

**ORIGINAL**  
U.S.S. ESSEX CV9  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

*Orig. In.*  
CV9/  
A16-3  
Ser: 093

**DECLASSIFIED**

30 September 1951

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet  
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

*OAR 296*

**FILE**  
15 JAN 1952

Subj: Action report for the period, 18 August 1951 to 21 September 1951

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS**

Encl: (1) CVG 5 Action report for the period 18 August 1951 to 19 September 1951

**DOD DIR 5200.10**

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 18 August 1951 through 19 September 1951 is hereby submitted:

**PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:**

1. During the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), COMCARDIV ONE, RADM J. PERRY, USN embarked: USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31): USS BOXER (CV21): COMCARDIV THREE, RADM W. C. TOMLISON, USN embarked: USS NEW JERSEY (BB62), COMSEVENTHFLT, VADM H. M. MARTIN, USN, embarked; USS HELENA (CA75); COMCRUDIV THREE, RADM. R. E. LIBBY, USN, embarked: USS TOLEDO (CA133): USS LOS ANGELES (CA135) and units of Destroyer Divisions 12, 51, 131, 132, 151, 171, and Escort Destroyer Division 11 and 21. OTC was COMCARDIV ONE.

2. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the east coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation Order No. 22-51, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was, primarily, to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea, which was advancing north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photo reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

**PART II CHRONOLOGY:**

(Particulars regarding loss of aircraft are covered in CAG 5 report.)

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PART II CHRONOLOGY

- 18 August 0600K - Underway from Yokosuka, Japan for combat operating area in accordance with COMCARDIV ONE dispatch 171154Z August.
- During the period 18 to 21 August, 1951, the ship was maneuvered to avoid typhoon "MARGE". Heavy swells resulted in slight damage to the ship. See PART IV.
- 21 August At 0014K, the ship experienced a roll of 25°. During the afternoon the Air group conducted familiarization flights. 2052K, USS ANDERSON (DD786) joined the ship as escort.
- 22 August Joined TF 77. Ships present included; USS NEW JERSEY (BB62), USS BOXER (CV21), USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31) and various destroyer divisions. Commenced combat air operations. No serious difficulties were encountered at this time or subsequently in meeting the operational commitments. This is attributed to the training afforded in the Hawaiian area with the Air Group embarked. OTC and CTF 77 was COMCARDIV ONE, (RADM J. PERRY) in USS ESSEX, (CV9).
- 23 August Conducted air operations. Afternoon portion of flight schedule cancelled due to weather. 0830K - Lost first aircraft and pilot, (Pilot LTJG FRANTZ) in F4U BuNo. 62920. Pilot became separated from Flight Leader over enemy territory in vicinity of Wonsan Harbor in instrument weather and was not seen or heard from thereafter.
- 24 August Conducted air operations. 0804K, 1 AD-4 Bu.No. 123987 lost power on take-off (Pilot ENS STRICKLAND) made water landing ahead of ship. Pilot rescued by helicopter.
- 25 August Conducted air operations.
- 26 August Conducted air operations. On pre-dawn launch, about 5 minutes after take-off, an AD-4N Bu.No. 124051 was observed to burst into flame in the air and crash. Pilot and one crewman (Pilot LTJG SMITH, and BLACH, P., ATAN) were not recovered.
- 27 August Replenished.
- 28 August Due to weather in target area and local weather conditions, launched only ASP flight.
- 29 August Conducted air operations.

- 30 August Conducted air operations. 2245K F4U-5NL Bu No. 124558 (Pilot LTJG KNOX) flew into water while on down wind leg of his landing pattern after completing a night heckler mission. Pilot rescued by screen destroyer.
- 31 August Conducted air operations.
- 1 September Task Force replenished and conducted AA firing practice.
- 2 September Conducted air operations. Lost 1 F4U-4B Bu No. 97530. Pilot ENS BATEMAN was forced to bail out after plane caught fire enroute to target area. Pilot was recovered by helicopter attached to shore bombardment unit in Wonsan Harbor. F2H's taken off all flights except CAP due to suspected catapult hook cracks.
- 3 September Conducted air operations. Lost 1 AD Bu No. 123967 and pilot (Pilot LT SISTRUNK) due to enemy action. Pilot was seen to crash approximately 15 miles inside enemy territory. Lost 1 F9F Bu No. 125122 (Pilot ENS ARMSTRONG). Control locked, due to enemy AA. Pilot was able to regain control of aircraft. Bailed out over friendly airfield, K-3. Plane crashed and burned.
- 4 September Conducted air operations. Lost 2 F9F's Bu No. 125102 and 127136 and pilots (Pilots LTJG BRANWELL and LTJG ASHFORD). Both aircraft crashed and burned in the vicinity of Maengsan.
- 5 September Task Force replenished and conducted AA firing.
- 6 September Conducted air operations.
- 7 September Conducted air operations. 0730-0830K conducted AA firing practice. 1 AD Bu No. 123990 was hit by enemy AA fire and was ditched off Wonsan Harbor. Pilot CDR GRAY was rescued by shore bombardment destroyer.
- 8 September Conducted air operations. Lost 1 F4U-4B Bu. No. 62974 due to enemy action; pilot LTJG WORKING was rescued by shore bombardment destroyer after flying his damaged plane from over enemy territory to the vicinity of Wonsan Harbor. Lost 1 AD Bu No. 123949 and pilot, LTJG PARSE due to enemy action. He was observed making a bombing run when his plane burst into flames, crashed and exploded in enemy territory, CU-6489. F2H's reassigned to all flights with no external ordnance however.
- 9 September Task Force replenished.

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- 10 September Conducted air operations.
- 11 September Conducted air operations. On landing, lost 1 F2H BuNo 124983 (Pilot LTJG TREADWELL) on taxiing from arresting gear, lost all braking power, plane rolled over side. Pilot rescued by helicopter.
- 12 September Conducted air operations.
- 13 September Task Force replenished. At 1500I launched recco, strike flights.
- 14 September Conducted air operations. At 1830I lost 1 ADW BuNo. 124762. Landing hook caught catapult bridle on take-off and bridle wrapped around vertical horizontal stabilizer. Excessive vibration set in and pilot was forced to ditch inside the screen. Pilot LT O'BRIEN and crewmen were rescued by helicopter and destroyer.
- 15 September Air operations were limited due to weather over the target area. Weather recco, CAP and ASP only flights launched.
- 16 September Conducted air operations. At 1823I F2H BuNo. 124968 (Pilot LTJG KELLER) with air brakes extended made an approach for a deferred emergency landing having been in a mid-air collision prior to return to the ship. Wheels touched deck but aircraft immediately became airborne, cleared all three barriers, landed forward on flight deck, and crashed into aircraft parked forward (starboard) on flight deck. Total loss of aircraft: 2 F2H BuNos. 234978, 124966, and 2 F9F BuNos 235131 and 125128, destroyed by fire. Personnel casualties included 3 known dead, 4 missing and 16 injured. Damages to the ship are listed in PART IV. However, damages did not prevent continued air operations, but all starboard catapult launches were discontinued until inspection and testing of the starboard catapult revealed no damage.
- 17 September Conducted air operations.
- 18 September Conducted air operations in the forenoon. At 1115I joined replenishment forces to replenish.
- 19 September Conducted air operations. At 0606I 1 AD BuNo 123991 (Pilot LT BRYANT) lost power on take-off, aircraft made water landing ahead of ship and sank. Pilot recovered by ESSEX helicopter. At 1712I ESSEX left formation in company with USS HELENA, CORTDES DIV 21 less USS WALLER, to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan for limited availability in accordance with COM7THFLT dispatch 130008Z September.
- 20 September Enroute to Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing practice with towed sleeves.

21 September Enroute to Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing practice. Arrived Yokosuka moored port side to Piedmont Pier - 1742I.

## PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.  
See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

20 MM	11,968 rds
3"50 Cal	1,478 rds
5"38 Cal	385 rds

3. Comment on Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.

a. 3 percent of the bomb vanes for 1,000 pound bombs were received with bad spot-welds. The vanes fell apart when tested for tightness. This is considered dangerous in that tail fuzes could be armed in the air.

b. Several bombs of all types were received with frozen nose and tail plugs, making it impossible to fuze them.

c. Mark 6 and Mark 8 parachute flares are received in double suspension. Single suspension must be jury-rigged. The suspension band received with these flares cannot be locked on the wing racks. Experienced two cases where aircraft dropped flares on the flight deck, one on an arrested landing, and one during a catapult launch.

d. Napalm powder received in lot #NY 51175 and NY 5884, manufactured by the Ferro Enamel Company, was in a lumpy condition, apparently due to moisture penetration. The color had turned a bright yellow. powder in this condition made a poor mixture and in most cases had to be jettisoned.

e. Mark 77 fire bombs are considered impractical for carrier use, especially when the reload time is short. These bombs require at least three men to assemble and considerable time to fuze. During the assembly, the slightest dent or scrape on the connecting surfaces causes leaks. Japanese tanks or Mark 12 belly tanks can be hung in 10 seconds, and filled in 7 to 10 minutes under normal operating conditions, and are inexpensive.

f. Bomb skids should come equipped with spare hold-down straps and chains.

g. Ships should have a bomb disposal officer and bomb disposal team on board. There have been several cases of fuzed bombs having fallen off aircraft on arrested landings. At present, there are no bomb disposal personnel assigned.

h. A number of 250 pound G.P. bombs have been received with suspension lugs that are unsuited for use with the Mark 55 bomb rack installed in the F4U-5NL, AD-2, and AD-N aircraft. The top angle of the suspension lug support bracket was too great to allow the bracket to be received and held by the recessed suspension hook of the Mark 55 rack.

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

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1. Ship.

a. No battle damage was sustained by the ship.

b. Enroute to combat operating area during period 18-21 August, ship encountered heavy weather and suffered following damages in the forecandle area:

(1) Seven 3"/50 ready service lockers were broken loose when sides of lockers separated from the locker bottom. One of these lockers was washed overboard.

(2) Twenty-two battle helmets were washed overboard.

(3) One protective clothing locker, type "A", complete with contents was washed overboard.

(4) One O.B.A. locker (H-O. B.A. capacity) was washed overboard. This locker had been emptied and the contents turned over to the repair locker.

(5) One-inch steam line (steam heat for secondary conn) was smashed.

(6) Empty case stowage bin located under mounts 32 (port side of bow) was caved in, one support member broken and another badly bent. The capacity of this bin has been decreased approximately 20%.

(7) Empty case stowage bin under mount 31 (starboard side) is caved in slightly, decreasing the stowage capacity approximately 2%.

(8) Two ring-type buoys washed overboard and one of the stowage brackets is bent and is not usable.

(9) The catwalk forward of secondary conn was caved in.

(10) Gasoline line and support brackets were bent out of line (port side).

(11) The forward MK 63 director (no.31) was slightly damaged and has been repaired by the ship's force.

(12) The two forward 3" mounts were only damaged to the extent that all inspection plates and all junction boxes were filled with salt water and had to be dried out. One inspection plate on mount 31 (train stop buffer) was slightly bent. All discrepancies on the mounts have been corrected by the ship's force.

(13) The MK 25 Mod 1 antenna mounting and the associated parts of the MK 34 Mod 6 radar which is part of the MK 63 Mod 11 gun fire control system was severely damaged and required replacement.

(14) The ladder leading to director 31 was slightly bent and has been straightened by the ship's force.

(15) Two life rafts, rectangular, balsam wood, twenty-five person capacity, with all associated equipment were carried away from storage at frame 42, port side.

(16) A split seam in the underwater hull in Compartment A-601-AE (chain locker), about two feet below water line.

c. As a result of the crash on deck 16 September the ship suffered the below listed damages.

(1) Approximately 500 linear feet flight deck planking burned.

(2) 1500 sq. feet of deck planking charred.

(3) 8 stanchions on forward starboard catwalk destroyed.

(4) 24 sq feet of catwalk damaged.

(5) 1 inclined ladder damaged.

(6) 155 feet (various size) of electrical cable damaged.

(7) 2 light fittings destroyed.

(8) 3 pr sound-powered phones destroyed.

(9) 2 junction boxes destroyed.

(10) 6 stuffing tubes destroyed.

(11) 150 ft. 1 and 1/4" gas hose destroyed.

(12) 1 quarter-inch gas nozel destroyed.

(13) 2 ship's twin 20MM gun mounts with MK 20 sights destroyed.

d. Damage inflicted on the enemy.  
See enclosure (1).

e. Damage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft.  
See enclosure (1).

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.

a. Performance of duty and morale has been excellent.

2. Casualties.

a. There were no personnel casualties suffered by ship's company personnel as a result of enemy action.

b. The plane crash and resultant fire which occurred on the flight deck on 16 September caused the following casualties among ship's company:

Two enlisted missing and presumed dead.  
Seven enlisted injured.

c. Total personnel casualties (ESSEX and Air Group 5)

	Dead	Wounded	Missing	Injured	Total
Officers	6	2	1	3	12
Enlisted	3	0	4	13	20
Total	9	2	5	16	32

Of the above casualties, the following occurred on 16 September when an F2H plane bounced over all barriers and crashed into parked planes on the forward end of the flight deck:

	Dead	Wounded	Missing	Injured	Total
Officers	1	0	0	3	4
Enlisted	2	0	4	13	19
Total	3	0	4	16	23

Of the sixteen injuries, fourteen were burn cases and three were fractures, one case having a fracture of the femur as well as extensive second degree burns. This case and one other burn case were classified as critical. Eight cases were serious and two of the remaining six cases required hospitalization. All cases were treated on board until 21 September, when the critical and serious cases were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan. All cases survived this period.

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering.

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

b. Steaming data.

(1) Miles Steamed 16 August (1200I) 19 September 12,643  
(2) Average speed 15.8 kt/hr

(3) Fuel oil received from tankers (gallons)	1,871,308
(4) Fuel oil delivered to destroyers (gallons)	457,726
(5) Fuel oil consumed by ESSEX (gallons)	1,830,806

c. Recommendations.

None.

2. Supply.

a. Aviation Supply.

(1) The current section B allowance lists are most useful as guides for quantities to be carried and a base of augmentation of items required under war-time conditions. Heavy operating schedules and damage to aircraft surfaces from anti-aircraft and small arms fire have necessitated constant revision of high and low limits on the following groups of items:

- (a) All aircraft surfaces.
- (b) Aircraft paints, waxes and hydrolube.
- (c) Nose wheel, main wheel, and main wheel struts.
- (d) Accessories, pumps and reservoir assemblies.
- (e) Firing assemblies.
- (f) Mark 55 bomb racks.

In addition to the above, there are a number of fleet-controlled items which require A.O.B. priority "A" procurement.

(2) The Aviation Stores Ship, USS JUPITER, has been able to supply about 71 percent of the items requested, excluding F2H-2 parts which are requisitioned directly from ASO, Oakland. The logistic support offered by the JUPITER is considered to be excellent. However, the AVS might be able to provide more complete replenishments by stocking selected parts not listed in the Section "B" Allowance List, since most AOG's aboard the ESSEX originate from a lack of parts not stocked nor intended to be stocked aboard a carrier.

(3) A list of high usage and short supply items thoroughly coordinated would be of value. However, operating experience with CAG 19 and CAG 5 and the receipt of marked-up allowance lists from other carriers indicates considerable variation in requirements. A screening process would be beneficial if the composite were promulgated.

b. G.S.K.

(1) No major replenishment of GSK stores have been made, or required. The only requisitions of any large quantities were submitted to the USS CASTER while in Yokosuka, upon first arriving in the Far East. Approximately eighty-five percent of the items requested from the CASTOR were furnished. None of the remaining fifteen percent of items not furnished were in the critical category.

(2) While at sea, a few critical items of the BuShips and Electronics spares have been obtained from other ships or received from the carrier on deck delivery plane (COD) after requisitioning from ComServDiv 31. The ESSEX has been able to reciprocate in furnishing like items to the other ships in the Task Force. This exchange between ships is most helpful and advantageous.

c. Ship's Store.

(1) Ship's Stores sales have averaged \$20,000 a month for the period reported on. The inventory limitation of \$125,000 requires greater velocity of turnover in the bulk stores and requires careful selection of stocks as well as exacting planning for replenishment of all items carried.

(2) The laundry is now operating on a 24-hour basis, 5 days a week. This work time has been reduced from a seven day round-the-clock work week and has resulted in a fresh water saving of approximately 35,000 gallons a week.

(3) Hours of operation of the Ship's Stores are from 0900 until 2030.

(4) A system of cigarette rationing has been in effect since commissioning date. Each man and officer is required to have a cigarette ration card which is issued by the Ship's Administration Office prior to making purchases of Tax Free cigarettes. These ration cards entitle each holder to purchase one carton of cigarettes per week.

d. Commissary

(1) No difficulty has been experienced in the Commissary Group. The logistic support in this area has been excellent. However, it is suggested that a list of available fresh fruits, vegetables, and new and uncommon items be furnished the operating forces as a basis for the submission of requisitions.

(2) Night rations are being furnished men actually engaged in night work. At present this involves only about 50 men. The ration consists of two meat sandwiches, one piece of fruit and a pastry ration. The ration is drawn by a member of the working group and is taken to the men at their stations. Coffee is furnished by the individual divisional coffee messes. Rolls, jams and coffee are served to one-half hour before flight quarters when early morning flights are scheduled. Cookies, cake, or toast and jam and coffee are served to the flight deck crew for 15 minutes after flight quarters on the evenings of late strikes. It is further planned to have hot soup available at the battle feeding stations for all flight deck personnel.

3. Air Intelligence:

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a. Physical equipment.

The Intelligence Office on the ESSEX is well equipped and air-conditioned. Working space is adequate but storage space inadequate. Communications consist of one ship's phone, one 2JG sound-powered phone and two intercom units; very adequate. One important change recommended is that sliding plywood floor to overhead chart boards replace the expensive cork panel on the after bulkhead.

A high degree of intelligence data is classified secret. This necessitates making most of the file cabinets secret. Recommend the large size safe be eliminated and two more file cabinets substituted.

Each ready room should have a small built-in partition and desk in the rear for debriefing and for the general use of the squadron AIO. This is necessary even to the extent of removing some rear ready room seats.

On ESSEX type carriers a window should be cut between the Intelligence Office and Ready Room Three so as to enable the teletypewriter to be seen by the AIO.

A space near the Air Intelligence Office should be designated for Photo Interpretation. Print Shop No.2 is now being used for this purpose. 1 file cabinet in the Air Intelligence Office can be set aside as photo files. A separate space should be provided for annotation. Part of the gunnery training room is not being used for annotation of prints.

b. Personnel.

Prior to arriving at the combat area the Intelligence Officer should be assigned two assistants. The Photo Interpreter should be one of these if his work does not require full-time photo interpreter work. It is not necessary for the assistants to have attended an intelligence school.

When in combat, a 24-hour watch is necessary in the Intelligence Office. This necessitates a minimum of three ship's enlisted personnel, all of whom must be able to typewrite.

c. Maps, Charts and Grids.

ComAirPac and CINCPAC did an excellent job in supplying maps and charts. The job of storage should be simplified if the operating area could be predetermined at ComAirPac and eliminate those maps and charts for which obviously there will be no demand.

d. Briefings Prior to Entering Combat.

The best method of obtaining combat information of intelligence operation in the area is to have one or two AIO go to the forward area on TAD orders. Such officers can either be Air Group or ship AIO's. The ESSEX did this and much valuable information obtained.

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e. Operations.

It is suggested that Intelligence Officers have free access to shore based intelligence activities. This policy was followed by the ESSEX in its pre-deployment period and from the results obtained, the time was well spent. It was found that by following the first alternative of Task Force 77 Air Intelligence Handbook "Suggestions for Responsibilities of Ship and Air Group AIO", misunderstandings were largely eliminated. Basically it involves separation of responsibilities rather than grouping all intelligence under one responsibility.

f. Target Dossier.

It was found that the usage of this material did not justify the time involved in keeping it up. It is suggested that distribution of such should be restricted to staff level.

g. Recognition.

The material available is adequate but the responsibility of instructing the appropriate ship's personnel should be that of the training officer. The Air Intelligence Officer should be responsible for only getting the material aboard.

4. Navigation.

Astronomical observations were taken regularly with occasional overcast sky conditions obscuring the horizon and celestial bodies. Radar navigational information has been excellent. Loran navigation has been usable only during the evening and morning sightings.

5. Communications.

GENERAL

Reporting on station in the operating area, ESSEX immediately relieved as task force flagship. The resultant increases in circuit guard responsibilities, in volume of radio and visual traffic, and in over-all demands placed upon both personnel and equipment called for a rapid and effective adaptation to the expansion of communication activities. Having obtained valuable information from reports distributed prior to arrival in the combat zone and receiving excellent assistance and worth-while suggestions from experienced staff and ship communicators of carriers (on the line and being relieved), the ship was prepared in no small degree for what might be expected of communications in the operating area. In general, those problems which were most difficult to solve were concerned with the preparation, routing and handling of messages. Ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, and ship-to-aircraft communications were highly satisfactory during this period. Conditions which have tended to qualify this evaluation are considered below. 27A conversion, as it applies to communications, has put ESSEX communications in a very favorable position to perform operational commitments. At the same time, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that an operational maintenance program is absolutely essential to optimum communications. The matter deserves the greatest consideration due to the almost continuous operation, especially in respect to MHF/HF transmitting equipment. Recommendations for improvement of

communications are indicated below.

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### CW CIRCUITS

The frequency allocation for communications with Joint Operations Control, Korea, leaves much to be desired. Under the present allocation, one CW frequency (D188) is available. Since this frequency is in the lower range of the HF band, it is not well-adapted to night (dusk-to-dawn) mission. Employment of the high frequency now used for voice communications with JOC would be ideal for this purpose.

### VOICE CIRCUITS

Recommendations have been made to the Fifth Air Force by the previous task force commander for a revision of the frequency allocation for the circuit with JOC, Korea. At present three voice frequencies are employed; only one (D189) is satisfactory. The high frequency mentioned above is only reasonably satisfactory.

In the VHF band, the frequency designated C4.2C appears to be employed for a number of purposes which has overloaded the circuit. The frequency is used as the screen common, secondary tactical, gunnery control, and administrative nets. It is recommended that the secondary tactical circuit, in particular, be assigned a separate frequency for that purpose alone. In the event of failure of the primary tactical circuit for maintenance, the burden on C4.2C becomes too heavy often creating confusion on an important circuit.

In Flag Plot it has been necessary to modify the pot-selector switches in order to make available in each of the speaker-amplifiers all circuits which can be remotely positioned in the five stations located in this space.

### RADIOTELETYPE CIRCUITS

During this period of operations, a duplex RITT circuit was set up between the ship and Radio, Tokyo. Although the clearance of the heavy volume of ship-shore and relay traffic has been erratic on this circuit, the value of the circuit can in no way be underestimated. During the next in-port period it is hoped that arrangements will be made for improving the utilization of this circuit.

### RADIO JAMMING

Considerable interference has been experienced on all wave-bands during the thirty days' operations covered by this report. Incidents of suspected enemy jamming have been reported and forwarded to the staff for relay to cognizant commands. Interference on a local basis as a result of faulty equipment (including equipment operated on the flight deck and in other parts of the ship) has been thoroughly investigated and corrective action taken.

ANTENNA INSTALLATION

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Frequent attention has had to be given to the forward and after whip antennas. A schedule has been set up for the cleaning and lubricating of this equipment.

PERSONNEL

Officers: During this period the following officer requirements have been established; CWO's (3) ; Assistant CWO's (3); Cryptographers (6).

Enlisted: Allocation of personnel has been as follows: Radio (55 RM's and TE's -- including postal clerks); Main Communications (25 TE's assigned duties as clerks, write-up men and messengers); Signals (28).

Discussion: Only after a number of changes and frequent shifting of personnel has this distribution proved to be the most efficacious plan. Augmentation of the ship's force by three staff officers and twelve enlisted personnel has made this plan possible. Experience is proving the best teacher and it is hoped that by the time of the next action report it will be possible to present a definite and detailed outline and pattern of personnel needs and the fulfillment of those needs on a carrier-task force flagship.

6. Aerology.

GENERAL

The period began with the operating area under the influence of a southeasterly circulation caused by the typhoon "MARGE" which had become nearly stationary off the coast of Shanghai. On 22 August, "MARGE" began to regenerate as an extra-tropical cyclone and move north-eastward crossing Korea on 23 August, causing undesirable flying conditions to prevail throughout the day.

This began the period of transition from the southerly monsoon to the northerly monsoon. Numerous weak cold front or trough passages occurred but generally with little effect on the weather other than wind direction and velocity.

Only on 27 August, when a low pressure system developed over the Yellow Sea and moved eastward across Korea, where flight operations curtailed by undersirable flying weather.

Surface wind velocities average over 10 knots on 13 of the 29 days in the operating area. Generally there was a noticeable decrease in velocity during the afternoon and light and variable winds during the afternoon prevailed on 9 days.

COMMUNICATIONS

a. FACSIMILE.

Weather charts received via the facsimile equipment installed in the Aerological Laboratory were unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

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RADIO PHOTO UNIT #5 TOKYO

(A) Reception very good during daylight hours 90% readable; very bad at night 15% readable.

(B) Insufficient useful weather charts transmitted. Only one surface chart (10 hours old) and one 700 MB chart (13 hours old).

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (Frequency shift - shared with RATT. - not simultaneous)

(A) Reception very good during daylight hours 90% readable; very bad at night 15% readable. Schedule irregular.

(B) Insufficient useful weather charts transmitted. No surface charts.

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (90% frequency shift)

(A) Reception fair; only about 50% of charts readable.

AIR FORCE AT TOKYO (Sub-carrier frequency modulation - RATT. and facsimile transmitted simultaneously)

(A) Unable to copy.

COMMENTS

Number of weather charts transmitted by radio photo unit #5 was increased on 17 September to include three surface charts and two briefing charts. An additional increase to four surface charts, two 850 MB charts and two 700 MB charts is desired.

b. RADIO TELETYPE

Reception of weather reports from AMCS Tokyo by radio teletype in the Aerological Office was considered good during daylight hours (85%) and very bad at night (50%). During period of outages AMCS Guam was copied with only fair results

COMMENTS

The most important reports, the Korean, were lost due to outage of the Tokyo RATT at the most important time, prior to first launch. Later in the day Carrier Pilot Reports were able to fill this gap. During the early part of the period 3182 kcs (Tokyo) was able to be copied with better than average results. Later in the period no signal was heard on this frequency.

7. Administration:

The overall complement of the vessel in some departments is not adequate under extended combat operating conditions. It is believed that an increase in ship's company personnel to augment the following departmental personnel is required to effect a maximum degree of efficiency during extended operations under combat

conditions:

41 men for handling crews.  
26 men for gasoline detail.  
3 men for catapult.  
85 men for ammunition replenishment.  
22 men for ordnance and bomb break out.

8. Air Department.

During the period covered by this report, there were 1884 landings made aboard. The arresting gear operated normally in all respects and only routine maintenance was required. 931 catapult shots were made, 373 on the starboard machine and 558 on the port. Operation of the catapults was satisfactory during this period, however, on three occasions launches were held up for a period of minutes due to a loss of electric power. It is believed that this was due to an overloading of the generators that feed power to the catapult system, and has been corrected. During normal operation when launching jet aircraft, planes were launched in sections, the second plane being catapulted approximately three seconds after the first. Launching in this manner will be increasingly important during periods of poor visibility, when it will be especially desirable for the sections to remain joined up. When launching night hecklers or ASP planes, only one catapult was used since the other half of the flight deck forward could be utilized for parking planes on the bow.

Gasoline and lube oil expenditures were as follows: Gasoline, 1,020,507 gallons; 1120 lub oil, 8,234 gallons; 1010 lube oil, 3,809 gallons.

The handling of two types of jet aircraft initially presented several problems which are in the process of being smoothed out. The biggest problem with the F2H aircraft is in the inability to fold or spread the wings with gas in the tip tanks. This has required that the tip tanks not be gassed until the plane is in a permanent parking spot, ready to be taxied out and up to the catapult for launch. It has been found that the most convenient spot for parking has been just aft of the number two elevator on the port side, with the tail angled outboard and the wings interlocked. In this manner, the wing tip tanks can be gassed, and all the planes scheduled for the launch parked with a minimum use of space. In the case of a dud aircraft, there are only two things that can be done if planes are to be deck launched after the jets are off. If there is only one dud, it can be parked forward of the island, if the nose is angled inboard and the tail parked over the side. This allows just enough room for the prop aircraft to be deck launched. In the case of two duds, the second dud must be put on the number two elevator and dropped to the hanger deck level where it must be left until the launch is completed. The tip tanks must be degassed, in order to fold wings and stow the aircraft.

A tail tow bar has been developed by flight deck personnel, for rearward towing of the F2H by tractor. This has been accomplished by adding a cushioned saddle to the universal tow bar which supports the after fuselage of the aircraft

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when being towed rearward.

In view of the recent casualty suffered by this vessel, when an F2H aircraft bounced and went over all barriers, it is strongly recommended that a higher barricade be installed on the flight deck in order to prevent any repetition of this type accident.

9. Photography.

a. Aerial Film Dryers.

During this first period of operations, laboratory personnel experienced difficulty in drying aerial film fast enough to meet operational requirements.

Two (2) aerial film dryers (SN E18-d-796 More A-5) were being used in the chemical mixing room of the laboratory. The high moisture content in the air made it almost impossible to dry the aerial film in any reasonable length of time. The two (2) aerial film dryers were relocated in one of the uptake spaces near the photographic laboratory. The uptake space furnished the required dry heat to dry the aerial film when operating the dryers at maximum speed. (Maximum speed of this type dryer is five (5) feet per minute.)

b. Photo enlarging paper.

Prints being produced on photographic roll paper SN E18-P-328-503 (for use with Sonne printer, Rapid Resisto manufactured by Eastman Kodak and Company) are being marked with yellow-brown bloches. These bloches were first noticed during the first week of operations. The bloches at first were believed to be caused from mishandling by photographic personnel. One roll of paper, half of which was bloched the other half free of bloches, was found. It is now the opinion of the Photographic Officer that the bloches are the results of poor photographic paper.

An RUDM has been submitted. A detailed report will be submitted on the operations of the photographic laboratory in the next report of the next operational period.

*Austin W. Wheelock*  
AUSTIN W. WHELOCK

Distribution:

CNO (2) direct-airmail  
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group (5)  
COMAIRPAC (5)  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
COMCARDIV THREE  
COMCARDIV FIVE  
USS BOXER (CV21)  
USS PRINCETON (CV37)

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31)  
USS ANTIETAM (CV 36)  
CVG 5  
CVG 15  
CVG 101  
CVG 102

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NOV 6 1951

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From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 October to 31 October 1951

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 5 Action Report for the period 1 October to 31 October 1951 p. 19

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period, 1 through 31 October, 1951, is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Mission:

1. At various times during the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV-9), ComCarDiv ONE, RADM J. PERRY, USN embarked; USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31), ComCarDiv THREE, RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, and RADM J. J. CLARK, USN embarked; USS BOXER (CV-21), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62) VADM H. M. MARTIN, ComSEVENTH Fleet embarked; USS HELENA (CA-75), ComCruDiv THREE, RADM R. E. LIBBY, USN, embarked; USS TOLEDO (CA-133) ComCruDiv FIVE, RADM F. MOOSBRUGGER, USN, embarked; USS LOS ANGELES (CV-135), and units of Destroyer Division 31, 32, 91, 171, 172, and Escort Destroyer Division 12, 21,

2. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV-9) operated off the east coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order No. 22-51, plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was, primarily, to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea, which was advancing north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

PART II CHRONOLOGY:

The period 21-30 September, 1951 was spent in yard overhaul at Yokosuka Naval Base, Yokosuka, Japan.

1 October. 0600, pursuant to Com SEVENTH Fleet confidential dispatch 130008Z of September, 1951, underway from Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS HELENA (CA-75). 1100, effected rendezvous with CortDesDiv 21. Conducted AA firing practice and training exercises.

2 October. Conducted flight familiarization operations. Conducted AA firing practice, and training exercises.

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- 3 October 1420, effected rendezvous with Task Force 77 in operating area. 1700, RADM J. J. CLARK, USN, relieved RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, as ComCarDiv THREE. No air operations.
- 4 October Task Force replenished. Conducted Air Operations.
5. October Conducted Air Operations.
- 6 October Conducted Air Operations. 1657, 1 AD-4, BU NO. 123945, (pilot, LTJG TEAGUE) was hit by 40mm AA fire over CU 5168. Plane was observed to crash and explode. Pilot presumed killed in action. ENS. J. W. ROCHE, VF-172, made 39,000th landing on ESSEX.
- 7 October Conducted Air Operations. 1600, RADM J. J. CLARK, USN, ComCarDiv THREE assumed tactical command of Task Force 77.
- 8 October Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing exercise.
- 9 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 10 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 11 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 12 October Task Force replenished.
- 13 October Due to poor weather over the target area, all Air Operations were cancelled with the exception of CAP, ASP, and weather reconnaissance.
- 14 October Due to poor weather over target area, all Air Operations were cancelled with the exception of CAP, ASP, and weather reconnaissance. Late in the afternoon, the Task Force replenished.
- 15 October Conducted Air Operations. USS ANTIETAM (CV-36) joined Task Force.
- 16 October Conducted Air Operations. 1546, F2H-2, BU NO. 124951, was hit by AA fire at CU 2335. Plane was observed to crash and explode. Pilot (LCDR OXLEY) presumed to be killed in action.
- 17 October Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing practice. 2040, RADM J. PERRY, USN, ComCarDiv ONE, relieved RADM J. J. CLARK, USN, ComCarDiv THREE as OTC.
- 18 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 19 October Conducted Air Operations. Weather over target area caused cancellation of Air Operations after 1000. Task Force replenished in the afternoon. CinCPacFlt and Com7thFlt came aboard for a short visit with ComCarDiv ONE.
- 20 October Conducted Air Operations.

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- 21 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 22 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 23 October Task Force replenished.
- 24 October Conducted Air Operations.
- 25 October Conducted Air Operations. On shot number 2225 of the port catapult, the catapult fired and immediately cutoff. The cross head travelled approximately 36 inches. F2H-2, BU NO. 124959, was unable to stop, and went over the port bow. Pilot, (LTJG DOSS) was recovered by ESSEX helicopter, no injuries sustained. LT W. BRYANT VF-54 made the 40,000th landing on the ESSEX.
- 26 October Conducted Air Operations. 0930, AD-4, BU NO. 123921, was hit by AA fire at CV8701. Plane was ditched at sea, and pilot (LTJG BURGESS) was rescued by USS CONWAY.
- 27 October Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 28 October Conducted Air Operations, F4U-4B, BU NO. 62960, was hit by AA fire at BU 7056. Plane was observed to crash and burn. Pilot, (ENS BATEMAN) presumed to be killed in action. ESSEX steamed 50,000 miles since re-commissioning.
- 29 October Conducted Air Operations. The following dispatch was received from CTF 77, "ESSEX SPECIAL STRIKE GROUP TODAY OUTPERFORMED THE MAN WHO WROTE THE BOOK X WELL DONE"
- 30 October Conducted Air Operations. The following dispatch was received from Commander, Air Group FIVE, "AT 1546 USS ESSEX LANDED THE LAST PLANE OF THE LAST FLIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SECOND COMBAT CHAPTER WHICH IS NEARING COMPLETION X IT IS A PRIVILEGE TO BE A PART OF A GREAT FIGHTING TEAM AND SHARE IN ACCOMPLISHMENT MADE POSSIBLE BY TIRELESS EFFORT, PATIENCE, AND COOPERATION X AIR GROUP FIVE WISHES TO EXPRESS HER PRIDE IN BEING A PART OF ESSEXVILLE."
- 31 October Task Force replenished. 1528, RADM J. J. CLARK, USN, ComCarDiv THREE assumed tactical command of TF 77. 1545, pursuant to Com SEVENTH Flt confidential dispatch 250816Z took departure from Task Force 77 for Yokosuka, Japan for rest, recreation, and upkeep.

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance  
See enclosure (1)
2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

20 MM 7,985

3"50 Cal 1,286

5"38 Cal 246

3. Comment on Performance of Ordnance Material.

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a. Parachute Flares.

No parachute flares were used as jury rig for single suspension mentioned in previous report was considered unreliable for catapulting and it is usual practice to catapult pre-dawn and nightheckler aircraft.

b. Working Spaces.

The ship's aviation ordnance crew is badly in need of work and stowage space to be used as a spare parts and tool issue room. The ship's aviation ordnance crew is required to supply the Air Group with all turnover material, yet does not have an adequate space to use as a spare parts and issue room. 20 MM space to be used when 20 MM batteries are removed as indicated in ShipAlt No. 225.

c. Hung Ordnance

This vessel has experienced many cases of hung ordnance, wherein it has been impossible for the pilots to expend all bombs or rockets, and have landed aboard with one or more. In several cases, the impact of an arrested landings has jarred the bomb or rocket loose from the rack and caused it to travel up the deck as far as the forward elevator. This is exceedingly dangerous, especially in view of the fact that generally, there are parked aircraft, forward on the flight deck, with ordnance loaded for the next strike.

4. Confirmed effort will be made by this command to eliminate malfunctions in bomb racks. However it has been noted in Action Reports of other carrier that difficulties with hung bombs have been experienced by all units even since the Korean hostilities commenced. In view of the seriousness of this situation it is recommended that prompt action at departmental level be taken to improve reliability of bomb racks provided Naval Aircraft.

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship

No battle, or voyage, damage was sustained by the ship.

2. Damage inflicted on the enemy

See enclosure (1)

3. Damage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft.

See enclosure (1)

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.

Performance of duty and morale has been excellent.

2. Casualties.

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a. Ship's Company.

There were no casualties to ship's company personnel.

b. Air Group FIVE

Casualties in Air Group FIVE are as follows:

OXLEY, I. B.	LCDR,	165618	USN	Killed in action.
TEAGUE, C. I.	LTJG	465417	USN	Killed in action.
BATEMAN, R. A.	ENS	538138	USNR	Killed in action.

There were no wounded or missing.

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering.

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

b. Steaming data.

(1) Miles steamed	11,838
(2) Average Speed	16 Knots
(3) Fuel oil received from tankers (gallons)	1,999,538
(4) Fuel oil delivered to destroyers (gallons)	373,283
(5) Fuel oil consumed by ESSEX (gallons)	1,768,134

c. Recommendations.

A change of location was made of Ready Room #2, which was found to be impractical for use as a Ready Room due to the necessity of having to use the tables and chairs in order to serve six meals a day, in the wardroom space. Ready Room #2 and its equipment was relocated in the Wardroom lounge, and the Wardroom lounge and its equipment, including tables and chairs, were arranged in the space formerly required by the Ready Room equipment. The new location of the Ready Room provides much better facilities as well as isolation and availability twenty-four hours a day.

2. Supply.

a. Aviation Supply.

(1) Support from the USS JUPITER and Aviation Supply Branch, Yokosuka, has been highly satisfactory on allowance list items. Approximately 90% of AOG items stem from unforeseen requirements for items not in the allowance lists. Where such items are required more than once, usage data is forwarded to the JUPITER with request that she stock such items.

(2) Cooperation between vessels of the Task Force on furnishing emergency requirements continues to be good.

(3) The Section A allowance of flight deck clothing is inadequate. Each man concerned requires a minimum of two jerseys rather than one, especially during warm weather when perspiration necessitates frequent laundering.

(4) Squadrons deploying to the forward area should make every effort to have a full allowance of Section H,U, and winter flight clothing items before embarking aboard ship, as provided in ACL-21-51.

(5) The present allowance of wings, stabilizers, ailerons, and rudders should be increased three times and stowed aboard carriers before leaving the United States. Damage from enemy anti-aircraft fire and operational losses have created a critical condition on aircraft surfaces.

(6) Five major Section B allowances are being carried for aircraft now assigned to CAG-5 (F9F-2; F4U-4B; AD-4; F2H-2; HO3S-1). In addition four minor Section B allowances are aboard for the various configurations of basic types (AD-4L, N,Q, W; AD-2, 3, 3N; F9F-2F; F4U-4NL). No great stowage problem has presented itself, although it has been necessary to unpack and rebox the major portion of items received.

(7) Local construction of additional tire racks to provide stowage for the wartime allowance was necessary in storeroom C-403-A.

b. G.S.K.

(1) The system of replenishing G.S.K. stores in this area by Mobile Support is considered excellent. The USS CASTOR issues stores within one day after the presentation of requisitions. By using the GSM Catalogue published by COMSERVRON 3, only materials carried by the CASTOR are ordered from this ship. These are either delivered or cancelled, thereby, reducing paper work and duplication of effort. NIS items are re-ordered from PRCO through COMSERVRON 3. To date there have been very few items requiring this action.

(2) The replenishment of Electronic and BuShip Machinery Spare Parts has not been as prompt as others. However, the LEAGUE ISLAND, CHIMON, and ELECTRON have furnished parts carried with a minimum of delay. The system of replenishment, presently in effect, requires that all requisitions be placed on the AG's. Approximately 30% of the items required have been furnished. For items NIS on the AG's, new requisitions are cut on Fleet Activities, Yokosuka. If still not available, another requisition must be prepared and submitted to SERVRON 3, or COMSERDIV 31, for forwarding to PRCO. This duplication of paper work tends to delay in the majority of replenishing that must come from the States, which because of distance alone requires considerable pipeline time for the item needed. It is suggested that a catalogue of all spares carried by these supply ships be promulgated and that stocks be maintained accordingly. When it is known that a particular item is not carried by AG's in this area, it could then be requisitioned immediately from PRCO.

(3) Exchange of type spares between carriers has helped greatly and to date no major equipment has become inoperative because of lack of spares.

(4) The stowage of foul weather clothing has presented a definite problem to this ship. A-305 $\frac{1}{2}$ -A (Foul Weather Gear Storeroom) should be equipped with bins and racks similar to a flight clothing storeroom. Under the present stowage arrangement of this compartment, receipt, stowage and issue is difficult and is considered unsatisfactory.

(5) Departmental Budgets have been established, in accordance with Afloat Accounting Memorandum No. 1. In setting up these budgets, the following departmental percentages were established.

Administrative	6%
Operations	8%
Air	15%
Gunnery	10%
Engineering	33%
Navigation	.7%
Supply	11%
Medical	.9%
Dental	.4%
C.O.'s Reserve	15%

(6) Close supervision in conformity with regulations has been maintained on charges against these budgets and each department is required to stay within their budgetary limitations.

(7) The conservation of critical items as contained in the Pacific Supply Line Publication of CINCPACFLT/COMSERVPAC of October 1951 has been rigidly enforced. All stub requisitions for these items are carefully screened by the Supply Department, and requests of unusual quantities are required to be justified.

c. Disbursing

(1) It has been noted that monetary requirements for pay days are considerably less when at sea than those pay days held in port or just prior to entering port. The monthly average of all disbursements to the crew on pay rolls is approximately \$275,000.00 of which \$265,000.00 was by cash. Total of pay day at sea was approximately \$70,000.00; prior to the arrival in port, the total was \$115,000.00. Cooperation of all hands has been most favorable in using the method of paying an even sum to the lowest five dollars, which speeds up pay lines and saves many man hours. This method also reduces the chance of error as only the five and ten dollar denominations are required.

(2) While in port, a change station for exchanging Yen for MPC's is set up each day. The change station for the crew is located at one of the regular paying stations and in the wardroom for officers. It has been found satisfactory to sell Yen in units of five and twenty dollars.

d. Ship's Store

(1) Sales for this period total approximately \$45,000.00. This is the largest sales volume recorded in a single month's operation since commissioning. Sales during the forthcoming holiday period are expected to increase this volume.

(2) Support received from the USS CASTOR and Fleet Activities, Yokosuka has been generally excellent. All material requisitioned has been received with the exception of a few minor items.

(3) Experience indicates that the following items are in short supply in the forward area and should be stocked to capacity by ships departing continental United States for the forward area:

- Buttons
- Uniform Accessories
- Chocolate Syrup
- Lighter Flints
- Hat Frames

(4) The operation of the laundry is continuing on a 24 hour basis, 5 days a week. These operating hours are considered superior to the previous 7 day round the clock work week, inasmuch as, a savings of approximately 35,000 gallons of fresh water per week has been realized, and time is now available for maintenance and upkeep of the operating machinery.

(5) The system of cigarette rationing mentioned in the previous report has been discontinued.

(6) Hours of operation in the Ship's Store activities have been established for the purpose of offering as nearly continuous service as possible. Hours of operations are as follows:

Ship's Store #1

Monday through Saturday	0900 to 1100 and 1300 to 1600
Sunday	1300 to 1500

Ship's Store #2

Monday through Saturday	1300 to 1600 and 1830 to 2030
Sunday	1830 to 2030

Ship's Service Store #1

Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday	1300 to 1630
Monday, Wednesday, Friday	1330 to 1630 and 1830 to 2030
Sunday	1300 to 1530

Ship's Service Store #2

Monday, Wednesday, Friday	1300 to 1630
Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday	1330 to 1630 and 1830 to 2030
Sunday	1830 to 2030

(7) Operating equipment has been running continuously with the exception of a few minor breakdowns in the laundry and soda fountain. In these instances, repairs have been effected by Ship's Force without delay.

(8) The installation of a shirt folding unit in the laundry is considered highly desirable. A unit of this type was removed during the 27-A conversion. The installation of this item would improve the finishing operation and contribute to the saving of man hours.

(9) Abnormal temperatures in bulk storeroom B-406-A have caused a general deterioration of stock stowed in this space. Laundry supplies have hardened thereby, making them difficult to use. Temperatures recorded in this storeroom during the months of July, August, and September averaged 110° F. Ventilation improvements in this space are necessary before it can be properly utilized as a satisfactory storeroom for Ship's Store Stock.

(10) In addition to the security measures prescribed by the BuSandA Manual and other current directives the following measures have been inaugurated and are believed to be of value in further safeguarding the stock and monies of the Ship's Store Activities.

- a. No money is left overnight in the cash registers of any of the activities.
- b. Cash drawers are left open when the activity is not in operations.
- c. Night lights are installed in the Ship's Stores and Ship's Service Stores and are left burning all night.
- d. Inspections are conducted nightly by the Duty Supply Officer at 2200 and 2400 of all Ship's Store spaces.
- e. Two (2) group 3 locks are installed on each door to the Ship's Store spaces.

e. Commissary

(1) Commissary has been generally satisfactory. Support from the AF's has been excellent. However no information as to fresh provisions carried by these ships is available. This has resulted in an occasional shortage of fresh provisions in the General, and other messes. In this connection none of these shortages are considered serious.

(2) The following schedule of meal hours has been maintained in the General Mess.

Breakfast	0545	These hours fluctuate to accommodate flight operation schedules.
	0645	
Dinner	1130	
Supper	1630	

Experience indicates that it takes approximately 2 hours for all hands to pass through the mess line, be served, eat, and vacate the messing areas, although the standard on other type ships is about one hour.

(3) The practice of serving sweet rolls, jam and coffee one half hour before flight quarters when early morning flights are scheduled, also the serving of cakes, or toast and jam 15 minutes after late flight quarters to the flight deck crew both have enabled the meal hours to remain reasonably steady yet flexible enough to conform to flight operations. This procedure is proving to be highly satisfactory to both the Air Group and Ship's Company. Night rations averaged 50 per night for the last month.

(4) Hot soup is now being served to all flight deck and weather deck personnel. This innovation has also been met with enthusiasm.

3. Air Department

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a. Catapult and arresting gear.

(1) Catapult and arresting gear operation was normal during the period of this report with the following exceptions:

(a) On shot number 2134, port catapult, five out of the nine bolts which secure the cable tensioner cylinder to the elbow at the base of the dome, sheared off. It was necessary to remove the elbow in order to extract the severed sections of the bolts, replace them with new bolts and reinstall. Time required was four hours, during which time the catapult was out of commission. Cause of the failure was apparently due to metal fatigue. Bolts have also been replaced on the starboard catapult, although there was no indication of weakening

(b) On shot number 2225, port catapult, the machine fired and immediately cut off. The F2H, Banshee, spotted on the catapult, received enough power to break the tension ring and start down the catapult track, but has insufficient power to take off. The pilot was unable to break to a stop and went over the bow, port side, and in to the water. The pilot was actually in the water a total of one minute and fifteen seconds before being picked up by the ESSEX helicopter, and was on deck within three minutes from the time he went over the bow. The cause of the catapult failure was due to a break in the catapult electrical firing circuit, immediately after the main piston valve opened. The break in the circuit, caused an immediate cutoff, allowing the crosshead to travel a total of only thirty-six inches. It is anticipated that all switches on the port catapult will be replaced with new ones, after which a series of no load and dead shots will be made prior to launching any more aircraft.

b. Towing Bars.

(1) The large variety of aircraft aboard this vessel requires several different types of tow bars for handling of aircraft. The standard Universal Tow Bar is used for tail towing AD-3, AD-4, and F4U aircraft, and also for forward towing of all AD, F4U, and F9F type aircraft. The F2H can be towed forward only after modification of the tow bar. Since nearly all towing on a carrier deck is from the rear, a special tow bar was necessary for use in tail towing the F9F, and another for the F2H. This was accomplished, by modifying the standard Universal Tow Bar. When they were modified, they can no longer be used for towing any other way. Modification of the F2H type was described in the previous action report.

When AD-2 aircraft were received as replacement, another problem arose in that it has a different type of tail wheel assembly which sits lower on the deck and when a Universal Tow Bar was used, interference was experienced with the tail hook. This required still another type of tow bar. All together, it has been found necessary to use three different type of tow bars, in addition to the Universal Tow Bar.

Because of the heavy service the tow bar receive during operations, the attrition rate is high. A maintenance crew of three men is required just to maintain the tow bars in serviceable condition. Before deployment from the Continental Limits, a vessel of this type should be equipped with a minimum of 45 Universal Tow Bars, and 5 each of the special types needed for handling those aircraft which can not be handled with the Universal Bars. (Total 60)

Arrested landings	1556
Catapult Shots	762
Starboard Catapult	487
Port Catapult	275
Gasoline, (gallons)	824,647
LubOil, Symbol 1120 (gallons)	4,693
LubOil, Symbol 1010 (gallons)	3,265

4. Navigation

Ship's position was obtained primarily by celestial observations. Weather conditions permitted sights to be taken seventy percent of the time.

Radar fixes were obtained frequently. This method of navigation proved very effective, and it was found that once the problem of using mountain ranges and land masses in obtaining radar positions was understood, radar fixes almost coincided with those obtained by celestial means.

Loran was employed less frequently, but it was proved that this method could be used with a fair degree of reliability at night.

5. Air Intelligence

a. Use of Frisket Paper

Air Group FIVE has been operating in the forward area, for two 30 day periods, and is still using the original chart issue. As far as can be determined the charts show all indications of being fully useable for another operating period.

Frisket covering allows pilots to use and erase soft lead or grease pencil markings. Charts not covered by Frisket seldom lasts one operational period. It is recommended that all charts be covered with frisket paper before arriving in the combat area.

6. CIC

The field alteration allowing the search antenna of the SX-2 antenna to be tilted has been accomplished and the operation of radar is being checked. Already improved detection of jet aircraft has been noticed and it is hoped that continued and marked improvement in this problem will be realized.

Trapping of radar and radio transmission continues to be a much noticed phenomena. A recent example was establishing loud and clear communications on the primary CI net (a UHF frequency) between the ESSEX and the NEW JERSEY at 45 miles.

Strike control of returning aircraft is one of the most important single features of the air control picture in the present operation. Thorough briefing and practice by both Air Groups and CIC personnel prior to deployment will be of real aid to strike control personnel and will eliminate to a large degree needless intercepts.

The three AN/ARC-1's installed for CIC use in the 27-A conversion have worked very poorly. This appears to be due to low modulation of the transmitter because of losses in the line from the broadcast through the CIC Communications System, the patching switches in Radio I, and the individual adapters in Radio VII.

Ship's force constructed a simple amplifier and installed it in one of the AN/ARC-1 adapters in Radio VII. This amplifying has improved the performance of this AN/ARC tremendously and has increased the range of the equipment to that of TDQ. When parts are available, additional amplifiers will be made and installed on the remaining two AN/ARC's.

## 7. Communications

a. With the experience of one period of operations as the greatest single asset, communications during this second period produced considerably more gratifying results. In general, many of the problems of a technical nature remained the same as before. Certain improvement, however, in this as well as other phases of communications have been rather marked. Close supervision and a continuous "on-th-job" training program have been directed toward the avoidance of repetitious errors and so-called communications "BUSTS". Radio supervisors, for example, have through experience and the exercise of good judgement learned to utilize more fully the facilities and equipment available to them. When regular transmission channels, for the heavy load of outgoing traffic imposed upon a task force flagship, have for some reason been closed to them, supervisors (and operators) have been quick to request special speed circuits with shore stations for the relay of messages.

Procedures for message handling, particularly in Main Communications Station, although not fool-proof by any stretch of the imagination, have been reasonably standardized. Routing of high precedence and action traffic has been a great deal more satisfactory than during the period covered by the previous action report. Concomitantly, the volume of traffic increased an estimated 15 to 20% over the volume of the previous period.

b. The situation in regard to CW and voice circuits as described in the previous report has remained unchanged. The same problems exist, although personnel have increased their efficiency in surmounting the difficulties encountered. As an example, the stationing of a log-watch in the pilot house on the secondary tactical circuit, has lessened the confusion in ship control that results from merely loud-speaker "monitoring." In addition, the primary tactical circuit, under the present arrangement, is the responsibility of the Junior Officer-of-the-Deck. Especially during flight deck operations the noise level is of such proportions as to demand that a receiver head-set be worn for both circuits in order to hear the broadcast tactical signals. Chest-sets with extended leads have been prepared by the Technicians so that the operators of both the primary and secondary tactical circuits have freedom of movement on the bridge. A log of traffic on the primary tactical circuit is maintained in CIC. 12

c. Although not completely dependable, the ship-to-shore radio-teletype circuit established toward the close of the previous operating period has proved a boom to communications and the clearing of outgoing traffic by a flagship maintaining ship-to-shore guard for the Task Force. Its performance is not dependable to the extent that atmospherics and frequent shifting among the frequencies assigned have interfered with its functioning smoothly and uninterruptedly. In the first place, the circuit has been shared with another Task Force Command; the allocation deterrent factor. The most recurrent difficulties have occurred from about sunset to midnight in this area.

d. Jamming, (intentional), although continuing in about the same degree as previously report for CW circuits, has appreciably increased on HF and VHF frequencies. A number of reports has been submitted to the force commander concerning foreign language jamming interference.

e. Due to the average loss of between two to three hours' transmission time each twenty-four hour period-predominantly on Radio II transmitters, an alteration request is being prepared for the installation of motor-driven equipment to control remotely (preferably in Radio Central) the rigging of forward and after whip antennae. At present, this is a manual operation performed by flight deck personnel.

f. The ship successfully transmitted by facsimile the photo news coverage of CinCPacFlt's 19 October visit to the Task Force. Transmission to Pearl Harbor (Radio photo unit number 4) was successful on the first run, whereas transmission to San Francisco (Radio photo unit number 2) was completed only after three repetitions of schedules arranged with unit number 2 over a period of approximately twenty-four hours.

g. The organization and assignment of personnel during this period has become fairly stabilized. A policy of rotating teleman (TE) rates within communications has been initiated. It is intended to further this program by making monthly exchanges within the division to include the postal clerks as radio and Main Communications personnel. A policy of exchange between signalmen and quartermasters (QM rates) has been in effect for over six months.

Although the total number of personnel has been reduced by transfers since the last report, sixty-eight (68) ship's personnel in the OR division and twenty-six (26) in the OS division augmented by twelve (12) staff personnel have been adequate. It has been attempted to emphasize training so that, if required, adjustments in the event of minimal losses can be made without seriously affecting the efficiency of communications.

## 8. Aerology

### a. Communications

#### (1) Facsimile.

NDT(Radio Photo Unit #5, Tokyo) was copied with reception as noted below.

01001 (1600Z)	700 mb chart (0300Z)	Very Poor
	Surface Chart (0600Z)	Very Poor

0500I (2000Z)	700 mb prog chart Briefing chart NR3	Very poor Very poor
0900I (0000Z)	300 mb prog chart 300 mb chart (0300)	Very good Very good
1430I (0530Z)	Surface Prog Chart 700 mb Chart (prog)	Very good Very good
1900I (1000)	Surface chart (0000Z) Briefing chart NRL 300 mb chart	Very good Very good Very good

- a. Little of the facsimile data was used during this period.
- b. Inteference caused by ship's own transmitter and aircraft engines was the main problem during the day; atmospheric interference during the night.
- c. Surface chart (1800Z), briefing chart NR4, 850 mb chart (1500Z), 700 mb chart (1500Z) and 500 mb chart (1500Z) if practicabale should be transmitted by NDT.
- d. The Ships electronics shop is constructing a converter which will enable present facsimile equipment to receive AACS Tokyo.
- d. During the first part of the period the 0000Z chart and a forecast was transmitted to the USS BON HOMME RICHARD with excellent results obtained.

(2) Radioteletype

- a. The installation of another teletype in the Aerological Laboratory enabled both AACS Guarm (AIE) and AACS Tokyo (AIF) to be copied simultaеously. This acted as insurance against outages and resulted in better than 90% reception.
- b. Occasionally Taego (KMPO) was copied to obtain Korean weather more rapidly. A time saving of from 15 to 45 minutes resulted, but reception was generally poor (less than 25%) and in ordernot to miss the Korean weather entirely, Tokyo was always copied.

(3) Radio (CW)

- a. The radio man stationed in the Aerological Office kept the teletype and facsimile tuned and during pericds of RATT outages copied CW.

(4) Radio (Voice)

- a. During the period two speakers located in the Aerological Laboratory were connected to the switchboard in Radio 1 via the two (2) facsimile trunk lines. It is planned to patch in appropriate VHF channels so that weather information from CAP, ASP, and strike groups can be heard in Aerological Laboratory thereby eliminating some of the delay and the possibility of garbling in relaying through CIC.

b. Weather Reports

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(1) Ships.

The hourly weather reports from ships located along the Korean east coast continue to be very important. Their value could be greatly increased if qualified weather observers were stationed on these ships.

(2) Pilots

Numerous pilot weather report summaries (0000-0400I) from the Korean area are received via teletype during the morning, but too late to brief early morning flights. Action has been taken by CTF 77 to have these reports relayed as soon as possible to the operating carriers.

c. Equipment and Supplies.

(1) All aerological equipment operated satisfactorily during the period.

(2) A pneumatic tube between the Aerological Laboratory and Main Communications Station is considered a "must" to reduce delays and save man hours in handling about 150 weather messages daily. An alteration request is being submitted requesting such installation.

(3) An additional means of communications with the Open Bridge, Captain's Plot, Flag Plot, CiC, Air Operations, and Main Communications Station is considered very desirable. At present, the ship's service phone is all that is available. An outlet on one of the MC circuits is considered to be the most desirable solution. An alteration request is being submitted requesting such an installation.

(4) Four RAWIN soundings were taken daily to an average height of about 30,000 feet. The RR-32/AM reflector (Navy stock R-16-R-3580-fish net-pyramid base, 52 inches square) was used in conjunction with Mark 37 directors and Mark 25 radar, and occasionally the Mark 56 director and Mark 35 Mod 2 radar.

(5) There is, at present, no helium in the forward area, and only about 89 full bottles remain aboard. Daily consumption averages about 2.5 bottles.

Typhoon "Ruth" which passed over southern Japan on the 14th then Northeastward along the west coast of Japan caused overcast skies in the operating area on the 14th and moderate to rough seas on the 15th and 16th with very little increase in the wind. Low ceilings in the target area required cancelling of Air Operations on the 14th.

This operating period saw the first real invasion, of the operating area, of cold dry air from Siberia.

The first outbreak occurred late October 18th when a weak cold front with little associated weather passed over the force. Temperatures dropped to 56 degrees. This front on passing over the relatively warm water of the Sea of Japan rapidly developed a Wave to the northeast of the force.

15

Low ceilings and rain from this wave moved over the force early the 19th and continued until early the 21st. Fog developed over the cold water area of northwest sea of Japan early the 19th causing the four early missions to be cancelled. The force was moved south into warmer water, out of the fog, and operations were continued.

The second outbreak of cold air occurred October 24th with the passage of a weak cold front. Temperatures dropped to the low 50's and westerly winds of 30 to 35 knots were experienced. This primary front developed considerable thunderstorm activity over Korea, and covered the higher mountains with snow. Considerable shower activity occurred over the force as well as westerly winds of 30 to 40 knots behind the front. CAVU weather occurred shortly after passage of the secondary front. Temperatures behind the front fell to the middle 40's.

Low ceilings with rain developed in the southern part of the operating area on the 23rd when the semi-permanent front, to the south of Japan, moved northward to southern Japan as a warm front, causing widespread cloudiness and rain over Japan and southern sea of Japan.

Light winds (4 to 8 knots) prevailed on the 28th, 29th and 30th when high pressure was centered over the sea of Japan.

9. Photography

a. Personnel

(1) Personnel allowance, on board, and squadron personnel assigned to the photographic laboratory.

	Allowance	On Board	Squadron Personnel
Chief	1	1	0
1st Class	2	1	1
2nd Class	3	2	1
3rd Class	4	4	3
PHSN	0	1	0
SN	0	3	0
PHAN	0	2	0
AFAN	0	0	1
AN	0	3	1
SA	0	2	0
AA	0	1	0
TOTAL	10	20	7

16

b. Personnel assignments within the Photographic Unit.

	Chief	1st Class	2nd Class	3rd Class	Seaman	TOTAL
Office	1	0	0	1	0	2
Production	0	1	1	2	2	6
Finishing	0	0	0	1	1	2
Photo Material	0	0	0	1	0	1
K-3A	0	0	1	0	0	1
Camera Installation	0	0	0	0	1	1
Film Marking	0	1	1	0	0	2
Night Crew	0	0	0	1	4	5
Mess Cook	0	0	0	0	1	1
Compt. Cleaner	0	0	0	0	1	1
Messenger	0	0	0	0	1	1
Chemical Mixing	0	0	0	0	1	1
Flight Quarters	0	0	0	1	2	3
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>27</u>

c. Production Period

(1) First Period 24 August through 19 September 1951

Total Number of Photographic Missions Flown	73	
Total Number of rolls filed	122	
Average number exposures per roll	39	
Total Number of negatives used	4,799	
Total Number of prints made	43,201	
		<u>Running Time</u>
Average time to develop and wash	67 Min	1 hour 07 Min.
Average time to dry	30 Min	2 hour 07 Min.
Average time for first set of grease pencil marked prints delivered to P.I. Officer.	1 Hr 30 Min	3 hour 37 Min.
Average time to mark one (1) roll of film (Computed from time of delivery to film marking, to time returned for distribution printing)	2 Hr 46 Min	6 hour 23 Min.
Average time for set of marked prints to P.I. Officer (ater receiving marked film from film marking)	1 Hr 52 Min	8 hour 15 Min.

All work completed and ready for mailing by 1000 the following day.

(2) Second Period 4 October through 30 October 1951

Total Number of Photographic Missions Flown	68
Total Number of rolls filed	101
Average number exposures per roll	60
Total Number of negatives made	6,280
Total Number of prints made	55,048

Running Time

Average time to develop and wash	69 Min	1 Hr 9 Min
Average time to dry	30 Min	1 Hr 39 Min
Average time for first set of grease pencil marked prints delivered to P.I. Officer.	2 Hr 20 Min	3 Hr 59 Min
Average time to mark one (1) roll of film (Computed from time of delivery to film marking to time returned for distribution printing)	2 Hr 19 Min	6 Hr 18 Min
Average time for set of marked prints to Flag(after receiving marked film from film marking)	2 Hr 26 Min	8 Hr 44 Min
Average time for set of marked prints to P. I. Officer (after marked film from film marking)	2 Hr 33 Min	11 Hr 17 Min

All work completed and ready for mailing by 1000 following day.

PRODUCTION RECORD FOR 1st and 2nd PERIODS 24 AUGUST THROUGH 30 OCTOBER 1951

Total number of missions flown	141
Total number of rolls filed	223
Total number of negatives used	11,079
Total number of prints made	98,249
Average number of exposures per roll	49½

RECORD OF K-25 CAMERAS FOR 2nd PERIOD 4 OCTOBER THROUGH 30 OCTOBER 1951


Rolls Taken	76
Total possible exposures	1,520
Total exposures taken	1,161
Total usable exposures	804
Total unusable exposures	359
Total prints filed	113
Rolls not usable due to improper techniques.	9

*Austin W. Wheelock*  
AUSTIN W. WHEELOCK

Distribution:

- CNO (Advance, airmail) (2)
- COMAIRPAC (Advance, airmail) (2)
- CINCPACFLT (Advance, airmail) (2)
- COMCARDIV ONE
- COMSEVENTHFLT
- COMNAVFE
- COMCAR DIV THREE
- COMCARDIV FIVE
- USS BOXER (CV-21)
- USS PRINCETON (CV-37)

- USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
- USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)
- USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
- USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)
- CVG 5 (5)
- CVG 11
- CVG 15
- CVG 101
- CVG 102
- AIR TASK GROUP ONE



U.S.S. ESSEX (CV9)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

CV9/A16-3  
Serial: 0147  
18 Dec 1951

**DECLASSIFIED**  
CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander, Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 November to 14 December 1951

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CarAirGrp FIVE Action Report, 1 Nov - 14 Dec 1951 *p. 16*

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 1 November to 14 December, 1951 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

1. At various times during the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), ComCarDiv ONE, RADM. J. J. PERRY, USN, embarked, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31), ComCarDiv THREE RADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, USS ANTIETAM (CV36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45), ComCarDiv FIVE, RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, embarked, USS WISCONSIN (BB64), ComSEVENTHFleet, VADM H. M. MARTIN, USN, embarked; USS LOS ANGELES (CA135), USS ROCHESTER (CA124), USS ST. PAUL (CA73) ComCruDiv ONE, RADM E. E. STONE, USN, embarked, USS HELENA, (CA75), ComCruDiv THREE, RADM R. E. LIBBY, USN, embarked, and units of Destroyer Division 111, 151, 152, 122, 31, and Escort Destroyer Division 11, 12.

2. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order No. 22-51 (First and Second Revisions), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The Mission of TF 77 was, primarily, to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea, which were advancing north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGY:

1 November Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan from Operating Area, in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT confidential dispatch 257816Z Oct.

2 November 1542, anchored berth 3B, Yokosuka, Japan.

3 November 0805 moored starboard side to, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

4-11 November Yard availability, rest, and recreation period, Yokosuka, Japan.

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- 12 November 0603 pursuant to Com7thFlt confidential dispatch 250816Z Oct. 1951 underway in company with USS HELENA, for operating area. 0815 RVU with DesDiv 111. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 13 November Conducted flight familiarization training. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 14 November Conducted large drone firing exercise. Joined TF 77, ComCarDiv THREE (embarked in USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)) was OTC. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 15 November Launched early morning hecklers and ASP. Rest of schedule cancelled due to weather. TF replenished in late afternoon and evening.
- 16 November Conducted Air Operations. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 17 November Conducted Air Operations. 0825I, AD, BUNO. 123923 power stalled on takeoff and crashed, pilot (LT W. A. BRYANT Jr.), not recovered, presumed dead.
- 18 November Conducted Air Operations.
- 19 November Conducted Air Operations. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 20 November Conducted large drone firing practice. TF replenished.
- 21 November Conducted Air Operations. 1630 F4U, BUNO. 97515, was hit by enemy AA fire, pilot was required to ditch his aircraft over Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT B. C. PRUITT) was rescued by LSMR 404.
- 22 November Conducted Air Operations.
- 23 November TF attempted to replenish but, due to heavy seas replenishment was discontinued.
- 24 November TF replenished.
- 25 November Due to weather at TF and over target, all Air Operations cancelled.
- 26 November Due to weather at TF and over target area all Air Operations cancelled.
- 27 November Conducted Air Operations. 1206 Lost AD, BUNO. 123974 over Wonsan Harbor, pilot (LTJG E. HALE) presumed dead. Tail fin came off 250# bomb and carried away arming wire leaving tail fuze armed, attempt to jettison was unsuccessful. Pilot bailed out but disappeared from view shortly after landing in water. Extensive search by remainder of flight, destroyer, and SAR from Army proved fruitless.
- 28 November Conducted Air Operations.

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- 29 November Conducted Air Operations. LT D. MARSHALL, VF-51, made 41,000 landing on USS ESSEX. 1630I, RADM J. PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, relieved RADM. J.J. CLARK, ComCarDiv THREE as OTC. 1630 USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) departed from Task Force enroute to Yokosuka, Japan for further routing to CONLUS.
- 30 November TF replenished. Conducted AA firing practice.
- 1 December Conducted Air Operations. 0915, F4U, BUNO. 62931 hit by enemy AA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LTJG E. C. GARRETT) was rescued by USS MCGINTY DD-365. No injuries were sustained. 0945, F4U, BUNO. 97504 hit by enemy AA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT N. E. CURRY) was rescued by SAR vessel. Pilot was not injured..
- 2 December Conducted Air Operations. 1023, 1 F4U-5N1, BUNO. 124554 lost power on launch and landed in the water ahead of the ship. Pilot (LTJG R. S. DONOVAN) was rescued by the ship's helicopter. No injuries sustained.
- 3 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 4 December Task Force replenished.
- 5 December Conducted Air Operations. The following dispatch received from CTF 77, "THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM COM7THFLT IS PASSED WITH PLEASURE TO THOSE WHO REALLY DID THE WORK X QUOTE X THE QUICK CHANGE FROM BLACK TO RED ON THE INTERDICTION MAP IS A PLEASING COLOR CHANGE X UNQUOTE. This message was addressed to ESSEX, ANTIETAM, CAG-5 and CAG-15.
- 6 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 7 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 8 December Task Force replenished.
- 9 December Conducted Air Operations. 0810, AD4, BUNO. 122342 hit by enemy AA fire, ditched over Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT F. J. O'MALLEY) was picked up by USS EVANSVILLE. No injuries sustained. 1500, AD4, BUNO. 122325 hit by enemy AA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT F. J. PENDERGAST) picked up by USS MCGINTY DD-365. No injuries sustained.
- 10 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 11 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 12 December Task Force replenished. 1558, RADM F. W. MCMAHON, (ComCarDiv FIVE) relieved RADM J. J. PERRY (ComCarDiv ONE) as OTC. 1600, Pursuant to ComSeventhFlt confidential dispatch 060900 Dec. ESSEX in company with ROCHESTER, DESDIV 111 detached from TF 77, to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and recreation. ComCarDiv ONE embar

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13 December Enroute to Yokosuka. Conducted AA tracking exercise with aircraft, flag hoist drill using ACP 175, voice and CW drill.

14 December 1510, Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.  
See enclosure (1)
2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.
  - a. For the period 1-30 November 1951.

5"/38 AAC Projectiles	254
5"/38 Non Frag Projectiles	130
5"/38 Cartridges, non-flashless	384
3"/50 VT Cartridges, non-flashless	686
3"/50 VT Non Frag Cartridges	576
20MM AA	5566
20MM BL&P	140

- b. For the period 1-14 December 1951.

There was no expenditure of ammunition for training purposes for this period.

3. Comments on Performance of Ordnance.

- a. Performance of Ship's Ordnance Equipment.

(1) During the period of this report, the ever increasing accent on gunnery readiness has reflected itself in the conduct of frequent anti-aircraft gunnery exercises. The performance of ordnance material on such occasions has been generally satisfactory with the exception of a few minor casualties in the 3"/50 caliber RFTM battery. Although minor in nature, the following casualties are considered worthy of comment because certain functions of a mount are inoperative due to the non-availability of spare parts:

(a) Slide lock (Pc 612221-1). This small machined part, which prevents a cartridge from bouncing out of the gun chamber when it is catapulted into the breech, broke while conducting a prefiring check-off routine on one mount. Although the ship is authorized to carry 5 spares, the commissioning allowance, (due January 15, 1951) has never been received. Besides receiving general mention in the precommissioning weekly progress reports for a period of 2 months, this item was listed as a deficiency on the spare parts discrepancy list submitted prior to the ship's departure for the shakedown cruise. Follow up correspondence initiated prior to departure from Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (post-shakedown availability, 24 May, 1951) San Diego (readiness for WESPAC,

28 June, 1951) and Pearl Harbor (enroute WESPAC, 8 August 1951) likewise produced negative results. Dispatch requests have indicated that spare slide locks are not available in Task Force 77, Service Squadron 3, nor Fleet Activities, Yokosuka Naval Base. According to information from the Ordnance stock Office, Washington, D.C. this part was shipped from the Naval Gun Factory on 20 September, 1951. Although the lack of this part renders on barrel of one 3"/50 caliber twin mount inoperative for routine firing practices, a replacement has been fabricated by the ship's repair force in accordance with applicable ordnance drawings. Since this temporary slide lock lacks the requisite degree of metal hardness set forth in the specifications, it is believed that the working edge would prematurely wear off by frequent contact with cartridge lips during extended operation. Considering the calculated risk in time of action, the value of one more firing barrel would logically take precedence over the potential possibility of a jammed cartridge anticipated with a complete failure of an improvised slide lock. During the previous war, common breakage parts for rapid firing mounts were far more in abundance.

(b) Parallax follow-up motor (Pc 480753-1). At the present time, the windings of two motors are burned out. In this instance also, there are no replacements available in the area. Although earlier allowance lists authorized the ship to carry 2 spare units, the latest modification to the list has reduced the allowance to zero. Based upon previous service experience, this command recommended a shipboard allowance (CV) of 4 spare units (CO USS ESSEX (CV-9) rest airmail ltr, XL3, ser 742 of 20 June, 1951). This recommendation was based upon estimates considered essential to ensure operation over a six months period. Actually, the present situation leaves one mount without corrected horizontal parallax. This is by virtue of the fact that the parallax follow-up motor in Mount 37 is superfluous and thereby available for use as a spare. Inasmuch as this mount is located a mere 6 feet from the reference point (MK 37 Director, No. 2), the parallax corrector is normally locked on zero. Until recently, the ship was able to keep abreast of failures in this category by using the unit from Mount 37 while a deficient motor was in the shop for rewinding.

(2) It is strongly recommended that adequate levels of spare parts for the 3"/50 caliber RFTM batteries be maintained on service vessels, and at repair activities in the WESPAC area. In this respect, the significance of the provision of an essentially complete commissioning allowance cannot be overstressed. It is believed that all activities connected with the original outfitting of ships should give this item much greater priority than it has customarily allotted. In addition to the previously mentioned spares, the following parts are considered critical due to their comparatively high breakage rate:

- (a) Shell support latch, rear PC 611250
- (b) Stud, shell support latch PC 611255
- (c) Cam, breech opening PC 365243-1
- (d) Tray finger mechanism, adjusting end PC 610869-1
- (e) Shaft, operating PC 510722-1

Of the above items, the first four were also recommended for increased allowances in the letter mention in subparagraph (b) of part (1) above. The operating shaft-item 5 above - was last reordered 1 October, 1951, and the Ordnance Stock Office, Washington, D.C. has indicated that the tentative delivery date for this item is 1 March 1952.

b. Performance of Aircraft Ordnance Equipment.

(1) Bomb vanes breaking loose from the hold down collars due to poor spot welds continue. BuOrd has directed using ~~MOZCAL~~ or AN-~~MOZCAL~~ type vane. It is strongly recommended that this type vane be made available in quantities as soon as possible.

(2) Due to the great volume of munitions handled to date, bomb handling equipment has been subject to considerable wear. Spare straps for MK 1 skills and eccentric binders for 250 GP bomb adapters are urgently needed. Requests for these items have been submitted. It is recommended that a 100% spare strap allowance be established.

(3) No. 1 upper stage 16,000 lb. bomb elevator has 1,211 operating hours and requires constant maintenance. The instruction manual received from BuShips lacks the necessary drawings and wiring diagrams required for proper maintenance of this elevator. It is strongly recommended that these drawings and diagrams showing incorporated changes be made available as soon as possible.

(4) A small percentage of 1,000 lb GP, 250 lb. GP, and 100 lb. GP bombs with bent and flattened lugs and broken and frozen noseplugs have been received aboard. It is impossible to hang or fuze bombs in this condition. More careful inspection of bombs on the replenishment ship is recommended.

(5) Preheated gasoline (heated by steam heater constructed aboard) for mixing napalm is being used in cold weather with good results.

(6) The following is a complete list of hung ordnance experienced during this period:

- 3 - 250 lb. GP bombs on MK 55 bomb racks; cause, defective rack.
- 2 - 250 lb. GP bombs on MK 55 bomb racks; cause, undetermined.
- 2 - 260 lb FRAG on MK 55 bomb racks; cause undetermined.
- 3 - 250 GP bombs on MK 55 bomb rack; cause, frozen racks.
- 1 - 1000 GP bomb on MK 51 bomb rack; cause, frozen rack
- 1 - 500 lb GP bomb on MK 51 bomb rack; cause, MK 8 shackle release mechanism jammed by loose disconnected plug.
- 1 - 250 lb GP on Aero 14A bomb rack; cause, electrical cannon plug inside Aero 14A launcher separated in flight.

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PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE.

1. Ship

a. During the period of November 22-28, minor structural failures were discovered and repairs made by the ship's force. The damage was caused from working of the ship in heavy seaways, and is enumerated below:

(1) Damage Control Void, A-50-V, developed a 36 inch split seam along the after top edge of the sea chest.

(2) Chain Locker, A-501-E, developed a 14 inch fracture in strake No. 7 on the port side of the chain locker.

(3) Passageway, A-205-1L, developed a fractured butt weld on the longitudinal beam at frame 27 on the starboard side of the 2nd deck. The beam also slightly buckled between frames 27 and 28, and between frames 23 and 24.

(4) The Forward Peak Tanks.

(a) A-1-W had deck slightly buckled between frames 1 and 4 at the third bottom level.

(b) A-2-W had longitudinal and vertical stiffeners were slightly buckled at frames 7 and 8.

(c) A-701-W had the transverse bulkhead slightly buckled between frames 10 to 14.

(5) Bosn's Store, A-401-A, and A-501-A had the deck buckled at frame 8.

(6) Four (4) roller curtains were damaged on the morning of the 26th when a series of three waves hit the port side of the ship between frames 70 and 100, while making a turn to the starboard. Three of the roller curtains, between frames 83 and 94, were torn from the forward roller tracks but were not ruptured. The roller curtains were shored to prevent further damage until repairs were accomplished.

2. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy.  
See enclosure (1)

3. Damage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft.  
See enclosure (1)

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.

Under the present heavy workload of continuous operations, the performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention.

## 2. Casualties.

## a. Ship's company.

There were no casualties to ship's company personnel.

## b. Air Group FIVE

Casualties in Air Group FIVE are as follows:

BRYANT, W. A., Jr. LT 442481, USN. Lost in crash after takeoff.  
 HALE, E. B. LTJG 506261 USNR Lost in action.

There were no wounded or missing.

## PART VI COMMENTS.

## 1. Engineering

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

## b. Recommendations.

## (1) Roller Curtains; shoring of.

In order to expedite the shoring and strengthening of the roller curtains during periods of heavy seas, ship's force plans to install clips on the vertical curtain guides to facilitate the installation of shoring timbers.

## (2) Whip Antenna Counterweights.

The counterweights of the forward whip antennas, frames 48 and 53 starboard, which extend down approximately four feet below the antenna platform, have been damaged by the burtoning lines on several occasions. In order to avoid future damage to these counterweights, ship's force intends to modify the weights on antennas #2-2, and #2-3 so that they can be swung up out of the way during replenishment. This will be accomplished by removing one bolt from the weight support and replacing it with a removable pin. The weight can then be pivoted around the remaining bolt, and pulled up by a lanyard.

## c. Steaming Data.

## (1) For the period 1 November to 30 November, inclusive.

Miles steamed	7959
Fuel Oil received from tankers	1,631,134 gal.
Fuel Oil delivered to destroyers	153,172 gal.
Fuel Oil consumed by USS ESSEX (underway)	1,631,134 gal.

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Fuel Oil consumed by USS ESSEX (anchored) 73,650 gal  
Average speed 16.3 knots.

(2) For the period 1 December to 14 December, inclusive:

Miles steamed 5,371.5  
Fuel Oil received from tankers 816,703  
Fuel Oil delivered to destroyers 165,004  
Fuel Oil consumed by USS ESSEX (underway) 808,850  
Average Speed 16.41 Knots

## 2. AIR DEPARTMENT

### a. Catapult and Arresting Gear.

During the period of this report, catapult and arresting gear operations were normal with the following exception. On 12 December, during a pre-dawn night heckler launch off the port catapult, both catapult hooks tore completely out of an AD-4Q aircraft. The failure occurred almost immediately after firing the catapult and the pilot stopped the plane about halfway down the catapult track. There was no failure of either the bridle, or of bridle tensioning. Catapult pressure was 1500 psi and wind over the deck approximately 35 knots. The gross weight of the plane was approximately 17,500 lbs. Cause of the failure has not as yet been determined. RUDM's will be submitted by VF-54.

### b. Flight Deck Operations.

The complement of aircraft aboard this vessel during the first three weeks of operations in this period averaged 77. This had several adverse effects on overall efficiency of flight deck operations. Additional planes had to be carried on the flight deck, resulting in a reduction of the bomb load on AD aircraft by 1,000 lbs. due to the shorter take-off run available. Duds were handled with difficulty because of lack of dud space on the flight and hangar decks. During the latter part of the period this particular problem was alleviated somewhat by launching 17 jet aircraft and an average of 12 to 14 propeller aircraft. The requirement that the ship be able to recover six planes besides its complement could not be met without parking three aircraft on the No. 5 and No. 6 barriers. While maintaining a "ready deck" with 77 planes aboard, the hangar deck was two blocked and maintenance of aircraft, especially jets, suffered due to the aircraft being spotted very close together in all bays.

Replacement of AD-4 with AD-2 aircraft has resulted in manufacturing of six "Z" type tow bars during this period. There are now a total of twelve aboard, six on the hangar deck, and six on the flight deck.

During this period, it has become necessary to increase the number of tie-downs on aircraft because of higher winds and heavier seas. Hurricane cables are put on the planes almost every night in addition to the normal 16 point tie-down. It has been necessary to order additional mooring assemblies (come-alongs) in order to facilitate securing of aircraft.

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c. Operating Data for November and December 1951

	1-30 November	1-14 December
Arrested Landings	702	774
Catapult Shots (starboard)	156	225
Catapult Shots (port)	179	219
Gasoline, (gallons)	358,635	462,504
LubOil, Symbol 1100	1,800	2,513
LubOil, Symbol 1010	1,528	4,586

3. NAVIGATION

A series of radar repeaterscope photographs were taken during the ship's departure from Yokosuka, Japan. A study of these photographs revealed numerous targets especially suitable for radar navigation. These photographs, properly notated to identify the targets, will be used when planning to make an entry or departure under low visibility conditions.

4. AIR OPERATIONS

a. Racon

One change was made to the wiring for the Racon (AN/CPN-6) gear. Since the controls for starting and stopping were located, along with the equipment, at the O10 level, there was considerable delay in assuming the guard and no assurance that the gear was operating. Two of the four (4) unused wires in the YE control box, which is located in AirOps were connected to a switch and light and mounted on the YE control box in AirOps. The upper ends of the wires are connected to the Racon. It is now possible to turn on the Racon from Air Operations, and the glowing light indicates that the gear is operating.

b. Radio Homer

Steps are being taken to construct an automatic keying device for the "Bird Dog" or radio homer. There appears to be no device furnished to ships for this purpose. Ship's in the past either constructed their own, or were forced to have a radio man available the entire day for this purpose.

If this device proves successful, Air Operations will have control of the YE, Racon, and the Radio Homer, the three required for navigational purposes, all centrally located in Air Operations Spaces.

5. COMMUNICATIONS

a. CW Circuits.

During the third period for the ESSEX in the Korean operating area, no new communications problems were encountered. The situation in regard to radio CW circuits has remained unchanged. This command forwarded a recommendation via the Task Force commander suggesting that the area commander reassign frequencies for both the CW and voice circuits with Joint Operations

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Center, Korea (guarded by 5th AF HQ, Korea). It was recommended that another daylight frequency for CW (retaining the present frequency for night transmissions), and a new night frequency for the voice circuits be assigned.

b. Tactical Circuits.

The disadvantage of employing the secondary tactical (radio-telephone) frequency for other purposes (screen common, administrative, and gunfire control) has continued to lessen the effectiveness of this circuit, particularly when the circuit has had to be used in lieu of the primary tactical frequency as during periods of operational maintenance.

c. Interference

During this period, attempts have been made to eliminate interference on both tactical circuits as a result of "splash-over" of the VHF frequency employed for air strike control. By interchanging receiver equipments, and thus shifting associated receiver antenna leads, some improvement has been noted. Interchanging crystals within (TDQ Model) transmitters has also been effective in reducing a portion of the interference. This problem is a part in reducing a portion of the interference. This problem is a part of the over-all program of shipboard radio interference reduction to be completed prior to the ship's next yard availability.

d. Ratt

Encouraging results have been obtained in radioteletype communications for this period. DUPLEX operations with NDT and Com7thFlt have been very satisfactory for the first time since the ESSEX reported to the Operating Area. The circuit assigned exclusively to the task force flagship for ship/shore radioteletype has proved highly satisfactory, although it appears that in the near future this circuit will be shared again with another task force command (CTF 95 when at sea). For a carrier flagship, sharing the circuit has one outstanding disadvantage of limiting time on the air to the extent that, combined with outages due to atmospherics, the value of radioteletype for clearing the heavy volume of ship/shore traffic is considerably reduced. The disadvantage arises primarily from the loss of transmitting time resulting from periods when antennas must be "de-energized" for flight, fueling, and arming operations.

e. Facimile

Facsimile schedules with the Radio Photo Unit stationed at NPG were highly satisfactory during this period. Prints of photo coverage of the visit of front-line G.I.'s to the ship over Thanksgiving have been returned to the ship and help to establish the value of this type of transmission for public information and morale purposes.

f. Personnel.

With the release to inactive duty and transfer of both officer and enlisted personnel, communications will be hardest hit in the cryptoboard and signal (EM) sections. For ships reporting to the operating area,

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it is again emphasized that personnel needs must be anticipated as far in advance as possible. In any event the training program must be of such a nature as to provide replacements for key personnel who are for one reason or another transferred from the command.

## 6. LOOKOUTS

The Lookout Division has been undergoing vigorous training. In addition to regular classes in recognition, sound-powered telephone talker procedures, and duties and responsibilities of lookouts, the men are also studying for rates which they will strike when transferred to a division of their choosing. The procedure has been established for the majority of seamen and seamen apprentice reporting aboard to be assigned to the Lookout Division. By doing this, the men have two to three months in the division during which time they can observe the duties of various rates on board and decide for which division they would be best adapted. This procedure is followed insofar as possible.

All men assigned to the division undergo eye examinations prior to assignment. All must have 20-20 vision and normal color perception to qualify for assignment. This requirement was made necessary because too many men were found with defective vision when the Lookout Division was first formed.

## 7. AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING.

The PO equipment has been used to advantage to give the ship's CIC a bird's eye view of the Task Force and surrounding area. Surface contacts consisting of three or more ships have been detected at ranges of over 90 miles from the ASP aircraft. Single ships to a slightly lesser range have been detected depending upon ASP altitude and atmospheric conditions.

The PO picture has also been used to determine wind direction, as well as to show a plane view of weather build-ups in the task force area.

At times, the relayed AN/APS-20A PPI picture has been able to supply excellent information on air contacts. Despite the low altitude of the ASP aircraft it has picked up returning strikes and jet CAP at altitudes over 20,000 feet as a result of reflection from the water.

## 8. AIR INTELLIGENCE.

Air Group FIVE has now completed three full months in the Korean Operating Area using the original charts issued covered with frisket paper. As far as can be determined the charts show all indications of being fully useable for another operating period.

## 9. PHOTOGRAPHY.

### a. K-25 Strike Photography.

K-25 damage assessment photography posed several problems.

These have been ironed-out, in part, through pilot orientation and through continued maintenance.

Pilots, understandably, have a tendency to use a mounted camera much the same as a gun. Use of the K-25 must be much more precise than gunnery in order to achieve clear sharp pictures. The aircraft must, at the time the camera is energized, be completely free of any forces acting upon it. The target must be sighted dead on and approached directly along a tangent which will render the camera less efficient. Maneuvers such as "pull outs" sweep the ground area across the field of view at a high rate. This coupled with the forces acting upon the camera creates undesirable results. Acceleration in a dive also creates a negative force which acts directly against the camera's weakest point.

The pressure plate in the K-25 is the primary weak spot when the camera is mounted in an aircraft. It is forced downward by cam action to hold the film flat and free of flutter. Flat springs act as a buffer to the cam action and also distribute the action evenly upon the plate. The springs, while of sufficient strength under free operation, are not strong enough to oppose the afore mentioned forces.

The shutter mechanism is a closely arranged mechanism and poses another problem, that of maintenance. Vibration of the aircraft when the camera is tripped bounces the parts so that their swing is not always 90° from their pivot points. When this occurs, breakage is almost certain to result.

It should be noted that guns must not be fired during camera operation. The laboratory has had to repair at least one camera a day and usually two or three. During the first month of usage the cameras showed no tendency toward breakages. The second and third month breakages at an increasing rate. The following is recommended:

1. Maintain close contact with the pilots using these cameras. Their complete understanding of the problems and techniques is of primary importance.
2. Carry spare parts for the K-25 shutter.
3. Make slight machining alterations on shutter parts.
4. Include a qualified camera repairman in ship's company.

RECORD OF K-25 STRIKE PHOTO VF-54

16 November through 11 December 1951

Rolls taken	58
Total Possible exposures	1375
Total Exposures taken	1132
Total usable exposures	694
Total unusable exposures	407
Total prints filed	124

Rolls not used due to poor techniques 4  
Prints made 8 x 10 1736

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b. COPYING, USING PAPER NEGATIVES

A large number of copies are being produced by the use of paper negatives. Sensitized material used for the paper negatives is standard stock enlarging paper, contrasts 0 through 4. For the reproduction of photographs and outdoor photographs contrasts No. 2 has been found satisfactory. For reproduction of charts, line maps, and drawings contrast No. 4 has been found satisfactory. Outdoor exposure in bright sunlight, with contrast No. 2 is approximately 1/50 sec at F 4.5. Copy work with two No. 2 photo-flood lamps is approximately 25 sec. at F 22. After the paper negative is developed, fixed, and washed it is dried on the glossy print dryer in the conventional manner as S.W. glossy prints.

Since recommissioning the photographic laboratory has been required to produce a large number of reproductions. Many of these reproductions required only a few copies with no use for the negatives. A large number of these reproductions have been of charts, drawings and sheets of figures whereby computations would have to be checked if produced in any other manner. A paper negative may be made, developed, fixed, washed, dried and ready for printing in approximately 30 minutes. Regular negative material requires a much longer time for processing unless given special handling.

Paper negatives are easy to handle, inexpensive and have been found very satisfactory for training photographic strikers in the operation of various ground cameras. The material may be handled under a yellow safelight whereby the beginner may follow the process. The major difference between the paper negatives and film is the sensitivity or speed.

c. PHOTOGRAPHY PRODUCTION RECORD

Third operating period 17 November through 11 December 1951

Total number of photographic missions flown	41	
Total number of rolls filed	49	
Average number of exposures per roll	70	
Total number of negatives used	3,647	
Total number of prints made	37,924	
		<u>Running Time</u>
Average time to develop and wash film, figured on 52 rolls.	65 Min 1 Hr 5 Min.	
Average time to dry film, figured on 52 rolls	36 Min 1 Hr 41 Min.	
Average time for first set of grease pencil marked prints delivered to P.I. Officer.	60 Min 2 Hr 41 Min.	
Average time to mark one (1) roll of film (computed from time of delivery to film marking, to time returned for distribution printing)	117 Min. 4 Hr 38 Min.	

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Average time for set of marked prints to Flag (after receiving marked film from film marking)

124 Min 8 Hr 22 Min


Average time for set of marked prints to P.I. Officer (after receiving marked film from film marking)

133 Min 8 Hr 31 Min

All work completed and ready for mailing by 1000 the following day.

PRODUCTION RECORD FOR 1st, 2nd and 3rd OPERATING PERIODS, 24 AUGUST THROUGH 11 DECEMBER 1951.

Total number of missions flown	171
Total number of rolls filed	260
Total number of negatives used	14,726
Total number of prints made	136,173
Average number of exposures per roll	56 $\frac{1}{2}$



AUSTIN W. WHEELOCK

Copy to:

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USS PRINCETON (CV-37)  
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)  
USS ANTIETAM (CV-36)  
USS KEARSAGE (CV-37)  
CVG 5 (5)  
CVG 11  
CVG 15  
CVG 101  
CVG 102  
AIR TASK GROUP ONE

USS ESSEX (CV9)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

CV9/A16-13  
Serial: 021  
4 February 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
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DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 13 December 1951 to 3 February 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report, 13 December 1951 - 3  
February 1952. P. 21

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 13 December 1951 to 3 February 1952 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

a. At various times during the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), ComCarDiv ONE, RADM J. FERRY, USN embarked, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45), ComCarDiv FIVE, RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN embarked, USS ANTIETAM (CV36), USS ROCHESTER (CA124), USS ST PAUL (CA73), ComCruDiv ONE, RADM E. E. STONE, USN, embarked, USS MANCHESTER (CL83) and units of Destroyer Division 12, 31, 72, 91, 92, 111, 122, 132, 131, 151, 152, 171, 172, and Escort Destroyer Division 11, 12.

b. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (1st & 2nd revisions), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was primarily to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGY:

13 December Enroute from operating area to Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with CTF 77 dispatch 100540Z Dec.

14 December 1510 moored port side to, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

15-25 Dec. Yard availability, rest, and recreation period, training and upkeep, Yokosuka, Japan.

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- [REDACTED]
- 26 December Underway Yokosuka, Japan for operating area in accordance with CTE 77.04 dispatch 230140Z Dec.
- 27 December Proceeding to operating area.
- 28 December Conducted refresher Air Operations. Joined Task Force 77 RADM J. FERRY, USN, Commander Carrier Division ONE, relieved RADM F. W. McMAHON, Commander Carrier Division FIVE as OTC.
- 29 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 30 December Conducted Air Operations.
- 31 December Task Force replenished. The following message was received from Commander SEVENTH Fleet addressed to Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. "YOUR STELLAR PERFORMANCE OF YESTERDAY, ESPECIALLY THAT OF ESSEX AIR GROUP FIVE IN MAKING 123 RAIL CUTS, WAS A FITTING CLIMAX TO THE YEARS WORK WHICH HAS SEEN TASK FORCE 77 HITTING THE ENEMY FROM THE BOMBLINE TO RASHIN X MY WISH FOR THE NEW YEAR IS THAT YOUR EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE WITH EVEN GREATER SUCCESS AND THUS HASTEN THE VICTORY WHICH WE ALL SEEK X VADM MARTIN SENDS
- 1 January 52 Conducted Air Operations.
- 2 January Conducted Air Operations.
- 3 January A 20mm gun installed in a F2H Banshee accidentally discharged due to a broken breech block lock and air pressure loss. Five men were wounded when the high explosive shell hit a F9F Panther and exploded. Four men were listed as not serious and one was listed as critical.
- 4 January Task Force replenished.
- 5 January Conducted Air Operations. The following message was received from Commander SEVENTH Fleet addressed to CTF 77 "THE MORE RED YOU PUT ON OUR INTERDICTION CHART THE LESS RED RICE AND AMMO GET TO ITS DESTINATION X TODAYS PICTURE IS THE MOST SATISFYING YET X KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK X VADM MARTIN SENDS"
- 6 January Conducted Air Operations. 0745 F9F BUNO. 123632 crashed over enemy territory - exploded on impact. Probable cause AA fire. Pilot (ENS. J. H. RICKELTON) listed as killed in action.
- 7 January Task Force replenished.
- 8 January Conducted Air Operations.
- 9 January Conducted Air Operations. 1145 AD3 BUNO. 122750. crashed over enemy territory - exploded on impact. Probable cause AA fire. Pilot (ENS R. G. KELLY) listed as killed in action.
- [REDACTED]

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10 January Task Force replenished.

11 January Conducted Air Operations. 1235 - AD BUNO. 122339 was seen to spin and crash shortly after takeoff. After a normal carrier takeoff, plane jettisoned 1-one thousand pound bomb then climbed abruptly to an estimated 900 feet, made three shallow turns to the right, the last turn steepening into a nose down diving spiral. The plane sank immediately after striking the water. Two helicopters conducted a fruitless search for the pilot. No radio transmissions were received from the pilot at any time. Cause unknown. Pilot (LTJG J. H. GOLLNER) listed as killed in the line of duty.

12 January Conducted Air Operations.

13 January Conducted Air Operations. Captain WALTER F. RODEE, USN, relieved Captain AUSTIN W. WHEELLOCK, USN, as Commanding Officer of the USS ESSEX (CV9). The following message was received from Captain WHEELLOCK addressed to Commander Air Group FIVE "UPON BEING RELIEVED AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ESSEX I WISH TO CONVEY MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AIR GROUP FIVE X YOUR SUPERB PERFORMANCE HAS BEEN A CONTINUAL SOURCE OF INSPIRATION TO ME AND THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ESSEX X I WISH YOU THE BEST OF LUCK FOR THE FUTURE AND GOOD HUNTING X SIGNED CAPTAIN AUSTIN W. WHEELLOCK"

1210. F4U BUNO. 62982 hit by AA fire, ditched 5 miles East Mayang-Do. Pilot (ENS E. R. HARRIS) picked up by USS PORTERFIELD. No injuries sustained.

14 January Conducted Air Operations.

15 January Conducted Air Operations. The following message was received from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN addressed to Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. "COMNAVFE 140212Z QUOTED FOR INFO QUOTE SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE SEVENTY-SEVEN ON 5 CMA 6 AND 8 JANUARY IN DESTROYING HEAVILY DEFENDED KEY RAIL AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES WEST OF YANGDOK MOST GRATIFYING X SPECIAL PREDAWN OPERATIONS 12 JANUARY NETTING 2 LOCOMOTIVES AND 36 RAIL CARS DESTROYED AND 2 ADDITIONAL LOCOMOTIVES DAMAGED ALSO NOTED WITH PLEASURE X CONSIDER SUCCESS THESE OPERATIONS REFLECT ASTUTE PLANNING AND SKILLFUL EXECUTION BY COMMANDER TASK FORCE SEVENTY-SEVEN AS WELL AS OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCES BY AIR GROUP PERSONNEL X WELL DONE X VADM G. T. JOY SENDS UNQUOTE X THE PLANNING REFLECTS THE COMBINED KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF BOTH STAFF AND FLIGHT PERSONNEL X THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE MAINTENANCE X ORDNANCE AND FLIGHT DECK CREWS MADE IT POSSIBLE X THE CONTINUED PERFORMANCE OF TASK FORCE 77 SUPPORT AND SCREEN VESSELS PERMITS SCHEDULING OPERATIONS OF THIS NATURE WHENEVER AN OPPORTUNITY IS OFFERED"

1125 AD BUNO. 122313 hit by AA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT F. J. PRENDERGAST) picked up by USS MACKENZIE. No injuries sustained.

[REDACTED]

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16 January Conducted Air Operations.

17 January Task Force replenished.

18 January Conducted Air Operations

19 January Conducted Air Operations. 1350. F2H BUNO. 124945 crashed over enemy territory - exploded on impact. Probable cause AA fire. Pilot (MAJOR F. N. McCULLUM, USAF exchange pilot serving in VF 172) listed as killed in action.

20 January Task Force replenished.

21 January Conducted Air Operations. The following message was received from Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN addressed to the ESSEX and ANTIETAM "WELL DONE TO BOTH CARRIERS FOR THEIR WORK TODAY WHILE WE REGRET LOSING AN ABLE DOG, WISCONSIN'S WINDMILL MADE AN EXCELLENT RESCUE X HURE IS THE SCOE WITH NIGHT HECKLERS STILL OUT, RAIL CUTS 137 BRIDGES 5 DESTROYED 2 DAMAGED X RR CARS 6 DESTROYED 32 DAMAGED X LOCOMOTIVES 2 DAMAGED X BYPASSES 2 DESTROYED X TROOPS 15 KILLED"

22 January Conducted Air Operations. 1005 F4U BUNO. 63033 hit by enemy AA fire, Pilot (LTJG J. ABBOTT) bailed out 20 miles South of Hungnam, was picked up by ROCHESTER helicopter and transferred to Yokosuka Naval Hospital for treatment. 1015 F4U BUNO. 62943 crashed in enemy territory. Pilot (LTJG E. V. LANEY) in attempting to drop a life raft to ROCHESTER helicopter crewmen in water fouled tail of plane with raft causing crash - pilot picked up by ROCHESTER helicopter, no injuries sustained. 1225. AD4 BUNO. 122807 crashed in Wonsan Harbor. Probable cause enemy AA fire. Pilot (CDR P. N. GRAY) picked up by CTE 95.21. No injuries sustained.

23 January Conducted Air Operations.

24 January Task Force replenished.

25 January Air Operations cancelled due to weather.

26 January Conducted Air Operations. F9F BUNO. crashed in Wonsan Harbor. Probable cause enemy AA fire. Pilot (LTJG L. R. CHESHIRE) listed as killed in action.

27 January Conducted Air Operations.

28 January Task Force replenished.

29 January Conducted Air Operations.

30 January Conducted Air Operations. 1025, AD BUNO. 122325 ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Probable cause prop failure. Pilot (CDR P. N. GRAY) picked up by the USS TWINING (DD 540), no injuries sustained. The following message was received from Commander SEVENTH Fleet "THE OUTSTANDING

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PERFORMANCE OF ESSEX AND HER AIR GROUP DURING THE PAST OPERATING PERIOD HAS RENDERED TELLING BLOWS AGAINST THE ENEMY X WELL DONE X VADM MARTIN "

31 January Conducted Air Operations,

1 February Task Force replenished. 1145 RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, ComCarDiv FIVE, relieved RADM J. PERRY, USN, ComCarDiv ONE as CTF 77. 1330 Took departure TF 77 proceeding to Yokosuka, Japan with ComCarDiv ONE embarked, in accordance with CTF 77 290908Z FEB.

2 February Proceeding to Yokosuka, Japan.

3 February 0945. Arrived Yokosuka, Japan for rest, recreation and yard availability.

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.  
See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

- a. For the period 13-31 December 1951: None
- b. For the period 1-31 January 1952: None
- c. For the period 1-3 February 1952: None

3. Comments on Performance of Ordnance.

- a. Performance of Ship's Ordnance Equipment: The performance of ship's ordnance equipment was satisfactory.

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE.

1. Ship

a. On 26 and 27 December enroute to the combat zone the ship sustained minor structural damages as a result of heavy seas as follows:

(1) Three 3"/50 ready boxes were torn from their bases on the fore-castle. All were recovered.

(2) Four life rafts were carried away off the port side forward.

(3) The starboard forward boat boom was broken; only eight feet remained.

(4) Framing on the main and second decks (frame 20 to 26) was distorted due to heavy seas hitting the flare of the ship.

(5) Indentations were made in the ship's hull on the port side at frame 7 and the deck depressed at frame 6 (Compt A-401-A).

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(6) The port corner of the spray shield around Secondary Gunn was forced up and back approximately eight inches.

(7) The gasoline line, port side frame 20 Cl deck, was crushed.

b. On 4 January a welded seam opened in the sea chest of A-50V, flooding the void with 22 feet of water. This same seam had been opened on 22 November 1951. Repairs were made by Ship's Force,

2. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy.  
See enclosure (1)

3. Damage Inflicted on ESSEX aircraft,  
See enclosure (1)

#### PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

##### 1. Performance.

Under the heavy workload of continuous operations, the performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention.

##### 2. Casualties.

###### a. Ship's Company

On 3 January 1952 the following men were wounded as a result of shrapnel and flying debris caused by the accidental discharge of a 20MM automatic gun in a F2H Banshee aircraft.

FERRIER, C. L, 926 99 80, SN, USNR, Multiple shrapnel wounds, back with traumatic section spinal cord. Placed on sick and critical list.

CLECKLEY, A. D. 422 02 57, AA, USN, Shrapnel wound, left leg. Wound dressed and returned to duty.

LAMBERT, G. D. 571 78 80, SA, USN, Shrapnel wounds, left elbow and right buttock. Placed on sick list, not serious.

LEARY, M. M. 799 79 85, AFAN, USN, Shrapnel wound, right forearm, right buttock and right knee. Placed on sick list, not serious.

WOODSIDE, J. B. 342 83 27, AO2, USN Shrapnel wounds multiple right leg from hip to ankle. Placed on sick list. Not serious.

b. Air Group FIVE  
See enclosure (1)

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[REDACTED]

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## PART VI COMMENTS:

### 1. Engineering Department

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

b. Recommendations.

None

c. Steaming Data

	<u>15-31 Dec 51</u>	<u>1-31 Jan 52</u>	<u>1-3 Feb 52</u>
Miles steamed	2,502	11,308.8	1134.2
Fuel Oil Received	778,192 gal.	1,588,469	243524
Fuel Oil Delivered DD's	82,536 gal.	163,651	28,644
Fuel Consumed (underway)	427,700 gal.	1,641,000	194,450
Fuel Oil consumed (anchored)	73,650 gal.	- - -	- - -
Average Speed	18.2 knots	15.2 knots	19.4
Hours Underway	132	744	57.8

### 2. Air Department

a. Catapult and Arresting Gear

During the period of this report Catapult and Arresting gear operations were normal with the following exceptions:

The platform for No. 5 barrier air cylinder, located within the island structure aft (Repair VIII locker) was reinforced with welded 1/4 inch plate. The platform, constructed of two 1/4 inch plates, is welded boxlike at the deck-bulkhead seam. With movement of the air cylinder both the bulkhead and deck plate would work, causing a torsion of the platform, and canting the air cylinder so that the piston rod wedged on the side of the cylinder. As a result the barrier remained approximately 10 to 12 inches above the deck. With additional bracing fore and aft, the twisting action was eliminated.

During the past six months of operations it has been determined conclusively that the jet starting units, installed under the edge of the flight deck adjacent to the catapults, have not justified the space and maintenance required by them. At the beginning of this period the starter units were used, however, several times planes could not be started when the signal was given, but immediately after the launch were lit off satisfactorily with a starter jeep. The use of the units was discontinued due to their extreme unreliability, and thereafter the dud problem was greatly reduced. Starter jeeps have since been used exclusively and there is rarely any difficulty in keeping the catapults "fed" in spite of the fact that the jets are started only 3-4 minutes before launch time, and that during a 16-plane jet launch anywhere from 24 to 28 engines have to be started. Using the starter jeeps, jets can be turned up anywhere on the flight or hangar deck.

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The F2H Banshee, unlike the F9F, cannot fold its wings with gas in the tin tanks. In the midst of a launch, a Banshee dud, with a wing span of approximately 45 feet, does present a problem, but no more so than that of an F9F, if handled properly. They can either be parked forward of the island with the tail outboard, aft of the island in the same position, or placed on the No. 2 elevator and then dropped down to hangar deck level and taken off onto the hangar deck. The Banshee, however, has proved to be an exceptionally reliable aircraft, and it is not uncommon to have a run of 200 Banshees launched without encountering a dud.

During this tour on the line, severe cold weather was encountered. After three weeks of such conditions it was found necessary to give certain flight deck personnel, especially plane directors, relief from all duties for a short period, usually 4 hours. With the flight deck crew 25% under complement, proportionately longer hours of work have been required of all hands. This, plus continued cold weather and high winds across the flight deck, have hastened fatigue. This practice (short relief from all duties) has paid big dividends in better leadership and higher morale.

b. Operating data for December 1951 and January and February 1952.

	<u>15-31 Dec</u>	<u>1-31 Jan</u>	<u>1-3 Feb.</u>
Arrested Landings	226	1,929	
Catapult Shots (starboard)	62	541	None
Catapult Shots (port)	60	559	
Gasoline, (gallons)	131,762 gal.	1,074,687 gal	
LubOil Symbol 1100	1,147 gal.	4,583 gal	
LubOil Symbol 1010	248 gal.	5,303 gal	
LubOil Symbol 1120	300 gal.	2,405 gal	
Alcohol AN-A-24	15 gal.	----	
Alcohol AN-A-13	23 gal.	43 gal	

3. Supply Department for the period 15-31 December 1951.

a. Aviation Stores

(1) No particular difficulties were experienced in obtaining aviation stores material.

(2) Approximately 150 tons of aviation stores representing the last major replenishment of stock in this area were received.

b. General Stores

(1) Services rendered by the CASTOR, ELECTRO I, Fleet Activities, and CTG 92.5 were excellent during this period. The CASTOR was particularly outstanding due to the short period of time it required to screen and fill requisitions.

(2) Approximately 75 tons of GSK materials were received.

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c. Ship's Stores

(1) During the inport period of 15-26 December, stores received from the afloat activities were 39% of those ordered. The availability of cobbler, tailor, and laundry supplies appears to be critical in this area. A fair assortment of other standard items is still available. Additional requirements placed on Fleet Activities resulted in 6% completion.

(2) About 6 tons of stores were received during this period.

d. Clothing and Small Stores

(1) Very few C&SS items were ordered during this period.

(2) All items were received with the exception of marks and service stripes, size 32 dungarees, and work gloves.

e. Commissary Officer

(1) No comments on services while in port. Replenishment at sea is decidedly preferable to replenishment in port.

(2) Received 46 tons of provisions from USS GRAFFIAS and 16 tons from Fleet Activities, Yokosuka for a total of 62 tons.

f. Disbursing

(1) W2, 1040 and 1040A tax forms were ordered but not procured from sources in this area. No receipt transfers of cash while in port. Fifteen deposit record books were received by transfer from Fleet Activities Disbursing Office.

(2) Tonnage not applicable.

For the period 1 January to 15 January 1952

a. Aviation Stores

The period 1 January 1952 was critical for the Aviation Stores Group. The 180 day initial allowance of spare parts (approximately 18,000 items) insofar as high usage and critical items were concerned, stocks were fairly well exhausted by the end of November, 1951. Although stocks were reordered as low limits were reached, 510 requisitions were pending on 15 January, representing about 1200 items due. Of these 1200 items 19 were pending on a Priority A basis for AOG aircraft.

During the first two weeks of January, 5 of the Priority A items were received by CODFISH delivery. The oldest pending Priority A requisition is dated 29 November 1951, for a nose assembly for an AD-4NL APS-31 radome, stock number R82-DG-5380466-50. Delivery is indefinite due to inability of contractor to meet requirements because of tooling redesign.

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Four AD aircraft were AOG because of the critical shortage of propellers, stock number R87-ADD-P100017. Up to 1 January, 19 propeller changes had been made on the ESSEX AD aircraft, with the 4 pending making a total of 23 to date. Apparently this requirement is unusually high.

Mutual support between the carriers in the operating area continued to be of great value. No ship has failed to send over an AOG part, if available. The importance of this informal source of supply cannot be over-emphasized. The last time the Aviation Stores Group was replenished at sea by the USS JUPITER (AVS-8) was on 29 October 1951, and we do not expect to replenish at sea again until 31 January 1952. Replenishment at sea is advantageous and greater utilization of this method would improve deliveries of aviation parts which are most necessary at this time, particularly in view of the present extended period of deployment of this ship.

b. General Stores

(1) The system of furnishing standard stock continues to be excellent. There has been no shortage of important items.

(2) Electronic and machinery spare parts are the most difficult to replace. Although replenishment sources have furnished available spares promptly, only about 30% of the items required can be obtained in NAVFE area. Replenishment from PROCO is comparatively slow with the result that stocks on board are diminishing progressively.

(3) Through the combined efforts of CTG 92.5 and CTG 92.1 to procure critical spares; CODFISH air deliveries; and cooperation between all ships in CTF 77 exchanging parts, we have had no major equipment shut down for lack of spares.

(4) During the period which is covered by this report, the ship has been operating in a very cold climate. Experience during this time has proven that all of the type of winterization equipment as allowed has been adequate. Considering that this ship is allowed 2,250 complete sea outfits of clothing, it is suggested that specially constructed storerooms be provided. This would greatly facilitate issues and provide for better care of the clothing while in stock.

c. Commissary

One hundred and sixteen tons of provisions were received from the USS POLARIS (AF11) in less than two hours; up to the present time about 48.5 tons per hour was average. The service has been satisfactory except for some of the highly perishable fresh items such as lettuce, tomatoes and celery. It is suggested that the AF's notify ships present when they take on their fresh provisions so the larger ships could load a month's supply, thus eliminating excessive handling and facilitating sorting of perishable items.

An itemized list of all provisions carried by the supply ships would be mutually helpful, along with instructions on the most expeditious means of replenishment, such as, suggestive quantities, better time to order, at sea or in port, and items that the AF would like to move.

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d. Disbursing

The last details of the transition from old to new pay records was completed. Income tax forms, (W-2) Withholding Statements, were prepared for distribution to all hands.

e. Clothing and Small Stores

The following items are difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities to maintain adequate stock levels, and at present are at the low limits.

Trouser, Dungaree, Sizes 31 and 32.

Socks, Black, Cotton, Size 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ .

Service Stripes, Blue

Branch Marks

f. Ship's Store

By the use of several display tables at scheduled times, the ship's store has been able to present souvenir items to ship's company. This method has been necessary since these items can not be displayed along with other merchandise because of the inadequacy of show space in the ship's stores.

4. Administration

The complement of this vessel must be maintained at the authorized level of 2060 enlisted personnel in order to carry out the mission of the ship during the present type of deployment. No problem existed with respect to personnel until the change in deployment schedule which required that many Reserve Petty Officer personnel be transferred from the ship prior to its departure for the continental United States. Corrective measures have been taken to cover the additional period of deployment by the ordering of "short timer" personnel to the ship.

5. CIC

The stowage and correction of the CI C allowance of H. O. charts have proved to be a problem. The number of portfolios sent to the ship for CIC has been far more than required for any particular cruise. In fact during the present action in the Sea of Japan one chart was used for weeks on end, and once a month three or four additional charts were used proceeding to and from port.

In the meantime correction changes to the entire allowance of charts continued to be received regularly. In order to keep up with these changes critical radar rates were taken from their primary CIC jobs. At times, due to the ship's steady operation, personnel to record the changes have not been available otherwise.

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No stowage facilities exist in CIC for charts. Consequently in order to stow the CIC allowance, facilities designed for the use of Air Operations and the Operations Department in general have been usurped. This in turn has overcrowded the Operations Department entire filing system facilities.

It is recommended that consideration be given to a "tailor-made" allowance of H. O. charts for CIC based upon the particular cruise or operation in which the ship is expected to be involved or that the Navigator's allowance be augmented in certain categories upon which CIC might draw for its needs.

## 6. Communications

As a result of improvements in communications effected during the fourth period of operations, ESSEX was able to carry out task force communications responsibilities more expeditiously than any previous period.

### CW Circuits

Following requests initiated by this command, a reassignment of frequencies was made by the area commander for the Tactical Air Administrative net (Joint Operation Center, Korea — net control station). Two additional daytime frequencies (designated Z-29 and Z-30 in the current edition of 5th Air Force Communication Operating Instruction #29) have greatly benefitted conditions on this circuit. Circuit G-65, used on a continuous 24-hour basis prior to the new assignments is now employed primarily as the night frequency.

The use of the Task Force Common CW circuit (designated C4.3c in JANAP 195-B) has been extended and its value increased by the relay through a destroyer in TF 77 of traffic to and from Task Force 95 — specif., TG 95.2 units (with the screen commander in the force designating the guardship). This destroyer closes down on C4.3c to transmit to TF 95 units on C4.3a. On an experimental basis, this arrangement has proved highly satisfactory.

All other CW circuits have been operated as before. Experience has proved that the "replenishment" circuit (C2e) is best guarded by the flagship, and the guardship of the wea-recco circuit assigned to a carrier or cruiser in company.

Numerous (and, it is felt, excessive) orders for shifts of frequency on the 7th Fleet Command net (C16) continued to be recorded during this period of operations.

### Radioteletype Circuits

An evaluation of the total daily hour's operating time of the ship-to-shore RATT circuit with NDT, Tokyo, has pointed up the great advantage of this method for clearing S/S traffic. A 15-day test estimate has shown that the flagship was in teletype communications with the beach an average of 20-plus hours daily. Excellent cooperation has been obtained from the shore facility during this period making possible the successful Duplex operations serving units afloat. As flagship, ESSEX cleared traffic from the beach to commands such as Com7thFlt and CTF 95 in addition to transmitting almost all traffic received from the force for shore station relay by means of this circuit.

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To a large extent the success of shipboard operations has been due to the use of the TBA-model transmitter. NDT supplemented the number of frequencies available to CTF 77 adding frequency C19a to the frequencies allocated by Circuit A4.8 (refer JANAP 195-B). A lower frequency than any that had been previously allocated, C19a has proved an ideal working frequency for night transmissions; the difficulties from dusk-to-dawn interference (evaluated as other TTY transmitting stations ashore) encountered on A4.8a and A4.8b have been effectively reduced. NDT has further improved teletype communications by adding a frequency in the VLF band (123 kc.) for dusk-to-dawn Fox broadcast as well as for Duplex purposes with this command (when acting as flagship).

#### Voice Circuits:

The conditions on the circuit with JCC, Korea, continue to leave room for improvement; this command's request for a change, particularly in the frequencies assigned to the circuit at night, has not been acted upon to date.

With the receipt of TED transmitters on board, the testing of this new equipment on circuits such as the Flag Conference net is planned. On the last day of this report the frequency for this circuit was changed from 386.6 mc (T5) to 307.4 mc (T3).

NOTE: The first TED fully installed has been used successfully on the Task Group Commanders net (RATT); designated circuit T6 — although a full evaluation is not possible at this time.

#### Antenna Installations:

A letter to BuShips is being prepared requesting a clarification of the conditions requiring the rigging and unrigging of whip antennas (5 forward, and 8 aft). ESSEX' average daily loss of transmitting time on the forward whips has been about 3½ hours; on the after whips, about 45 minutes. Primary cause of this loss has been the plane-gassing operations for which the "de-energizing" of whips has been required.

#### Traffic:

A preliminary traffic analysis for the period 1-31 January 1952 indicates the following volume of incoming and outgoing traffic by radio, visual means, and mail. Only total figures are shown.

Incoming - 22,861

Outgoing - 5,432

#### Personnel:

Due to the fact that six key personnel eligible for transfer volunteered to remain on board until the ship's return stateside, communications has been able to operate effectively (Condition III Watch Schedule) with enlisted personnel assigned as follows:

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	<u>Ship's Company</u>	<u>Flag</u>
Radio	33	5
Teletype	9	0
Main Communications	15	7*
Signal	24	3
Post Office	4	0
TOTAL	85	15 - 100

\* Includes 4 Marine Detachment personnel ~~serving~~ as messengers.

N.B. The total of 100 personnel is believed the minimum number with which a flagship can fulfill its communications obligations.

## 7. Air Intelligence

### a. Photo Interpretation

The majority of photo interpretations during the period were devoted to the preparation of flak mosaics for distribution to all carriers operating with the force. These mosaics were prepared for the major strikes as well as routine rail cutting and were well received by the Air Groups embarked. On particularly intense flak concentrations it was found that new positions were installed in a matter of 48 hours or less and therefore required photo coverage approximately every 2 or 3 days. The enemy has utilized previously unoccupied positions which make it imperative that photo interpreters annotate all gun positions, occupied or unoccupied, in order that the pilots will be aware of their presence. These mosaics, once prepared, were copied, printed, and assembled in book form for easy reference on the pilots' ~~knee pads~~ or chart boards.

For the latter portion of this period, the F2H-2P have been operated to supplement the coverage obtained by the F9F-2P. Arrangements with the Air Force for two K-38 36" cameras were successful; the cameras were installed in the F2H-2P's which enabled them to photograph the high intensity flak areas at 15000 feet and still obtain scales suitable for flak analysis. The K-38 photography is far superior to the K-17 in that one run is required to cover an area which heretofore required three runs.

In view of the above, it is highly recommended that future photo detachments deployed to WesPac be equipped with planes capable of accommodating K-38 cameras.

Air Group FIVE has now completed four full months in the Korean operating area using origin. 1 charts covered with frisket paper. As far as can be determined the charts show all indication of being fully serviceable for another period.

8. Photography

a. Aerial Film Drying

The film-drying problem was temporarily solved during warm weather by installation of two aerial film-dryers in one of the heated uptake spaces. During the past two months of cold weather operations this uptake space lost a considerable amount of its heating power. During the warm weather the aerial film dryers (E-18-D-794 Morse A-5) were operated in the uptake space at the maximum speed of five feet per minute. During cold weather it has been operated at approximately two feet per minute.

OPERATING SPEEDS AND DRYING TIMES

<u>Operating Speed of Dryer</u>	<u>Time required for drying 200' roll</u>
5 feet per minute	40 minutes
4 feet per minute	50 minutes
3 feet per minute	1 Hr 7 minutes
2 feet per minute	1 Hr 40 minutes
1 foot per minute	3 Hr 19 minutes

MAXIMUM OPERATING SPEEDS OF DRYERS ON BOARD

E-18-D-794  
Morse A-5

E-18-D-796  
Model "J"

5 feet per minute

3 feet per minute

With the addition of a heater unit (E-18-H-348-300) for the Model "J" aerial film dryer the maximum speed remained three (3) feet per minute.

b. Matte Print Dryer

The matte print dryer (E-18-D-830), used for Sonne print drying, has been operated at the rate of three feet per minute requiring one man to operate capable of drying either one or two rolls at a time. During this operating period the matte print dryer was speeded up to the rate of six feet per minute, requiring two men for drying one roll or three men for drying two rolls simultaneously.

The faster drying was accomplished by installing reels in the overhead for hanging approximately 40' of Sonne paper. The paper was sponged or squeegeed and then advanced over the reels into the dryer. This partial drying has been found necessary to remove enough moisture in order that the higher rate of drying six feet a minute could be maintained. The dryer itself was speeded up by using a smaller-sized pulley.

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Speed of matte print dryer	Time req. to dry 1 200' roll	Aver. time per roll 2 rolls at a time.	No. men req. to dry 1 roll at a time.	No. men req. to dry 2 rolls at a time.
3 feet per minute	67 Min.	34 Min.	1	1
6 feet per minute	34 Min.	18 Min.	3	3
12 feet per minute	18 Min.	9 Min.	2	3

The quality or type of Sonne paper has been a major factor in the drying problem. Experience has proved the dryer can be operated very satisfactorily at 6 feet per minute when the Sonne paper does not break down. It has been found that the majority of the Sonne paper being used, (Kodak Resisto Rapid, Navy S/N E-18-P-328 Cont. No. A.F. 33-038-15597 Spec. No. 67) has broken down in processing, allowing the solutions to get to the paper base and resulting in slower drying to remove moisture.

### USE OF F-56 20" CAMERA IN F9F-2P AIRCRAFT

An F-56 20" camera has been used during this operating period in the F9F-2P aircraft for shooting aerial oblique photographs. This installation was made primarily to shoot color transparencies. This was done to utilize F-56 color film on board and to minimize the quantity of solutions required for processing. Handling of the 7" width film has been easier than for 9" film. Previously, only K-17 12" or K-17 6" could be mounted in the Banshee in the oblique position. Brackets were installed on trunnions for attachment to the camera. The handles of the camera were removed, and the handle bolts were used to secure the trunnions to the camera bodies. The forward trunnion on the camera was fitted into one of the mounting slots in the aircraft camera mount which is used for installation of the K-17 6"; while the rear trunnion on the camera (fitted in place of the rewind handle) was fitted into one of the mounting slots used for installation of the K-17 12". Mounted in this manner the camera has an approximate depression angle of 10 degrees. The camera can be mounted with the aperture and shutter speed knobs at the top for convenience in making the desired settings.

### Fourth Operating Period 29 December 1951 through 31 January 1952

Total number of photographic missions flown	81
Total number of rolls filed	104
Average number exposures per roll	73
Total number of 9 x 9 B/W negatives used	6659
Total number of 9 x 18 B/W negatives used	1271
Total number of 9 x 9 color transparencies used	188

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Total number of 9 x 9 B/W prints made	79,908
Total number of 9 x 18 B/W prints made	15,252
Total number of prints made	95,160

TIME PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR FOURTH PERIOD  
29 DECEMBER 1951 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1952

Running Time

Average time to process & wash one roll.	71 Min 1 Hr 11 Min.
Average time to dry one roll of film.	69 Min 2 Hr 19 Min.
Average time to make first flash print and deliver to film marking.	84 Min 3 Hr 43 Min.
Average time to identify, mark (grease pencil) and deliver flash print to P.I. Officer.	70 Min 4 Hr 53 Min.
Average time to mark one roll of film (computed from time of delivery to film marking until time returned to laboratory for distribution printing).	124 Min 6 Hr 57 Min.
Average time for one set of marked prints to P.I. (This print made from marked negatives) Time computed from time of delivery of film to laboratory from film marking until completed set of prints delivered to P.I. Officer.	2 Hr 20 Min 9 Hr 17 Min.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY PRODUCTION  
1ST PERIOD THROUGH 4TH PERIOD 24 AUGUST 1951 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1952

Total number of missions flown	263
Total number of B/W rolls filed	369
Total number of color rolls filed	4
Total number of 9 x 9 B/W negatives used	21,385
Total number of 9 x 18 B/W negatives used	1271
Total number of 9 x 9 color transparencies used	188
Total number of 9 x 9 B/W prints made	216,081
Total number of 9 x 18 B/W prints made	15,252
Total number of all prints made	231,333
Average exposures per roll (for 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th operating period)	61

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RECORD OF K-25 STRIKE PHOTO 4TH OPERATING PERIOD  
29 DECEMBER 1951 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 1952

Rolls taken	75
Total possible exposures	1588
Total exposures taken	1067
Total usable exposures	786
Total unusable exposures	315
Total negatives filed	118
Rolls not used due to poor techniques	2
8 x 10 prints made	1770

(2ND, 3RD, AND 4TH OPERATING PERIOD)  
4 OCTOBER 1951 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 52

Rolls taken	209
Total possible exposures	4483
Total exposure taken	3360
Total usable exposures	2284
Total unusable exposures	1081
Total negatives filed	355
Rolls not used due to poor techniques	15
8 x 10 prints made	5325

RECORD OF K-17 STRIKE PHOTO  
4TH OPERATING PERIOD 29 DECEMBER 1951 THROUGH 31 JANUARY 52

Rolls taken	7
Total possible exposures	280
Total exposures taken	280
Total usable exposures	90
Total unusable exposures	190
Total negatives filed	45
Rolls not used due to poor techniques	0
8 x 10 prints made	675

GUN CAMERA FOOTAGE

1. Gun camera footage has been handled in the following manner:

a. The unexposed magazines have been drawn from the ship's photographic laboratory by the Petty Officer in charge of the K-3-A processing machine.

b. The magazines have then been titled with pilots' names and squadrons on each individual roll (magazine) of gun camera film before installation in the aircraft. The magazines then have been delivered to the squadron ready rooms and placed in the pilots' boxes.

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c. Loading magazines in gun cameras has been the pilots' responsibility with actual installation made by their plane captains.

d. Setting of the lens and the number of frames per second has been done by the Petty Officer processing the film. Special attention has been given to quality of film and necessary lens adjustments.

e. Following each flight the plane captains have removed exposed film from the aircraft for delivery to the ready rooms.

f. At 1800 daily the Petty Officer in charge of processing has obtained all film in the ready rooms for delivery to the K-3-A processing room. The film has been processed and edited the same night in order to have the finished film ready for delivery to the ship's photographic laboratory. The squadron representatives have then called for the finished film for eventual assessment.

PROCESSING OF GUN CAMERA FILM TO A NEGATIVE

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

Greater latitude in exposures.

Pilots have difficulty distinguishing objects for identification.

More film processable without changing solutions.

Little upkeep required on tanks since solutions contain no strong acids.

PROCESSING OF GUN CAMERA FILM TO A POSITIVE

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

Pilots have little difficulty identifying objects.

Exposure is very critical.

Solutions must be renewed frequently.

Tanks require constant cleaning and maintenance due to the use of sulphuric acid and sodium hydroxide used in the reversal solutions.

2. Footage Processed.

	<u>1st Period</u>	<u>2nd Period</u>	<u>3rd Period</u>	<u>4th Period</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
B&W Negative	11,000	6900'	8900'	- - -	26,800'
B&W Reversal	- - -	- - -	- - -	13,000	13,000
					<u>39,800</u>

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Processing Problems

a. Spots and streaks on the film apparently caused by potassium bichromate not thoroughly dissolved before use. The bichromate settles to the bottom and forms on the sides of the bleach tank adhering to the film prior to re-exposure.

b. The film does not dry when machine operated at 13 feet per minute as recommended T. O. 10-10-25.

3. Viewing and Evaluation of film.

Due to the high speed of Banshee aircraft gun camera footage obtained has left much to be desired. Frame rate of the present cameras has not been fast enough to keep pace with strafing runs over target area. The jet aircraft do not begin to pull out of their dives at sufficiently low altitudes to enable the focal length of camera lenses to produce an image large enough for satisfactory evaluation.

K-17 STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHY

A K-17 24" camera was used during this operating period for strike photographs in conjunction with K-25 strike photography. It was desired to obtain a useable size image of bomb damage from a higher altitude than the altitudes from which K-25 (f/1 63/8" ) strike photographs have been made.

A camera capsule was designed by VF-54 personnel to accommodate the K-17 24" camera. This capsule was suspended from the wing in the same manner as the K-25 except it was hung at stub wing station left. The camera was electrically operated; vacuum was supplied by a venturi tube. Installation and photography proved very satisfactory; however, the capsule with camera was lost in action on 15 January 1952.

*W. F. Rodee*  
W. F. RODEE

Copy to:

CNO (Advance, airmail) (2)  
COMAIRPAC (Advance, airmail) (2)  
CINCPACFLT (Advance, airmail) (2)  
COMCARDIV ONE  
COMSEVENTHFLT  
COMNAVFE  
COMCARDIV THREE  
COMCARDIV FIVE  
USS BOXER (CV21)  
USS PRINCETON (CV37)  
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45)  
USS BON HOME RICHARD (CV31)

USS ANTIETAM (CV36)  
USS KEARSARGE (CV33)  
CVG 5 (5)  
CVG 11  
CVG 15  
CVG 101  
CVG 102  
AIR TASK GROUP ONE  
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP  
(CDR W. W. BREHM)

USS ESSEX (CV9)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, Calif.

CV9/A16-13  
Serial: 040  
12 March 1952

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GENERAL SECURITY INFORMATION

AR 502  
29

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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DOC ID: 1570010
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CENTRAL MAIL SECTION
MAR 20 1952
Reg. No. _____
Copy No. <u>2-2</u>
Routed to _____

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 4 February 1952 to 7 March 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

022849

Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report, 4 February 1952 to 7 March 1952 3.28

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 4 February 1952 to 7 March 1952 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

a. At various times during the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), ComCarDiv ONE, RADM J. PERRY, USN, embarked, USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45), ComCarDiv FIVE, RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, embarked, USS ANTIETAM (CV36), USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47), USS WISCONSIN (BB64), Com SEVENTH Fleet, VADM H. M. MARTIN, USN, embarked, (Relieved by VADM R. P. BRISCOE 3 March 1952), USS ST PAUL (CA73), ComCruDiv ONE, RADM E. E. STONE, USN, embarked, USS ROCHESTER (CA124), and units of Destroyer Division 52, 71, 72, 92, and 111.

b. During the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd revision), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of Task Force 77 was primarily to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea; the support missions included deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction, NGF spot, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes against enemy installations.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGY:

4 February Moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan for yard availability,  
17 February rest and recreation.

18 February 0557 underway Yokosuka, Japan for operating area in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE 140022Z Feb. USS WISCONSIN (BB64), USS ANTIETAM (CV36) and DesDiv 72 in company. Conducted training exercises.

19 February Proceeding to Operating Area. Conducted Refresher Air Operations.



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- [REDACTED]
- 20 February Conducted refresher Air Operations.  
1100 arrived operating area and joined Task Force 77.  
1300 RADM J. PERRY, USN, relieved RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, as  
CTF 77.
- 21 February Conducted Air Operations.  
1037 AD, BUNR. 123933, ditched at EA 4509 due enemy AA fire.  
Pilot (LTJG F. S. JUTRAS) picked up by USS THOMASON (DD760)  
Pilot sustained minor injuries.  
1630 F4U. BUNR. 97475 crashed at sea in the vicinity of K-50.  
Probable cause, pilot (LTJG F. G. GERGEN) disoriented in snow  
storm. Not recovered; listed as killed in line of duty.
- 22 February Conducted Air Operations.  
1433 AD, BUNR. 123947, ditched inside ASW screen. Probable cause  
loss of oil pressure. Pilot (LT W. B. MUNCIE) recovered by ships  
helicopter; no injuries sustained.
- 23 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 24 February Task Force replenished.
- 25 February Conducted Air Operations forenoon. Air Operations cancelled in  
afternoon due to weather.
- 26 February Task Force replenished.
- 27 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 28 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 29 February Conducted Air Operations.
- 1 March Task Force replenished.
- 2 March Conducted Air Operations
- 3 March Air Operations cancelled due to weather.
- 4 March Conducted Air Operations. Transferred replacement aircraft  
to USS ANTIETAM (CV36)
- 5 March Transferred replacement aircraft to USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45).  
1105 RADM F. W. McMAHON, USN, relieved RADM J. PERRY, USN, as  
CTF 77. Task Element 77.04 CTE Captain W. F. RODEE, USN,  
Commanding Officer USS ESSEX (CV9) with RADM J. PERRY, USN, ComCar  
Div ONE embarked. USS TAUSSIG (DD746) and USS HANSON (DD832)  
departed Operating Area for Yokosuka, Japan in accordance with  
CTF 77 020710Z March.
- 6 March Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.
- [REDACTED]

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- [REDACTED]
- 7 March Transferred replacement aircraft to FasRom.11 at NAS, ATSUGI. 0927 anchored in berth 138 Yokosuka, Japan.
- 9 March 0600 shifted berths portside to Piedmont pier (Berth 12).
- 10 March USS ESSEX (CV9) chopped to ComNavFe for onward routing CONUS and so ended the first combat tour of the USS ESSEX (CV9) (27-A conversion). The work done by the ship and Air Group can best be told by the following dispatch received from ComNavFe addressed COMCARDIV ONE, USS ESSEX, and AIR GROUP FIVE: COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST IS DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE SPLENDID MANNER IN WHICH ESSEX PILOTS BACKED BY THE ESSEX CREW HAVE DOGGEDLY STRUCK DAY AFTER DAY AT THE COMMUNIST TRANSPORTATION NETWORK IN NORTHEAST KOREA X THE COMBINED EFFORTS OF THE AIR GROUP AND THE SHIPS COMPANY GUIDED BY THE IMAGINATION AND CAREFUL PLANNING OF THE CARDIV ONE STAFF HAVE BEEN A PRIME FACTOR IN THE CAMPAIGN TO KEEP THE ENEMY INEFFECTIVE X ALL GOD SPEED AND THE BEST OF LUCK ALWAYS X VADM C T JOY
- 11 March 0600 pursuant Admin ComNavFe 090010Z the USS ESSEX (CV9) with ComCar Div ONE embarked, underway for San Diego via Pearl.

PART III ORDNANCE:

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.

See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

a. For the Period 4-29 February:

25 rounds 5"38  
107 rounds 3"50

b. For the Period 1-7 March:

24 rounds 5"38  
121 rounds 3"50

c. The following totals of ammunition were expended for training while the USS ESSEX (CV9) operated in the Far East Command. The period covered was from 18 August 1951 to 5 March 1952.

1,135 rounds 5"38  
4,114 rounds 3"50  
28,679 rounds 20mm

3. Comments on Performance of Ordnance.

a. The performance of ship's ordnance equipment was satisfactory.

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PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship

a. During the period of this report several cracks were found in the welded joints of the longitudinal strength member and web along the overhead of the second deck. Repairs were made by ship's force by chipping out the old weld and beveling the crack before rewelding.

The locations of these cracks was as follows:

Frame 67	Stbd.	---	Compt.	A-215-L
Frame 101	Port	---	Compt.	B-208-L
Frame 104	Port	---	Compt.	B-208-L
Frame 106	Port	---	Compt.	B-208-L
Frame 124	Port	---	Compt.	B-212-L
Frame 128	Port	---	Compt.	B-212-L
Frame 137	Port	---	Compt.	B-214-L

2. Damaged inflicted on the enemy.

See enclosure (1).

3. Damage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft.

See enclosure (1).

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

1. Performance.

Under the heavy work load of continuous operations, the performance of all personnel has been excellent. Morale has been a factor requiring no special attention as plans were laid during the ship's training period for a program of events outlined below to include maximum utilization of welfare and recreational facilities. Prior to the ship's deployment to WesPac the following was instituted:

a. Recreation and hobby-craft materials were purchased and plans made to maintain the interest of and offer diversion to the crew.

b. A nightly broadcast was conducted by an officer of the Air Combat Intelligence Office to keep the crew informed on the activities of the day.

c. A daily newspaper was published to keep personnel informed through the latest wire releases.

d. The ESSEX Broadcasting System was organized with members of the crew participating as program directors, engineers, technicians, disc jockeys, announcers, etc. Programs, both canned and live, were broadcast several hours each day over the RBO. This served not only to provide entertainment for those who listened but was excellent training for the men who participated.

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e. Each evening the Protestant and Catholic chaplains alternated in conducting evening prayers immediately following tattoo.

f. Happy Hours were rehearsed and shown to the crew at the end of each combat tour while enroute to Yokosuka, Japan. Talent was plentiful, and the performances were very well received by the crew. Personnel of the U. S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka enthusiastically received a special showing performed in December 1951.

g. In port, smokers and basket-ball games were scheduled with other ships and shore activities.

h. Sightseeing and camera tours were arranged for the men during each "in port" period.

i. Japanese Variety Shows were arranged for aboard ship.

j. At Christmas the ship entertained 100 Japanese Orphans.

k. Cub Scouts from Tokyo and Yokosuka were entertained.

l. At Thanksgiving while in the operating area, the ship entertained six GI's from the front lines in Korea as guests.

m. German, Japanese and Spanish classes as well as courses in Bible and Religious Instruction were held weekly.

n. Divine services were held regularly for Protestants, Catholics, Latter Day Saints and Christian Scientists.

o. Memorial Services were conducted at the end of each operational period.

p. Movies were shown daily except when combat conditions prohibited. Two showings were usually run each evening.

q. The ship's paper "The Carrier Pigeon" was published semi-monthly. The editorial staff was composed of all crew members.

r. A Cruise Book was assembled and printed in Japan for distribution.

s. On replenishment days, the Ship's Band played on the hangar deck and contributed much to morale.

These various activities outlined above proved great benefit to the crew for they taught us to play as well as work and fight as a team.

## 2. Casualties.

### a. Ship's Company

There were no casualties sustained by ship's company personnel.

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b. Air Group FIVE

See enclosure (1).

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering Department

a. The Engineering Department experienced no casualties during this operational period.

b. Recommendations.

None

c. Steaming Data

	<u>14-29 Feb.</u>	<u>1-7 March</u>	<u>21 Aug 1951</u> <u>7 March 1952</u>
Miles Steamed	4583.3	2404.8	17,693.6
Fuel Oil received	560,208	386,442	10,743,023
Fuel Oil Delivered DD's	0	0	1,424,016
Fuel consumed (underway)	696,380	370,270	8,995,795
Fuel consumed (anchored)	42,440	8,480	378,950
Average Speed	16.3	16.7	16.2
Hours Underway	281.1	144	3684.8

d. During the period 24 August 1951 through 7 March 1952 the USS ESSEX fueled 32 destroyers, at an average rate of 85,500 gallons per hour. The USS ESSEX refueled from tankers 37 times during this period at an average fueling rate of 175,000 gallons per hour.

2. Air Intelligence

a. Photo Interpretation

Photo Interpretation, like a heavily loaded freight train, got off to a slow start at the beginning of the first tour of duty in the Korean Theatre. During the first operating period, many mistakes were made and corrected. In order to enable future carriers to avoid some of the pitfalls these suggestions are offered.

(1) Prior to arrival in the Task Force stress the importance of K-25 strike photographs. Since most pilots are not experienced in this type of camera work a discussion regarding type of run, altitude, scale, and general make-up of camera installation proves most beneficial.

a. Items such as strafing during camera runs.

b. Starting camera too far away from target.

c. Erratic maneuvers during run are a few that should be emphasized.

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Valuable time is lost trying to pinpoint pictures taken without knowledge of location. A photo card readily filled out in 4 digit coordinates should be made available to all pilots of K-25 equipped aircraft.

(2) An up to date file of photographs covering Korean "KING" airfields should be maintained with a tickler system showing the last photo coverage and status of each field. A separate alphabetical file should be maintained of other Korean fields. These established photographs can be readily located and the status of the fields quickly determined.

(3) Complete and current 1:500,000 AMS L 751 series maps should be available in sufficient numbers in order that strike leaders, briefers, photo pilots, and film-marking personnel have an adequate supply. A minimum of 10 copies of each chart should be on hand. The Far East Air Force Material command located at Tachikawa AFB has these maps instock, available for distribution to Naval Forces,

(4) All photography should be marked and checked by the photo pilots prior to its delivery to the Photo Interpreter. The importance of correct coordinates cannot be overemphasized. The additional time required by the photo pilots and film marking personnel in accurately locating photography will later pay off great dividends in speeding up the actual interpretation and dissemination of the P.I. Report.

(5) During the early portion of combat operations, the primary targets were rail and highway bridges. Pictures of these bridges should be filed alphabetically by area and numerically within each area. This enables rapid location of desired bridges as well as other targets. As the AA defenses increased, more and more time was devoted to flak analysis. The original concept was to prepare flak mosaics of bridges or other targets including commanding terrain. These mosaics proved to be very satisfactory. However, the whole operation was changed and 12-16 mile sectors of RR track were chosen as primary targets. Flak mosaics were then prepared of the entire route. Usually three parallel runs at 1:5,000 were required to give sufficient coverage.

AA encountered in this theater, unlike German or Japanese AA positions of World War II, is mobile in every sense of the word. Positions pinpointed one day will or can be moved the following day. Old positions are utilized whenever they are present. No attempt was made to break the sizes down other than small arms including machine guns, automatic weapons and heavy.

(6) Each ship should have a minimum of two enlisted men to assist the photo interpretator in carrying out the required duties, these men should be QM, PH, or AF, strikers or petty officers, and preferably should have attended one of the photo interpretation schools. The ESSEX utilized the facilities at Barbers Point.

(7) Photographic and photo interpretation procedures as outlined by Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet restricted ltr FF4-1/J12 serial 30/3074 of 14 February 1952 should be utilized as the basic operating procedures.

b. Air Group FIVE has now completed the entire combat tour in the Korean operating area using original charts covered with frisket paper. As far as can be determined the charts show all indication of being serviceable for further use. It is therefore recommended that the allowance of ACS 1:250,000 charts be reduced to fifty.

c. It was found during the training period at Pearl Harbor that it would assist the ACI personnel to have a small glass viewing port between ACI and Ready Room THREE. The installation was accomplished by ship's force and permitted ACI personnel to view the ready room teletype and keep current with latest information as it came down from Air Operations, and thus minimized internal communications.

3. Photography.

a. At the beginning of operations in the Korean area the Photographic Officer began recording information necessary to determine the maximum working load of the photographic laboratory and the times required to complete various steps of processing through the laboratory. To obtain this information one man was assigned the task of maintaining account of all aerial film recording the times aerial rolls entered the laboratory and this time required for processing through the various steps to completion.

All information concerning time for processing, marking, printing and delivery has been taken from these records. Negatives and prints which were processed and later discarded have not been included in the production figures as only material which was satisfactorily completed and delivered have been used.

Since aerial photographic reconnaissance was of prime importance, other items performed, such as RUDM's, deck crashes, public information work, copies of maps, charts and drawings have been omitted from the production figures.

Aerial photographic reconnaissance work constituted approximately 90% of the total work produced during the operating period 24 August 1951 to 6 March 1952.

Equipment used for drying film and some prints were two (2) aerial film dryers (Morse A-5) for the film, and one (1) 26" Fako Matte print dryer for the some prints.

AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY

PERIODS

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total for entire period.
	8-24-51	10-4-51	11-16-51	12-29-51	2-23-52	
	9-19-51	10-30-51	12-11-51	1-31-52	3-5-52	
*Sorties Flown	72	68	41	81	24	288
Number of rolls filed.	122	101	49	104	30	407
Average exposure per roll.	33	60	70	73	61	60

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<u>NEGATIVES</u>	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total
Number of 9 x 9 B & W negatives filed.	4,799	6,280	3,647	6,659	1,866	23,251
Number of 9 x 18 B&W negatives filed.	0	0	0	12,71	471	1742
Number of 9 x 9 color transparencies filed.	0	0	0	188	0	188
Number of K-25 strike photo's filed, (capsule installation)	44	113	124	118	16	415
Number of K-17 strike photo's filed, (capsule installation)	0	0	45	0	0	45
<u>PRINTS</u>	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Total for entire operating period
	8-24-51	10-4-51	11-16-51	12-29-51	2-23-52	
	9-19-51	10-30-51	12-11-51	1-31-52	3-5-52	
Number 9 x 9 prints made and delivered.	43,201	55,048	37,924	79,908	15,026	231,107
Number of 9 x 18 prints made and delivered.	0	0	0	15,252	5,181	20,433
Number of strike photo's 8 x 10 made and delivered.	616	1582	1736	2445	280	5984

\*The term sortie is used to denote the flight of a single aircraft. During which photographic coverage was obtained.

<u>TIME PRODUCTION FIGURES</u>	Running Time					
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	Overall
Average time to process & wash one roll.	67M 1-07	69M 1-9	69M 1-9	71M 1-11	78M 1-18	71M 1H 11Min.
Average time to dry one roll of film.	30M 1-37	30M 1-37	36M 2-19	69M 2-19	66M 2-24	46M 1H 57Min.
Average time to make first flash print and deliver to film marking.	90M 3-07	140M 3-59	60M 2-45	84M 3-43	103M 4-07	95M 3H 32Min.

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Overall

TIME PRODUCTION  
FIGURES

Running Time

1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	--

Average time to identify, mark (grease pencil) and deliver flash print to P.I. 166M 5-33 139M 6-18 117M 4-42 70M 4-53 82M 5-29 115M 5H 27Min

Officer. -----  
Average time to mark one roll of film computed from time of delivery to film marking until time returned. 70M 7-03 87M 7-45 76M 5-58 124M 6-57 117M 7-26 95M 7H 02Min

Average time for one set of marked prints to P.I. 112M 8-15 146M 8-44 124M 8-22 140M 9-17 97M 9-03 124M 9H 06Min  
This print made from marked negatives. -----

Time all work completed, forwarding letter written and work delivered for distribution. 0900 1000 1000 1100 0800 093634M

K-25 STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHY

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	TOTALS
Rolls Taken	* 0	76	58	75	18	227
Total possible exposures*	0	1520	1375	1588	900	5383
Total exposures taken	* 0	1161	1132	1067	278	3638
Total usable exposures	* 0	804	694	786	120	2404
Total negatives filed	44	113	124	118	16	415
Rolls not used due to poor techniques:	* 0	9	4	2	22	17
8 x 10 prints made.	616	1382	1736	1770	280	5984

\* No records kept this period.

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16mm MOTION PICTURE GUN CAMERA FOOTAGE PROCESSED AND 16mm KODACHROME GUN CAMERA FOOTAGE FORWARDED AS LISTED BELOW.

	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	TOTAL
B&W negatives processed	11,000	6,900	8,900		3,700	30,500
BEW positive processed				13,000		13,000
Kodachrome forwarded		10,595				10,595
TOTALS	11,000	17,495	8,900	13,000	3,700	54,095

c. The following is a record of the number of prints and negatives in addition to the aerial reconnaissance work. These figures are for the quarters ending 30 Sep 1951, 31 Dec 1951 and 31 March 1952 (figures for the quarter ending 31 March 1952 includes work performed up to and including 15 March 1952.)

	<u>B&amp;W Negatives</u>			<u>B&amp;W Prints</u>		
	Quarter ending 9/30/51	Quarter ending 12/31/51	Quarter ending 3/31/52	Quarter ending 9/30/51	Quarter ending 12/31/51	Quarter ending 3/31/52
Misc. 35mm I. D. 2 1/2 x 3 1/2 Etc.	520	352	0	829	544	120
4 x 5	586	1860	1025	1172	4848	1734
5 x 7	-	-	-	184	1575	58
8 x 10	770	310	775	8413	12806	32372
11 x 14	-	-	-	48	35	503
16 x 20	-	-	-	292	1053	1151
18 x 22						
20 x 24						
40 x 50	-	-	-	-	-	3
TOTALS	1876	2522	1800	10938	20862	45938
TOTAL Negatives	6198			TOTAL Prints 77738		

### d. Print Drying

Drying Some prints has been the main source of trouble in completing aerial reconnaissance work. The standard 26" Matte dryer was speeded up to a rate of six feet per minute. Partial drying was required before entering the dryer, and it was found necessary to assign three men to operate when drying two rolls simultaneously.

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Print drying is the big time consumer due to the fact that at the rate of drying three feet per minute using the 26" Matte dryer one hour and seven minutes is required to dry one 200' roll of Sonne paper. Drying two rolls simultaneously averages out to 34 minutes per roll or approximately two rolls per hour. In eight hours the maximum number which may be dried is sixteen - provided the dryer is drying continuously. If the laboratory were required to process six rolls of aerial film a day and make nine prints from each roll - the time required for drying the prints alone would amount to twenty-seven hours.

Aerial Film Dryers were found unsatisfactory for drying Sonne prints. When used for Sonne prints the drive chains on the machines continuously broke, requiring constant repair and maintenance. Additional equipment and space were made the subject of separate correspondence (USS ESSEX serial 2097 of 26 November 1951).

e. Developing Outfit for 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " x 400'

It is recommended that item 443 HSO Catalog Section 1801, Developing Outfit, type B-6 SN E12-D-163-325 be added to the Section "P" Allowance List. The K-18 Magazine (MA-4) S/N E18-M-469-100 and 390' Aerial Film S/N E18-F, 31485-160 can not be used without the above developing outfit for processing. During operations with the two F2H-2P the K-38 Aerial Camera could not be fully utilized because developing outfits were not available for processing 390' rolls.

4. Communications

a. During the fifth and final period for ESSEX in the operating area, task force communications reached a level of performance more stabilized and reliable than for any previous period during the ship's seven months' tour.

b. CW circuits: the use of the Task Force Common CW circuit for relay of traffic to Task Force 95 units (through a destroyer in TF 77) required close supervision in order to minimize the delay in traffic delivery. Heavy backlogs developed primarily due to overloading of the circuit (e.g., Ckt C3.3a) between the designated TF relay and TG 95.2 ships. It is recommended that frequent inquiries be made of the TF 77 destroyer to determine whether more expeditious methods of clearing traffic can be controlled. Proper assignment of precedence by originators is important in raising the efficiency of this as well as any other circuit.

c. Radioteletype circuits: the reduction of outages on the ship-to-shore circuit with NDT, Tokyo, was made possible through a conscientious effort to shift frequencies with a minimum loss of circuit time. On occasions the shift was made in less than forty seconds. No shift during the last two weeks of operations required more than three minutes to complete. The average of 20 plus hours of continuous communications reported in the preceding action report was raised to a daily averages of 23 hours.

Teletype maintenance has been of primary concern throughout the ship's tour. Governor assemblies—particularly, governor contacts—required frequent servicing and replacement of parts (some of which have been difficult to obtain).

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It is recommended that motors installed in ESSEX equipments (MOD 19, MOD 15, TD, MOD 50, etc.) be replaced by synchrous motors. The ship has been fortunate to have an extremely capable teletype repairman on board. It is suggested that more than one man trained in this specialty be assigned to a carrier task force flagship.

Due to the increased emphasis on TTY communications it is further recommended that the space allotted to teletype equipment and associated working area be proportionately extended during the next overhaul period.

d. Voice circuits: the area commander upon recommendations by this command assigned an additional daylight frequency (designated Z-31 by the current edition of 5th AF COI #29) for communications with JOC, Korea.

The situation with regard to JOC, Korea has improved markedly with the allocation of frequencies as revised during the past seven months. Night voice communications can still be improved; however, the volume of traffic on the net during the dusk-to-dawn period has been at a minimum.

e. Radiophotography: three schedules with NPG3 were arranged with NPG3 during the two weeks of this period. Two were unsuccessful due to heavy interference reported by NPG3. Shifting of frequencies had no effect. Hours and frequencies assigned for the third sked, which was successfully conducted, were not changed.

f. Traffic: a comparison of message counts for the first and fourth periods—each covering a full month's operating—follows. An increase of approximately 47% outgoing and 17% incoming was noted.

USS ESSEX (CV9)

Flagship - CTF (CCD-1)

20 Aug - 19 Sep      1 Jan - 31 Jan  
1951                              1952

Circuit

	OUT	IN	OUT	IN
Fleet, S/S to ComNavFe-A4.8/C19A (Ratt Duplex)	228	18	2189	177
UHF TG Commanders Net - T6 (Ratt Simplex)	388	760	619	1170
TF Common (CW) - C4.3C	194	2253	428	4172
7th Fleet Command Net - C16	887	1214	908	528
TF Commanders Net - C2E	83	256	123	239
Tac. Air Admin. Net(CW)- D188,ETC.	520	428	865	779
Tac. Air Command (V) - D189, ETC.	96	152	156	172
WEA Recco (CW) - E12 Series	18	244	-	-

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Primary S/S (CW)	- A1 Series	997	-	17	2
Pacific Emerg. Net (CW)(Simplex Man.)	- P30 Series	-	16	89	61
Simplex Manual to Guam-PL4 Series		-	-	38	10
Guam Prim. Broadcast	-B5	-	8108	-	8066
"JIG" Broadcast	-	-	-	-	154
Hicom Broadcast	-B32,2 & 123 Kc.	-	5780	-	6851
Guam Prim. Genl. Bdcst.	-B18	-	56	-	409
Visual (F/L & Sema.)		577	932	448	827
Mail (Estim.)		50	80	60	70
	TOTALS	4038	20297	5940	23688

5. Gunnery

a. During the period that this vessel operated in the forward area, the most important role performed by the Gunnery Department was the replenishment at sea.

(1) During this period, this vessel replenished ammunition at sea, thirty-seven (37) times, receiving a total of 6,654.4 tons an average number of whip trips per hour was fifty-seven (57) with the highest rate being ninety-three (93) per hour. The greatest tonnage received in one hour was one hundred sixty-seven (167) tons.

(2) Provisions were replenished at sea thirteen (13) times with this vessel receiving a total of 920.7 tons at an average rate of 34.9 tons per hour and the fastest hourly rate being 77.3 tons.

(3) One hundred forty-one destroyers came alongside for highline transfers of personnel and freight, and thirty-two (32) destroyers were re-fueled at sea. The total number of personnel transferred by highline is four hundred fifty-three (453).

(4) All replenishments and transfers were accomplished without a single loss or casualty. (See Re-Arming and Re-Fueling at sea analysis charts).

6. Air Department

a. Catapult and Arresting Gear

During the period covered by this report, catapult and arresting gear operation was normal, with the following exception.

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On shot No. 3229 the retracting panel operator in the starboard catapult noticed an excessive pressure loss during the retracting stroke. The catapult was put out of commission and closer examination of the constant pressure valve revealed that the bolts which secure the base of the valve housing to the elbow had come loose, allowing the entire housing assembly to raise during retraction, and oil to escape past the constant pressure valve spindle into the gravity tank. Tightening the bolts resulted in satisfactory retraction.

4. b) Flight Deck

(1) Complement of Aircraft

During the past seven months of operations in the Korean area, the aircraft complement aboard this vessel has fluctuated between 60 and 77 planes. This variation in complement has given flight deck personnel and excellent opportunity to determine the operating capacity of the CV34 Class aircraft carrier, when operating under war time conditions. With 77 aircraft aboard the following difficulties were most apparent:

(a) Maintenance suffered because aircraft could not be moved to the hangar deck immediately following recovery, or if already below, could not be moved to a spot for turn up, wing spread, drop check or engine change. (Thirty-two is the maximum number of mixed types which can be spotted on the hangar deck).

(b) Servicing of aircraft was slow due to lack of room on the flight deck to spread wings on AD, F4U and F9F type aircraft for loading of 250# bombs and for fueling tip tanks in F2H-2s.

(c) Movement of aircraft was most difficult due to limited space available ahead of the barriers when holding a ready deck.

(d) Flight and hangar deck crashes were caused largely by errors in judgement of personnel making fast respots under over-crowded conditions.

(e) Recoveries which included several aircraft with jammed guns or aircraft which could not fold wings due to battle damage overcrowded the deck to a point where barrier operations were restricted.

(f) With 77 aircraft on board there is insufficient space for spotting visiting aircraft ahead of the barriers. It should be possible to recover at least five to six additional aircraft while holding a ready deck.

(g) Late changes to the schedule frequently could not be accomplished due to the fact that any special aircraft could not be broken out quickly or easily from a hangar deck continuously two blocked with aircraft.

(h) The bomb load on the first AD's on the strike frequently had to be limited during low wind conditions due to the fact that deck run was limited by the number of aircraft which had to be kept on the flight deck.

During operations with 66 to 68 aircraft aboard all of the above listed problems can be minimized to and it is possible to achieve and main-

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tain the highest possible state of operating efficiency.

(2) F2H Rearward Towing

F2H's were towed backwards during flight and hangar deck respotting using universal towbars modified with hooks turned 90° and facing outboard. A sponge rubber pad 6 inches thick, 7 inches wide and 22 inches long is mounted over the apex of the towbar on the backs of each tractor. The center of the pad remained under the center of the fuselage regardless of tractor turns. If the towing rings on the F2H were horizontal instead of vertical the universal towbar could be used without any modification. No Banshees were damaged while using this method of rearward towing.

c. Operating Data

	14 Feb - 29 Feb	1 Mar - 7 Mar	Total in Korean Area
Arrested landings	666	169	7,928
Catapult shots (Starboard)	180	52	2,110
Catapult shots (Port)	180	59	2,116
Gasoline (gallons)	351,741	97,928	4,629,810
LubOil Symbol 1100	2,877	597	16,235
LubOil Symbol 1010	1,192	480	23,590
LubOil Symbol 1120	87	0	13,918
Alcohol AN-A-24	0	0	25
Alcohol AN-A-18	0	0	205

(1) Total tonnage of aircraft ordnance expended by ESSEX Air Groups - World War II. 4,688

(2) Total tonnage of aircraft ordnance expended by Air Group FIVE during first Korean combat tour USS ESSEX. 6,903

(3) Total landings, ESSEX from commissioning 31 December 1942 until arrival Seattle 15 September 1945. 31,015

(4) Total landings, ESSEX from re-commissioning 15 January 1951 to end of combat tour 4 March 1952. 14,558

7. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) The USS ESSEX (CV9) was outfitted in March 1951 with a 180 day allowance of aeronautical material and peculiar aircraft spare parts for the following types:

- (a) F9F2-2P
- (b) AD-4,N,4Q,4W,3N
- (c) F4U-4
- (d) F4U5N
- (e) Ho3S-1

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This initial allowance was supplemented by the following additional allowances for new aircraft types and configurations assigned as the months passed:

- (1) F2H-2, 2P
- (2) AD-2, 3, 4L, 4NL
- (3) F4U-4B
- (4) F4U-5NL

(2) Actual flight operations (with resultant maintenance of aircraft onboard) commenced in April 1951 and continued practically uninterrupted for eleven months. During this time 2152 requisitions, representing approximately 12,900 items, were submitted to fill allowances of those items which reached the low limits established on the stock record cards. Supply support has been good. The USS JUPITER, primary source of aircraft parts in Japan - Korea area, was able to fill about 75% of the items required. Those items that could not be filled were obligated (if NIS) or passed to ASB Yokosuka or ASD Oakland for action (if NC). Material which had to be shipped from the continental U.S. took on the average of 20 days to reach the ship if sent by air - 50 days by surface. Cooperation between aircraft carriers and delivery service by "COD" aircraft of VR-23 greatly assisted in decreasing AOG's and kept aircraft utilization high.

(3) The period 1-15 January was the most critical period during the entire cruise. The original 180 days allowance (approximately 18,000 items) was exhausted insofar as high usage and critical items were concerned, and stock replenishment on critical items was slow and necessitated requisitioning on a Priority "A" basis. Although stocks were reordered as low limits were reached, and requisitions mailed off weekly, 510 requisitions were pending on 15 January, representing about 1200 items due. Of these 1200 items 19 were pending on a Priority "A" basis for AOG aircraft. Between 15 January and 18 February approximately 800 of these items were received. When the ESSEX departed from Yokosuka on 18 February, the remainder of the unfilled Priority "C" requisitions were cancelled, and during the last two-week operating period only Priority "A" items for AOG aircraft were ordered. It has been determined that 90% of AOG requisitions stemmed from items not in allowance lists. Where such items were required more than once, usage data was forwarded to the JUPITER with a request that she stock those items. Usage reports to AMO, Oakland and submission of stubs to FAO (for tabulation by ASO) will serve as a basis for correcting allowances for wartime operation.

(4) The allowance of flight deck clothing should be increased three times. Each man requires at least two jerseys to carry him while one is being laundered; in addition, each man will wear out one or two winter and summer jerseys during six months of constant wearing. Two pair of flight deck shoes per man are also required for the same reason.

(5) An attempt by the ESSEX to receive aircraft engines at sea from a supply ship of the replenishment group was unsuccessful because of transportation difficulties ashore. The deadline date scheduled for the experiment could not be met. The procedure used in the Mediterranean of floating engines in steel containers is undesirable in this task force during wartime operations as the replenishment program is carried on while underway.

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It is therefore recommended that a trial transfer between ships using a Burtoning rig be undertaken. Engines in steel containers gross between 4500 and 5000 pounds. Wings (2000 lbs) and propellers (700 lbs) were regularly transferred at sea with no difficulties.

(6) Squadrons being deployed to the forward area are advised to obtain a full allowance of Section "H" and "U" material and winter flight clothing as provided in ACL 21-51 prior to embarking on the parent carrier.

## b. General Stores

(1) The system of replenishing GSK stores in this area by Mobile support is considered very good. The USS CASTOR issues stores within one day after the presentation of requisitions. Paper work is greatly reduced by ordering only materials carried by the CASTOR as listed in the GSM Catalog, published by COMSERVRON 3.

(2) Critical GSK items that cannot be supplied by the CASTOR may be obtained from other ships at sea or in port, from Fleet Activities, Yokosuka or from PRCO, Oakland via CTG 92.1 or CTG 92.5. Only priority "A" and "B" requisitions should be placed on Fleet Activities when items are NIS from supporting supply ships, because the mission of this shore activity does not include support to combatant vessels. During the entire cruise the ESSEX has had a negligible amount of GSK material forwarded directly from Oakland.

(3) Experience to date regarding the replenishment of Electronics and BuShips Machinery Spare Parts has been fairly good. However, the logistic support of these hard to get items is neither as prompt nor as expedient as that of GSK. Nevertheless, service was excellent from the supply ships CHIMON, LEAGUE ISLAND, ELECTRON and PROTON. Items NIS or NC are forwarded to PRCO, Oakland. As approximately seventy per cent of the electronic and machinery spares are "hard to get" items in this area, ships scheduled for the NAVFE area should concentrate on having on board all allowed spares prior to departure from the United States.

(4) The General Stores Group has placed requisitions for GSK, Electronics and Spare Parts material during the cruise just concluded with the following results:

### GSK Requisitions

Placed with CASTOR	264
Accomplished by CASTOR	76%
Placed with other activities	530
Completed with other activities	57%
Total number of Priority "A" requisitions	8
Total number of Priority "B" requisitions	27

### ELECTRONICS LINE ITEMS

Placed with PROTON and ELECTRON	687
Accomplished by PROTON and ELECTRON	53%

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## BUSHIPS SPARE PARTS LINE ITEMS

Placed with LEAGUE ISLAND and CHIMON  
Accomplished by LEAGUE ISLAND and CHIMON

428  
7%

Shortages of the following items have caused Priority "A" and "B" requisitions:

- (a) Bearings
- (b) "V" Belting
- (c) Gaskets
- (d) Winterization Equipment (snow shovels, pushers, rock salt, stoddard solvent, etc.)
- (e) Intelligence materials (bristle board, mapping tacks, frisket paper plifilm)
- (f) Automotive spares for jeeps, peeps, fork lifts, etc.
- (g) Hurricane tie down equipment for aircraft (1½" 21 thread manila rope, wire rope, clips, etc.)
- (h) Electronics spares
- (i) Flight deck repair equipment (metal, lumber, studs, etc.)
- (j) Webbing for strap on bomb skids.
- (k) Valves and parts
- (l) Batteries (all types)
- (m) Duplicating machine materials (master sets, paper, fluid, etc.)
- (n) Machinery spare parts

Intra-ship transfers and carrier on board deliveries (by CODFISH) have aided greatly in our record of experiencing no major machinery or electronic shut down during the nine months since leaving the U.S.

(5) The allowance of seventy-five per cent foul weather clothing has been more than adequate to meet the demands of the rigorous winter months in the Japan - Korea area, and this allowance is considered liberal. It is recommended that the ESSEX carry approximately ten per cent more than the quantities shown as issued. This will conserve critical materials and give the ship additional space to carry other essential stores.

A comparison of clothing issued and clothing allowed is shown below:

	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ALLOWED</u>
Artics	1175	2250
Parkas	203	300
Drawers, Winter	1489	4500
Helmets,	1348	2250
Parka, Rain	819	2250
Jackets, Winter	2089	2250
Face Masks	850	2250
Mittens N-2	1305	2250
Mittens N-3	977	2250
Socks	3371	6750
Rain Trousers	827	2250

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	<u>ISSUED</u>	<u>ALLOWED</u>
Winter Trousers	1157	2250
Undershirts	1553	4500
Goggles	729	2250

From the figures it can be readily seen that the allowance granted is excessive. From now on, the ESSEX plans to carry approximately 10% over the quantities shown as issued.

This will result in full utilization of and and alleviate the cramped condition of the storerooms.

(6) Departmental Budgets have been established in accordance with Afloat Accounting Memorandum No. 2. In setting up these budgets, the following departmental percentages were established:

	<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Daily Budget</u>	<u>Quarterly Amount</u>
Administrative	4.5%	\$ 22.22	\$ 2,000.00
Operations	8	38.88	3,500.00
Air	16.5	83.33	7,500.00
Gunnery	10	50.00	4,500.00
Engineering	33	166.66	15,000.00
Navigation	1	3.33	300.00
Supply	11	55.55	5,000.00
Medical	1	4.44	400.00
Dental	.05	1.94	175.00
Paint	5.5	27.71	2,500.00
C.O. Reserve	9	45.83	4,125.00
Totals	100 %		45,000.00


Close supervision in conformity with regulations has been maintained with respect to adjustments of these budgets and each department is required to stay within its budgetary limitation.

(7) The conservation of critical items as contained in the Pacific Supply Line Publication of CINCPACFLT/COMSERVPAC of October has been rigidly enforced. All stub requisitions for these items are carefully screened by the Supply Department, and requests of unusual quantities are required to be justified.

(8) The combined supply support received from the service activities and ships in the Japan - Korea area was considered outstanding. At no time during the entire cruise did the ESSEX lack any item of electronics, machinery spares, or GSK that may have caused a major equipment shut down.

c. Ships Service

(1) Sales in the ship's service store activities have been well above the expected average during this eight month cruise. Japanese merchandise sales were high, especially during the Christmas season.



Several Bazaar sales of Japanese goods were held during special hours at which time various items were displayed on tables. These sales were popular with the crew, and the demand offered an opportunity to display a large number of items. Of the regular ship service items normally stocked, cigars, cigarettes, candy and wrist watches have enjoyed exceptionally high sales.

(2) A monthly breakdown of sales is listed below for period beginning July 1951 and terminating February 1952:

July	\$19,125.00	November	\$44,647.00
August	26,549.00	December	28,853.00
September	30,112.00	January	31,582.00
October	41,117.00	February	22,949.00
	Total Sales		\$244,934.00
	Monthly Average		30,167.00

High month in sales was November 1951 when Ship's Service activities sold \$44,000.00 worth of merchandise. The combination of Japanese items and the Christmas buying season were factors in making this month the leader. The low month was July, the first month away from the United States. It was also interesting to note that the overall percentage of sales was thirty-three per cent greater during the operating periods than during the inport periods.

(3) The support received from the USS CASTOR and Fleet Activities, Yokosuka during the cruise was very good. Of a total of one hundred and seventeen requisitions submitted, one hundred and nine were completed or partially accomplished. Scarce items during the eight months period were cobbler, tailor, fountain and laundry supplies. Cobbler items short were full soles, nails of all sizes, rubber heels and sand paper; tailor shop shortages were white striping, tan and white buttons; fountain items difficult to obtain were ice cream mix and chocolate syrup; laundry items short in the area were press covers, mangle covers, spare parts for extractors, and occasionally soap. During the last several months in the Far Eastern Area basic ship store stock was more difficult to obtain than in the earlier stages of the cruise. It is therefore advisable to have all ships leaving for the forward area carry to full capacity a complete supply of Ship's Service stock.

(4) Abnormal temperatures in bulk storeroom B-406-A have caused a general deterioration of stock stowed in this space. Laundry supplies have hardened, thereby making them difficult to use. Ice cream powder and paste have required survey as being unfit for human consumption. Temperatures during July, August and September averaged 110° F. During the last five months of the cruise they have averaged 98° F. Ventilation improvements in this storeroom are necessary before it can be properly utilized as a Ship's Store Stock storeroom.

(5) Operation of the laundry on a twenty four hour five day week in the forward area has proven very successful. These operating hours are considered superior to the continuous seven day week schedule because there is a saving of about 35,000 gallons of fresh water per week and time is available for routine maintenance and upkeep of the operating machinery.

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The operating machinery has been running continuously throughout the entire cruise, and the several minor breakdowns have been repaired without delay.

(6) Taut security measures are continuously observed for all Ship's Store spaces. In addition to those prescribed by the BuSanda Manual and other current directives, the following are in effect and are believed to be of value in further safeguarding the stock and monies of the Ship's Store activities. The following security measures were included in the action report of 1-31 October 1951:

- (a) No money is left overnight in the cash register of any of the activities.
- (b) Cash drawers are left open when the activity is not in operation.
- (c) Night lights are installed in the Ship's Store and Ship's Service Stores and are left burning all night.
- (d) Inspections are conducted nightly by the Duty Supply Officer at 2200 and 2400 of all Ship's Store Spaces.
- (e) Two (2) group 3 locks are installed on each door to the Ship's Store spaces.

(7) The monthly monetary limitation for Ship's Store stock for this ship is \$125,000.00. It is believed advisable that the limitation be increased to \$150,000.00 per month to enable a ship of this class to carry more fountain, cobbler, tailor, and ship store items (watches, cameras, pens, pencils, electric razors) and other special items of popular demand.

### d. Clothing and Small Stores

(1) A six months winter and summer load list was originally stocked on board the ESSEX at the beginning of the current cruise. It was necessary to temporarily stow bulky items such as shoes and towels in the Aviation Main Issue storeroom and Aviation Tire storeroom. A ninety day supply of clothing and small stores can be stowed in the present spaces allocated for C&SS materials. An additional storeroom of approximately four thousand cubic feet suitable to the stowage of shoes would be highly desirable to facilitate stowage and security of required quantities.

(2) Clothing and small stores sales were fairly uniform during the cruise. Sales dropped slightly in December 1951 and increased in January 1952 due to substantial reduction in prices that went into effect in January 1952. Following is a monthly recap of C&SS sales:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>SALES</u>	
July 1951	8,775.75	
August 1951	7,895.50	
September 1951	10,402.15	
October 1951	9,319.85	
November 1951	7,213.51	
December 1951	6,513.55	
January 1952	10,598.00	
February 1952	6,016.10	
TOTAL	\$66,734.41	<u>Monthly Average</u> \$ 8,590.00

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(3) Items ordered repeatedly yet difficult to obtain in the forward area in quantity and sizes required during this cruise are listed below:

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>NO. REQUISITIONED</u>	<u>NO. RECEIVED</u>
Drawers, Cotton	11,400	5,940
Socks, Cotton, Black	20,328	5,160
Service Stripes	800	335
Trousers, Dungarees	4,388	2,124
Gloves, Leather, Work	378	None
Socks, Cotton, White	8,880	840

(4) Slow moving items during the cruise included Peacoats, Undress Jumpers, and Dress Blue Jumpers. A complete sellout of white cotton socks was experienced during the one month stay in Pearl Harbor at the early portion of the cruise.

e. Commissary

(1) The operation and logistic support of the Commissary Group has been generally satisfactory during the eight months cruise just completed. Support from the provision ships during replenishment in the operating area has been excellent. An occasional shortage of desired fresh provisions has resulted from time to time, and it is believed that a list of these provisions prepared and delivered in advance of the provisions replenishment day would aid materially in reducing this shortage. Some difficulty was experienced during the last operating period in receiving dry provisions.

(2) Based upon experience gained during the cruise just completed, the Commissary Department planned to procure approximately one hundred tons of provisions each replenishment day. During the replenishment periods at sea when provisions were received three times, no fresh provisions were needed during the inport period; but when only two replenishments were accomplished about fifty tons of provisions were needed during inport period to maintain levels. It is recommended that a system of direct loading (or palletized unit loads) be instituted on ships of this class. Subject ships would requisition provisions directly from the logistic support ships, provisions would be required but once a month, and reefers with open holds could be used on the line. Rehandling of provisions would be reduced to a minimum which would in turn reduce manpower necessary to handle provisions and reduce damage and spoilage. Working parties required for replenishment at sea include fifty men to handle the sleds, sixty men to unload and check the stores and sixty men to strike the stores below. In port the reefer ships require about one man per ton of stores to off load, and fifty men are needed to strike stores below on this ship.

(3) Night rations and special rations constituted another interesting phase of this cruise. About 300 night rations were issued to men engaged in actual manual labor at night. Requests for night rations were submitted daily at 1500 to the administration office for approval. The menu consisted of two sandwiches per man and fruit. Soup was served at 0900 to 1030, 1330 to 1500 and 2300 to 0030 every day on the line. The four soup stations were turned over, two to the squadrons, one to the Gunnery Department and one to the Air Department. Soup was made in the crews galley and kept hot in the soup stations.

(4) No difficulty was experienced with the normal meal hours (at sea).

0645 - 0745	Breakfast
1130 - 1245	Lunch
1700 - 1815	Dinner

Rigid enforcement of these hours was practiced and all hands, cooperated in meeting the schedule.

f. Disbursing

(1) Disbursing activities in the forward area proceed along routine lines with minor variations. The biggest problem is the use of Military Payment Certificates. Conversion of U. S. Currency to MPC upon arrival and reconversion on departure is difficult to accomplish smoothly without running the risk of distributing U. S. Currency in Japan or removing MPC from the designated area. These conversion operations must therefore be accomplished as near arrival and departure time as possible. It is therefore recommended that the official exchange activity for afloat activities (U. S. Fleet Activities, Navy No. 3933) provide exchange facilities until departure time in order to avoid complications which arise when ship's personnel spend time ashore after the deadline time for final conversion of MPC to "greenbacks".

(2) On the pay line it has proved necessary to eliminate the one dollar MPC note because of its awkward size. Payments were made to the nearest lower five dollar increment. This has the further advantage of speeding up the pay line which helps avoid confliction with ship's operations. The total Military Pay Roll for the period was \$2,135,934.15; with an average monthly cash payroll of \$244,000.00.

(3) The handling of foreign currency was limited to a daily exchange line. One hundred million four hundred forty thousand yen were passed out to ESSEX personnel in exchange for \$279,000 during the eight month period.

(4) Currency requirements during operations in the forward area are modified by the fact that from one third to two thirds of the monthly cash payroll is returned through Ship's Store sales, postal money order business, the exchange of Yen, etc. The percentage of return is in direct relationship to the time spent in port or at sea.

g. Replenishment Underway

(1) Replenishment underway was one of the most interesting phases of the ESSEX cruise in Far Eastern waters. Replenishment days, normally held every fourth day underway, occasionally were held on the third day if weather conditions were not suitable for flight operations. The chief items of interest to the Supply Department during replenishment periods were the receiving of Navy Special Fuel Oil, Aviation Gasoline, Freight and Provisions. Transfer of various critical items from this ship through the replenishment ships to other ships in the Task Group was also accomplished.

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Navy Special Fuel Oil and Aviation Gasoline were received during each replenishment period, provisions were received about every fourth period, and freight was received in various quantities as it arrived or was assembled in the Far Eastern area.

(2) Pertinent facts and averages concerning Navy Special Fuel Oil, Aviation Gasoline and Provisions receipt during the replenishment periods of this cruise are as follows:

Navy Special Fuel Oil

Average time per 100,000 gallons	45 minutes
Average gallons per hour received	132,650 gallons
Highest amount received in gallons per hour on a single day of replenishment.	191,600 gallons
Lowest amount received in gallons per hour on a single day of replenishment .	73,850 gallons

Aviation Gasoline

Average time per 100,000 gallons	1 hour 29 minutes
Average gallons per hour received	62,100 gallons
Highest amount received in gallons per hour on a single day of replenishment.	137,750 gallons
Lowest amount received in gallons per hour on a single day of replenishment.	22,459 gallons

Provisions

Average provisions tonnage received per hour	35 tons
Highest tonnage per hour on a single day of replenishment.	77 tons

The low amounts listed above were in all cases attributable to replenishment during rough weather. However, in spite of the weather, the replenishment periods during the entire cruise were relatively smooth in operation and are preferred to replenishment periods in port.

*W. F. Rodde*  
W. F. RODEE

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USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45)  
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(CDR W. W. BREHM)

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the Period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report, 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952 is hereby submitted.

## PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION.

a. During the period 18-26 July 1952, USS ESSEX (CV9) was a unit of Special Task Group 50.8. This group was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), CTG 50.8 and ComCarDivTHREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV47) and screening units.

b. During the above period USS ESSEX (CV9) operated in the South China Sea, the Formosa Strait and off the East Coast of Formosa in accordance with ComSEVENTHFlt Operations Plan 75-52 and ComCarDivTHREE Operations Order 1-52.

The mission of TG 50.8 was to make a show of force off the China Coast as a deterrent to Communist Chinese aggressive actions against Formosa and to bolster the morale of Nationalist Chinese Forces on Formosa in support of United Nations Policy on Formosa.

c. During the period 27 July-4 September, USS ESSEX (CV9) was a unit of Task Force 77 at various times composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV9), ComCarDivTHREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31), ComCarDivONE, RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, embarked, USS BOXER (CV21), ComCarDivTHREE RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS PRINCETON (CV37), USS IOWA (BB61) ComSEVENTH Flt, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and various heavy support and screening ships.

d. During this latter period, USS ESSEX (CV9) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd Revision), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was primarily to support United Nations ground forces in Korea. The support missions included close support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes

e. The ESSEX Air Group flew across Korea twice to make coordinated large scale strikes with the Air Force and other United Nations aircraft; the first of these on 20 August was against a supply area in the vicinity of YD 1058 and the other on 29 August was against related targets in the general area of the capital city of Pyongyang. During the month additional heavy attacks were flown against power plants at Kyosen #1, Kyosen #2 and Chosen #1. The increased antiaircraft fire encountered at these targets, particularly Chosen #1 indicates their value and importance to the enemy. Other large scale strikes were made against Chongin by three carriers on 2 August and again on 1 September and against the Hoeam-dong synthetic oil plant on 1 September.

f. The shift of emphasis from the rail interdiction program to important industrial and military targets has been, it is believed, an increased contribution to the overall United Nations effort. It has also been more in keeping with the inherent ability of a carrier task force to utilize surprise and keep the enemy off balance. The success of these attacks and the very considerable decrease in losses of pilots and aircraft is proof of the wisdom of the present program of operations.

g. The value of coordinated intelligence from all sources cannot be over emphasized. Recent high quality photographs of assigned targets increase the accuracy of attacks and are of great assistance in avoiding heavy flak areas and in flak suppression.

h. The coordination of flak suppression flights by jets with strikes by propeller aircraft contributed effectively to the success of attacks and certainly was a major factor in reducing losses and damage from enemy anti aircraft fire. The necessity for launching the faster jets after the prop strikes and recovery before the strike aircraft returns complicates scheduling but is well worth the effort and it is recommended that it be continued.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGY:

18 July	0635	Departed Subic Bay, Philippine Islands enroute Formosa Strait, in accordance with ComCarDivTHREE OpOrder 1-52. OTC, ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK), embarked.
19 July		Conducted Air Operations enroute Formosa Strait.
20 July		Enroute Formosa Strait. During refueling of USS DUNCAN (DDR874), DUNCAN lost steering control.
	1119	DUNCAN slid into the side of the ESSEX, breaking the after fueling boom and extensively damaging mount 311. DUNCAN sustained major damage after 5 inch gun mount.
21 July		Air operations cancelled due to bad weather.
22 July		Conducted Air Operations--mass air parade over Formosa.
23 July		Conducted Air Operations--mass air parade over Formosa Strait.

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25 July Enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

26 July 1700 Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

27 July . Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

28 July Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

29 July 0600 Pursuant to CTF 77 confidential dispatch 270300Z July, underway for Area Sugar.

30 July 1340 Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar. Rendezvoused with USS STICKEL (DD888).

31 July Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar.

1 August 0530 Joined Task Force 77. OTC, ComCarDivONE (RADM H. E. REGAN) in BON HOMME RICHARD. Task Force replenished. Conducted First Combat Air Operations against the enemy to commence second ESSEX Korean tour.

2 August 0603 Conducted Air Operations. AD BuNo 129011, crashed ahead of the ship. Pilot (LTJG L. ADDICOTT) rescued by helicopter. No injuries.  
0608 F4U BuNo 96951 suffered a similar accident. Pilot (LTJG W. RALSTON) rescued by helicopter.- minor injuries.

3 August Conducted Air Operations.

4 August 1352 Task Force replenished. ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) in BOXER relieved ComCarDivONE (RADM H. E. REGAN) as OTC. BON HOMME RICHARD departed for Yokosuka, Japan. Conducted AA firing practice.

5 August Conducted Air Operations.

6 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of major fire on BOXER. Received eight BOXER personnel, rescued by helicopters.

7 August 1328 ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) and Staff transferred via high line from BOXER to USS WALKER (DDE507) to ESSEX.

8 August 0448 Conducted Air Operations. AD4N BuNo 124710 ditched near Yangdo Island, due to loss of oil pressure. Pilot (LT J. C. NORTON) and 2 crewmen picked up uninjured by USS OZBOURNE (DD846) and returned via high line. BOXER departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

9 August Task Force replenished. BON HOMME RICHARD joined Force. Conducted AA firing practice.

12 August Conducted Air Operations.

13 August Task Force replenished.

14 August Conducted Air Operations.

15 August Conducted Air Operations.

16 August Conducted Air Operations.

17 August Task Force replenished. Conducted AA firing practice.

18 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather preceding typhoon Karen.

19 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather accompanying typhoon Karen.

20 August Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strike on supply areas, West Coast of Korea.

21 August Conducted Air Operations.

22 August Task Force replenished.

23 August Conducted Air Operations.

24 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.

25 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather. BOXER rejoined Task Force.

26 August Task Force replenished. ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) and staff transferred via high line to BOXER. Conducted AA firing practice.

27 August Conducted air operations.

28 August Bad weather cancelled morning flights. Conducted air operations in afternoon.

29 August Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strikes on Pyongyang.

30 August Task Force replenished.

31 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.

1 September Conducted air operations. ESSEX and PRINCETON conducted joint strikes against oil refinery near town of Hoam-dong, northeast corner of Korea. BOXER conducted strikes against Musan.

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The following dispatch, addressed to TF 77 was received from Com7thFlt: " THE STRIKES ON MUSAN AND HOEAM-DONG MARK A SIGNAL DEMONSTRATION TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE WILL FIGHT FOR OUR FREE WAY OF LIFE X CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OF THE PILOTS AND WELL DONE TO ALL HANDS X VADM CLARK SENDS X "

- 2 September Conducted air operations.  
1121, Captain Paul D. STROOP, USN, relieved Captain Walter F. RODEE, USN, as Commanding Officer USS ESSEX (CV9).
- 3 September Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.
- 4 September Pursuant to CTF 77 Conf. dispatch 301226Z Aug. underway for Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS BOXER (CV21) and USS PARKS (DD884).

PART III ORDNANCE :

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.

See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training.

a. Period 18-31 July 1952

None

b. Period 1-31 August 1952

104 rounds 5"38 AAC  
74 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT)  
437 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT) Non-Frag

c. Period 1-4 September 1952

None

3. The performance of ship's ordnance equipment was satisfactory.

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship

a. On 20 July, USS HUBBARD DD748 pulled away from along side during fueling operations before the fueling hose was disconnected resulting in loss of one 50 foot length of four inch hose.

b. During the same fueling operations on 20 July, USS DUNCAN DD874 had a steering casualty. Before steering control could be regained, the DUNCAN scraped the ESSEX on the starboard side. The ESSEX suffered no personnel loss or injury. Material damage and loss of equipment was sustained.

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85 starboard side at gun mount #35. There was only slight damage to shell plating on sponson just below splinter shield. The damage consisted of approximately 20 sq. ft. of plating dished in by the bridge of the DUNCAN.

Mount #37, frame 105 starboard, was the next point of contact. The floater net basket housing, two (2) floater nets were knocked off of the splinter shield. Two small holes were pierced in the shell plating on the under side of mount #37 gun sponson and an additional 250 sq. ft. of plating was damaged.

As the destroyer drifted aft, the fueling boom at the after fueling station was badly twisted with fittings and four (4 x 50 foot) lengths of fueling hose being lost over the side. One length of (4 x 50 foot) fueling hose was lost at the forward fueling station. The safety rail around the walkway at frame 94 main deck level was damaged by the fueling hose as it was torn from its cradle and the fueling boom gave way.

The propeller guard of the DUNCAN made contact with the ESSEX at frame 157 starboard at about the 3rd deck level hitting the protective pipe covering of the gasoline filter drain line. Only slight damage was caused.

The point of greatest damage was at the gun sponson on the after starboard quarter. Gun mount #311 was badly damaged by the after twin five inch gun mount on the DUNCAN.

The DUNCAN's after mount was trained aft and slightly elevated and as contact was made between the ESSEX and the DUNCAN, the 5" gun barrels pierced the under side of the gun mount. Approximately 400 sq. ft. of sponson plating is badly damaged, 12 ft of the splinter shield is deformed, but can be repaired and the deck outboard of the gun was torn up. A detailed report of damage sustained was submitted to CNO.

#### PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES:

##### 1. Performance

The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention.

##### 2. Casualties

###### a. Ship's Company

(1) NELSON, Jr., Clarence W. AN, USN, sustained a simple fracture of the right tibia, while unhooking a tow bar from an airplane. Starboard wheel ran over right ankle.

###### b. Air Task Group TWO

(1) LTJG Donald H. HOWARD, USNR, received minor lacerations of the face when his aircraft was hit in the canopy by enemy projectiles while flying over enemy territory.

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- (2) There were no casualties sustained by Air Group enlisted men.
- (3) No flight time was lost due to illness of flying personnel.
- (4) There were no man hours lost due to psychiatric disorders.
- (5) There were no deaths.
- (6) There were no venereal diseases reported.
- (7) The morale was good.

c. Other Ships

On 20 July 1952, STEWARD, P.W. GM3 was received aboard via helicopter from USS DUNCAN DDR874 with lacerations of left forearm received as result of collision between USS DUNCAN (DD874) and USS ESSEX (CV9). Eight survivors were received aboard on 6 August 1952, as a result of a fire on USS BOXER (CV21). They were admitted to the sick list for approximately eight hours and returned to duty.

PART VI COMMENTS:

1. Engineering Department

a. Engineering maintenance has been seriously hindered as a result of reduced upkeep availability. The combination of curtailed navy yard overhaul availability and subsequent continuous operation has allowed little preventative maintenance. During the one month availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard only work of a known or emergency nature was accomplished. Since leaving the yard the ship has had three periods of 4, 3, and 10 days in San Diego, three periods of 20 hours, 17 hours, and 71 hours in Pearl Harbor, one period of one day in Subic Bay, and one period of 60 hours in Yokosuka out of a total of 115 days. The lack of opportunity for the ships force to properly inspect worn machinery since the ships return from the first tour of duty is now manifesting itself in machinery failures.

b. Recommendations

None

c. Steaming Data

	<u>18-31 July 52</u>	<u>1-31 Aug 52</u>	<u>1-4 Sep 52</u>
Oil received	1050506	2481125	0
Oil delivered	382021	549389	75552
Oil consumed underway	867900	1811930	278410
Oil consumed at anchor	30470	0	0
Hours underway	268.8	744	96
Hours at anchor	66.2	0	0
Average speed	18.9	15.9	17.2
Miles steamed	5080	11829	1651

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### a. Catapult

During the period of this report the catapult operation was considered normal with exception of the following minor discrepancies:

(1) On 5 August the port catapult cable tensioner jammed. Investigation revealed the ram was pitted, scored and the lips on the female follower turned under. The follower was machined down and new chevron packing installed.

(2) On 12 August the port catapult domes of the cable whip dampers required new "O" ring seals.

(3) On 14 August the port catapult main oil supply line to the firing valve developed a leak. Investigation revealed that the reducer bushing threads were damaged. New reducer bushings were locally manufactured and installed.

(4) On 17 August the starboard catapult cable tensioner ram stuck at about two (2) feet from the "full in" position. Investigation revealed that the ram packing follower was out of round. This was corrected by machining the follower down to .005 I.D. and installing new packing.

### b. Arresting Gear

Arresting gear operation during this period was considered normal and satisfactory. The lowest time required for rero rigging jet barricade was 4.5 minutes.

The port barricade stanchion has become distorted inboard and the base plate distorted outboard, possibly due to jet barricade engagement. This causes scoring of the ram cylinder. The barricade is still operational and will be repaired upon entering port. A report is being submitted to Naval Shipyard Bremerton.

### c. Aircraft Ordnance

The aircraft ordnance division shortage of personnel continues to present a problem. With the present number of personnel it is impossible to properly man all arming control stations during rearming of aircraft. Loading schedules have been met however, at the expense of tiring arming crews by working excessively long hours.

### d. Maintenance

#### (1) General:

The first operational tour found the aircraft maintenance division working hard to meet the needs of the embarked group. Five (5) QEC's, six (6) propellers, one hundred sixteen (116) tire and wheel assemblies, and 1274 spark plugs were drawn from supply and/or cleaned, built up, or otherwise prepared for installation by the squadrons. Thirty three thousand (33,000) cubic feet of oxygen were delivered by trailer during four hundred seventy eight (478) aircraft servicings.

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Some uncertainty exists as to the exact aircraft maintenance responsibilities of the Air Department Maintenance Division. Recommendations are being submitted by separate correspondence.

(2) Personnel:

Some difficulty was experienced by lack of "know how" in engine buildup. Three AD ratings had been sent to Jet Engine School on a returnable quota, ~~prior~~ to deployment, but were not returned to the ship.

(3) Facilities, Equipment, and Material:

It is noted that the RB 19R-2 plugs are falling far short of the 180 hours specified by GEB 136. R.U.D.M.'s should be forthcoming.

Considerable time was spent by the division metalsmiths in fabricating a combination engine build up and installation stand for J34 engines which are used in conjunction with a universal tail jack. The J34 engine overhaul stands (R85-WXT-243265-S1) furnished by the section "G" allowance are entirely unsuited for carrier maintenance.

The one hydraulic test stand provided for hydrolube by section "G" allowance has proved inadequate, partly due to drop check requirements promulgated by ComAirPac dispatch 3020122 of April 1952. One test stand should be provided for each F9F squadron embarked, and one has been ordered "in excess" by this vessel.

A jack shortage, likewise developed, due to frequent drop checks of F9F A/C.

The section "G" allowance specifies six (6) 7.5 ton jacks but this vessel has procured jacks in quantities and for reasons shown:

Two (2) 12 ton for AD's - 7.5 ton jacks too light for carrier jacking.

Four (4) 5 ton for F2H - 7.5 ton jacks too high.

Four (4) 7.5 ton jacks for F4U's and F9F's.

Two (2) more 7.5 ton jacks have been ordered to expedite jacking of F9F's.

A preservation machine is badly needed and, although a section "G" allowance item; this vessel has been unable to obtain one.

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servicing has put a heavy load on the oxygen transfer units. The only way this has only been obtained by timely, ample procurement of spare parts and frequent repairs.

The twelve (12) fifty (50) foot jumper cords (28 volts) provided by section "G" have proven inadequate in length and number. No racks were provided for their stowage. APU's were used almost entirely for 28 volt A/C power on the hangar deck to the exclusion of the ship's installed system, until 100' cords and stowage racks were installed on or adjacent to each of the eight (8) deck edge 28.volt outlets on the hangar deck.

One hundred (100) foot cords and stowage racks are now being installed adjacent to flight deck outlets in anticipation of cutting down on APU operations and usage on short lived, easily breakable APU's.

Wide separation of 117 volt ship service receptacles precluded the use of this current in the UPM-8 for checking APX-6 at all aircraft locations on flight and hangar decks. This difficulty was overcome by modifying a cable assembly, furnished in accordance with C.A.P. S/L Ser. 70/1295, to take a single phase of the numerous 120 volts, 3 phase, 400 cycle aircraft electronics service power outlets.

Suitable shop facilities are not currently provided on 27A conversions for aircraft engine work. Work benches and stowage cabinets for the material and equipment used in this work, especially engine build up, are currently being installed on the hangar deck aft of frame 196. A Ship Alt. will be submitted covering this installation.

Hangar deck stowage facilities are not provided for stowing APS-19 radomes and sonobuoy dispensers when removed due to use of aircraft for other missions. An eight (8) radome rack has been installed on the after hangar deck for the radomes and torpedo dollies are presently used for the dispensers.

Propeller changes are now made anywhere on the hangar deck with the use of a light block and tackle and a beam clamp obviating the need for a special spot beneath a chain hoist. If the aircraft is not centered under a overhead beam two clamps and tackles may be used to give a varying suspension point.

### 3. Gunnery Department.

a. During the period 18 July - 31 July seven destroyers were refueled at sea. Ten (10) destroyers came alongside for highline transfers of personnel and freight. Three persons were transferred by highline.

b. During the period 1 - 31 August, this vessel replenished ammunition at sea eight (8) times, receiving a total of 1041.2 tons at an average rate of 76.4 tons per hour. The greatest tonnage received in one hour was 90 tons. Provisions were replenished at sea three (3) times with this vessel receiving a total of 242.5 tons at an average rate of 50.4 tons per hour and the fastest hourly rate being 69 tons. Thirty-nine destroyers came along side for highline transfers of personnel and freight, and twelve (12) destroyers were refueled at sea.

c. During the period 1-4 September 1952.

None

4. Supply Department

a. Aviation Stores

(1) The ESSEX commenced this operating period with approximately 90% of BuAer allowance list items on board. Those shortages which caused most trouble during the period were:

- (a) F9F-2 Nose Wheels
- (b) AD-4 Propellers
- (c) AD-4 and F4U4-4 Tail Wheels
- (d) F9F-2 Nose Struts
- (e) Aircraft clocks
- (f) F9F-2 Fuel Pumps
- (g) F4U-4 Fuel warning transfer switches.
- (h) Red and Green flight deck jerseys.

(2) Supply sources utilized for aeronautical material were (1) ASB, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka; (2) ASA, Naval Supply Depot, Guam; and (3) ASD, Naval Supply Center, Oakland. Since departure of the USS JUPITER, AVS-8, the Aviation Supply Branch, Yokosuka, has taken over support of aircraft carriers in the Japan-Korea area. ASB has been able to furnish approximately 65% of items requested; the remainder were passed to ASA, Guam, or ASD, Oakland, for action only if ordered on a Priority A or B basis. As ASB is not making any obligations, all "NIS" or "NC" items not ordered on a Priority A or B basis have been cancelled. This has brought about a large number of Priority B requests in order to insure delivery of high usage items prior to depletion of remaining stock on hand.

(3) It has been determined that the time required to receive material "on the line" in the following categories is as follows:

- (a) From ASB, Yokosuka via COD - approximately 4 or 5 days.
- (b) From ASB, Yokosuka via fleet freight - approximately 20 days.
- (c) From Continental U.S. via government air - approximately 20 days.
- (d) From Continental U.S. via surface shipment - approximately 45 to 50 days.

(4) Squadrons being deployed to the forward area are advised to obtain a full allowance of sections "E" and "U" material prior to embarking on the parent carrier as subject items are exceedingly difficult to obtain in the forward area.

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(1) Issues of stock during this period were heavier than anticipated, and the items showing highest usage were hand tools, office supplies and rags. Electronics and machinery spare parts are the most difficult parts to replace.

(2) In several instances empty gas cylinders have been received in place of full ones, resulting in extra handling of bottles and a more limited stock of desired gases on hand.

c. Commissary

(1) Receipt of provisions during replenishment on the line has been stepped up approximately 20 tons per hour by the additional use of the high line.

5. Administration

a. Personnel Count:

During the period of operation the average on-board count was as follows:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ship's Company	126	1944	2070
Marine Detachment	2	60	62
Air Group	130	622	752

	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>E-2</u>
Transfers:	3	7	9	11	10	1
Receipts:	5	3	1	5	26	66

Petty Officers:	<u>Pay Grade</u>	<u>Allowed</u>	<u>On Board</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	E-7	74	76	102%
	E-6	171	72	57.8%
	E-5	265	118	55.5%
	E-4	374	450	120%

There continues to be a shortage of petty officers in the following ratings: QM, FC, MM, BT, EM, IC, AO, AA/AN, HA/HN, and YN.

b. The delivery of mail during this period has been slightly below average in comparison to previous periods. This may have been caused by the nature of operations just prior to reporting to ComNavFe and the relatively short period in port.

c. This vessel requested special services hotel reservations for the period 6-14 September for 100 officers and 300 enlisted. The reservations assigned were 50 officers and 53 enlisted for special services hotels. Ninety percent of the reservations for enlisted covered only two day periods, including travel time. Ninety reservations were allowed at Camp Yokohama. The majority of these special service reservations were assigned pilots and aircrewmembers. These will be augmented by three (3) day leave privileges.

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a. Loran positions have been much improved with the use of the new Japan-located station ZHO and ZHI. These stations gave very accurate positions when near Honshu in the Japan Sea, diminishing somewhat when nearer Korea. Tables have been requested. Loran charts have been provided but their small scale makes accurate fixing difficult.

## 7. Operations Department.

### a. Air Operations

(1) After more than a year, an automatic keyer for the low frequency homer has been placed in operation. A MC ELROY PHOTO TUBE KEYER and a tape puller were located in Naval Reserve Stock and authority to draw this equipment was granted by BuShips. A continuous paper tape, coded with India Ink, is employed, giving identification every thirty seconds with a twenty second dash on each side. Connections are made directly to the transmitter at a remote telegraph station located in Air Operations. The Keyer has been highly satisfactory in operation and it is recommended that the equipment be furnished to all CV's until such time as specially designed equipment is available for this purpose. - alteration submitted.

(2) The controls for the YE, Racon and Homer are now installed in the Air Operations space. This makes a convenient working arrangement.

(3) It is recommended that an AN/ARC-1 radio be installed in Air Operations to replace one of the Remote Radio Stations. Commitments on the TDQ-RCK equipment prohibit guarding two other carriers land/launch and a helicopter circuit. One AN/ARC-1 and one TDQ-RCK would eliminate this difficulty.

(4) 1929 sorties were flown during the period totalling 4,110.6 hours. 34 sorties aborted.

### b. Photography.

#### (1) Film drying

(a) After much trial and error, the newly installed AIOA aero film dryers have been found to be efficient machines. It is important that only qualified personnel be allowed to operate them, however. The machines must be observed constantly to assure that the film is properly centered and feeding freely. The operator must learn to tell by the curl of the film whether the film is coming through too brittle or too wet. Lack of vigilance on his part can ruin several feet of film almost immediately.

(b) Only two mechanical difficulties have been experienced with the AIOA dryers. The solenoid cut-out switch for the film take-up spindle often fails to actuate properly. It was found that this was due to damage sustained when the heavily weighted spool had dropped on the actuating lever. This weighted spool has been replaced with a lighter one, thus decreasing chances of damage to the cut-out solenoid, and also exerting less force on the film, allowing it to ride against the feed rollers inside the dryer and clear of the heat louvers.

drying paper is six to eight feet per minute. These speeds are dependent on room temperature and humidity.

(d) Space is still a problem. One dryer is installed conveniently within the main photo laboratory. The other is installed in the film stowage room directly across the passageway from the laboratory. The latter space is too small to allow proper operation.

c. Aerology.

(1) It was found by using the metallic screen reflector instead of the tin foil reflector for obtaining RAWINS that higher altitudes could be tracked and the target returns were larger.

(2) It is recommended that carriers having facsimile equipment no longer be required to transmit surface analyses to the OTC. When transmitting, the facsimile transmitter cuts out the ships communication equipment with heavy interference. Dispatching a verbal analysis is considered adequate.

(3) During the reporting period nine days of flight operations were cancelled due to bad weather.

d. Communications.

(1) The ship began the period with a relatively new and untrained Communication Section.

(a) Only two CWO's had any previous experience in this type of work. Enlisted personnel were equally inexperienced. Only fifty percent of the allowance of rated men were on board. Close supervision and continued on-the-job training for the enlisted men and a nightly communication class for officers has improved this situation somewhat. A continued rigorous training program should bring about desired results.

(2) During the time CTF 77 (ComCardiv 3) was embarked the BOXER loaned the ESSEX three rated Radiomen and three rated Telemen to assist in the added workload. While the Flag was aboard traffic jumped from an average of three hundred dispatches per day to an average of nine hundred eighty-two per day. During the reporting period on the line the Communication Section processed a total of 26,770 messages.

(3) Keeping in operation the two CSP 2900's belonging to the ship and the one belonging to the Flag, proved a problem. CTF 77 requested and received another machine from the RPIO in Yokosuka. No qualified CRF personnel were available however. This situation will be improved when the minor CRF is set up and qualified CRF personnel made available.

e. Photographic Interpretation.

(1) The major portion of the Photographic Interpretation during this period consisted of target searches with the flak studies of the rail routes being of next importance. The flak studies of the rail routes changed in format from the

a 1/50,000 chart. This method has proved very satisfactory from the standpoint of the photo interpreter. It saves many man hours, but for use in flak suppression strikes the mosaic type is of much more value. It is recommended that a system be instituted whereby periodic photographic touraids are distributed by the photographic interpretation unit at Atsugi and implemented by current flak studies on the 1/50,000 charts by the carrier photo interpreters.

(2) All interpretation was accomplished from fully annotated sonne prints rather than from flash prints. This proved to be more efficient in the combined teamwork between the photographic laboratory, the photo interpreter and the photo detachment. Inasmuch as the interpreter and the photo pilots did not work in the same spaces, the use of annotated prints speeded the job of identifying the area photographed. By not printing "flash" prints the photo lab was able to deliver rolls of film sooner to the photo pilots for annotation and allowed them to complete their work sooner.

(3) The interpretation unit operated under the slogan of "a picture for every pilot" on all strikes. The attack pilots had individual annotated photos of each target while the flak suppression pilots also had individual photos to pinpoint each gun position. Prior to each strike the latest photography was interpreted for all possible flak positions which were duly noted on the individual photos and on the larger briefing mosaics.

(4) The K-25 damage assessment camera was soon shelved upon the development of an excellent F-56 camera installation for the AD aircraft. The larger plate size and longer focal length proved to be a great improvement over the K-25. Further details are being submitted in enclosure (1).

(5) The photo interpretation unit of the ESSEX consists of one Lieutenant, graduate of the Photographic Interpretation Center, and three enlisted assistants, graduates of the Barbers Point and Alameda PI schools. This number is considered ideal, and it is considered important that at least one of the assistants be either an experienced assistant or a first or second class petty officer.

(6) The photo interpretation unit operated in the flag intelligence space at such times when ComCarDiv THREE was not embarked on the ESSEX. So long as the flag intelligence space is available the interpretation working conditions are considered excellent. When the ship's PI is relegated to Print Shop #2, the Ozalid room, the working space is considered inadequate and the filing space negligible. In either working space the problem of filing the 9" x 18" K-18 and K-38 photography is still unsolved. As the cruise progresses and the Banshees fly more coverage, this problem will become increasingly complicated. Added experience should bring about a solution to this problem.

#### f. Air Intelligence

##### (1) Material, Maps and Charts

(a) Concerted effort was made to obtain all the necessary intelligence materials and supplies prior to deployment. It is estimated that about fifty thousand (50,000) maps, of various scales, with a total weight of approximately two and one-quarter tons, were brought aboard during this period.

A discussion of the services obtained from various Air Navigation offices is being submitted by separate correspondence as being of possible assistance for future deployments.

(b) The use of 1:50,000 scale maps has increased to a marked degree over the first Korean tour, and it is felt that this is due largely to the type of operations now in progress where the planes attack widely separated areas and diversified targets, whereas previously emphasis was placed on the rail and bridge interdiction program. Unfamiliarity of some of the pilots with the area ma also account for the unusual rate of consumption of 1:50,000 scale maps. Detailed comments on the attrition rate of these maps will be submitted in subsequent action reports.

#### g. CIC

During the first tour on the line of the second ESSEX Korean cruise the CIC operated with a total complement of 50 enlisted men and 9 officers. Under the circumstances it is considered that the personnel were adequate to handle the assigned tasks. However, the pinch was felt during the time that ComCarDiv THREE was aboard. It is considered that a minimum of 56 to 60 enlisted men be assigned to CIC (with staff embarked) to properly handle all aspects of CIC work. Due to the fact that there were 15 stations to be manned each watch the men were divided into three duty sections. The officers stood watches as follows; Five (5) were on the regular CIC watch schedule and three (3) were assigned duties as Air Controllers both strike and CAP. Five (5) of the total eight (8) officers mentioned above have had 22 months aboard and it is anticipated that they will all receive orders to other duty within a one or two months periods. If possible it would be better if fewer officers (especially experienced) were rotated in so short a time. Replacements for these five (5) officers have just come aboard.

Indoctrination in ATP-1 proceeded smoothly. Lectures were scheduled for all officers in the Operations Department, any others who wished to were welcome to attend. Each chapter was assigned to one of the officers in CIC who was responsible for the presentation thereof. These lectures were also attended by the OOD's who were asked to make constructive suggestions and inform all attendants how some particular point effected this ship when operating with TF-77. Each lecture was given twice daily so all who needed to could conveniently attended.

It is recommended that the CIC officers of the various ships in the Task Force be called together at the convenience of the staff to standardized details of CIC operations of a routine nature.

  
PAUL D. STROOP

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**Copies to:**  
CNO (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP  
COMNAVFE (1) Advance  
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP  
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance  
CTF-77 (1) Advance  
ComCarDiv 1  
ComCarDiv 3  
ComCarDiv 5  
COMAIRPAC (10)  
COMSERVPAC  
COMFAIRALAMEDA  
COMFAIRJAPAN  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
USS BOXER (CV21)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV31)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CV45)  
USS PHILLIPINE SEA (CV47)  
USS PRINCETON (CV37)  
USS ORISKANY (CV34)  
USS KEARSARGE (CV33)  
CVG-2  
CVG-5  
CVG-7  
CVG-9  
CVG-11  
CVG-15  
CVG-19  
CVG-101  
CVG-102  
ATG-2 (5)

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18

USS ESSEX (CVA9)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

CVA9/A16-13  
Ser 0175  
1 November 1952

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 5 September to 1 November 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report for period 5 September to 1 November 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 5 September to 1 November 1952 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

a. During the period 5 September to 1 November, U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA9) was a unit of Task Force 77 at various times composed of the following units: U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA9), U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA31), ComCarDiv ONE, RADM H. E. REGAN, USN, embarked, U.S.S. PRINCETON (CVA37), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA33), ComCarDiv FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked, U.S.S. IOWA (BB61), and U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB63), ComSEVENTHFLT, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and various other heavy support and screening ships.

b. During the subject period, U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA9) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd revision), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period.

c. The mission of TF 77 was primarily to support United Nations ground forces in Korea. The support missions included close and deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes against enemy installations.

d. The ESSEX Air Group on three occasions joined with the Air Forces in coordinated strikes against Korean targets; the first of these on 5 October was against vehicle, supply and personnel shelters in the vicinity of HOEYANG; the second on 7 October against supply and storage areas at YONGPYONG-NI and the third on 8 October against the railway and highway bridges at KOWON. From 12 October through 16 October the ESSEX Air Group joined with those of the carriers PRINCETON, BON HOMME RICHARD, and KEARSARGE in support of forces under Commander

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Amphibious Group THREE in training maneuvers in the vicinity of KOJO in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 25A-52.

e. On 24 October the ESSEX and BON HOMME RICHARD joined in strikes on mining, railroad and other facilities at HYESANJIN, a stone's throw from Manchuria. Throughout the period strikes were made against personnel, vehicle and supply areas at the bomblines. Assessment of damage can be evaluated only against the ability of the enemy to mount future offensives.

PART II ORDNANCE

1. Expenditure of Air Ordnance.
  - a. See enclosure (1)
2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for Training.

	5-30 Sept	1-31 Oct
5"/38 AAC	192	191
5"/38 (VT) Non-frag	0	85
5"/38 BL & T	0	83
3"/50 FCL (VT)	98	45
3"/50 FCL (VT) Non-frag	477	597
3"/50 BL & T	12	0

3. The performance of ship's ordnance equipment was satisfactory.

PART III BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship received no battle damage. Enclosure (1) contains damage to ATG-2 aircraft and damage inflicted on the enemy.

PART IV PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. The performance of all personnel has been excellent. There were no casualties to personnel of ship's company. Personnel casualties sustained by ATG-2 are listed in enclosure (1).

PART IV COMMENTS:

1. Air Department.

- a. Catapult

(1) On 16 September 1952, while firing test no load shots, the port catapult failed to retract. Subsequent investigation revealed the cause to be an expansion of the braking cylinder which prevented the passage of the crosshead over that area.

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(2) On 18 September following the ordering of a new cylinder, the ESSEX sailed to rejoin Task Force 77, operating with the starboard catapult alone. After three (3) days of successful operations, on 21 September, CTF 77 ordered the ESSEX to proceed to Sasebo, Japan, arriving there 24 September. The new braking cylinder awaited the ship's arrival and necessary material and personnel were made available there.

(3) By the morning of 26 September, installations and necessary parts had been restored to operational condition and test no load shots were conducted throughout the afternoon. A runaway shot resulting from a parted towing bridle prevented completion of the tests until the morning of the 27th after which the ESSEX got underway to rejoin Task Force 77 again. Following these repairs, both catapults were in operational condition throughout the remainder of the cruise, except for short periods when minor repairs were necessary.

b. ARRESTING GEAR

(1) Operations:

Arresting Gear operations have been routine with the exceptions of the re-reeving job that was required on the number one (1) arresting engine, following the discovery of breaks on the purchase cable on 30 September. On 8 October, the 50,000 th arrested landing aboard the ESSEX was made by LT. Robert BERGNER, in his AD-4N Night Fighter.

(2) Barricade and Davis Barrier Rerigging:

The ESSEX left CONUS on 16 June 1952 for the Far East. Since that date there have been approximately seven barrier engagements by jet type aircraft. After each of the first three engagements it took in excess of ten minutes to set a ready deck. It became apparent that this was unacceptable because of critical fuel supply of the F9F. An intensive program of drills was initiated utilizing all arresting gear and flight deck personnel. Drills are held just prior to returning to the operating area and at two week intervals during an extended operating period. The result of this program was a reduction of 50% in rerigging time over previous times. The time required to set a ready deck after each of the last three engagements have been six, five and seven minutes respectively. After each of these engagements the barricade was rerigged in five minutes or less. It is felt that the maximum acceptable time for rerigging the barricade and barriers should not be over six minutes after a normal engagement.

(3) Value of Barricade:

Since the barricade has been installed there has been one barricade engagement during which the Davis Barriers were not engaged. The barricade had a runout of approximately 65-70 feet. If the barricade had not been installed, there would have been a flight deck crash similar to the one that took place in September 1951 when an F2H jumped over the Davis Barriers and crashed into the planes parked forward on the flight deck.

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c. AIRCRAFT ORDNANCE

(1) The Air Department Ordnance Division shortage of personnel still continues to be a problem in that personnel have been transferred without replacements. This situation will become more serious as the operating schedule becomes more difficult to meet due to cold weather conditions.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced in procuring 20mm aircraft cannon driving springs. This item was ordered in quantities to replenish the ships allowance, but instead of receiving the items requested, aircraft gun charger inner and outer springs were issued as substitutes for driving springs. These springs could not be utilized and are now in excess. To alleviate a critical situation of having aircraft guns out of commission, fifty (50) driving springs were procured from the U.S.S. PRINCETON prior to her departure from the operating area.

d. MAINTENANCE

(1) Equipment:

A new type of engine build up stand for reciprocating engines has been developed and is in use, permitting off loading of the conventional allowance type. Briefly described; the stand consists of three vertical legs, one under each side of the engine mount and one under the propeller shaft.

On completion of the build up; the engine is stored vertically on the same stand.

Hangar deck space for an additional aircraft has been gained and three tons of topside weight subtracted.

Tool box racks have been installed on certain areas of the hangar deck not accessible for parking aircraft. General appearances are greatly improved and they have proven a real convenience for the mechanics.

Radio "gripes" often prove, after investigation, to be headset and microphone discrepancies. To alleviate this condition; test sets (TS 387/U) have been installed in each ready room in order that pilots may positively determine the condition of headsets and microphones prior to manning planes.

Proper marking of flight clothing can now be performed with a newly obtained gold print machine, a popular addition to the ship's equipment.

Difficulties in moving oxygen trailers to filling locations among closely parked aircraft have been alleviated by installing 50' filler hoses, fabricated from 3000 P.S.I. hydraulic hose.

Contrary to the reports of other carriers, the oxygen trailers have been used during two Korean tours and have proven satisfactory.

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[REDACTED]

A simple effective tester for the batteries of CRC-7, VHF, search and rescue transceiver, carried in parrafts has been fabricated on board. Both the "A" and "B" sides may be checked under load with one instrument and one plug in.

The much needed, long awaited preservation machine finally arrived and is considered an excellent piece of equipment.

(2) Material:

The 180 hour RB 19R-2 spark plugs are only averaging 69 hours. Cause of the difficulty has not been determined.

J42 engines are being received minus the TJC's and high pressure pumps. This situation is not critical as long as the Supply Officer can furnish the "missing" quantity above the normal usage.

Spare F4U wings are still being received without F4U Change No. 432 incorporated. Because it is impractical for carriers to make this change, the wing must be off-loaded.

(3) Personnel:

The personnel situation has been satisfactory. A training program, underway since deployment, recently paid off with fifteen (15) men, out of sixty four assigned, being advanced in rate on 16 October.

2. Supply Department.

a. Aviation Stores

(1) Installed cargo nets in the overhead of aviation engine store-room C-419-A for the storage of damaged aircraft surfaces, thereby reducing additional damage and providing additional deck storage space.

b. General Stores.

(1) Replenishment while in port from the USS POLLUX (AKS-4) and the USS CASTOR (AKS-1) was considered highly satisfactory, about 85% of items requested being supplied.

(2) The most critical items in the area are:

lumber  
metal (bar and plate)  
standard forms  
bottled gases

(3) Electronics spare parts have been supplied in an excellent manner - 90% of requests have been filled.

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(4) Ordnance and BuShips spare parts are in short supply, resulting in high priority requisitions for stateside supply action.

3. Administration

a. Personnel Count

During the period of operation the average on-board count was as follow:

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Ship's Company	127	2054	2181
Marine Detachment	2	62	64
Air Group	130	624	754

	<u>E-7</u>	<u>E-6</u>	<u>E-5</u>	<u>E-4</u>	<u>E-3</u>	<u>E-2</u>	<u>E-1</u>
Transfers:	5	6	5	25	7	0	0
Receipts:	0	3	2	6	1	22	1

	<u>Pay Grade</u>	<u>Allowed</u>	<u>On-Board</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Petty Officers:	E-7	74	73	99
	E-6	171	72	43
	E-5	265	132	50
	E-4	374	483	129

Three officers and nineteen (19) enlisted men are on emergency leave.

The on-board count is considered adequate for the mission assigned and type of operations conducted. There continues to be a shortage of petty officers in the following ratings: QM, FC, MM, BT, EM, IC, AO, and YN.

b. Morale

Despite an extended tour of operations on-the-line, the morale of personnel continued to be high. During the latter part of the period there were indications of fatigue of pilots, loading and flight deck crews and watch-standers. The delivery of mail during this period was below average in comparison to previous periods. This was due to an extension of the operating period. As a result, this vessel received no mail at the last three consecutive replenishments.

4. Operations Department

a. Air Operations

No comment

b. Aerology

(1) Weather in the Korean Operating area was normal.

(2) One and one half days of flight operations were cancelled due to weather. This was caused by active cold fronts passing through the area.

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(3) One replenishment day was cancelled due to heavy weather when a deep low pressure area developed in the Sea of Japan.

c. Communication

(1) Since the first period traffic has continued to increase, putting an added load on the already overburdened circuits. During the second period the ship handled a total of 28,858 dispatches, an average of 411 per day. Of this number 1394 were originated by the ship and 2546 were addressed to the ship. The rest were relays, transmitted and received, over the circuits guarded for CTF 77, George FOX and NDT FOX messages.

(2) During the second period the rigid training program has been continued. Close supervision, on the job training and classroom instruction for the enlisted men and an afternoon communications class for officers has improved the communication section considerably.

(3) The slowing down of the NFN FOX to approximately 22 WPM no longer necessitates placing the best available operators on this circuit. This indicates that complete reception of first transmissions, although slower, is far better than requesting the already overburdened transmitting station to repeat messages or sections of messages missed.

d. CIC

During the period of this report CIC operated with an average of 53 men and 10 officers. This complement is considered to be adequate.

Three significant programs were undertaken during this period as follows:

(1) O.O.D. Training Syllabus.

An O.O.D. training syllabus for all line officers on board who desired to qualify as O.O.D. underway, with particular emphasis on the qualifying of CIC officers, was established. Lectures were given by the Navigator, the Engineering Officer, and other department heads at specified times. All CIC officers were required to attend these lectures. To date two (2) CIC officers have qualified and another will be qualified in the near future. All O.O.D.s and J.O.O.D.s were required to stand observation watches in CIC to better familiarize themselves with the functions of CIC, Gunnery Liaison, and Air Operations. This program proved very effective in a better co-operation and understanding between combat and the bridge.

(2) CTF 77 Air Control Training and Qualification Program.

CTF 77 has recently commenced a program for the training and qualifying of officers from destroyers as "Air Controllers, Day", by having these officers report to TF 77 carriers on TAD orders for training. This is considered to be an excellent program however, it should be realized that the training and

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qualifying of an officer who has never been to CIC School, Air Controller School or has never been in control of an aircraft before is a long process. Concentrating on these trainees in order to get them back to their ships is a serious hindrance to the training of the officers permanently attached to the carriers. Proficiency of the carrier personnel must be kept up. CIC qualified one (1) officer and two (2) more were far enough along so that another three days of air control work would have qualified them also. On the recommendations of VC-11, the trainees are also given a short course in ASP Air Control work. The pilots of VC-11 felt the ASP Controllers of the destroyers were not using proper techniques and did not know the capabilities of the planes or the equipment installed. The instructions given to trainees thus far has already improved ASP Air Control.

### (3) AEW/ASW/CIC Training Program

On 26 October 1952 CIC and VC-11 Unit ITEM established a co-operative training program. The object of the program was:

(a) To acquaint certain CIC personnel with (1) the capabilities and limitations of the AD4W, the AN/APS-20A, and other airborne equipment used for AEW and ASW; (2) Techniques of airborne air control; and (3) the problems of the airborne controller and technicians.

(b) To acquaint VC-11 Airborne controllers, technicians, and pilots with CIC, its problems, techniques, and the capabilities and limitations of its equipment. It is intended that the above objectives be carried out by a series of AEW/ASW training flights, CIC instructions watches, and lectures. The proposed program met with a great deal of enthusiasm. A total of 24 persons (including two (2) officers, twenty (20) rated men, and two (2) non-rated men) volunteered to participate. Most of these people have put in a good number of hours as shipboard ASP Controller using both the PO presentation and regular shipboard radars. In the four (4) operating days during which this program has been in effect twelve (12) people participated in ASW training flights totaling 25.4 hours. The schedule for these flights were arranged on a non-interference basis with VC-11 Unit ITEM. Also, during this period thirteen (13) VC-11 personnel were scheduled for a total of 96 hours of instruction watch in CIC. Both the instruction watches and the training flights have proven to be very effective. Personnel who have participated have learned much which will benefit them in performance of their normal duties. Enthusiastic response to the training program and a new interest in AEW and airborne ASW has been demonstrated by CIC personnel in personal interviews. It is felt that this program will be of immeasurable benefit to the men and units involved.

### e. Photographic Interpretation

Photographic Interpretation during this period continued to be primarily target search and damage assessment. The "touraid" of a rail route is practically a thing of the past. Flak studies continued to be made but were

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most often centralized to a specific target area rather than a general route as had been the practice in the past. Flak studies point up the need for greater emphasis on flak interpretation. Photo interpreters do not agree among themselves in the interpretation of various types of gun positions. The need for a symposium on the subject of flak in the Korean theatre is indicated. \*

Towards the latter portion of this operating period the hours of daylight and, thus the hours for acceptable photography diminished. Several schedulings of late afternoon or early morning flights in mountainous areas produced photographic results difficult if not impossible to interpret. All such missions should be scheduled closer to midday when the sun is near its zenith.

An attempt was made to coordinate photographic interpretation with ECM reports in the search for enemy radar; however, no positive results were obtained. An expansion of this work during the next operating period is anticipated. \*

The F-56 20" camera capsule was continued in use on the AD aircraft in place of the K-25 for strike photography. Continued excellent results were obtained.

The interest of the Air Group pilots in photography and photographic interpretation was aroused by a demonstration of stereoscopy involving the various types of targets peculiar to Korea. For the first time many pilots were able to see some of the camouflaged supply areas they had been attacking nearly in the blind. This aroused interest led to a steady stream of jet recon leaders perusing photographs of a scheduled mission so they might be better prepared for lucrative targets along the route.

The photographic pilots many times returned from an incomplete mission with a sense of frustration because their time had run out. Time has proved to be a much more critical item on photographic missions than either aircraft endurance or film capacity. This is particularly true in the case of targets at a considerable distance in from the coast.

#### f. Air Intelligence

##### (1) Comments on Services of Air Navigation Offices

##### (a) Air Navigation Office, San Diego

The cooperation of the COMAIRPAC Intelligence Officer and the Air Navigation Officer was outstanding in all respects. After consulting the Air Navigation Officer all maps and charts remaining from the first Korean tour were off loaded. After the necessary inventory was taken by the Air Navigation Office, approximately half the maps had to be destroyed due to obsolescence. The ship was then provided with a new allowance of maps and charts.

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On one occasion, maps were requested from the Air Navigation Office in the morning and the charts were loaded aboard ship that same afternoon. This particular order was placed on a Saturday morning, and yet the Air Navigation Office needed only five hours to deliver some 15,000 maps aboard neatly boxed and indexed. Their services could not have been more outstanding.

(b) Air Navigation Office, NAS Barbers' Point

The Air Navigation Office at Barbers' Point was requested to supply certain items in which the ship was deficient. Subsequently, the ship was notified that all the items had been delivered. However it was learned after the ship had gotten underway for WESPAC that some of the items were not aboard. This oversight was undoubtedly inadvertent, but nevertheless the ship relied upon the inventory sheets received from the Air Navigation Office until the material itself could be unpacked and inventoried. Hence the shortages were not disclosed until after the ship had departed Pearl Harbor, and then it was too late to notify either Barbers' Point or forward a speedletter requesting delivery of the missing items in Japan. Except for this incident, the cooperation and services of the Air Navigation Office at Barbers' Point was satisfactory.

(c) Air Navigation Office, NAS Atsugi

Although most of the intelligence material required was aboard prior to arrival in Japan, members of COMFAIRJAP staff rendered the ship invaluable service. The major deficiencies concerned various types of survival gear and AMS L-751 series 1:50,000 scale maps. The urgently needed survival gear was requested both by dispatch and by a speedletter delivered by the first aircraft flown into Atsugi on 26 July. The ship arrived in Yokosuka on a Saturday afternoon and the survival gear was delivered on board Sunday afternoon. A scant thirty six hours elapsed between the receipt of the request by COMFAIRJAP and the delivery of the items to the ship. Such prompt action is no small tribute to the coordination and efficiency of the Air Navigation Officer and the COMFAIRJAP Intelligence, Material, and Supply Officers. Their efforts were somewhat hindered by the fact that the items were obtained over a weekend period, and where certain items could not be readily obtained, acceptable substitutes were provided. The timely delivery of the survival material alleviated a critical shortage and provided an immeasurable boost to the morale of the pilots in general. Prompt action by COMFAIRJAP in the matter is deeply appreciated.

(2) The high consumption of 1:50,000 scale maps in the Navy area of responsibility has continued throughout the second period on the line. The estimated attrition rate has been about twelve percent, but the primary difficulty has been caused by the fact that any sector of the Navy area may be selected for concentrated strikes.

Hence, the supply of maps available on any particular area is soon exhausted, and on one occasion depleted stocks were partially replaced by maps

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received from another carrier which had just returned to the line from Yokosuka. Consequently, a minimum stock of 60 copies of each 1:50,000 map in the Navy area will be carried aboard in the hope that this will eliminate the exhaustion of the supply of particular maps during one operating period.

*B B C Lovett.*

B. B. C. LOVETT

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance

CINCPACFLT (2) Advance

CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP

COMNAVTE (1) Advance

COMNAVTE EVALUATION GROUP

COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance

CTF-77 (1) Advance

ComCarDiv 1

ComCarDiv 3

ComCarDiv 5

COMAIRPAC (10)

COMSERVPAC

COMFAIRALAMEDA

COMFAIRJAPAN

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

USS BOXER (CVA21)

USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA31)

USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45)

USS PHILLIPINE SEA (CVA47)

USS PRINCETON (CVA37)

USS ORISKANY (CVA34)

USS KEARSARGE (CVA33)

CVG-2

CVG-5

CVG-7

CVG-9

CVG-11

CVG-15

CVG-19

CVG-101

CVG-102

ATG-2 (5)

USS ESSEX (CVA-9)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

CVA9/A16-13

Ser

6203

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SECURITY INFORMATION

7 DEC 1952

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 1 November through 24 November 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report, 1 November to 24 November 1952.

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 1-24 November 1952 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I GENERAL NARRATIVE

a. During the period 1-24 November 1952, USS ESSEX (CVA-9) was a unit of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN which at various time included the following additional units: USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), ComCardiv ONE, RADM. W. D. JOHNSON, USN, embarked; USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), ComCardiv FIVE, RADM. R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked; USS MISSOURI (BB-63), ComSEVENTHFLT, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked; USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), and other support and screening ships.

b. During this period ESSEX operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52 plus supplemental plans and orders issued during this period.

c. The mission of this force was as set forth in CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

ESSEX departed the operating area for Yokosuka, Japan on 1 November, arriving 3 November. The ship remained in Yokosuka until 13 November for upkeep, rest and recreation, rejoining TF 77 and commencing operations on 16 November. The morning of 17 November ESSEX aircraft joined with those of ORISKANY in a coordinated attack on Chongjin while KEARSARGE aircraft were striking Kilchu. In the afternoon, KEARSARGE and ORISKANY aircraft attacked Chongjin while ESSEX planes concentrated on supplies and warehouses at Kyongsong. On 18 November the planes from ESSEX and KEARSARGE joined in a raid on the border city of Hoeryong, causing heavy damage to bridge, rail and billeting facilities. Throughout the remainder of the period ESSEX planes were executing heavy attacks on enemy frontline facilities and other supply and troop areas. On 20 November, the port catapult suffered a major casualty while launching an F2H-2P. On 24 November, ESSEX left the force to return to Yokosuka for repairs to this catapult.

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PART III ORDNANCE

1. Ship's Ordnance Expenditures for training was as follows:

74 rounds 5"/38 AAC

1 round 5"/38 (VT) none frag

10 rounds 3"/50 FCL (VT) Service

317 rounds 3"/50 FCL (VT) non frag

2. Air Ordnance. (See enclosure (1))

PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE

Battle damage sustained by ESSEX aircraft and damage inflicted on the enemy are listed in enclosure (1). The ship sustained no battle damage.

PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention. Action casualties were three pilots of Air Task Group TWO; details are included in enclosure (1). There was one psychiatric disorder: PATTERSON, Cecile Ray, RD3, 231 88 58, USN was admitted to the sick list from CIC at 2200, 23 November 1952 with Schizophrenic Reaction.

PART VI SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. Operations Department.

a. Intelligence. COMCARDIV FIVE has originated a method of distributing flak data which appears to be the best system used so far in the Korean War. Flak is plotted on 1:250,000 maps, duplicates of which are run off on Ozalid foil transparencies, and distributed to the carriers in the force. This works in very well with the ESSEX flak system where all flak is plotted by ship's AIO's on transportable maps which are then used by the squadron AIO's for their briefings. The 1:250,000 Ozalid foil transparencies are issued approximately every two weeks and are taped over a 1:250,000 map, which is used in briefing all reconnaissance flights. Strikes are briefed from 1:50,000 maps, the data for which is taken primarily from the index of flak issued by CTF 77 staff simultaneously with the transparencies. Maps are corrected daily from the data published in the TF Air Plan. The problem of deletion of the flak positions has been partially solved by issuing lists of positions to be removed both in the Daily Air Plan and in the Bi-weekly Flak Summaries.

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The plotting of machine gun positions has proven useless. The guns are too easily moved, too hard to spot exactly either by PI or pilot reports, and too numerous to keep plotted.

b. Photographic Interpretation. Damage assesment assignments in the front line area brought out the continued necessity for pre-strike photography. Small targets such as artillery positions and personnel bunkers are very difficult to detect after having been bombed and require previous photography for accurate comparison. Continued distribution of photography between carriers is considered imperative for accurate and complete photographic interpretation. Comparison of photos is necessary for both damage assessment procedures and routine surveillance.

## 2. Air Department

a. Catapult. On 20 November 1952, while firing a F2H-2P from the port catapult, machinery failure resulted in the plane's loss of the towing bridle. The resultant runaway shot caused major damage to the sheaves and cable system of the engine. The plane was unable to stop before reaching the end of the flight deck and crashed into the water. The pilot was rescued. The reason for failure has not yet been ascertained; however, non-functioning the runaway shot preventer is attributed to a broken CRP switch. The ship maintained scheduled operations through 23 November with the starboard catapult.

b. Aircraft Ordnance Handling Equipment. All MK5 2,000 lb bomb skids are in poor condition. Eight (8) of these skids have been on order for approximately ninety (90) days and to date only one (1) has been received. Due to the critical need for these skids for operations, the ship's force is attempting to manufacture parts for repairs.

## 3. Air Task Group TWO. (See enclosure (1))

*B. B. C. Lovett*  
B. B. C. LOVETT

### Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance  
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP  
COMNAVFE (1) Advance  
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP  
COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance  
CTF-77 (1) Advance  
ComCarDiv 1  
ComCarDiv 3  
ComCarDiv 5  
COMAIRPAC (10)  
COMSERVPAC  
COMFAIRALAMEDA  
COMFAIRJAPAN

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
USS BOXER (CVA-21)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)  
USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)  
USS PHILLIPINE SEA (CVA-47)  
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)  
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)  
CVG-2  
CVG-5  
CVG-7  
CVG-9  
CVG-11  
CVG-15  
CVG-19  
CVG-101  
CVG-102  
ATG-1  
ATG-2 (5)

JAN 23 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer  
To: Chief of Naval Operations  
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East  
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report, 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953 is hereby submitted.

#### PART I GENERAL NARRATIVE

a. During the period 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953, USS ESSEX (CVA-9) was a unit of Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN which at various times included the following additional units: USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31), ComCardiv ONE, RADM W. D. JOHNSON, USN, embarked; USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), ComCardiv FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKLEY, USN, embarked; USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), ComCardiv THREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked; USS ORISKANY (CVA-34); USS MISSOURI (BB-63), ComSEVENTHFLT, VADM J. J. CLARK, USN, embarked, and other support and screening ships.

b. During this period ESSEX operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52 plus supplemental plans and schedules issued during this period.

c. The mission of this force was as set forth in CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52.

#### PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

ESSEX departed the operating area for Yokosuka, Japan on 25 November, arriving 26 November. The ship remained in Yokosuka until 6 December for emergency repairs to port catapult, rejoining TF-77 and commencing operations on 8 December. On the morning of 9 December ESSEX aircraft raided railroad facilities at Hunyung. This was the northern-most raid of the Korean War. Simultaneously BON HOMME RICHARD aircraft were raiding the Musan iron works and

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ORISKANY aircraft the rail facilities at Hyesanjin. On that same afternoon ESSEX aircraft raided Rashin rail facilities. On 22 December ESSEX aircraft joined with those of the KEARSARGE and ORISKANY to destroy billeting, vehicle shelters and construction facilities at the Kwangsuwon A/F. On 27 December ESSEX and KEARSARGE aircraft briefly revived the all-out main supply route interdiction program smashing strategic rail and highway bridges and other facilities. On 30 December Rashin rail facilities again felt the blows of ESSEX and KEARSARGE aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the period ESSEX aircraft were employed in close air support and heavy attacks on enemy front-line positions, troop and supply areas. On 10 January ESSEX departed TF-77 to return to Yokosuka for further routing to CONUS, arriving in Yokosuka 13 January.

### PART III ORDNANCE

1. Ship's ordnance expenditures for training were as follows:

104 rounds 5<sup>1</sup>/<sub>38</sub> AAC  
1 round 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>50</sub> FCL (VT) Service  
390 rounds 3<sup>1</sup>/<sub>50</sub> FCL (VT) Non-frag

2. Air Ordnance. (See Enclosure (1))

### PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE

Battle damage sustained by ESSEX aircraft and damage inflicted on the enemy are listed in enclosure (1). The ship sustained no battle damage.

### PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention. There were no action casualties sustained by ship's company personnel. There was a minor epidemic of common colds and upper respiratory infections during the first two weeks of this period. There were no psychiatric disorders. Personnel performance and casualties of Air Task Group TWO are included in enclosure (1).

### PART VI SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. Administrative.

a. Public Information. ESSEX concurs in recommendations made by other carriers that there should be a minimum of two full-time rated journalists assigned to PIO. ESSEX has good facilities for transmitting newsworthy photographs but was handicapped in having to send dispatches to ComNavFE to arrange transmission schedules. It is believed a regular schedule should be set up for radio transmission of photographs. In this way, photos of immediate public information value can be assured of rapid delivery. "

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a. To give CIC watch officers a better understanding of the functions performed on the bridge, a program has been in effect to qualify them as Officers of the Deck underway. This has been accomplished by having two of the CIC watch officers on the deck watch list until qualified, and then replacing them with two others. The exchange training of CIC enlisted personnel and VC-11 Detachment enlisted airborne controllers has been continued. The personnel involved have been very enthusiastic about this training and considerable mutual benefit has resulted.

### 3. Air Department.

a. Catapult. All catapult operations were normal. In the previous action report it was noted that the port catapult received extensive damage from a run-away shot. During the ship's stay at Yokosuka, new sheaves, cables, shuttle, instruments and piping were installed by the ship's force and SRF Yokosuka. Repairs and tests were successfully completed on 5 December 1952.

b. Arresting Gear. All arresting gear operations were routine with the exception of three barrier crashes. All crashes were caused by material failure of the F9F-2 arresting hook shoes, which split upon engaging the arresting pendant. The maximum number of landings on these hooks was twenty-one and in all cases the hooks were carefully inspected after every landing.

c. Maintenance. Some trouble was experienced with the TS-250 range calibrator during this period due to crystal failures, but in general electronic maintenance was very satisfactory. A new shielded cage was fabricated of aluminum sheet for the AN-6 radio direction finder loop. This cage greatly improved the signal to noise ratio over the previous wire mesh cage.

Difficulty has been experienced during this period in keeping the Model X-4210 and X-4439 oxygen pumps in an operating status. The high pressure output required of the pumps to recharge the Spen oxygen servicing trailers caused the high and low pressure cylinders to require renewal of "V" packings after five hours of operation. The Oxygen-Nitrogen system to be installed during the forthcoming Navy Yard period should rectify this situation.

d. Ordnance. The shortage of senior rated personnel continues to be the greatest operating problem. This problem has existed since the beginning of this Korean tour and has made it necessary to put lower rated personnel in responsible billets. These men have neither the experience or training required to properly carry out their assigned positions without close supervision. This creates an added work load, longer hours and hardship on the few higher rated men.

### 4. Air Task Group TWO. (See enclosure (1))

*B B C Lovett*

B. B. C. LOVETT

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CTF-77 (1) Advance  
ComCarDiv 1  
ComCarDiv 3  
ComCarDiv 5  
COMAIRPAC (10)  
COMSERVPAC  
COMFAIRALAMEDA  
COMFAIRJAPAN  
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
USS BOXER (CVA-21)  
USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)  
USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)  
USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)  
USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)  
USS VALLEY VORGE (CVA-45)  
USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)  
CVG-2  
CVG-5  
CVG-7  
CVG-9  
CVG-11  
CVG-15  
CVG-19  
CVG-101  
CVG-102  
ATC-1  
ATG-2 (5)

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