, KOREA while on scheduled combat mission. Pilot declared as missing in action.
- 31 Dec: Conducted air operations. 1436 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135) joined the formation.
- 1 Jan: Air operations cancelled because of weather over target area.
- 2 Jan: Conducted air operations. 0815 U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) joined the formation. 0320 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the formation. SOPA VADM J.J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT. 1626 U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63) departed from the formation. SOPA RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3. 1728 U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135) departed from the Task Force.
- 3 Jan: Anti-aircraft firing exercise and air operations were conducted.
- [REDACTED]

- 4 JAN: Task Force replenished from Task Element 92.11. Departed Task Force in company with U.S.S. MC DEEMUT (DD-677) for SASEBO, JAPAN in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 020948Z of January.
- 5 JAN: Anchored SASEBO, JAPAN at 0803. Departed SASEBO, JAPAN at 1459 proceeding to HONG KONG, B.C.C. in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 020948Z of January.
- 6 JAN: Underway to HONG KONG, B. C.C.
- 7 JAN: Underway to HONG KONG, B. C.C.
- 8 JAN: Moored HONG KONG HARBOR, B. C.C.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).
2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for AA practice.

5"/38

Projectile

Powder

197 AAC
16 VT Frag,

197 Non-Flashless
16 Non-Flashless

3"/50

620 Frag, VT.

Non-Flashless Powder

3. Performance of Ships Ordnance.

a. The performance of ships ordnance is considered excellent. There were no major material casualties. A few minor material casualties occurred on the 3"/50 Battery but were quickly repaired by Ship's Gunners Mates.

b. Some trouble was experienced with the Mark 29 Mod 1 gunsight. Replacements were quickly obtained. It is recommended that repair facilities be established in this area for the repair of the Mark 29 sights.

c. During "Warning Magenta" drills the ordnance equipment functioned excellently. It is estimated that 90 percent of targets were acquired outside of maximum gun range.

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PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship.

- a. The ship was not attacked and sustained no battle damage.
2. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).
3. Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.

a. Personnel.

(1) Personnel performance and morale has been excellent during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 1998 Navy and 58 Marines. There were 23 Navy enlisted men received and 7 transferred.

b. Legal.

(1) The number of Legal assistance problems has dropped off considerably. The number of unauthorized absences during the last in port period increased slightly. Two special courts-martial and six summary courts-martial were held during this period.

c. Education.

(1) Personnel aboard the KEARSARGE have demonstrated a continued interest in improving their educational background during the present tour of duty on the line. Twenty-one GED tests and end-of-course-tests have been administered, sixteen USAFI correspondence courses have been applied for, and forty-six educational manuals have been checked out. Thirty-five applications for Navy correspondence courses have been mailed and seventeen have been completed. Sixty-three men have been interviewed in an effort to assist each with his individual educational problem.

(2) Classes in elementary education were continued. A new class in Basic Mathematics was organized and attendance records indicate a steady interest in this program.

(3) The training room has been in constant use. In addition to the one hour periods utilized for professional advancement instruction and billet training, Catholic Rosary services are held daily and Protestant Bible Class meets weekly in this compartment.

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d. Divine Services.

(1) The number of Divine Services scheduled and normally conducted during each week was twenty six (26). The Christmas Holidays swelled the total number of divine services held on board. On Sundays three Catholic Masses and a Rosary Service are held, and three Protestant Services and a Latter Day Saints Service are conducted. On week days a Catholic Mass is said daily by the Catholic Chaplain at 1630 and Rosary Services are held at 1845. A Protestant devotional Service is held each week day from 1240 to 1300.

(2) On Christmas Eve a Protestant Carol Service was conducted at 2130 and a Catholic High Mass was held starting at 2400. On Christmas Day, 25 December 1952, three Divine Services were held for Protestant men, and an additional Mass for Catholic men. On the afternoon of 25 December both the Chaplains went to Destroyers for Divine Services. On 26 and 27 December both Chaplains conducted divine services on two additional Destroyers operating with Task Force 77. Transfer of the Chaplains was effected by highline and helicopter.

(3) On Sunday 28 December 1952 Francis Cardinal Spellman said a Mass in the Ship at 1200 while on his Christmas tour of the Korean front areas.

(4) On New Year's Day two divine services were held by both Chaplains.

(5) In addition to the above a Protestant Bible Class meets each Tuesday and a Latter Day Saints Class meets on Thursday. A Protestant Memorial Service was conducted for a pilot lost during the last operating period.

e. Welfare and Recreation

(1) A Christmas party for 57 under privileged Japanese children was held on board on 14 December 1952 in Yokosuka, Japan. A committee composed of members of the ship's company supervised the outfitting of the children at a Department Store in Yokosuka on 13 December. Each child received a new outfit of clothing including shoes and coat. On Sunday 14 December the children came on board in their new clothes for the noon meal and a party at which they were each given a Christmas present of toys and a bag of candy.

(2) On Christmas Eve, 24 December 1952, a Christmas concert was given on board by the KEARSARGE Glee Club.

(3) During the period on the line there was an average of 22 movies per week shown. Reading constituted an equally engrossing form of activity. The library issued an average of about 45 books per day. Several dozen new title Navy pocket, paper bound books were circulated.

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e. Welfare and Recreation continued.

(4) Daily Press News and three issues of the ship's paper were published.

(5) Approximately three hundred twenty copies of magazines were received and distributed. A new supply of small games have been received and distributed. The disc jockey programs, Task Force and world news continue to be a popular feature.

(6) Another happy hour was held enroute to Hong Kong. During our last inport period many divisional and squadron parties were held. Sightseeing tours were conducted as before and approximately 580 enlisted men went to Rest Hotels or Rest Camps.

f. Hobby Shop.

(1) The Hobby Shop still is a drawing card for many of the personnel on board. As new shipments of material are received aboard notices are published and the supply is sold immediately. The hobby program is a stimulating morale builder.

2. Casualties.

a. See PART VI, Paragraph 6.6. .

PART VI.

COMMENTS

1. Air Department.

a. Flight Deck. With the coming of cold weather, it was found necessary to set up an ice and snow crew to be on call any time during the night to clear the deck prior to the morning launch. This crew is composed of two tractor drivers to operate the brush and snow plow, one plane pushing crew and an Air Department Officer in charge.

b. Arresting Gear. The total number of landings for this period was 2,122. Total barrier engagements consisted of two (2) conventional and two (2) jet type.

On 27 December 1952, an F9F-2 was brought aboard after sustaining damage when a hung bomb inadvertently released from an altitude of 300 feet. The only information known prior to the landing was that the aircraft would have to be brought aboard flaps up. The approach speed was approximately 130 knots, with 40 knots of wind over the deck, resulting

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b. Arresting Gear Continued.

in an actual landing speed of 90 knots. The hook contacted P8 but was torn from its mount due to damage received by the bomb blast. The aircraft engaged B2 but failed to successfully engage B3, possibly due to its excessive speed. Complete arrestation was accomplished only after the aircraft engaged the barricade, producing a barricade purchase cable runout of three (3) feet.

c. Catapults. No major difficulties were experienced during this period on the line. There were 364 launchings made on the Port Catapult and 351 launchings made on the Starboard Catapult. These figures break-down to 637 jet aircraft and 78 conventional aircraft launched.

The packing gland and packing "blew" out of the cable tensioner on the Port Catapult, slightly expanding the gland. The cause has not been determined.

d. Maintenance. Continued difficulty has been experienced with a catapult tieback rings entering the intakes of J34 engines. It is believed that this trouble will be eliminated when all the intake screens have been modified in accordance with Technical Order Number 92-52.

e. Ordnance Handling Equipment. On 3 December 1952, seven new AERO 12B Bomb Skids with Adapters Mods 8B and 9B were received for test and evaluation. The evaluation was conducted during carrier based operations which utilized these Skids day and night continuously for a period of nineteen days. Report will be submitted by separate correspondence.

f. Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditures.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Gasoline (Gallons)</u>	<u>Lube Oil (Gallons)</u>
16 Dec - 31 Dec 52	678,000	2223
1 Jan - 5 Jan 53	111,685	257

g. Oxygen-Nitrogen Plants. Operation of the Oxygen-Nitrogen Plants during the operating period was satisfactory. A total of 53,179.5 Standard Cubic Feet of Oxygen was produced for the period 16 December to 31 December 1952.

2. Engineering Department

a. Electrical. Only one casualty of any note occurred. A zero ground was recorded in the low speed winding of the 40 H.P. motor for the 5500 lb. lower stage bomb elevator A-535. Considerable difficulty was encountered in removing the motor as its location required removal of structural

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(Part VI Cont.)

interference and installation of handling padeyes. Inspection of the stator windings revealed that the old glyptol insulation had become brittle and cracked allowing one coil to ground to the frame and burn open, and cause damage to the two adjacent coils. Since no repair facilities will be available during this vessels next upkeep period at Hong Kong, a technical availability was requested from COMSERVRON-3, and the stator was left on the U.S.S. DELTA at Sasebo for rewinding and return to the ship either at Hong Kong or at the next replenishment on the line.

b. Electronics.

(1) General. There were no major difficulties experienced with electronics equipment during the past operational period. Replenishment days are being utilized to bring preventative maintenance schedules up to date, and correct any malfunction of equipment that cannot be secured during operations. Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal, except as indicated in the following paragraphs.

(a) SG-6B RADAR. The antenna appears to be dragging on the half cycle into high winds. A complete examination is to be conducted during our in-port period. The difficulty appears similar to that reported by the U.S.S. TARAWA (CVA-40) in Electronics Installation bulletin No. 343.

(b) AN/SPS-6B RADAR. Settling of the transmitter foundation as reported on page 14, para 2 U.S.S. KEARSARGE Action Report 20 October to 6 December 1952, necessitated realignment of the waveguide coupling into the transmitter. It has been discovered that this misalignment caused excessive failure of internal components due to mismatching and that the overall efficiency and capabilities of the system were not realized. Recurring trouble within the AFC circuit has necessitated constant manual tuning until the system could be de-energized for corrective maintenance. The repairs were well within the scope of ships force and normal operation was restored. The major portion of corrective maintenance concerned the AFC circuit.

(c) RADIO. Intra-ship VHF radio interference as reported on page 14, para 4 U.S.S. KEARSARGE Action Report 20 October to 6 December 1952, still continues to be a major electronics problem. There has been no change in this situation since the last action report.

(2) SUPPLY. No major electronics equipment has been out of commission due to lack of electronics repair parts.

3. Gunnery Department

a. Ammunition re-supply.

(1) Replenishment was accomplished as indicated below:

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(Part VI Cont.)

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>	<u>AVERAGE TON PER HR.</u>
12-19-52	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	156	114
12-27-52	USS TITANIA (AK-13)	343.7	62
12-29-52	USS PARICUTIN (AE-18)	330	135
1-4-53	USS TITANIA (AK-13)	246	93

B. Ammunition Handling Problems.

(1) During the period of this report no major difficulties were experienced in the handling of ammunition.

C. Recommendations

(1) None.

4. Operations Department

a. Communications

(1) Personnel

The rated personnel situation continues to deteriorate in spite of a stringent training program. Experienced personnel are detached for RAD, expiration of enlistment, and transfer to other commands with replacement by inexperienced strikers from radio school, or seamen drawn from other divisions of the ship.

Radio school graduates continue to prove the value of their training. Their full attention to subjects presented at school allows them to progress much more rapidly than is possible on board ship.

(2) Radio

The present cruise represents the first time since arrival of this command in Far East Waters, that departure from the Japan Area has been taken. It has been forcibly brought to the attention of communication personnel that NDT Radio Tokyo cannot be worked directly on a long-range ship/shore net. Traffic for the NavFe command must be transmitted to NPO, Radio Sangley Point, or NPN, Radio Guam, for relay to the Tokyo Area.

Communication traffic volume continues at the high rate previously reported. As experience is gained at all communication levels, the traffic is handled with more facility, though continuous alertness and energy on the part of all hands is of the essence.

(3) Material

Lack of crypto-repair personnel continues to hamper communi-

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(Part VI Cont.)

cation functions. Though this command is designated as a minor crypto-repair activity, the lack of any qualified personnel will not permit efficient upkeep of the crypto-facilities of this command, let alone of other ships of the force. Area-wide shortage of qualified personnel is apparent.

(4) Registered Publications. Messages announcing the compromise and supercession of crypto-key lists are often received within hours of the effective time of the new publication. The delivery of such messages, carrying deferred precedence, could easily have been delayed several more hours, with the result that a compromised key list would have been employed. The time difference between Wash., D.C. and the Korean Operating Area, the large volume of high precedence traffic extant in this area, and the preponderance of encrypted messages, are contributing factors in late delivery and should be anticipated to the maximum extent.

The efficiency and speed of issue of required registered publications by RPMIO NO. 3 in the USS PIEDMONT (AD 17) at Sasebo, Japan was noted with pleasure and appreciation.

(5) Postal Affairs. It has been found desirable to maintain on board at least 100 empty U.S. mail bags, with this number considered to be minimum upon leaving foreign ports. The number of gifts, souvenirs, and curios accumulated and presented for mailing by personnel is phenomenal. Important and interesting mail statistics are as follows:

Incoming Mail: 80 to 100 bags per replenishment, including 10 to 15 bags of first class.
Outgoing Mail: About 4,000 letters daily plus packages in widely varying number up to 90 bags or crates per replenishment.
Money Orders: Sales average 1800 per month of total value of approximately One hundred thousand dollars.
Stamp sales: About \$3500 per month with heavy volume in 6¢ airmail, when not in the free mail area, and in large denominations for package mailing.

b. Air Intelligence

(1) The replenishment of maps which is normally handled in a most satisfactory manner by the ANO representative from COMFAIRJAP Atsugi, becomes somewhat more difficult when the ship puts in to any port other than Yokosuka. It is recommended that, when possible, AIO's anticipate such occurrences and arrange to order sufficient supplies during the inport period in Yokosuka for two tours on the line.

(2) During the last tour, the Air Intelligence Office was called upon to assist in the implementation of the ship's information program in connection with the coming visit to Hong Kong. It is suggested that all AIO's become thoroughly familiar with the requirements for such programs as laid down in CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 1560.1 prior to departure Continental Limits of the United States of America, and procure all available intelligence including city plan maps etc. of major Far East ports. This procedure will greatly expedite the necessary work in preparation of briefs and brochures of useful information.

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(Part VI Cont.)

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5. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) Availability

Of 1,164 items requested, 1,140 were furnished from stock. This represents 98 percent of all items requested.

(2) ACOG Requests

ACOG requests totaled 11 items. Other carriers on the line furnished 3 of these.

USS KEARSARGE CVA-33

ACOG REQUESTS 7 DECEMBER THROUGH 5 JANUARY

H	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	
0	4	4	9	2	2	D	D	D	D	
3	U	U	F	H	H	4	4L	4N	4W	
S	4	5N	2	2	2P					TOTAL

NOT ON ALLOWANCE				1	1	5		2		9	
NIS			1			1				2	
FLEET CONTROLLED										0	
TOTAL	0	0	0	1	1	1	6	0	2	0	11

(3) The F4U-4 continued to be a difficult plane type to properly support. While no new ACOG requests were received during this cruise on the line, BuNo 80848 remained ACOG for an R82-CV-VS-40248 Sliding Section from 17 November until 13 December.

(4) The assistance of COMFAIRJAP in screening parts available on stricken aircraft has been found most valuable, this is particularly true in the case of code M and ML items for the F4U-4.

(5) The KEARSARGE was able to support other carriers on the line to the following extent:

12 items supplied of which 10 were to fill ACOG requests.

b. Commissary

(1) Replenishment of provisions in Yokosuka from the USS Graffias AF-29 and the USS Merapi AF-38 were expedited by allowing the provisions to remain in the cargo nets when placed in the delivering boats. The handling of provisions in this manner increased the efficiency of the operation.

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(Part VI Cont.)

The total time and man hours required were reduced and damage to the containers lessened due to the reduced handling. The cooperation of the receiving ship is of prime importance for all cargo nets must be returned immediately for re-use.

(2) Recommendation---Provisions, clothing, ship's store and other items which lend themselves to net operations be allowed to remain in the nets for hoisting aboard by the receiving ship.

c. Disbursing

(1) A difficulty encountered was the inability to obtain MPC's and Yen prior to reaching Japan. This necessitated a complete change of U.S. currency into MPC's and Yen after arrival in Japan. The Disbursing Officer spent the first half-day in port procuring and verifying this money. Four officers were busy for two full days effecting the transition. Considerable delay in granting liberty was necessary for only U.S. dollars were available upon arrival.

A similar problem will exist at the time of leaving the area. It will be more difficult for the disbursing officer, because everyone will want to keep his MPC until the very last minute before turning it in. Under existing instructions MPC's must be turned in by the disbursing officer prior to the ship's departure from the area. Another problem is that of not permitting the exchange of Yen for U.S. currency upon departure.

In a vessel of this size several days are required to effect a complete change of currency from one kind to another.

(2) Recommendation---

1. That MPC's and Yen be made available either stateside or at Pearl Harbor for vessels scheduled to go to Japan or areas where U.S. dollars are not acceptable currency.

2. That authority be granted to exchange MPC's and Yen for U.S. currency during the return trip to the United States and the Disbursing Officer be allowed to turn it in at the first port of call--- either Pearl Harbor or the continental United States.

6. Medical Department

a. During the operating period no significant shortages of medical department supplies occurred. However, due to the sudden onset of a great number of influenza type illnesses, antibiotic usage rates exceeded all other operating periods.

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(Part VI Cont.)

b. With the detachment of two hospital corpsmen, near the end of this operating period, detachment of two others during the last in port period and the receipt of three corpsmen at the beginning of this operating period the medical department personnel situation remains at approximately 75 % of allowance.

c. Medical evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Officers and Men

(1) In general, the morale of all personnel, including the Air Group pilots, was excellent during this operating period. This improved morale situation is attributed entirely to the relatively shorter operating period and serves to emphasize that three weeks is the optimum time for a tour on the line.

(2) Because of the great number of influenza type illnesses coupled with numerous common colds and upper respiratory infections, many pilots and other personnel were incapacitated during the first 12 days of this period. At one time 20 pilots were grounded and many other personnel were admitted to the sick list.

(3) With the marked increase in respiratory infections among the pilots, it was observed that many AD and F4U pilots were reluctant to seek therapy in fear that by being grounded they would be putting undue hardship on their squadron mates. This situation was rapidly corrected and the attitudes toward grounding altered when a CTF-77 dispatch put a limitation of one combat mission per day for each AD and F4U pilot, unless otherwise directed. With the fear of imposing a burden dispelled, early therapy was instituted and there was a noticeable decrease in pilot morbidity.

d. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

- (1) Admitted to sick list..... 151
- Total sick days out of 95542 possible work days..... 331
- Officers admitted to sick list..... 10
- Total patient visits to sick call.....3797
- Total medical treatments.....6520
- Patients transferred to hospital..... 23
- Number of minor injuries treated..... 26
- Minor surgical procedures..... 31
- Venereal disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total 64
 - 1. Gonorrhoea 36 Chancroid 18
 - 2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure 10
- (2) Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing in action..... 1
- Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries 2

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(Part VI Cont.)

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(3) Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons.....	32
Pilots indefinitely grounded pending medical evaluation	2
Pilot availability.....	90.5%
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons.....	2

e. Description of Aircraft Casualties

(1) On 12-27-52, LT D. A. CRANDALL, 424643/1315, USNR, VF-884, flying an F4U-4, BuNo 80996, ditched near the task force because of engine failure. He was rescued by helicopter and suffered only from mild strain and exposure.

(2) On 12-28-52, LTJG F. J. PESTER, 508236/1310, USN, VF-721, flying an F9F2, BuNo 123636, ditched following a flame out. He was rescued by helicopter and suffered mild abrasions of the face and strain of the posterior cervical muscles.

(3) On 12-28-52, LT A.L. HOVDE, 466589/1315/USNR, VA-702, flying an AD-4 on a combat mission over Kasong was hit by enemy ground fire. A piece of shrapnel pierced the floor plate of his plane and imbedded itself into the skin of his right foot. The shrapnel was easily removed, the wound was cleansed and dressed and LT HOVDE was returned to duty.

(4) On 12-30-52, LT J.F. LEE, 435810/1310, USN, VF-11, flying an F2H-2, BuNo 125060, on a combat mission, crashed over North Korea after apparently being hit by enemy ground fire. LT LEE was declared missing in action.

L. E. French
L. E. FRENCH

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group
COMNAVFE Evaluation Group
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRHAWAII
Naval War College
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV FIVE
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN
USS ESSEX (CVA-9)
USS BOXER (CVA-21)
USS BONHOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)
USS BATAAN (CVA-29)
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)
USS BAIROKA (CVE-115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
USS SICILY (CVE-118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO

CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA-15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)
Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group NINETEEN

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U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA33
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061
MAR 15 1953

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE (CTF77)
(2) Commander Carrier Division THREE (CTF77)
(3) Commander Seventh Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the Period 8 January to 28 February 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group 14 Action Report for the Period 8 January to 28 February 1953
(2) USS KEARSARGE summary report of operations during deployment in WESTPAC
(3) Carrier Air Group 14 summary report of operations from 14 September 1952 to 28 February 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a) the subject report is submitted herewith:

PART I


COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

1. During the period of this report the USS KEARSARGE, with Carrier Air Group FOURTEEN embarked, operated for various periods with the USS ORISKANY (CVA34), the USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45), the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47), and with various heavy support and screening ships.
2. The USS KEARSARGE (CVA33) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order 2-52 plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.
3. The assigned mission of the force, in support of the United Nations Forces in Korea, was interdiction of supply and transportation facilities and close air support of United Nations Troops.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

8-16 Jan: Moored to Buoy Number 1, Hong Kong Harbor, Hong Kong, B.C.C.



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Part II Continued

- 16 Jan: 0638 Under way for Korean operating area, in accordance with CTF 77 CONFIDENTIAL dispatch 120154Z of January. 0753 USS DEHAVEN (DD-727) and USS LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) joined up. SOPA is RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5. OTC is CAPTAIN L. E. FRENCH, USN. 1100-1403 Flight operations were conducted.
- 17 Jan: Enroute to Korean operating area. 1000-1139 Flight operations were conducted. 2240 USS DEHAVEN (DD-727) and USS LYMAN K. SWENSON (DD-729) were released.
- 18 Jan: Enroute to Korean operating area.
- 19 Jan: Enroute to Korean operating area. 0639 USS LAWS (DD-558) joined up.
- 20 Jan: Enroute to Korean operating area. Replenished from Task Unit 92.1.1. 1625 Joined Task Force 77, heavies present: USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45). SOPA and OTC is RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3.
- 21 Jan: Combat air operations. 1221 USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) joined the Task Force.
- 22 Jan: Combat air operations. 0853 An F9F aircraft discharged one round of 20 MM ammunition upon making a normal arrested landing, fatally wounding a plane director on the flight deck. 0929 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77, relieving RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, COMCARDIV 3. 1143 USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) departed from Task Force.
- 23 Jan: Combat air operations. 0925 Anti-aircraft firing exercise conducted by the Task Force. 1100 pilot CDR., D. P. PHILLIPS, USN, Commanding Officer VF-11, crashed at 29-16 N, 127-15 E; pilot declared missing in action.
- 24 Jan: Task Force replenished. 1708 USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) departed from Task Force.
- 25 Jan: Combat Air operations. Anti-aircraft firing exercises conducted by Task Force. 0628 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) Joined Task Force. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COM SEVENTHFLT. 1655 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) departed from Task Force. SOPA RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5.

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Part II Continued

- 26 Jan: Combat air operations.
- 27 Jan: Combat air operations. 0633 USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) joined the Task Force. 0927 USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) departed from Task Force.
- 28 Jan: Combat air operations. Anti-aircraft firing exercises conducted by the Task Force. 1006 USS TOLEDO (CA-133) joined the Task Force. Transferred helicopter UP-30 to the USS TOLEDO. 1036 USS TOLEDO (CA-133) departed from Task Force. 1520 USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) joined Task Force. 2045 pilot, LT. F. C. ANDERSON, USNR, VC 35, air crewman SCHMID, JOHN R., AT3, USN, VC 35, failed to return from night heckler mission. Pilot and crewman were declared missing in action.
- 29 Jan: The ship replenished fuel oil and aviation gasoline but was unable to receive ammunition on board due to rough seas. 0740 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, arrived on board by helicopter from the USS MISSOURI (BB-63). SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT. 0745 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the Task Force. 0805 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, departed by AD aircraft for Korean Airfield, K-16. SOPA RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5. 1633 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT arrived on board by AD aircraft. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN. 1715 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, departed by helicopter for the USS MISSOURI (BB-63).
- 30 Jan: Task Force completed replenishment. Combat air operations. 1730 USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) departed from Task Force. 1811 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) departed from Task Force. SOPA RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5.
- 31 Jan: Combat air operations. 0620 USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47) joined the Task Force. 1601 CAPTAIN THURSTON B. CLARK, 61379, USN, arrived on board by COD aircraft for duty as prospective commanding officer.
- 1 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 2 Feb: Combat air operations. Anti-aircraft firing exercises conducted by Task Force. 0636 USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) joined the Task Force. 1720 USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) departed from the Task Force.
- 3 Feb: Task Force replenished. 1345 USS TOLEDO (CA-133) joined the Task Force.

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Part II Continued

- 4 Feb: Combat air Operations. Anti-aircraft firing exercises conducted by Task Force. 0001 Air Group 101 redesignated Air Group 14, in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 03110 of 23 December 1952.
- 5 Feb: Due to unfavorable weather only 2 sorties were flown.
- 6 Feb: Combat air operations. 0757 CAPTAIN THURSTON B. CLARK 61739/1310; USN, relieved CAPTAIN LOUIS E. FRENCH, 60380/1310, USN, as commanding officer of this vessel. 1355 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the Task Force. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT. 1427 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, and VADM W. V. SOHN, and COMMODORE KUK MO JOUNG, ROK Navy, arrived on board by helicopter. 1650 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, departed by helicopter for the USS MISSOURI (BB-63). 1808 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) departed from Task Force. SOPA RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5.
- 7 Feb: Task Force replenished: 0815 VADM W. V. SOHN and COMMODORE KUK MO JOUNG, ROK Navy departed by COD aircraft to Korean Airfield, K-16.
- 8 Feb: Combat air operations. 1500 pilot LTJG., DONALD H. HAGGE, USN, VA 145, shot down in North Korea at 38-23 N, 129-49 E; pilot declared missing in action.
- 9 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 10 Feb: Combat air operations. 0210 USS TOLEDO (CA 133) departed from Task Force. 0242 USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) joined the Task Force.
- 11 Feb: Task Force replenished. 1147 RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, assumed Tactical Command of Task Force 77. Commander Carrier Division 5 Administration transferred to USS ORISKANY (CVA 34) 1720 USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) departed from Task Force.
- 12 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 13 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 14 Feb: Combat air operations. 0840 RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, COMCARDIV 5, departed by aircraft. 1000 Pilot, LT., JOHN R. RALSTON, USN, VF 141, made 30,000th landing.
- 15 Feb: Task Force replenished.

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Part II Continued

- 16 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 17 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 18 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 19 Feb: Task Force replenished.
- 20 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 21 Feb: Combat air operations.
- 22 Feb 0815 USS MISSOURI (BB-63) joined the formation. SOPA VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, COMSEVENTHFLT, in the USS MISSOURI. 0949 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, arrived on board by helicopter from the USS MISSOURI. 1000 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, presented awards to Air Group and Ship's Company personnel. 1146 VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, departed by helicopter to the USS MISSOURI (BB-63). 1212 In accordance with CTF 77 CONFIDENTIAL dispatch 190740Z of February, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) detached from Task Force 77. Proceeding in company with the USS KIDD (DD-661) enroute YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.
- 23 Feb: Underway for YOKOSUKA, JAPAN. 1000 Launched 9 jet and 26 propeller aircraft to Naval Air Station, ATSUGI, JAPAN. 1600 Refueled the USS KIDD (DD-661). 1745 USS KIDD (DD661) detached and proceeded on duty assigned.
- 24 Feb: Underway for YOKOSUKA, JAPAN.
- 25 - 28 Feb: Upkeep Yokosuka Navy Yard, Yokosuka, Japan. Turnover to USS PRINCETON completed. At 1611 I 28 Feb underway for COMUS via Pearl Harbor.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. Expenditure and performance of Air Ordnance is contained in enclosure (1).
2. Expenditure of ship's ordnance.

5"/38

Projectile

98 AAC

Powder

98 Non-flashless

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Part III Continued

2. Expenditure of ship's ordnance continued.

3"/56

Powder

630 Frag. VT

Non-flashless

3. Performance of ship's ordnance.

a. The performance of ships ordnance considered excellent. Two major casualties developed on the 3" battery and one on the 5" battery. Mount 39 elevation amplidyne unit was placed out of commission due to grit and foreign matter lodging on the armature. The armature was removed and a light cut taken to remove rough spots. The elevation amplidyne unit on Mount 311 developed a foreign noise. The end bearings on the armature were renewed and the casualty rectified. The parallax servo motor in the elevation indicator regulator on 5" mount 56 burned out. The motor was replaced. The cause of this casualty is undetermined at this time. All repairs were effected by the ship's force.

b. During "Warning Magenta" drills the ordnance equipment functioned excellently. It is estimated that 90% of targets were acquired outside of maximum gun range.

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Ship.

a. The ship was not attacked and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

3. Damage inflicted on ship's aircraft is contained in enclosure (1).

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Performance.

a. Personnel.

(1) Ships personnel performance has been excellent and morale has in general been very good during the period of this report. During this period the average on board count of enlisted personnel was 2015 Navy and 60 Marines. There were 23 Navy enlisted men transferred and 52 received.

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b. Legal.

(1) In spite of increasing fatigue among members of the crew, disciplinary cases did not increase appreciably during this period.

(2) Legal assistance cases handled during this period decreased. The majority of these cases dealt with domestic relations.

c. Education.

(1) During the final tour on the line, personnel aboard the KEARSARGE continued to pursue their educational goals with unflagging interest. Seventy-five (75) GED and End-of-Course tests were administered, twenty-two (22) USAFI correspondence courses have been applied for and seventy-eight (78) educational manuals have been checked out. Ninety-one (91) applications for Navy Correspondence courses have been mailed. Two hundred-one (201) men have been interviewed in an effort to assist each with his educational problem.

(2) The training room has been in constant use. One hundred thirty-five (135) hours were utilized for professional advancement instruction and billet training.

(3) Since leaving CONUS one hundred forty-five (145) GED and End-of-Course Tests have been administered. One hundred eighty-seven (187) USAFI courses have been applied for and four hundred eighteen (418) educational manuals have been checked out. Eight hundred twenty-six (826) training courses have been distributed and three hundred forty-one (341) men have started Navy Correspondence Courses.

d. Divine Services.

(1) The number of Divine Services conducted each week continued at twenty six (26). This includes three (3) Catholic Services and a Rosary Service and three (3) Protestant Services and a Latter Day Saints Service on Sundays. Daily Catholic Mass at 1630 and Rosary Services at 1845 and daily Protestant Devotions at 1240 grew in attendance over previous periods.

(2) A Protestant Bible Class met each Tuesday and a Latter Day Saints Class each Friday.

(3) Protestant Memorial Services were held for two pilots missing in action and one enlisted man killed on board. A Catholic Requiem Mass was said for one enlisted man missing in action.

e. Welfare and Recreation.

(1) The average number of movies shown per week was twenty-one. Reading books was not as popular as previously. The library circulation was about 35 books per day. Navy paper bound pocket books continued to be in demand as usual.

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Part V Continued

e. Welfare and Recreation continued

(2) Daily Press News and two issues of the Ship's paper were published.

(3) Approximately four hundred twenty-five (425) copies of magazines were received and distributed. The disc jockey programs, Task Force and World News, continued to be popular.

(4) While the ship was in Hong Kong five (5) tours were organized for a total of three hundred thirty-four (334) persons.

(5) A troupe of Chinese entertainers staged a show on board on two (2) nights while in Hong Kong which was thoroughly enjoyed by all.

(6) Another happy hour was held enroute from the line to Yokosuka. Plans are being made for many divisional parties to be held at Yokosuka and Pearl Harbor, while enroute to the United States.

2. Casualties.

a. See PART VI, Paragraph 6.e.

PART VI

COMMENTS

1. Air Department.

a. Flight Deck. Snow flurries encountered during this period on the line brought forth a serious problem. The tractors were shorted out electrically and could not be readily started. It was found that graphite used in polishing the hangar deck collected on the ignition harness. This, plus the moisture from snow and rain completely short-circuited the ignition system. To prevent this from recurring, the tractors were dropped to the hangar deck after each night respot, and during any rain or snow showers when they were not actually towing aircraft. It was found that if the tractors were in operation during the snow or rain shower, the heat generated by the engine was sufficient to prevent shorting of the ignition harness.

b. Arresting Gear. During the period of this report there were two thousand one hundred eighty five (2,185) arrested landings. One of these resulted in a conventional barrier engagement.

One complete barricade engagement was made on 23 January 1953, in which neither of the jet barriers were engaged. The F2H-2 touched down at about P11 but did not engage P12 or P13. It engaged B2 with the nose low and B3 with the nose slightly high at a speed of approximately seventy (70)

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Part VI Continued

b. Arresting Gear Continued.

knots. The left landing gear was sheared off by one of the barrier cables just before the aircraft entered the barricade. Eight (8) engaging straps contacted the left wing while ten (10) contacted the right wing. The purchase cable **runout** was sixty (60) feet. Damage to the aircraft was substantial, but the pilot was uninjured.

c. Catapults. A total of one thousand three hundred eighty two (1382) shots were fired using both H-8 catapults. This figure breaks down as follows:

	<u>Port Catapult</u>	<u>Starboard Catapult</u>
No loads	9	0
Conventional Aircraft	86	79
Jet Aircraft	<u>578</u>	<u>630</u>
TOTAL	<u>673</u>	<u>709</u>

For a period of approximately ten (10) days, difficulty was experienced when taking tension on the port catapult shuttle. The cause was determined when the piston valve forward flange was removed during a check of the piston rings and rubber "O" rings. This disassembly revealed that the securing pin (AN-397-121) for locking the castellated nut (R9ONAF-A89909-13) of the piston valve was missing and the nut was backed off approximately six (6) turns. The pin, bent double and battered, was located in the launching gravity tank return line screen. The forward end of the ram and main engine cylinder were dented and slightly gouged, but not appreciably damaged. This explained the difficulty in tensioning the shuttle. A recommendation for a visual inspection of safety pins on piston valves of H-8 Catapults, has been sent to Commander Air Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, by Commanding Officer, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) spdltr 494 of 22 Feb 1953.

d. Maintenance.

(1) Mobile Equipment. The work load required to keep the tractors in a high state of readiness has increased. The Ford Ferguson Tractor was designed for use when relatively light-weight aircraft were being operated from carriers. This tractor can adequately handle the present-day heavier aircraft only when the towing is done in a low gear. Pressure of operations requires that towing be done at speeds in excess of that which can be obtained in low gear. To obtain the speed necessary with this light powered towing equipment, it is necessary to overstress the engine in order to shift to a higher gear ratio, thereby increasing the maintenance problems with this equipment. A separate letter will be written to recommend acquisition of new larger tractors.

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Part VI Continued

(2) Aircraft Maintenance. The embarked squadrons used almost as many engines during this period as all previous periods combined. The following engines were processed for installation.

J34-WE-34	5
J42-P8	3
R2800-32W	1
R2800-18W	4
R3350-26WA	5

e. Gasoline and Lube Oil Expenditure.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Gasoline (Gals.)</u>	<u>Lube Oil (Gals.)</u>
16 Jan - 31 Jan	433,170	991
1 Feb - 22 Feb	812,700	2,157

f. Oxygen-Nitrogen Plants. Operations of the oxygen-nitrogen plants during this operating period were satisfactory. A total of 103,963 S.C.F. of oxygen for the period 16 January to 22 February was produced.

2. Engineering Department.

a. Main Propulsion, Electrical and Damage Control. No casualties or derangements were experienced during this period. Maintenance continued to be limited to that which could be accomplished at night and on replenishment days while underway.

b. Electronics.

(1) General. There were no major difficulties experienced with electronics equipment during the past operational period. Replenishment days are being utilized to bring preventive maintenance schedules up to date and correct malfunctions of any equipment that cannot be secured during operations. Maintenance and technical difficulties have been normal except as indicated in the following paragraphs.

(2) SX RADAR. Excessive hunting was experienced in the level and cross level system of the Mark 8 Mod 4 stable element, causing intolerable vibration in the height system antenna. Inspection revealed excessive play of several thousandths of an inch in the stable element gear trains for both level and cross level. This play was removed by mechanical adjustment requiring removal of the gear box adjustment pins.

(3) MARK 25 MOD 3 Fire Control Radar. Considerable "out of service" time was experienced on both Mark 25 radar systems due to the failure of various components. The major trouble was the failure of the V-1 and V-2 tubes in unit 25B of the PP 572/SPG power supply, requiring the replacement of as many as eight (8) 393-A magnetron tubes in a period of two (2) days.

Part VI Continued:

(3) Mark 25 Mod 3 Fire Control Radar continued.)

The trouble seemed to point to faulty tubes as the only tubes which failed were old tubes manufactured by United Electronics Company. Since the 393-A tubes manufactured by Raytheon or Western Electric Company were obtained and installed, only routine troubles have occurred. Failures of many other minor components (resistors, capacitors, and tubes) were experienced during this period. The cause of these minor failures was felt to be the result of inter-action between components due to circuit unbalance when the 393-A magnetron tubes failed.

(4) Radio. Intra-ship VHF radio interference still persists as previously reported. No further action has been taken as it is understood the proposed shift to UHF frequencies will be effected in the very near future.

(5) Supply. No major electronics equipment has been out of commission due to the lack of electronics repair parts.

3. Gunnery Department.

a. Ammunition Re-Supply.

(1) Replenishment was accomplished three times during the period 16 to 31 January 1953 and five times during the period 1 to 22 February 1953.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TONNAGE</u>	<u>AVERAGE TON PER HR.</u>
1-24-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	273.6	102
*1-29-53	USS TITANIA (AD-13)	14	42
1-30-53	USS TITANIA (AD-13)	299	84
2-3-53	USS TITANIA (AD-13)	292	117
2-7-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	106.4	79
2-11-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	251	120
2-15-53	USS PARICUTIN (AE-18)	159	82.2
2-19-53	USS PARICUTIN (AE-18)	265	114.5

* Due to rough weather rearming on this date had to be cancelled. Rearming was completed on 30 February 1953.

b. Ammunition Handling problems.

(1) None

c. Recommendations

(1) None

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4. Operations Department.

a. Communications.

(1) Personnel.

Personnel in communications have profited greatly from preceding tours on the line and are now capable of handling greater traffic loads with less time consumed per message. Procedures have also become more standardized, particularly with repetitive types of messages. With the debarking of COMCARDIV FIVE staff, traffic volume, and the number of circuits guarded, was greatly reduced, permitting more training in other types of work in each man's rate. Lack of rated personnel continued to impair operational efficiency and effectiveness of training.

During this period no personnel were received or transferred.

(2) Equipment.

Radio and teletype equipment have been maintained in a good state of operational readiness, and breakdowns have been promptly and effectively corrected. There is no qualified teletype or crypto repair-man attached to the ship. Maintenance of teletype equipment during this last period on the line consisted mainly of removing the machinery from one teletype and using it in another. Only once during this period was traffic interrupted due to a mechanical breakdown.

(3) Postal Affairs.

During this period the Post Office handled 550 Bags of incoming mail, 108 bags of outgoing and 1225 money orders (\$53,995.00). The supply situation in regard to stamps, forms etc. remains unsatisfactory. The large amount of gifts and souvenirs sent home by Parcel Post, even after the Christmas rush, has continuously threatened to exhaust the ship's supply of stamps. The stamp allowance, although increased to \$10,000 in accordance with Para 6, section 20 of the Navy Mail Service Manual, has proved inadequate. Before returning to the Far East, an increase to \$15,000 will be requested. Replenishing the stamp and money order form supply can now be done only by mailing requisitions to the Postmaster, New York, New York which often takes five to six weeks. During this time the remaining part of the stamp allowance dwindles to practically nothing. In order to alleviate this situation, even with increased allowances, it is again recommended that fleet post offices at major fleet bases in the Far East be given an adequate supply of stamps to permit direct sale to fleet units.

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5. Supply Department.

a. Aviation Stores.

(1) Availability. 1,665 items were requested from Aviation Stores of which 1,648 were furnished from Stock. Availability from stock was 98.9 per cent.

(2) ACOG Requests 16 January 1953 to 25 February 1953.

ACOG ITEMS REQUESTED

	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	H	T
	D	D	D	D	4	4	9	2	2	0	0
	4	4L	4N	4W	U	U	F	H	H	3	A
					4	5N	2	2	2P	S	L
Not on Allowance	12	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	18
N I S	1	0	1	0	2	0	3	2	0	1	10
Total	13	0	1	0	4	0	6	2	1	1	28

Aircraft for Which ACOG Items were Ordered

A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	H	T
D	D	D	D	4	4	9	2	2	0	0
4	4L	4N	4W	U	U	F	H	H	3	T
				4	5N	2	2	2P	S	A
										L
4	0	1	0	3	0	2	1	1	1	

(3) The usage of engines on this cruise was high. At the end of the tour two F4U-4 were ACOG for R-2800-18W engines.

Engines Changed

J42-P8	3
R2800-18W	4
R2800-32W	2
R3350-26WA	3
J34-WE-34	10

13

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Part VI Continued

(4) The KEARSARGE, prior to its departure for CONUS, initiated a system which advised other CVAs on the line of the availability of aeronautical items believed difficult to obtain. On the basis of the KEARSARGE's experience, five hundred and eighty (580) such items were selected and published in stock number order listing nomenclature, aircraft type application, and the quantity then available. These lists were guard mailed to the USS ORISKANY, USS VALLEY FORGE, and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA, to be marked up and returned with any additional requests.

This procedure was well received by these ships, and over one hundred and thirty (130) items were thus supplied, approximately seventy-five per cent being transferred prior to leaving the line. The items supplied were exclusive of those items directed to be off-loaded by ComFairJapan.

b. Provisions.

Replenishment of provisions at sea on 20 January from the USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29) proved to be a highly successful operation. A total of 154 tons were requisitioned and 122 tons were received on board or 79.22%. It should be noted that of the 32 tons not received, the only highly desirable item not furnished was fresh tomatoes.

The transfer of 122 tons of provisions from the USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29) was completed in one hour and twenty minutes, or a rate of 1.525 tons per minute. This proved to be the most efficient transfer experienced by this vessel."

c. General Stores, Ship's Stores and Clothing and Small Stores.

Replenishment of subject stocks under the present system is accomplished during "In Port" periods. This works a hardship on vessels operating for periods in excess of four weeks. Stocks become depleted near the end of a cruise, and with limited availability during the next "In Port" period, it is difficult to replenish with sufficient stocks. Items marked "NIS" by mobile supply ships remain unfilled until the next time "In Port." It is therefore recommended that urgently required stores be consolidated with fleet freight, and at-sea delivery be effected for those ships operating for extended periods.

6. Medical Department.

a. Supplies were adequate and equipment functioned satisfactorily during this period.

b. There was no change in the previously reported shortage of hospital corpsmen.

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Part VI Continued

c. Medical Evaluation of Air Group and Ship's Officers and Men.

(1) Morale in general slumped somewhat because of the length of this period on the line. Pilots, particularly, had hoped that this final period might either be a relatively short one or at least broken by an in-port visit. The combat loss of the well-liked Commanding Officer of VF-11 on 1-23-53 dealt an early severe blow to morale.

(2) It became necessary to assign an additional daytime sleeping period for the gunnery mid-watch because of dawn and dusk alerts to prevent over-exhaustion.

(3) Although morale and exhaustion were factors of greater concern, due in part to the cumulative effects of previous periods, the health of all hands in general remained excellent. One accidental flight deck death, one serious foot injury, one case of active tuberculosis and two cases of conversion hysteria occurred during this operating period.

(4) From a purely personnel standpoint, as mentioned in previous reports, three weeks appears to be the optimum period for unrestricted operations. After three weeks, there has consistently been a decline in physical well-being and morale, particularly noticeable during winter operations. It is again recommended that favorable consideration be given to line periods not exceeding three weeks.

d. Medical Statistics.

	Current Period	Overall Period
Admitted to sick list.....	171	641
Total sick days.....	464	1368
Officers admitted to sick list.....	13	31
Total patient visits to sick call.....	4858	16677
Total medical treatments.....	5844	26818
Patients transferred to hospital.....	5	49
Number of minor injuries treated.....	22	127
Number of major injuries treated.....	4	20
Number of shipboard injuries resulting in death...	1	5
Minor surgical procedures.....	75	297
Major surgical procedures.....	4	20
Venereal disease cases and Non-Specific		
Urethritis total.....	52	300
Gonorrhea.....	12	146
Chancroid.....	5	61
Non-Specific Urethritis following sexual exposure.....	35	93
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered	0	1

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	<u>Current</u> <u>Period</u>	<u>Overall</u> <u>Period</u>
Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing in action.....	3	7
Planes lost, operational, pilot not recovered..	0	1
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, minor injuries.....	0	4
Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered uninjured.....	0	1
Planes lost, enemy action, crewmen missing in action.....	1	1
Planes damaged, enemy action, pilot injured....	1	2
Planes damaged, enemy action, crewmen injured..	0	1
Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons.	18	65
Pilots availability.....	96.3%	96.75%
Crewmen grounded for medical reasons.....	3	7

e. Casualties.

(1) On 1-22-53 Kay Sherrill PLATT AB3, USN, a flight deck director was instantly killed when he was struck by a 20mm shell which discharged from an F9F2 upon arrested landing.

(2) On 1-23-53 CDR Denny P. PHILLIPS, USN, CO of VF-11, while flying his F2H2 on a mission over North Korea, was shot down by enemy ground fire. CDR PHILLIPS was declared missing in action.

(3) On 1-28-53 LT Francis C. ANDERSON, USNR, pilot and SCHMID, John R. AT3, USN, crewman, VC-35, did not return from a night AD4N heckler mission. A comprehensive search failed to reveal any information as to their loss. LT ANDERSON and SCHMID were declared missing in action.

(4) On 2-8-53 LTJG Donald H. HAGGE, USN, VA-145, while flying an AD4 on a combat mission over North Korea, was hit by enemy ground fire. Although his parachute was seen to stream from the cockpit it is believed that LTJG HAGGE was not actually able to leave his plane. Intensive search failed to reveal any sign of LTJG HAGGE and he was declared missing in action.

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PART VII

Summary of Recommendations

1. Page 9 para. 1 c. Recommendation for a visual inspection of safety pins on piston valves of H-8 Catapults. Refer to USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) spdltr 494 of 22 Feb 1953.
2. Page 9 para. 1 d (1). Recommendation that tractors with greater power be acquired to replace the Ford Ferguson tractor. A report will be submitted by separate correspondence.
3. Page 12 para. 4 a (3). Recommendation that fleet post offices at major fleet bases in the Far East be given adequate supplies of stamps to permit direct sales to fleet units.
4. Page 14 para. 5 c. Recommendation that urgently required general, ship, clothing and small stores be consolidated with fleet freight, and at-sea delivery be effected for those ships operating for extended periods.
5. Page 15 para. 6 c (4). Recommendation that unrestricted operations on the line with TF 77 be limited to three (3) weeks where conditions permit.
6. Encl 2 pg 1 para 1 a. Recommendation that regular scheduled maintenance periods be considered in the preparation of operating schedules for ships operating in the latter two-thirds of their deployment.
7. Encl 2 pg 2 para 1. Recommendation that all plane captains attend a course in fire fighting, and V-1 and V-3 division personnel attend a refresher course prior to deployment.
8. Encl 2 pg 9 para 2 d. Recommendation that qualified crypto repairmen be assigned to deployed carriers designated as minor CRFs.
9. Encl 2 pg 10 para 2 e. Recommendation that greater advance notice or higher precedence be assigned changes to crypto systems, publications, and circuits.
10. Encl 3 pg 5 para 1 b. Recommendation that the Air Group complement of boatswain mates and ship servicemen be filled prior to embarkation.
11. Encl 3 pg 5 para 2. Recommendation that critical rates be frozen during the deployment of the Air Group.
12. Encl 3 pg 9 Photographic. Recommendation that the Center Camera bay of the F2H-2P be modified to take a high speed K-17, 6 inch camera.
13. Encl 3 pg 12 para 6. Recommendation that a waterproof radio speaker be installed at the LSO platform;

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PART VII Continued

14. Encl 3 pg 18 para 4. Recommendation that the leg straps on the parachute harness be lengthened.
15. Encl 3 pg 22 para 4 a. Recommendation that each squadron be authorized one (1) spare of each of the essential aircraft electronics equipments and the CAG be authorized two (2) spares to care for the VC detachments.
16. Encl 3 pg 24-25 para 1 and 2. Consolidated recommendation regarding aircraft electronics.
17. Encl 3 pg 14 para e. Recommendation for an RUDM Digest.



T. B. CLARK

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DISTRUBUTION LIST

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
CTF 77 (1) Advance
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group
COMNAVFE Evaluation Group
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
COMFAIRALAMEDA
COMFAIRHAWAII
Naval War College
COMCARDIV ONE
COMCARDIV THREE
COMCARDIV FIVE
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN
USS ESSEX (CVA 9)
USS BOXER (CVA 21)
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA 31)
USS PRINCETON (CVA 37)
USS ORISKANY (CVA 34)
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA 45)
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA 47)
USS YORKTOWN (CVA 10)
USS RANDOLPH (CVA 15)
USS HANCOCK (CVA 19)
USS BATAAN (CVL 29)
USS RENDOVE (CVE 114)
USS BAIROKA (CVE 115)
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE 116)
USS SICILY (CVE 118)
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE 107)
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119)
USS TRIPOLI (CVE 64)
Carrier Air Group TWO
Carrier Air Group FIVE
Carrier Air Group SEVEN
Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
Carrier Air Group FOURTEEN
Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN

Carrier Air Group NINE
Carrier Air Group TWELVE
Carrier Air Group NINETEEN
Carrier Air Task Group ONE
Carrier Air Task Group TWO
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CO, Composit Squadron THREE
CO, Composit Squadron ELEVEN
CO, Composit Squadron THIRTY FIVE
CO, Composit Squadron SIXTY ONE
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA 39)