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Integration of RO Soldiers into US Army Units (USA) (U)

11/21/59 *S. J. B. 59*

by
Alfred H. Hausath
David S. Fields
Operations Research Office

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Technical Memorandum ORO-T-363
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U S Army Military History Institute

**Integration of ROK Soldiers
into US Army Units (KATUSA) (U)**

by

Alfred H. Hausrath
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Richard C. Sheldon
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International Research Associates, Inc.



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The Johns Hopkins University, Bethesda, Maryland

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WORKING PAPER

This is a working paper of members of the technical staff of the Tactics Division concerned with ORO Study 11.10.

The objective of the study is to explore US Army experience in Korea in utilizing local nationals as military troops, particularly in the later period of the Korean conflict. This paper, ORO-T-363, deals with the integration of Korean troops into US units at the squad level. The findings and analysis of this paper are subject to revision as may be required by new facts or by modification of basic assumptions. Comments and criticism of the contents are invited. Remarks should be addressed to:

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US Army Photograph

Frontispiece—American Troops Instructing Korean Troops Attached to Co K, 3d Bn, 160th Inf Regt, 40th US Inf Div, in the Use of .30-Cal Machine Gun

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Part of the work for this study was performed under subcontract with the International Research Associates, Inc., New York, and part by ORO staff members. Members of the IRA team were Elmo C. Wilson, president, Dr. Richard S. Sheldon, vice-president and team leader, and Dr. John P. Kishler, assisted by Charles Sobel and John Orton. Alfred H. Hausrath was the ORO representative who monitored the study, participated with the team in the field, and directed the study through its subsequent stages.

Hay Nam Lee, Professor of Western Civilization at Seoul National University and also at Taegu University, assisted the research team during the data-collecting period and interviewed the Korean troops.

The machine tabulation and statistical processing of data were supervised by Sobel, first in Tokyo, with the cooperation of the Machine Records Unit of The Adjutant General's Office at Camp Drake, and later at the Bureau of Applied Social Science Research, Columbia University.

Major James Stafford, serving in Korea as an Operations Research Officer of the Canadian Army at the time of the field work for this study, volunteered to administer the questionnaire to Canadian troops, and he supplied the data on this subject reported in the appendices.

The subcontractor's preliminary report was drafted by Kishler in January 1954 and submitted to ORO and then revised by Sheldon in March 1954. This revised draft was circulated by ORO for critical review by US Army officers who had had experience with KATUSA. Their observations and experiences were carefully weighed in preparing this manuscript and are gratefully acknowledged. All data were subsequently checked at ORO; new and additional data were gathered and included; and the report was reorganized and rewritten by Hausrath, assisted in the final stages of the study by David S. Fields, who redesigned tables and charts and prepared the final draft while the senior author was on another assignment in the Far East. Sheldon and Kishler were not available to participate in the later stages of the study and did not review the final draft. Valued assistance was received from many ORO colleagues, especially John G. Hill, Col Robert W. Kane, Lt Col W. L. Clement, Frank J. Harris, J. David Reed, Murray Dyer, Fred C. Hipp, and Richard E. Zimmerman.

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PROBLEM

To study the experience in integrating ROK soldiers into US Army units, as background for evaluating the feasibility of KATUSA-like programs in other underdeveloped countries.

FACTS

Early in the Korean conflict, South Korean soldiers were assigned to fight in US units that were understrength and for which American replacements were not available. This integration of Korean soldiers with US troops, formalized under the program known as "Korean Augmentation Troops to the US Army" (KATUSA), continued after the war ended.

These ROK enlisted men, called "KATUSA," were used in combat units, predominantly as infantry riflemen. They served in squads with US soldiers as privates only, although some held ranks up to sergeant in the ROKA. They were issued US supplies on the same basis as other UN forces, but were paid by and were under the military discipline of the ROKA. Throughout the conflict widely varying numbers of KATUSA were assigned, up to a maximum of 23,000 at any one time.

During the first months of the war, reports about KATUSA effectiveness suggested that integration of indigenous personnel in US combat units had not proved satisfactory.¹ As the program continued, however, there were significant shifts in opinions of its value. GHQ, FEC, in its comments on an ORO report on this subject in December 1951, stated that ". . . It is not felt that a blanket statement as to the effectiveness of integration can be safely made until operations in Korea are further studied . . ." ² It recommended that the ORO report¹ be considered an interim one, and that further study be made on the problem of utilization of indigenous personnel.

The present study, however, considers only one phase of this problem—integrating foreign (ROK) soldiers into US units at the squad level. The desirability of using entire foreign military units with US organizations has been substantiated by subsequent experiences in Korea,² and the utilization of indigenous civilian manpower is now a prescribed principle of Army administration as applied in theaters of operations.³

Therefore this study, undertaken at the request of G3 AFPE, covers only one of three major ways of utilizing indigenous personnel. It is the last of a series of papers on the use of local nationals as military troops in the later period of the Korean conflict. The first deals with problems in developing a local national army, and the second with MAAG.^{4,5}

SUMMARY

DISCUSSION

Field work for this study was conducted in Korea during the summer and fall of 1953. Primary data were collected by means of questionnaires administered to a representative sample of about 4500 US troops who had recent experience with KATUSA, and to about 600 KATUSA who had been rotated back to ROKA within the past few months. Supplementary interviews were held with US officers, US enlisted men, and KATUSA.

KATUSA military performance was analyzed on the basis of the opinions of the US officers and enlisted men with whom they fought. This was studied by examining their opinions of (a) over-all combat performance, (b) specific combat skills, and (c) discipline and physical stamina of the KATUSA.

Problems affecting morale (not normally found in army units made up entirely of US troops) appear when integrating foreign nationals. Therefore analysis was made of the attitudes expressed by US troops toward having KATUSA in their units and of the attitudes expressed by KATUSA toward being integrated with them. Finally, ways of utilizing KATUSA and an analysis of problems encountered in their use were reviewed along with other lessons learned from the Korean experience that could be useful in evaluating the feasibility of programs of this type in other countries.

The unique conditions under which the KATUSA program was organized and implemented limit the inferences that might be drawn directly from it regarding similar programs elsewhere. Military performance of nationals of different countries will vary because of differences in physical abilities and mental attitudes stemming from dissimilar backgrounds (social, economic, and political) and environment. Consequently the outcome of this program is of limited value in predicting the results of integrating other foreign soldiers into US Army units. Nevertheless the KATUSA program affords valuable experience data for assessing the feasibility of similar programs in other areas.

CONCLUSIONS

By the last year of the Korean conflict:

1. The military performance of KATUSA was considered satisfactory by the US officers and enlisted men in whose units they fought.
2. Americans in integrated units had a generally favorable attitude toward serving with KATUSA and felt that the prevailing practice of assigning two or three KATUSA per squad did not adversely affect unit performance or morale.
3. KATUSA were overwhelmingly satisfied with being integrated into US units, and this association was accompanied by more favorable attitudes toward Americans and counteracted Communist propaganda.
4. The language barrier was the only problem reported to be of major significance.*

* This problem is treated in detail in ORO-T-356.⁶

5. Lowered efficiency due to the difficulty of working with KATUSA was compensated for in part by their familiarity with the terrain and local conditions and ability to readily identify the enemy.

6. KATUSA accepted the less favorable material conditions of the ROKA when returned to their army without creating a morale problem for the ROKA.

Application to Future Situations

7. Under international conditions that require planning and readiness for US participation in limited or brush-fire wars in remote areas of the world, it is to be expected that local national military forces may require assistance in the form of intervention by US Army units to beat back overwhelming forces of powerful aggressors. Integration of local nationals in US Army units so employed offers a practical expedient with military advantages. The experience in Korea, analyzed and reported here, can be useful in making plans for and decisions in such situations. Factors that seemed to be important in the success of the KATUSA program were:

a. The responsible local government recognizing the situation as desperate and the need for military participation by US (or UN) forces.

b. Full cooperation from responsible local political and military leaders, and their readiness to act promptly and decisively in accord with military needs.

c. Strong support for the cause by the mass of the local population.

d. Military manpower resources in excess of its current military establishment.

e. Problems, such as the language barrier, judged not to outweigh the military value of the integrated local nationals.

f. The prospect of hostilities continuing long enough to justify the period of time required for integrated local nationals to become adjusted and trained as responsible members in US units.

g. Cultural compatibility, i.e., absence of serious conflicts in customs, taboos, and mores, and adaptability of local nationals to the standards and practices of US troops and to US Army regulations.

h. Attachment of local nationals to US Army units only as soldiers of the local national army and after they have completed adequate basic training.

i. Integration as privates at the squad level, principally, but not exclusively in combat units, and ordinarily not exceeding two or three per squad.

j. Agreement that local nationals who do not prove satisfactory as members of US units will be immediately transferred back to the local national army.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Appropriate agencies of the Department of the Army should prepare plans for integrating indigenous troops into US Army units that may be engaged in military action in countries where such a practice appears feasible.

SUMMARY

2. CGSC and other general service schools responsible should be requested to develop doctrine pertaining to the military use of indigenous troops in combat, and include same in applicable manuals and curricula.

3. War plans for the countries affected, and for other areas where integration of foreign nationals might be militarily desirable, should be reviewed in the light of these considerations.

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INTEGRATION OF ROK SOLDIERS INTO US ARMY UNITS (KATUSA)

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INTRODUCTION

During the first 2 months of the Korean conflict when the ROK Army had been destroyed as an effective fighting force and the understrength US Army in Korea had been compressed into Pusan perimeter by the North Koreans, immediate replacements were desperately needed for the depleted US forces. To meet this need, joint plans of EUSAK, ROKA, and KMAG made it possible for South Korean soldiers to fight as integral parts of US combat divisions.⁷ In August 1950 the Commander in Chief, UN, ordered the assignment of these troops and approved the integration of "a hundred South Koreans into each US Army company-size unit under his command."⁸

This program was formalized under the title "Korean Augmentation Troops to the US Army" (KATUSA), and Koreans thus assigned became known as KATUSA.* Although these troops, referred to as "augmentation" to the US Army, were at times overstrength in some US divisions, the manpower supply never yielded enough US replacements to fill all front-line infantry units in Korea.† With various modifications the KATUSA program continued throughout and following the Korean War.

Utilization of KATUSA‡

ROKA soldiers, when assigned to this program, had had no active service other than a minimum of basic training that they were supposed to receive at the ROKA Replacement Training Centers. In the early days of the war, however, they frequently were sent directly to US units with little or no military training. For the most part they were to be found in infantry units, with two or three men assigned to each squad. In general they performed the more basic jobs of the units, such as riflemen. Although some of them were promoted to NCO rank in the ROKA while serving as KATUSA, they were not placed in positions of authority over US troops and were, in fact, used as perpetual privates in US units.

"US commanding officers employed their own discretion in making the best possible use of integrated Korean troops," with the restriction that they could not form them into all-Korean units.⁹ An Eighth Army directive explicitly emphasized that they were to be "employed in a way comparable to US

* Also referred to as "Korean Army Troops, United States Army."⁹

† Augmentation is defined as an "increase of personnel... applicable to a specific table of organization...."¹⁰ However, it is used herein in the same sense as the word integration, and does not necessarily imply "increase in personnel...."¹⁰ Integration of KATUSA means that they were detailed as components of an American army unit and distinguishes these Koreans from those who were attached to US forces as members of a ROKA unit that retained its ROKA identity.

‡ See App E for details on the process of selection, training, and nature of service of KATUSA.

soldiers in similar assignments," and that "they must not be used as common laborers or cargo carriers."¹¹

Except for pay, which they received from ROKA appropriations at ROKA scales, KATUSA were provided with equipment, clothing, food, and other munitions on the same basis as other UN troops. However, they remained subject to ROK military laws. In April 1953, General Ryan, former Chief of KMAG, recommended to General Taylor, Eighth Army Commander, that "a rotation policy be established to return KATUSA personnel to ROKA control after having served one (1) year with a UN unit."¹¹ However, Army policy called for returning KATUSA to the ROKA when they reached their 35th birthday only when such request for return was made by ROKA Hq.*

Number of KATUSA Assigned†

Early in the war it was contemplated that 40,000 KATUSA could be utilized, and a ceiling for this number was approved by Department of the Army.¹² In the first months of the program the KATUSA strength reached its peak under this ceiling with only a little over 23,000 assigned at any one time.¹³ By May 1952 this number had fallen to less than 9000, when a new ceiling of 28,000 was established, and another build-up of KATUSA strength was begun.‡ In addition to this wide range in the total number of KATUSA there were considerable fluctuations in the number assigned to an individual organization (see Table 1).

Shifts in Opinions about KATUSA

At the start of the Korean War, KATUSA, many of whom were recruited directly off the streets of Pusan, were with their unit between 19 days and 1 month before being committed to action in the Inchon area in mid-September 1950. It is not surprising that under these circumstances KATUSA were reported to lack discipline. American officers and NCOs were said to have been forced to overexpose themselves constantly in order to get these inexperienced KATUSA moving in an attack, or to keep them from abandoning their positions at the slightest indication of an enemy action.

As a result of these conditions the EUSAK G3 recommended in October 1950 that US infantry units be allowed to keep their KATUSA as long as desired or until no longer needed, but that no more KATUSA be assigned. However, in May 1952, when there were only 9000 KATUSA assigned, EUSAK recommended rebuilding KATUSA strength to a ceiling of 28,000. Since replacements were no longer the matter of utmost concern at this time, this recommendation reflected a change in opinions about KATUSA.

In a historical study of the KATUSA program a similar shift in the opinions about KATUSA is indicated.¹⁵ According to this report US commanders' initial enthusiasm was based on the fact that replacements were so desperately

*See Eighth Army Circular 176 in App E. (Some additional data on utilization policy as formulated in the early months of the war are to be found in previous Eighth Army circulars issued in 1950 and 1951.)

†For complete listing of month-end data see App E.

‡This ceiling, approved by the Department of the Army in October 1952, was established by making a rough estimate that KATUSA could be integrated to the safe level of 10 percent of the Eighth Army as a whole. This would make the percentage considerably higher for combat units, since most KATUSA were assigned to combat units. Support for this relation could have been drawn from the recently acquired experience of the Eighth Army in integrating Negroes, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and native Mexicans (see ORO-R-11¹⁴).

needed as to be welcome from any quarter. This enthusiasm changed to opposition as US units were flooded with inadequately trained troops, who spoke practically no English.

Nevertheless, as the number of KATUSA diminished through normal attrition, opinions about them improved. This change also was a result of the fact that the less capable were returned to the ROKA and those who remained became trained and learned some English. By 1951, division commanders quoted

Table 1

NUMBER OF KATUSA ASSIGNED TO US UNITS
FOR SELECTED DATES^a

Unit or organization (1)	15 Sep 50 (2)	15 Dec 50 (3)	5 Sep 53 (4)
Eighth Army	—	1,325	7,479
KCOMZ	—	—	1,020
I Corps	1,227	265	—
IX Corps	—	315	—
X Corps	—	1,132	140
1st Cav Div	2,338	1,456	—
2d Div	1,821	1,145	1,935
3d Div (reinforced Dec 50)	—	5,943	1,932
7th Div	8,325	5,452	2,059
24th Div	2,786	1,844	—
25th Div	2,447	1,270	2,473
40th Div	—	—	2,186
45th Div	—	—	1,988
5th RCT	—	—	426
2d and 3d Log Com	—	1,032	—
1st Marine Div	—	106	—
Totals	18,944	21,285	21,638

^aColumns 2 and 3 from ORO-R-4(FEC);¹ information for column 4 prepared for A. H. Hausrath, 5 Sep 53, by Lt Col Wilbur A. Ohls, Office of the Advisor, G1, ROK Army; Hq US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea, Taegu, Korea. On 5 Sep 53 there were also 717 Koreans attached to the 1st British Commonwealth Division.

in the same study were generally favorable toward KATUSA. It was suggested, however, that in integrating such troops into US Army units, sufficient time be allowed for training and that relatively small numbers of KATUSA should be used as opposed to the large numbers integrated in 1950.

A monograph from Hq FECOM indicates that "from the point of view of immediately providing combat effective soldiers to the depleted forces, the KATUSA program failed."⁹ It also notes that:

... because KATUSA personnel were rapidly and necessarily placed into US units without training or military skills of any sort, and because of the profound language barrier, the cultural differences and adverse tactical conditions under which KATUSA and US personnel were operating, it is seriously doubted whether any groups of such varying nationalities could have performed with greater effectiveness.

The same report indicates a shift in opinions about KATUSA when it says "by November 1951 and even earlier many of the original difficulties were overcome since better understanding, partial grasp by each group of the other's language and customs, and valuable training under favorable conditions had been accomplished."

A survey of opinions of 65 officers and senior NCOs in Korea made by an AGO team also supports the unfavorable views held regarding KATUSA in the early period of the war. In this study it was reported that by spring, 1951, the "majority of commanders wholly or partially disapproved of Koreans in a military capacity. . . ." This attitude was ascribed mainly to the "language difficulty and the belief South Koreans were poor soldiers."¹⁶

The data in Table 2 taken from the same report, however, clearly indicate that the disapproval decreased as the time respondents were in Korea increased.

Table 2

COMMANDERS' OPINIONS OF SOUTH KOREANS USED
IN A MILITARY CAPACITY¹⁶

Opinion	Months in current assignment			
	Less than 12		More than 12	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Approve for full combat duty	7	16	10	47
Disapprove in part or in full	28	63	10	47
No clear direction to attitude	9	20	1	6

This study also hypothesizes that by late fall, 1950, many of the less efficient South Koreans had probably been weeded out.

One of the later comments on this subject, from a Human Resources Research Office staff study made in Korea during the winter of 1952-1953, stated that

. . . although the majority of our troops is not basically adverse to working with foreign nationals, acceptance of KATUSA was so poor that it lessened efficient operation. On the surface it may have seemed that integration of US troops and foreign nationals was successful. It created no evident, acute problems and it seemed to offer a ready solution to a pressing manpower shortage. However, if we agree that the most efficient operation of a rifle squad requires the harmonious integration of all the people making up the unit, then it would seem these units were not operating at their best levels. The second more obvious conclusion is that the communication problem inherent in this kind of integration must be resolved if it is to work successfully.¹⁷

This study based on 105 interviews of 116 soldiers from 25 squads clearly states, however, that the foregoing represents ". . . incidental findings" based on data collected for other purposes, and is "therefore not to be construed as definitive."¹⁷

Need for Over-All Appraisal of Opinions

Although the original reason for the employment of KATUSA—the desperate need for personnel to bring US units up to fighting strength—had passed by the time this and the later studies referred to above were made, the following rationales for the continuance of the KATUSA program still existed.

First—and most important—KATUSA reduced the number of US personnel needed in Korea.

Second, KATUSA provided a ready trained pool of replacements available from the ROKA Training Centers, should serious losses in US forces occur in the future.

Third, KATUSA service could serve as on-the-job training for Koreans who would eventually go to the ROKA.

Fourth, KATUSA, unlike American soldiers, were not limited to relatively short terms of service in Korea and hence became among the most experienced soldiers in many US units.

In spite of these rationales, opposition to KATUSA continued. The shifts to more favorable opinions of KATUSA recounted previously did not mean that there was unanimous approval of the KATUSA program. Individual reactions to KATUSA ranged from high enthusiasm to strong condemnation, reflecting the personal experience and viewpoints of the individuals reporting.

It is within this frame of reference that this study was undertaken through the request of G3, Department of Army, at the suggestion of G3, AFFE. G3, AFFE, specifically requested that a consensus of opinions be obtained and emphasis be on the period since 1952. Thus fresh views would be secured from officers and enlisted men with recent KATUSA experience and before they were rotated out of Korea. This request, made after the research team had arrived in the Far East, was recognized as an additional duty for the team whose primary mission was to study the problems of MAAG advisers in ROKA combat units during hostilities in Korea.

Procedure

Opinions on the military performance of KATUSA and the human relations aspects of integrating Korean soldiers into US Army units were gathered by means of questionnaires, interviews, and examination of documentary records.

The military performance of KATUSA was evaluated by means of a questionnaire (App A) administered during July and August 1953 to a representative sample of 4545 enlisted men and officers in the US Eighth Army who had recently had experience with KATUSA. The human relations aspects of the problem from the viewpoint of US soldiers were studied through an analysis of responses to other questions in the same questionnaire. The KATUSA views about this problem were obtained through a second questionnaire (Table A2) administered to 635 KATUSA who had then been rotated back to ROKA within the past few months. (Details of the sample design and procedure for administering the questionnaire are in Apps B and C.)

To supplement the questionnaires, interviews were conducted with US officers, NCOs, and enlisted men, and with KATUSA. Records were examined at KMAG Headquarters in Korea, AFFE Headquarters in Japan, and the Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.

The questionnaire administered to the US troops was, with minor modifications, submitted to 188 volunteers in Canadian Army units who had experience with KATCOMs, i.e., Korean Augmentation Troops to Commonwealth Division, the Canadian counterpart of KATUSA. Results of Canadian responses are reported with US data in App A. Canadian experience with KATCOMs compared with US results (Table A1 and Fig. A1) reveals that both groups had very similar experiences with Korean troops integrated into their respective units.

KATUSA MILITARY PERFORMANCE

The questionnaire used to elicit the opinions and attitudes of US troops about KATUSA consisted of 65 questions. Twelve were face questions about such data as rank, race, schooling, and service of the respondents (questions 1-11 and 65). Five were free-response questions in which respondents were asked to write in their own words the responses to questions on training needs of KATUSA, and their attitudes toward integrated service (questions 54, 55, and 61-63).

The balance of the questions, for which possible responses were supplied in the questionnaire, were classified into the following three groups:

- (a) Opinions on military performance of KATUSA.
- (b) Attitudes of US troops toward utilization of KATUSA.
- (c) KATUSA utilization practices, problems, and other lessons learned.

These areas, along with attitudes of KATUSA toward being integrated with US troops (studied through the ex-KATUSA questionnaire), serve as the basis around which this report is organized.

Scoring the Questions

Some of the questions had five alternative responses comparing KATUSA with US troops, as in the following example:

"How do KATUSA's and Americans compare in carrying out orders to the letter?"*

KATUSA's are:

- Much better than Americans
- A little better than Americans
- About the same as Americans
- A little worse than Americans
- Much worse than Americans.†

*Throughout the questionnaire the word KATUSA was spelled KATUSA's wherever more than one KATUSA was intended. This was done so as to minimize the possibility that the respondents would base their answers on experience with only one KATUSA, i.e., a "buddy" when actually opinions were sought about all KATUSA they knew.

† All except three of these questions cover desirable characteristics (i.e., aggressive in attack) and the sequence of the responses to each of them begins with the most favorable alternative answer, and each successive response expresses a less favorable opinion. The three excepted questions (20, 21, 23) cover undesirable characteristics (i.e., reluctance to engage the enemy), and the sequence of their alternative responses is in the reverse order. The subjects of these three questions appear to be the reverse of the type of behavior described in questions 14, 15, and 16 respectively, and will be referred to as 20 R14, 21 R15, 23 R16, so as to indicate these relations.

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This wording made it possible to score each of these questions by assigning numerical weights to the responses as follows:

Response	Numerical weight
Most favorable, i.e., "much better"	5
Next most favorable, i.e., "little better"	4
Neither favorable nor unfavorable, i.e., "about the same"	3
Next to the most unfavorable, i.e., "little worse"	2
Most unfavorable, i.e., "much worse"	1

Though these quantitative weights are unavoidably arbitrary, consistently applied, they permitted the computation of an average (mean) of the judgments for each item. This mean score in turn allowed a comparison of the opinions of the characteristics described in the questions.

Over-All Combat Performance of KATUSA

Opinions on the military performance of KATUSA were obtained through questions on (a) over-all combat performance, (b) specific combat skills, and (c) discipline and physical stamina.* The percentage results of the responses of those US troops who answered questions in these categories are graphically presented in Figs. 1 to 3 in the descending order of the mean scores. An array by the mean scores for all the questions on military performance is in Table 3.

Figure 1 indicates that on the three questions regarding over-all combat performance KATUSA were rated about the same as or better than Americans by almost half the respondents. However, the mean scores for these questions range from 2.30 to 2.69 and are below the median of 3. This is explained by the fact that although between 35 to 45 percent of the respondents rated KATUSA about the same as Americans, many more of them rated KATUSA below rather than above Americans.

In addition, over-all effectiveness in combat (question 33) and performance as fighters (question 12) were among the lowest of all 18 military characteristics studied (see Table 3). How may it be explained that questions on over-all combat performances, which are essentially the composite of specific combat skills, are rated lower than almost all these specific skills?

Opinions about specific combat skills can be founded on fairly concrete activities of KATUSA. For example, the respondent could observe KATUSA marksmanship and maintenance of weapons and compare performance in these skills with similar observations of himself and other Americans. However, over-all effectiveness and performance of KATUSA could not be measured by reference to such specific circumstances. For these opinions about the KATUSA they knew, the US troops may have turned to such a tenuous frame of reference as the military effectiveness of the ROKA as a whole. Under these conditions this

*Many of the questions and the categories were drawn from ORO-R-11, which included an evaluation of the military performance of Negro troops in Korea.¹⁴ Additional criteria of military performance were subsequently developed by Meals and Colby in ORO unpublished notes. See App C for discussion of procedure used in constructing this questionnaire.

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apparent contradiction of opinions about KATUSA is not surprising, in view of the collapse of the South Korean forces in the early days of the war by comparison with the Eighth Army's successful drive to the Yalu.

A further explanation for the relatively low scores for KATUSA over-all performance might be found in the hierarchical nature of the Korean society with its tradition of subservience toward superiors. The commonly expressed





Fig. 1—Over-All Combat Performance of KATUSA in Comparison with US Troops



Korean phrase, "Officials high, people low," indicates the existence of this attitude that is prevalent in civilian life as well as in the army. Thus a Korean soldier does what he is told by his officers, and, if he is not told to do something, he has no authority for doing it; it is up to high officials to determine actions. In view of the high premium placed on initiative in American society, it is possible that the Korean attitude toward initiative may have adversely affected the US soldiers' opinions of KATUSA over-all performance.

Thus the difference in attitudes toward initiative might suggest why KATUSA were rated so low in over-all combat performance. Also the lack of a well-defined basis for forming opinions about over-all performance might explain in part why KATUSA were rated lower on this category than on the specific skills that make up the over-all picture. However, whether these opinions accurately describe the over-all performance of KATUSA depends on (a) the extent to which initiative in the full American sense of the term is a proper standard for measuring this characteristic, and (b) the amount of attitudinal bias that was introduced by the respondents' personal pride in being a member of the army that they consider the finest fighting force in the world.*

In the light of these conditions it is to be expected that US troops would rate KATUSA low in comparison with Americans on over-all performance and effectiveness. It should be borne in mind, nevertheless, that almost 50 percent

*See App D for a discussion of possible adjustments for bias.

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Table 3

SUMMARY OF US TROOPS' RATINGS OF MILITARY
PERFORMANCE OF KATUSA

Question no.	Characteristic	Category ^a	Mean score	Rank order by mean score
In the median category				
23 R16	Lack of reluctance to engage the enemy	c	3.25	1
20 R14	Resistance to tendency to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat	c	3.20	2
13	Maintenance of weapons	b	3.02	3
31	Physical stamina	c	2.80	4
29	Patrolling and scouting	b	2.79	5
18	Likelihood of success in dangerous mission containing KATUSA	a	2.69	6
27	Hanging on to weapons and equipment in a withdrawal	c	2.68	7
21 R15	Resistance to tendency to break under mass attack	c	2.58	8
Below the median category				
24	Use of weapons and ammunition	b	2.46	9
26	Ability as bayonet fighters	b	2.45	10
14	Seasoning to combat and acquiring combat skills	c	2.45	11
22	Carry out orders to the letter	c	2.43	12
25	Rifle marksmanship	b	2.42	13
33	Over-all effectiveness in combat	a	2.35	14
16	Aggressiveness in attack	c	2.33	15
12	Performance as fighters	a	2.30	16
17	Good judgment and common sense in tough spots	b	2.24	17
15	Hold ground in hand-to-hand combat	c	2.18	18

^aGroup a—over-all combat performance; b—specific combat skills; c—discipline and physical stamina.

of the respondents did rate KATUSA about the same as or better than Americans. In addition, likelihood of success in a dangerous combat mission by units containing KATUSA (question 18), the third question on over-all combat performance, had a mean score of 2.69. This is within the limits of the central category, indicating that the respondent US troops generally considered KATUSA about the same as Americans in this respect.*

Indirect Measures of Over-All Combat Performance

Questions pertaining to the utilization of KATUSA under varying levels of unit strength involve consideration of their effectiveness as soldiers.

Table 4 reports the results of the questions on the use of KATUSA at different levels of (under) strength if American replacements are (1) available

*Since the median point is 3 and the two adjacent categories are weighted 2 and 4, the central category (median class), may be said to extend from about 2.51 to about 3.49.

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and (2) not available. Lines 1a and 1b indicate that 52 percent of the respondents either advocated or had no objections to the use of KATUSA as part of the normal strength of units, even "if American replacements were available," as the equivalents of American soldiers. Thus over half the respondents, actively or passively, endorsed the use of KATUSA under conditions in which they were least necessary. About one out of five respondents opposed such implementation (1d).

Table 4

ATTITUDES OF US TROOPS TOWARD USE OF KATUSA
UNDER VARYING LEVELS OF UNIT STRENGTH

Responses ^a	Percent of respondents
1. If American replacements are available KATUSA should be used:	(Question 36) ^b (N = 3980)
(a) Regularly to make up part of the normal strength of the unit (4)	33
(b) It makes no difference whether Americans are used to fill a few openings (3)	19
(c) Regularly, but only for overstrength (2)	27
(d) Not at all (1)	21
2. If no American replacements were available for your unit when would you want to have KATUSA?	(Question 37) (N = 3795)
(a) If the unit were full strength (6)	42
(b) Only if my unit lost 5 percent (5)	14
(c) Only if my unit lost 15 percent (4)	8
(d) Only if my unit lost 25 percent (3)	9
(e) Only if my unit lost 40 percent (2)	16
(f) Never (1)	11

^aResponses are listed in order of decreasing acceptance of KATUSA. The number in parentheses following the responses indicates the order in which they appeared in the questionnaire. The response calling for the regular use of KATUSA, but only for overstrength, cannot be ranged in a clear-cut sequence of favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward KATUSA even though the 27 percent of the respondents who checked this response evidently believed that they had positive contributions to make to American units. The response was included in the questionnaire because preliminary interviews indicated that many US troops thought that the use of KATUSA as overstrength was common practice in Korea, and a number of them believed that this would be the best procedure. If such individuals were not given the opportunity to state their actual opinions in answer to the question, they would either fail to answer or their responses would tend to distort the more precise picture of opinions.

^bQuestions 38 and 39 were exactly the same as 36 and 37, except that they referred to "English-speaking" KATUSA. As might be expected, the response under this condition indicated much more favorable attitudes toward the use of KATUSA at almost all levels of unit strength. Results of responses to these questions are in Table A1. A comparison of officers' and enlisted men's responses at extreme levels of strength is given in Table 7.

If "no American replacements were available," 56 percent of the respondents felt that KATUSA should be used if units are full strength or as little as 5 percent understrength. Here the response "I would want KATUSA if the unit were full strength" (2a) is clearly favorable to KATUSA. The next most favorable response at "5 percent understrength" (2b) was checked by an additional 14 percent of the respondents. Actually, all except 11 percent of the respondents (2f) felt that at some level of understrength KATUSA could help more than hinder.

Two further questions indirectly involve respondents' appraisal of combat performance by KATUSA. These are questions 50 and 51, asking whether there are any KATUSA in respondents' units "who are good enough to be NCOs in the US Army." (See Table A1.) The first of these questions also includes the question whether they know enough English for this type of duty; the second question eliminates consideration of the KATUSA's knowledge of English. While a third of the respondents said they "did not know" to each of these questions, 38 percent reported that there were KATUSA in their units who were good enough soldiers to be NCOs in the US Army as compared with 29 percent who said there were not. Even when the question asked if there were KATUSA who were good enough soldiers and knew enough English to be NCOs in the US Army, 19 percent said there were, 46 percent said there were not. Thus, the significant aspect is that lack of knowledge of English rather than lack of ability as a soldier (and potential leader) was the limiting factor in rating these KATUSA. It must be pointed out that the percentages reported do not refer to the percentage of KATUSA who may have been "good enough soldiers. . ." but to the percentage of US soldiers who thought some KATUSA in their units were of this caliber.

Specific Combat Skills

Figure 2 indicates that on four of the questions concerning specific combat skills over 50 percent of the respondents consider KATUSA about the same as or better than Americans, and for the other two questions about 35 to 40 percent also felt this way. Five of the characteristics covered by these six questions are those about which the respondent could make concrete observations.

On the other hand, good judgment and common sense in tough spots (question 17) was the sixth and lowest-rated question in this group. In some respects, however, it is very similar to the over-all-combat-performance questions in that opinions on such subjects are likely to be affected by attitudinal bias. For example, although specific observations of KATUSA actions in tough spots could readily be made, whether these actions actually reflected good judgment and common sense is subject to evaluations based more on personal attitudes than on well-established standards.

In addition, apart from the possible biases discussed in connection with over-all combat performance, a further reason for ranking KATUSA 17th out of 18 on this question may be adduced from the fact that most of the KATUSA had a limited command of English. This made it necessary to explain things again and again, in order to make them understand. And, even when because of the KATUSA lack of knowledge of English it is not certain that he has understood even though he indicates that he has, it would seem quite normal to think of him as lacking common sense. Also, an observer is likely to question the KATUSA lack of good judgment when, having been told to do one thing in a given situation, he often does another in a tough spot. The language difficulty, which engendered these conditions, also may contribute to the low rating KATUSA received on the over-all-combat-performance questions. The communication problem—one of the most difficult in an integration program—is discussed further in the section "Lessons Learned."

Of all the specific combat skills, maintenance of weapons (question 13) had the top mean score of 3.02. It was one of the highest of all the military perform-



ance ratings given KATUSA. This seems to reflect the pride that they, and Korean soldiers in general, manifested in their hand weapons. It was commonly believed by Americans that Koreans, coming from a depressed economy, took extraordinary pride in their personal possessions, particularly those of an advanced mechanical nature, such as those issued to them in the army. Koreans liked to keep these possessions in good order and were also noted for an aptitude for doing neat work with their hands. Applied to small equipment such as rifles and carbines this attitude showed up in the way they exercised great care in taking these weapons apart, oiling and cleaning them, and seeing to it that they functioned well. The reason for the high rating on maintenance of weapons is clear when this aptitude is added to the pride Koreans took in this equipment.





Fig. 2—Specific Combat Skills of KATUSA in Comparison with US Troops



KATUSA were also considered to have a distinct pride in accomplishing their mission and a relative lack of concern for personal safety. Accordingly the respondent US troops rated them 2.79 in patrolling and scouting (question 29). It was the opinion of many soldiers in Korea that the practice of setting routes and timing of patrols by higher headquarters sometimes made it possible for the enemy to make better judgments about where and when to ambush a patrol. The Koreans who had the advantage of being much more familiar with the terrain than the Americans were believed to adhere much less rigorously to the plans. Although this looseness in procedures sometimes produced an added amount of confusion and perhaps added risks due to lack of prearranged



fire support, it was considered to result in more successful patrols (i.e., patrols that kept going long enough, and over the best routes judged on the spot, and that evaded ambush sufficiently to accomplish their mission). This would explain why KATUSA were considered in the median category in this skill.

The balance of the specific combat skills considered: use of weapons and ammunition (question 24), ability as bayonet fighters (question 26), and rifle marksmanship (question 25) all scored within the narrow range from 2.42 to 2.46. These ratings are very close to the median category and suggest a fair degree of similarity of performance between Americans and KATUSA in these skills. However, since past research has shown that there is a general tendency to give one's own group an advantage in comparisons of this kind (included in attitude bias), these scores would indicate that American opinions suggest a high degree of similarity in the two groups for these skills. Thus, except for question 17, which is on the border line between a specific skill and over-all performance, these results reveal that US respondent troops were of the general opinion that KATUSA were about as good as Americans in specific combat skills.

Before leaving this category a word should be said about marksmanship and the use of the bayonet. The M1 rifle was regarded as a large and awkward weapon for people with a small physique like the Koreans'. KATUSA themselves often spoke of difficulty in handling this weapon. The opinions of ex-KATUSA who were queried about relative merits of the rifle and the carbine are discussed more extensively in App F. Nevertheless, as the ratings indicate, given time and willingness, KATUSA learned to handle the M1 rifle and did not seem greatly handicapped by its size and weight.

Discipline and Physical Stamina

For six of the nine questions on discipline and physical stamina more than 50 percent of the respondents considered KATUSA about the same as or better than Americans. For the other three questions about 40 percent expressed a favorable opinion about KATUSA. Five of these nine questions were also within the central category, and two of them had a mean score well over 3.0. Thus, without considering any qualifications or adjustments, US troops thought KATUSA discipline and physical stamina fairly satisfactory (see Fig. 3).

Physical stamina (question 31) was probably one of the characteristics about which Americans had the most concrete and striking evidence of KATUSA performance. One of the first sights that greeted Americans on arriving in Korea was the A-frame, a device equivalent to the American pack board and an extremely common mode of transporting burdens in Korea. Using A-frames, Koreans transported very heavy weights on their backs, and most Americans had a story of seeing them carrying a cylinder block, a loaded 55-gal oil drum, or some similar heavy load on an A-frame. Furthermore, the members of the Korean Service Corps, a group of civilian laborers attached to US Army units, transported supplies on A-frames in the extremely rugged mountainous terrain at the front. The ability of these porters to keep going over long periods of time on a relatively poor diet was a frequent topic of discussion among Americans, and undoubtedly influenced the rating (2.80) they gave KATUSA on physical stamina.





Fig. 3—KATUSA Discipline and Physical Stamina in Comparison with US Troops



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The pride KATUSA manifested in their weapons, which helped to explain the more favorable rating they received on maintenance of weapons (question 13—discussed under specific combat skills), also serves to indicate a possible reason why they were rated in the central category for hanging on to weapons and equipment in a withdrawal (question 27). Obviously, weapons they were proud to possess and to which they gave a great deal of personal care were less likely to be left behind in a withdrawal.

Similarly the language difficulty discussed in connection with good judgment and common sense in tough spots (question 17) also explains why KATUSA were rated relatively low on carrying out orders to the letter (question 22). It is easy to see that any deficiency in the ability of KATUSA and US troops to communicate with each other would affect the understanding of the orders being given. And since most KATUSA had a limited command of English, and few Americans spoke Korean, it is not surprising that in carrying out orders KATUSA were ranked 12th out of 18 military performance characteristics (see Table 3).

Of the six remaining questions in the group on discipline and physical stamina, three cover undesirable behavior characteristics, and the other three, which describe desirable characteristics, may be thought of as representing somewhat the reverse type of behavior. Also the sequence of responses to the latter questions are from the most favorable to the least favorable, whereas the responses to those with undesirable characteristics are in the reverse order.

Theoretically, if the respondents considered these pairs of questions as the precise reverse of each other, the structural differences described above should not have affected their replies. However, the well-recognized fact that wording of questions can affect results is supported by the data in Table 5, in which it can be observed that each of the three pairs of questions had significantly different scores.

The wide disparity in the ranking of the questions in pairs 2 and 3, however, may indicate that the respondents did not consider the characteristics in these pairs very similar. Apparently, although they were saying, in pair 2, that KATUSA were not particularly "aggressive in attack" (question 16) they also were saying that KATUSA were "much less reluctant to engage the enemy than Americans" (question 23 R16), once this engagement became inevitable.

Similarly, in pair 3 the respondents indicated that although KATUSA "did not season to combat and acquire combat skills as readily as Americans" (question 14) they were stolid Orientals and "did not go to pieces as a result of sustained combat" (question 20 R14). Over-all, these two pairs of questions suggested that KATUSA were willing to fight although they did not exhibit an eagerness to hurl themselves at the enemy. They were tough soldiers who took what came when it came, and did not lose control under pressure.

In contrast, both the questions in pair 1 ranked rather low and exhibited a much narrower difference between the mean scores. Thus it may be assumed that in this case the respondents felt that these two questions were measuring more similar characteristics than the previous pairs. In this connection they appeared to be saying that KATUSA "break under mass attack" (question 21 R15) and do "not hold ground in hand-to-hand combat" (question 15) very well, and there is very little difference between these two behaviors. (Possible meanings of the shift in the means of these two questions are discussed in App D with respect to question bias.)

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Table 5

COMPARISON OF QUESTIONS COVERING SOMEWHAT REVERSE TYPES OF BEHAVIOR

Pair ^a	Number	Desirable characteristics	Undesirable characteristics	Rank of 18 (Table 3, col 5)	Mean score	Diff in mean score
1	15	In hand-to-hand combat, can you count on KATUSA's to hold their ground better, about as well, or less well than Americans?	—	18	2.18	
	21 R15	—	Are KATUSA's more likely to break under mass attack than Americans, about as likely, or less likely to break?	8	2.58	.40
2	16	Are KATUSA's more aggressive in attack than Americans, about as aggressive, or less aggressive?	—	15	2.33	
	23 R16	—	Comparing KATUSA's and Americans, would you say that KATUSA's are more reluctant to engage the enemy, less reluctant to engage the enemy, or about the same as Americans in this respect?	1	3.25	.92
3	14	Do KATUSA's season to combat and acquire combat skills more readily, less readily, or about as readily as American soldiers?	—	11	2.45	
	20 R14	—	Do KATUSA's tend to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat more, less, or about as much as Americans?	2	3.20	.75

^aThe difference between each pair of questions is statistically significant at the 0.001 level. It should be noted, however, that reversing the sequence of responses may account for some of the differences, and the fact that all the three questions covering undesirable characteristics ("R" questions) had higher scores than the other three questions appears to point up this possibility.

The opportunities that the respondents had to observe the performance of KATUSA with respect to the activities covered in questions 15 and 21 R15 hardly justify the opinions they expressed. During the period in which most of the respondents had been in Korea there was relatively little mass attack by the enemy on American units and relatively little fierce hand-to-hand combat. However, severe enemy attacks had occurred in the center of the front in June and July 1953 where the line was held by ROK divisions. These Korean divisions, hit by enemy forces that were vastly superior numerically, had given way, and in some cases their retreat became a rout.

No judgment is implied here as to whether the retreat was or was not justified; the fact of the marked retreat is simply noted as probably the respondents' chief immediate source of opinion about the behavior of Koreans under mass attack and in hand-to-hand combat. This source was probably coupled with a carried-over reputation of the overwhelmed Korean units in the early stages of the war, when the ROK Army crumbled under the North Korean onslaught.

In addition to this, in the early days of the integration program, during which the KATUSA were most subject to mass attacks, the KATUSA were inadequately trained, understood little English, and were present in such large numbers that control over them was difficult. During this period one of the chief complaints about KATUSA was that they had a tendency to abandon their positions under mass attack. This is probably also reflected in the scores received on these questions.

Hand-to-hand combat ranked the lowest in this group as well as in all the military-performance characteristics measured. However, in view of the extenuating circumstances described above and the high scores KATUSA attained on the other factors in this group, it can be said that over-all they demonstrated satisfactory discipline, and above-average physical stamina. It is reasonable to assume that had they received the type and amount of training given American soldiers they would have shown up much better in these activities.

The foregoing analyses are based on the opinions of both officers and enlisted men who responded. A comparison of the opinions of these two groups reveals such significant differences as to warrant their careful examination before drawing together the conclusions about KATUSA performance in all three categories studied.

Officers' Ratings Compared with Those of Enlisted Men

Of the 4545 US troops in the sample, 168 were officers. Their ratings of KATUSA deserve special attention, since one of the duties of officers is to assess the abilities of the men under their command. In addition these officer ratings can be considered to be more objective than those of enlisted men since they were comparing two groups of which they were not a part. The enlisted men, on the other hand, were comparing KATUSA to themselves. Thus, any bias in the enlisted men's ratings resulting from this relation should not show up in the officer ratings. A comparison and ranking of the mean scores of officers' and enlisted men's rating of KATUSA, and the results of the tests of significance of the differences, appear in Table 6, revealing striking facts discussed in the following paragraphs.

Officers Consistently Rated KATUSA Higher than Enlisted Men. Perhaps the most important point to emerge from Table 6 was that for 15 of the 18 questions officers rated KATUSA higher than enlisted men. On two of the three remaining questions they rated them the same as enlisted men, and on the only one for which enlisted men's ratings were higher than officers, the difference was not statistically significant.* In many cases the officers' ratings were also significantly higher than those of the enlisted men. Obviously, if it were not for the

*This apparent exception to the rule may be due to the facts that this question was one of the three that covered an undesirable characteristic and that enlisted men were probably more affected by the reversed phraseology than officers, thus shifting their ratings of KATUSA relatively higher on these questions. The difference of the means between officers' and enlisted men's ratings on all three of these questions was negligible, being 0 on one of them and 0.1 on the other two.

Table 6

COMPARISON AND RANKING OF THE MEAN SCORES OF OFFICERS'
AND ENLISTED MEN'S RATINGS OF KATUSA PERFORMANCE

Question no.	Characteristic	Officers		Enlisted men		Diff in mean score
		Mean score	Rank order by mean score	Mean score	Rank order by mean score	
Ratings with Statistically Significant Differences ^a						
13	Maintenance of weapons	3.7	1.5	3.0	3	0.7
31	Physical stamina	3.7	1.5	2.8	4.5	0.9
29	Patrolling and scouting	3.3	3.5	2.8	4.5	0.5
20 R14	Resistance to tendency to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat	3.3	3.5	3.2	1.5	0.1
27	Hanging on to weapons and equipment in a withdrawal	3.2	5	2.7	6.5	0.5
22	Carrying out orders to the letter	3.0	7	2.4	12	0.6
26	Ability as bayonet fighters	2.8	8.5	2.4	12	0.4
14	Seasoning to combat and the acquiring of combat skills	2.7	10	2.4	12	0.3
16	Aggressiveness in attack	2.6	12	2.4	12	0.2
33	Over-all effectiveness in combat	2.4	16.5	2.3	15.5	0.1
Ratings with Statistically Insignificant Differences						
23 R16	Lack of reluctance to engage the enemy	3.1	6	3.2	1.5	-0.1
18	Likelihood of success in dangerous mission by units containing KATUSA	2.8	8.5	2.7	6.5	0.1
21 R15	Resistance to tendency to break under mass attack	2.6	12	2.6	8	0.0
24	Use of weapons and ammunition	2.6	12	2.5	9	0.1
12	Performance as fighters	2.5	14	2.3	15.5	0.2 ^b
25	Rifle marksmanship	2.4	16.5	2.4	12	0.0
17	Good judgment and common sense in tough spots	2.4	16.5	2.2	17.5	0.2 ^b
15	Hold ground in hand-to-hand combat	2.4	16.5	2.2	17.5	0.2 ^b

^aAlthough the mean scores are reported here, the measure of statistical significance was based on the differences between the proportions of the various ratings, rather than the differences between the means, as the former test was considered more conservative. On all questions except 27 (which is significant at the 0.02 level) the differences are significant at the 0.01 level.

^bAlthough the differences between means here were greater than two of these in the statistically significant group, these three items are in the nonstatistically significant group because the test was based on proportions of the individual five ratings. For these three items, enough enlisted men rated the KATUSA in the lowest category ("Much worse than Americans") to bring the mean down, but the proportions checking the other four categories were not enough smaller than the proportions of officers checking these categories to make the over-all difference in proportions between the categories large enough to be statistically significant.

small proportion of officers in the total sample, the ratings of all the troops also would have been higher.

This is an important factor in the evaluation of KATUSA military performance because of the greater objectivity that can be expected from officers' ratings. Two reasons for expecting less biased results from officers have already been mentioned, i.e., the facts that their duties require them to make frequent and objective judgments of their men, and that, being outside the situation, officers were less "ego involved" in questions comparing enlisted men to KATUSA. In addition, since their training specifically cautions them against bias and prejudice in making such judgments, their measurements should be less distorted.

With all these factors to improve their qualification to judge, less negative bias could be expected in the officer ratings compared to those of enlisted men. This is borne out by the comparison in Table 6 indicating that officers consistently rated KATUSA higher than enlisted men. This also provides important additional evidence that the possible biases discussed in explaining the combined ratings of officers and enlisted men may not be unreasonable. Thus, if the mean scores for the entire sample were adjusted upward to reflect this bias, an even higher caliber of military performance of KATUSA would emerge from the opinions of the respondent troops than the raw data suggest.

The Ranking of the Mean Scores of the Ratings of the Officers and the Enlisted Men Was Similar. Although the officers rated KATUSA higher than enlisted men, they tended to rank them high on those items on which enlisted men rated them high, and low on those items on which enlisted men rated them low. The same characteristics were ranked among the first six by both officers and enlisted men, and the last six likewise were similarly ranked. Apparently, officers and enlisted men agreed on KATUSA strong and weak points. Thus the general profile of KATUSA military performance that emerged from the analysis of the total sample was substantially borne out by the more detailed examination of the officer ratings.

The Absolute Ratings by Officers Were Favorable. By officer standards, KATUSA fell below the median category for only 4 of the 18 characteristics measured. On all four of these questions they scored 2.4, just a shade under being in the group that may be considered "about the same as Americans." This is an impressive proportion of the items, considering that the rating "about the same as Americans" must really be regarded as a favorable rating. As a matter of fact, in 7 out of 18 factors KATUSA scored 3 or better, indicating that officers thought them as good as or even somewhat better than Americans in such military traits as maintenance of weapons, physical stamina, and patrolling and scouting. In the first two traits, nearly two-thirds of the officers or over 50 percent said flatly that KATUSA were superior to Americans. Thus, in terms of the response statements themselves, officers rated KATUSA quite favorably in absolute terms.

Table 7 compares the officers' and enlisted men's attitudes toward the use of KATUSA at the extreme levels of unit understrength. In spite of the fact that officers generally expressed a higher opinion of KATUSA ability than enlisted men, Table 7, A, indicated officers were not more ready than enlisted men to sanction the use of KATUSA when American replacements were available.* However,

*The differences between officers' and enlisted men's judgments were not statistically significant on this point.

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if American replacements were not available—when the choice was not between KATUSA and Americans but between KATUSA or nothing—officers indicated significantly greater acceptability of KATUSA than enlisted men. (See Table 7, B.)

If KATUSA were able to speak English, officers confirmed their higher opinion of them by indicating an equal or greater willingness to use KATUSA than the enlisted men, regardless of whether or not American replacements were available (see questions 38 and 39, Table 7). The officers corroborated this view by their strong emphasis of the "language problem."

Table 7

COMPARISON OF OFFICERS' AND ENLISTED MEN'S ATTITUDES
TOWARD USE OF KATUSA

A. If American replacements were available KATUSA should be used:

Extent of use	Without reference, in the question, to whether or not they speak English (question 36)		If KATUSA speak English (question 38)	
	Officers, % (N = 152)	Enlisted men, % (N = 3828)	Officers, % (N = 145)	Enlisted men, % (N = 3606)
Regularly	26	33	39	39
Not at all	28	21	6	13

B. If no American replacements were available KATUSA should be used:

Level of strength	Without reference, in the question, to whether or not they speak English (question 37)		If KATUSA speak English (question 39)	
	Officers, % (N = 150)	Enlisted men, % (N = 3645)	Officers, % (N = 140)	Enlisted men, % (N = 3422)
If the unit were full strength	48	41	57	44
Never	5	11	1	8

American officers confirmed their favorable opinions of KATUSA when asked whether there were any KATUSA in their units who were good enough to be NCOs in the US Army.* In response to question 51, "Are there any KATUSA's in your unit who are good enough soldiers and who know enough English to be NCOs in the US Army?" 50 percent of the officers said yes, 17 percent didn't

*Questions 50, 51, and 52 on the use of KATUSA as NCOs in the US Army are hypothetical. The questions are not intended to suggest that foreign nationals be used as NCOs to command US soldiers. It should be noted, however, that in connection with these questions responses were sought regarding "any KATUSA's" in contrast to the other questions that sought data covering *all* KATUSA the respondents knew. Therefore the results do not indicate the proportion of KATUSA who were good enough to be NCOs but rather that among KATUSA known to the officers there were one or more of NCO caliber.

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know, and the balance said no.* However, for question 50, based on the assumption KATUSA did know enough English, 75 percent of the officers said there were good enough KATUSA in their units to be NCOs in the US Army, and the balance were divided among the "no's" and "don't know's."*

Summary and Conclusions

The picture of KATUSA military performance in the last year of the war that emerges from US troops' opinions, and their evaluations herein, is that of a fairly good soldier, not particularly aggressive but willing to fight when the fighting occurs. Certainly the opinions expressed do not describe an inspired soldier of the type one thinks of in connection with certain traditional "elite" troops. It is safe to assume, however, that KATUSA will do what they are told, take meticulous care of their weapons and equipment, and above all withstand physical hardships without collapsing and normal psychological stresses without going to pieces. Over half the officers felt that there were KATUSA in their units who were good enough to be NCOs in the US Army.

The question of integrating foreign nationals into US Army units overseas may involve human relations problems of considerable magnitude. In the previously cited HumRRO study,¹⁷ it was suggested that "the most efficient operations of a rifle squad required harmonious integration of all people making up the unit." In units composed entirely of Americans, it is normally expected that its members will eventually learn to get along with each other so as to permit the development of an effective unit. However, when two groups that are entirely strange to each other, and whose communications are hampered by language difficulties, are concerned, human relations can be a critical problem. This subject is discussed in the next two sections.

*The results of the responses of all US troops to these questions, reported in Table A1, are considerably lower because the enlisted men, who represent such a larger proportion of the total sample did not have as high a regard of the NCO caliber of KATUSA as did the officers. However, since this question is essentially within the scope of officer decisions, their opinions would appear to be more significant. The attitudes of US soldiers toward serving under KATUSA NCOs is discussed in the next section.



ATTITUDES OF US TROOPS TOWARD KATUSA

An analysis of the human relations aspects of integrating foreign nationals into US Army units should weigh the views of both those being integrated and the US troops. For, if either group is incompatible it would adversely affect morale and lower the effectiveness of the entire unit. Data on attitudes of KATUSA toward their integration into US units are based on the questionnaire administered to KATUSA who had been rotated back to ROKA (i.e., ex-KATUSA). They will be considered in the following section. The American attitudes examined in this section have been determined through an analysis of responses to ten questions included in the questionnaire on the use of KATUSA.

First, the over-all attitude of US troops toward KATUSA and the effect of their presence on morale were studied through responses to two questions specifically about these subjects. Second, other questions approached this problem less directly by requesting information on whether and how KATUSA should be used under varying levels of unit strength. Third, three questions were asked about such factors as teamwork and cleanliness, giving an insight into the feelings of US troops toward KATUSA on more detailed human relations issues.*

Over-All Attitudes toward KATUSA

One way of finding out the over-all attitudes of US troops toward KATUSA was to ask the simple and direct question, "How do you like serving with KATUSA's?" (59). Thirty-four percent of the respondents indicated that they did not mind too much but that they would rather serve with Americans, and only 11 percent flatly stated they did not like serving with KATUSA (bar B, Fig. 4). On the other hand, as revealed in bar A, Fig. 4, 55 percent of those responding did not mind serving with KATUSA. These responses seemed to indicate that, although some Americans did not manifest strong enthusiasm about having KATUSA in their units, more seemed perfectly willing to serve with them and that apparently most of them had no excessive misgivings about the presence of KATUSA in their units.

If KATUSA were actually felt to be considerably more trouble than they were worth, if they were regarded as endangering the safety of the unit or as being personally unacceptable as comrades in arms, the resultant discontent among American personnel might be expected to reveal itself in less favorable unit morale. On the basis of opinions about KATUSA military performance reported in the previous section it might be anticipated that the respondents would feel that the presence of KATUSA did not lower the unit's morale to any great extent.

*In discussing human relations it should be borne in mind that, in contrast to the analysis in the previous section, attitudinal biases that might serve to explain opinions expressed are not the subject of interest. On the other hand, in this and the next sections, attitudes are precisely the subject of interest. (The "question bias," however, previously mentioned and discussed in App D should be taken into account in the section on human relations.)



The responses to question 19 (bars C and D, Fig. 4) indicated that this was the case. Over 65 percent of the US troops stated that morale of outfits with KATUSA was the same as or higher than units without them (bar C). This, along with the fact that only 55 percent of the respondents "didn't mind" serving with KATUSA suggests that the attitudes of those who "did mind" were based on personal reactions to KATUSA rather than on their military performance. In any event it is noteworthy that such a high number of the respondents felt as they did about unit morale since KATUSA—the strangers in the unit—are the most likely targets for any of its shortcomings.* It may be worth noting that the same percentage of respondents (11 percent) felt "morale was lower with KATUSA in the unit" as those who said they "didn't like serving with them" at all.




Fig. 4—US Troops' Over-All Attitude toward Serving with KATUSA and Its Effects on Morale

Indirect Measures of Over-All Attitudes toward KATUSA

Although less direct, perhaps an even more crucial index of the attitudes of Americans toward KATUSA is their views about the level of unit strength at which KATUSA should be used and their feelings about serving under KATUSA NCOs.† A soldier who did not sanction the use of KATUSA even when his unit was seriously understrength and facing enemy attack, and when no other replacements might be available, might feel strongly opposed to KATUSA as soldiers. In contrast he might manifest a high degree of acceptance of KATUSA both as soldiers and in personal relations if he indicated his willingness to serve under a KATUSA NCO or felt they should be used even when American replacements were available.

*Based on the same weighting method used in scoring the previous questions the one on morale has a mean score of 2.77 and the one on "like serving with KATUSA" had a mean of 2.80. These scores are both within the median category. The mean of the officers' responses to the latter question, however, was 3.13.

†This is a hypothetical question intended to describe a situation that represents an extreme test of the US troops' confidence in and acceptance of KATUSA. It is in no way intended that Americans should serve under KATUSA or NCOs of other local nationals. These findings were similar to those found in the study of "The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army," ORO-R-11.¹⁴

The preceding analyses of responses to questions on attitudes and combat performance of KATUSA is a meaningful indicator of the relations between them and American soldiers from the latter's viewpoint. However, in view of opinions about NCOs held by many US soldiers, their attitudes toward serving under a KATUSA NCO could be considered a more extreme test of their feelings about KATUSA and the level of their confidence in them (see Table 8).

Table 8

ATTITUDES OF US TROOPS TOWARD IDEA OF SERVING
UNDER A KATUSA^a

(Question 52. If a KATUSA were a good enough soldier and knew enough English to be an NCO in the US Army, how would you feel about serving under him?)

Responses	Percent (N=3846)
I would not like it at all	40
It wouldn't bother me too much, but I would rather serve under an American	41
It wouldn't make any difference to me one way or the other	19

^aAlso see questions 50 and 51, Table A1.

By ascribing to KATUSA the requisite skills to be an NCO, as question 52 does, the question suggests the real attitude of Americans toward accepting KATUSA as equals and even as superiors. It also reflects the true degree of acceptability of Koreans as full members of US Army units, rather than only as basic soldiers which they always were. It is surprising to find that 60 percent indicated that they would either be completely willing or would not object to serving under KATUSA, and only 40 percent of the respondents said that they definitely would not like to serve under KATUSA. By this test, acceptance of KATUSA—as foreign nationals in US units—appeared quite general among enlisted men.

Attitudes toward Personal Characteristics of KATUSA

A further method for gaining insight about the likelihood that two groups would get along together is to find out their attitudes toward each other's personal characteristics. If one of the groups has a strong disposition about cleanliness, intelligence levels, or spirit of cooperativeness and the other demonstrates a lack of concern or a marked difference regarding these traits, the groups may find it difficult to adjust to each other and to get along. The results of the questions eliciting attitudes of US troops toward these characteristics of KATUSA were weighted in the same manner as those in the preceding section and are reported in Fig. 5.

Since many Americans who fought in Korea did not consider it a particularly clean country, it may seem surprising that 60 percent of those responding

rated KATUSA's personal cleanliness about the same as or better than Americans'. The impression of the dirtiness of Korea resulted from inadequate sewage and sanitary facilities, the lack of facilities for washing and cleaning, and dusty roads. Also the retentive and strong odor of Kimche, the principal food, which was so highly objectionable to most Americans, must have affected the Americans' concept of cleanliness of Koreans. Personal cleanliness, however,





Fig. 5—KATUSA Personal Characteristics in Comparison with US Troops



is well regarded in the Korean system of values, and they conformed to this standard. Typically they bathe daily in the local streams without benefit of soap. With the facilities of the US Army standard and the soap provided them by their American fellow soldiers, they were better able to maintain their standards of cleanliness.

Americans were divided almost 50-50 on the question of whether KATUSA were poorer or better than Americans at jobs requiring teamwork (question 28). As in the case of the question on personal cleanliness the mean score of this question is in the median category. Thus it can be said that in these two specific bases for estimating the attitudes of Americans toward KATUSA the respondent US troops generally considered KATUSA about the same as Americans.

The US troops were asked: "Considering differences in schooling, do you think KATUSA's more intelligent, less intelligent, or about as intelligent as Americans?" (question 30). This question had been included in the questionnaire with the hope that responses might throw light on possible attitudinal bias of respondents toward foreign nationals serving in their units. It was postulated that innate intelligence is similar among different civilized national groups, even though such groups may differ widely in their culture, traditions, education, and knowledge. Thus any deviation from the response, "same as Americans," could be regarded as an indication of bias. Almost 60 percent of those responding indicated that they felt KATUSA were less intelligent than Americans.

Hence, it is conceivable that this rating is a general expression of the Americans' feelings of superiority to KATUSA. The Americans may have found

it difficult to separate their higher level of schooling from the question of (innate) intelligence.

In any event, the mean score on this question (2.26) placed the composite rating in the "inferior" category. The deviation of -0.74 from the theoretical mean of 3.0 could be considered as a measure of the degree of bias on this question. Although it would be unsafe to generalize this deviation as a general measure of bias of respondents, it is worth noting that it indicates the presence of a considerable negative bias and that allowance should be made for this sort of bias in interpreting responses to other questions in the study. (See App D.)

Regardless of the accuracy of respondents' views on this subject, it is an important point since this section is concerned with attitudes toward KATUSA and their effects on the program. These attitudes may help to explain the general tendency to rate KATUSA lower than Americans. See the discussion in the section "KATUSA Military Performance" concerning the role of language difficulty on the attitudes about KATUSA common sense.

Summary and Conclusions

This analysis of the human relations aspects of the KATUSA program reveals that a large majority of the US troops accepted KATUSA and felt favorably toward them. Approximately 10 percent of the Americans, however, indicated that they considered relations with KATUSA entirely unsatisfactory: they didn't like to serve with them, felt their presence adversely affected morale of the units, and stated that they should not be used under any circumstances.*

Although only a small percentage of the US troops' attitudes indicated that relations with KATUSA were unsatisfactory, this condition could be a serious threat to the success of any integration program. For, a high esprit de corps, on which competent military performance rests, goes hand in hand with good human relations. Despite these attitudes and the low estimate that a large number of Americans had about the KATUSA intelligence level, twice as many Americans felt morale was about the same as or better with KATUSA than those who felt it was worse with them.

*It should be remembered that these results represent merely attitudes of respondent US troops and are not meant, nor should they be construed, to be factual data about KATUSA.

[REDACTED]

ATTITUDES OF KATUSA TOWARD BEING INTEGRATED WITH US TROOPS

The study of KATUSA attitudes toward being integrated with US troops is based on 27 questions orally administered to 635 ex-KATUSA.* Questions on how this program affected the morale of KATUSA and that of their compatriots after KATUSA returned to their own army are also included in this section. This point, which is important in an integration program, will be discussed along with the effect of the program on KATUSA sentiments toward Americans in general. This will follow an analysis of the ex-KATUSA attitudes toward (a) their living conditions while in the US Army, (b) personal treatment of them by American soldiers, and (c) their morale in general while with US troops.

Ex-KATUSA Attitudes toward Living Conditions in the US Army

Since the clothing and equipment that KATUSA received in the US Army were substantially the same as that given to US troops, it is not surprising that ex-KATUSA rated these material conditions in the US Army very high as compared with those in the ROKA (see question 13, Table 9). For example: Replacement of worn-out clothing was more liberal in US than in ROKA units. Also in the ROKA soldiers were issued shoes made of canvas (tennis shoes), whereas US regulation leather field boots were issued KATUSA in the US units. Similarly, the extremely stern and often brutal disciplinary methods of the ROKA make it understandable why KATUSA felt more favorable toward US discipline (question 16).

In view of their strong preference for Kimche it is interesting to note that over 90 percent of the respondents stated they liked the US food as well as that they received in the ROKA (question 12). It is also interesting to note that over 90 percent said they had as good a time in their off-duty hours while in the US Army (question 14), and were worse off financially in the ROKA (question 15) even though the pay scale of Koreans in the US Army was the same as in the ROKA.

It would seem that if the ROKA possessed any advantages over the US Army in the eyes of ex-KATUSA, they would have been the companionship of fellow nations, military and civilian, in off-duty activities and participation in the welfare funds of ROKA units. From the results of the responses to these questions it is evident that American cigarettes, beer, and movies counterbalanced the

* Professor Hay Nam Lee administered the questionnaire in Korean. It was done orally owing to the low level of Korean literacy. Because of the respect and esteem in which teachers are held in the Korean culture, bordering almost on reverence in many cases, the responses thus elicited are considered to be relatively free of distortion and untruth.

off-duty recreational activities in the ROKA, and the availability of PX-priced goods and the generosity of US personnel more than compensated for nonparticipation in ROKA welfare funds while serving as KATUSA. It is also apparent that they were willing and able to adjust to US food. The ROKA rations were more limited in quantity (barely adequate in calories), and lacked variety compared with US rations. Generally, it took Koreans about 2 weeks to get adjusted.

Table 9

EX-KATUSA ATTITUDES TOWARD LIVING CONDITIONS
IN THE US ARMY

Question no.	Question	Responses (%) indicating most favorable in: (N=635)		
		US Army	ROKA	No answer
13	Do you have poorer clothing and equipment in the ROKA than in the US Army?	98	0	2
16	Which is better for Koreans: The kind of discipline used in the US Army, or that used in ROKA?	95	3	2
15	Are you worse off financially in the ROKA than you were in the US Army?	93	1	6
14	Did you have as good a time in your off-duty hours in the US Army as in the ROKA?	92	2	6
12	Do you like the food as well in the ROKA as in the US Army?	91	4	5
18	Do you get more dirty details in the ROKA than in the US Army?	78	18	4

These highly favorable attitudes of ex-KATUSA toward specific living conditions in the US Army were borne out by their responses to a question about their general "living conditions" while integrated (question 11). Ninety-eight percent said that "living conditions" in the ROKA were not so good as in the US Army.

The final question (18), in Table 9, when viewed along with a question on this subject administered to the US troops (58), reveals that, although 10 percent of the US troops felt that there was a tendency for KATUSA in their units "to get more dirty details than Americans," 78 percent of the KATUSA indicated that they got more dirty details in the ROKA than in the US Army. It is probably true that KATUSA were assigned fewer details than Americans considered "dirty." This may be a result of US commanders' efforts to comply with the orders instructing them not to use KATUSA as common laborers, and the possibility that for some details they may have felt more confident in US soldiers.

In addition it would be reasonable to expect that KATUSA and Americans had different standards as to what constitutes dirty details. In this connection their integration made possible a division of duties that each group preferred.

For example, although Americans generally did not relish cleaning their weapons, KATUSA did not object to this chore and performed it very well. American soldiers were resourceful in taking advantage of these differences in standards by making arrangements with KATUSA that were mutually satisfactory. This being the case it can be seen why the previously discussed economic and social differences between two groups involved in integration can affect the outcome of such a program. Though the differences appear to have had a favorable result in this case, it is clear that they could just as readily have had an extremely adverse effect.

Table 10

EX-KATUSA ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONAL TREATMENT OF THEM
BY THE AMERICAN TROOPS

Question no.	Question	Responses, % (N = 635)		
		No	Yes	No answer
6	Were the American soldiers intolerant of your habits, customs, ways of doing things?	95	3	2
4	Did the American soldiers treat you like an inferior man?	94	2	4
5	Did the American soldiers often ridicule you, make you lose face?	83	10	7
7	Did they get angry when you couldn't understand what they said or meant?	83	13	4
3	Did the American soldiers often criticize you unfairly?	78	14	8

Ex-KATUSA Attitudes toward Personal Treatment of Them by American Troops

Despite the diversity of the backgrounds of the two groups, KATUSA regarded their treatment by Americans as friendly, just, and fair (see Table 10).

The favorable attitudes of ex-KATUSA toward treatment of them by Americans is borne out by their responses to the general question: "Were the American soldiers you served with friendly toward you?" to which 97 percent said "yes" (question 1). To demonstrate further the rapport that developed between these two groups, although initially they knew so little about each other, 83 percent of the ex-KATUSA respondents indicated that in less than 3 months they had been fully accepted into their US Army units (question 2). It is interesting to note that, in response to question 57 administered to the US troops on how they felt KATUSA were treated, over 90 percent of the Americans who knew enough KATUSA to say said KATUSA were treated fairly. Compared to question 3 (Table 10) it is apparent that KATUSA were treated fairly. KATUSA and Americans seemed agreed on this point.

Over-All Attitude of KATUSA toward Integration

The over-all attitude of KATUSA toward integration in the US Army was elicited by asking: "Altogether, everything considered, were you happier when

...serving in the US Army than you are in the ROKA?" (question 21). The responses to this question (98 percent yes, 1 percent no, 1 percent no answer) clearly indicated that in comparison with service in the ROKA conditions in the US Army were conducive to high morale among integrated personnel. In support of this view only a negligible number (less than 0.5 of 1 percent) of ex-KATUSA felt that "Most Koreans now serving in the US Army want to be transferred to the ROKA" (question 23). Ninety-six percent said most Koreans would prefer remaining in the US Army (and the balance did not answer).

Table 11

EX-KATUSA CONFIDENCE IN ROKA TROOPS
AND PRIDE IN SERVING IN ROKA

Question no.	Question	Responses, % (N = 635)		
		Yes	No	No answer
26	Are you as proud serving in the ROKA as you were in the US Army?	44	48	8
19	Do you have as much confidence in your ROKA officers as your American officers?	44	52	4
20	Do you have as much confidence in ROKA enlisted men as you did in American enlisted men?	44	58	1

The over-all attitude of ex-KATUSA toward integration is consistent with their view about living conditions in the US Army and personal treatment by US troops. These results leave little doubt that, from the ex-KATUSA point of view, good human relations existed among the integrated troops while in the US Army. The answers to further questions on ex-KATUSA confidence in American troops and pride in serving in the US Army did not reveal such overwhelmingly favorable attitudes. They do indicate, however, that fewer ex-KATUSA have as much confidence in their ROKA officers and enlisted men as in their former American counterparts, and fewer are as proud of serving in ROKA as they were in the US Army (see Table 11). These views also support the over-all attitudes KATUSA had about being integrated with the US troops.

Ex-KATUSA Reactions to Rotation to ROKA

Over 80 percent of the KATUSA respondents said yes when asked: "Do you want to go back to the US Army?" (question 25), and 79 percent said yes to the question "Did you want to stay in the US Army rather than be transferred to the ROKA?" (question 22). These responses coupled with the over-all attitudes of ex-KATUSA, discussed above, might portend possible low ROKA morale in terms of dissatisfaction of ex-KATUSA on return to their ROKA units, although this proved not to be the case.

Possible seeds of dissatisfaction are more likely to be indicated in the responses to question 27, "Was it hard for you to come back to ROKA after serving with the US Army?" (57 percent yes, 36 percent no, 7 percent no answer),

and question 17, "Are the methods of enforcement of rules in ROKA harder on ex-KATUSA than on soldiers who have never been in the US Army?" (35 percent yes, 55 percent no, 10 percent no answer).

Actually there was widespread belief among Americans in Korea that KATUSA would suffer a morale shock when rotated to the ROKA because they were separated from the material advantages they enjoyed in the US Army. In response to a question on this subject in the American questionnaire, over 50 percent of the US troops who indicated that they knew how KATUSA felt, said that most Koreans "would mind being transferred to ROKA as replacements in established units."*

Undoubtedly the American rationale for this view was based on the less advantageous material conditions that any local national army in an underdeveloped area of the world afforded its troops. This possibility was recognized by General Ryan, former chief of KMAG, who wrote: "It is understood, though not confirmed, that KATUSA personnel previously returned to ROKA control were dissatisfied with their transfer from UN units and created a large morale problem in the ROKA units to which assigned . . . This is believed to be caused by the change in living standards upon return to ROKA."¹¹

Confirmation for this conclusion was evident in every aspect of integration discussed thus far. However, despite the extremely high proportions of KATUSA that responded so favorably to integration with US troops over two-thirds of them indicated that they were not angry "at being transferred out of the US Army" (question 24). Apparently KATUSA were ready to accept the fact of their transfer without resentment.†

This contradiction between the logic of the circumstances and the actual attitudes expressed underscores one of the findings of this study. Important differences in people exist, and any group being integrated into the US Army should not be expected to conform or measure up to the standards of US troops. Study of the nature and culture of prospective integratees offers an opportunity to anticipate the adjustments called for by their differences, prior to integration. Knowledge of the characteristics of the US troops by those being integrated would also be desirable.

Korean Sentiments toward Americans as a Result of Integration

The study "Korea, 1950" by the Office of the Chief of Military History indicates the extent of Soviet propaganda during the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities.⁸ Needless to say their campaign attempted to develop a very unfavorable picture of Americans.

Despite the Communist propaganda reaching South Korea, 96 percent of the ex-KATUSA said that they "like Americans better than other [South] Koreans do" (question 8). The respondents were also asked whether they had kept in touch with the Americans they had served with and 30 percent answered "yes." Considering the obvious barriers to communication between ex-KATUSA and

*Thirty-nine percent of the respondents who felt they knew how KATUSA felt said KATUSA would mind being transferred "as cadre for new units."

†In discussions with the respondents about the meaning of their responses this conclusion was borne out. They said that although they were certainly happier in the US Army, they knew all the time that they would eventually be transferred to the ROKA and that they were prepared realistically to accept the transfer. In addition, they stated that the ROKA was their army and that they felt that it was up to them to serve it when called.

GIs after they were separated, a 30 percent figure suggests fairly strong ties of friendship.

The extent to which KATUSA association with the Americans tended to improve relations between them is also indicated by the results of a question asked of the American troops about the tendency of the KATUSA to keep to themselves. Of the respondents who felt they knew enough KATUSA to say, almost 50 percent said that for the most part KATUSA mixed with Americans in their units and "did not tend to keep to themselves" (question 56). The strength of these friendships and the success of KATUSA integration is further borne out by the responses of both Americans and the ex-KATUSA on the subject of how Koreans serving in the US Army could best be used. Ninety-one percent of the responding ex-KATUSA stated that they should be mixed with Americans in squads rather than organized in separate squads (question 10), and 72 percent of the Americans had a similar view on this point (question 40).

Summary and Conclusions

This study of ex-KATUSA attitudes toward their integration in the US Army revealed that they felt overwhelmingly that their living conditions were better than in the ROKA, that they were treated particularly well by Americans, and that, over-all, the conditions of integrated service were conducive to high morale. These results coupled with the US troops' opinions of KATUSA military performance and their attitudes toward the presence of them in their units clearly suggest that the experience of integrating Koreans in the US Army met with success in the last year of the war. Indeed, KATUSA were so strongly in favor of their service in the US Army that continued service was often considered a reward for outstanding performance, and an incentive for those who were not meeting standards to measure up or be returned.

LESSONS LEARNED

Although some reports about the KATUSA program in the early days of the war were strongly negative, the preceding analyses of the opinions of KATUSA military performance and of the attitudes of the two groups toward each other indicate that the integration of ROKA soldiers with US troops was successful, despite major obstacles posed by differences between the two groups in language, attitudes, and physical abilities. It would seem that if integration worked under these cross-cultural circumstances in Korea, future programs of this type may also work in other countries.

LIMITATIONS OF EXPERIENCE WITH KATUSA

However, it may be assumed that the military performance of all nationals varies, in part because of differences resulting from their dissimilar backgrounds and environment (social, economic, and political). Such differences distinguish one national group from another. Consequently the success or failure of integrating Koreans cannot be the sole basis for predicting the outcome of similar programs with other national groups.

In addition the KATUSA program was organized after the ROKA had been defeated and the US Army in Korea was critically understrength. It represented an effort to help the South Koreans save their country from invading forces when there was little other hope. Since it is to be hoped that conditions of this kind can be avoided in the future, integration programs might not have the cohesiveness effected by the urgency of the Korean situation. This further serves to limit the transferability of the results in Korea to other areas.

These limitations notwithstanding, the lessons learned in Korea serve as an excellent basis for evaluating the feasibility of KATUSA-like programs in other countries. Those considering future programs can gain considerable insight from the Korean experience into many of the problems that can be expected when integrating foreign nationals into US Army units. The differences between KATUSA and American soldiers, as they affected the outcome of the program, are applicable only to Koreans and the situation in Korea. Nevertheless with the lessons learned from the KATUSA experience, MAAG advisors, attachés, and others who may be well acquainted with the pertinent characteristics of other foreign nationals and local conditions should be able to judge the feasibility of such a program in countries with which they are or have been associated.

In this connection personnel with CAMG, MAP, MAAG, attaché, or similar experience or backgrounds might be requested to report recommendations on the feasibility of KATUSA-like programs for underdeveloped countries with which they may be familiar. Such reports could also include comments on personal and group characteristics of the peoples of these countries that bear on the logistic, training, and other military aspects of the problem.

POTENTIAL OF KATUSA-LIKE PROGRAMS

The possibilities of such programs should not be overlooked in view of the manpower potential in underdeveloped countries. This is particularly significant in the light of the US practice of maintaining relatively small peacetime armies. For, if the size of US peacetime forces has reflected the hope of preventing war rather than the expectation of conducting war, as history shows and current experience has borne out, then the existence of detailed plans for effective integration of foreign forces could tend to make the military posture of the anti-Communist countries strong enough to discourage aggression.

In addition the fact that KATUSA liked Americans better than other Koreans liked Americans suggests that integrating foreigners with US troops on this "grass-roots" basis improves their attitudes toward America. This is important in view of the effectiveness of Communist propaganda in misrepresenting the US, and the failure of some American "aid" programs as good-will builders. The supplementary value of such a program further suggests serious consideration for possible extension to other areas.

The balance of this section deals with various other lessons learned regarding the integration of ROK soldiers into the US Army. First, the data collected in the field on utilization practices, and problems judged to create major difficulties, are analyzed. Then a few of the many logistical, political, and other problems suggested by, though not directly related to, Korea and KATUSA are briefly discussed. Finally, the attitudes of the two groups toward each other and the opinions of military performance of KATUSA are reviewed in the light of their possible applicability to programs of this kind in other countries.

KATUSA UTILIZATION PRACTICES

When KATUSA were assigned to US units, questions arose concerning the number that should be used per squad and the jobs on which they should be used. Questions on these subjects were included in the questionnaire administered to the US troops who had experience with KATUSA.

It should be borne in mind, however, that answers to questions of this type are affected by the kind of experience those who responded had in these connections. Thus a respondent who was familiar with the practice of having two KATUSA assigned per squad and using them as riflemen had only this experience as a basis for his reply. If he had not seen KATUSA used in any other ways, he had no basis for judging whether other practices might also be satisfactory or preferred. Therefore responses to these questions were primarily indexes of the respondents' reactions to utilization practices with which they were familiar, i.e., those which were employed in their own units in the program in 1953.

Number of KATUSA per Squad

Table 12 shows that more than two-thirds of the respondents replied that a maximum of either two or three KATUSA should be assigned per squad. These responses correspond closely with the actual practice at the time. The number of KATUSA in squads in US units varied from squad to squad and from unit to unit; but in nearly two-thirds of the units sampled, all or most of the squads contained two or three KATUSA. The respondents therefore endorsed this practice as suitable and effective.

Table 12

LARGEST NUMBER OF KATUSA PER SQUAD
(Question 41. If KATUSA's are used in US squads, what should be the largest number in each nine-man squad?)

KATUSA per squad	Responses, %		
	Officers (N=151)	Enlisted men (N=3775)	Total (N=3926)
One	9	16	16
Two	44	44	44
Three	35	27	28
Four	9	8	8
Five	3	1	1
Six or more	0	4	3

It should be noted that these results do not necessarily mean that two or three KATUSA per squad is in fact the optimum number. Rather, these findings should be interpreted primarily as evidence that the respondents were satisfied with the prevailing practice. Nevertheless this finding does correspond with those in the Negro integration study.¹⁴

Jobs Performed by KATUSA

Respondents were given a short selected list of Army jobs and were asked to check those jobs they felt KATUSA could perform almost as efficiently as US personnel (question 34). Since respondents had little basis for judging the effectiveness of KATUSA performance in jobs that they had not seen KATUSA perform, the fact that they did not check certain jobs did not mean that they believed KATUSA could not do these jobs. Primarily, the results of the responses indicate whether or not the respondents were satisfied with the way in which KATUSA had performed the tasks for which they had been utilized.

Table 13 shows that the US troops interviewed did feel that KATUSA performed effectively the jobs that the respondents had seen them perform. In all branches reporting, KATUSA were considered to have performed well. Rifleman and ammunition bearer were the jobs in which the overwhelming majority were employed and they were generally considered to be satisfactory in these jobs. Respondents in branches other than infantry who had not seen KATUSA

performance on these jobs had heard reports that KATUSA performed these jobs satisfactorily.

Considering the lesser number of KATUSA who were used in jobs other than rifleman and ammunition bearer, the percentage of respondents who indicated other satisfactory utilization of KATUSA is particularly revealing. Several conclusions can be drawn from these data.

Table 13

JOBS THAT KATUSA ARE KNOWN OR INFERRED TO PERFORM
ALMOST AS EFFICIENTLY AS US PERSONNEL^a
(Question 34)

Job ^b	Responses, %				
	Infantry	Engineer	Artillery	Signal	Total
<u>Ammunition bearer</u>	60	41	41	48	57
<u>Rifleman</u>	51	45	30	38	48
BAR gunner	19	14	8	16	17
<u>Field artillery crew member</u>	11	16	49	19	16
<u>Combat engineer</u>	8	36	10	12	11
Heavy mortar gunner	11	10	8	13	11
Combat demolition man	8	12	7	12	9
<u>Signal wireman</u>	6	8	14	30	8
Motor mechanic	7	14	13	14	8
Ordnance repairman	6	7	4	10	6
Forward observer	5	11	6	10	6
Medical aidman	6	6	2	12	6
Radio repairman	4	7	3	8	5
Tank cannoneer	3	5	6	7	4
Respondents by class	78	7	9	6	100

^aOfficer responses were not singled out by branches because the samples of officers from branches other than infantry were too small to permit significant comparison.

Percentages add to more than 100 because most respondents checked more than one job.

^bItems underscored are considered to be especially significant.

First, in each branch (infantry, artillery, engineer, signal) a considerable proportion of respondents indicated KATUSA were satisfactory in their performance of certain jobs in their own branch. Thus, of those responding, KATUSA were ruled satisfactory: as artillery crew members by 49 percent of the artillery; as combat engineers by 36 percent of the engineers; and as signal wire men by 30 percent of the signalmen.

Second, KATUSA were used only in very limited numbers in jobs other than rifleman, artillery crew member, and ammunition bearer. Responses indicate that many KATUSA who were assigned to other jobs were judged satisfactory. However, relatively smaller percentages of US soldiers had an opportunity to observe KATUSA in these jobs. Data were not obtained on the number of KATUSA assigned to each of these various jobs in the different branches, but over-all distribution was concentrated in infantry units. It is possible, therefore, that, if larger numbers of KATUSA had been assigned to these other jobs, responses might have been higher.

Third, even in technical jobs KATUSA performed satisfactorily. For example, contrary to the widely held preconceived idea that Koreans—because of limited experience with technical equipment in their own culture—would be poor in technical jobs, the few KATUSA who were assigned as motor mechanics and ordnance and signal repairmen drew favorable comments.

Interview responses were more illuminating on the points discussed above. Many artillery officers and enlisted men were enthusiastic in their opinions of KATUSA as artillery men. The same was true in signal units, particularly with respect to wiremen. Repeated typical comments were: "Koreans are uncanny in their ability to locate and repair wire breaks."

The implication of these data is that Koreans (KATUSA) probably could have been used satisfactorily in a wider variety of jobs and in other branches than those to which they were assigned. There is ample reason to draw on local nationals for the combat branches primarily or in largest numbers, but the evidence is that they can be employed satisfactorily in other branches, if needed.

KATUSA as Buddies

One further practice utilized in the KATUSA program that might be of interest to those planning future programs was the use of the "buddy system." Those Americans who said they had served in a unit that used the buddy system (question 64) were asked if KATUSA should have American buddies or not. Sixty-three percent of those responding said KATUSA should have buddies, 14 percent said they shouldn't, and the balance held that it does not make any difference. Apparently a large majority of the US troops thought the buddy system was a good idea in the KATUSA program.

MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN INTEGRATED UNITS

The Americans' appraisal of difficulties that arose from the introduction of KATUSA into their units was ascertained through a list of 15 problems drawn up on the basis of preliminary interviews. They were instructed to check those problems, if any, that had created major difficulties in their units. From Table 14, which reports the results of the responses of officers, enlisted men, and the total sample, it is evident that language was the outstanding problem.

Problems Other than Language

It appears, and it is to be expected, that language was a real problem. As a matter of fact it was the only real problem. Only small proportions of the respondents considered that major difficulties were caused by any of the other problems. Furthermore the other problems most frequently mentioned corresponded closely to the items of military performance on which KATUSA were generally ranked lowest. This suggests that "poor" performance of KATUSA seldom was considered to produce major difficulties and lends corroboration to the previous conclusion that KATUSA were fairly good soldiers.

Language Problems

Officers checked the language problem twice as frequently as enlisted men and this was the only problem on which there were any significant differences between officers and enlisted men. This attitude corroborates the stronger

preferences of officers toward use of English-speaking KATUSA. Undoubtedly officers considered the language difficulty a more serious problem because their communication with soldiers consists primarily of commands and reports that have to be understood without delay or explanations.

The language problem is further analyzed by a study of the communication methods used and the degree of difficulty experienced by Americans in interchanging different kinds of ideas. Figure 6 shows the different methods used in communicating with KATUSA, the extent to which each was used, and the one that was used most.

Table 14

PROBLEMS JUDGED TO CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN US UNITS^a
(Question 35)

Problems	Responses, %		
	Officers	Enlisted men	Total
KATUSA's inability to speak English	79	45	46
KATUSA's inability to understand English	65	41	41
KATUSA's tendency to "bug out" under attack	12	20	19
Low intelligence of KATUSA	16	12	13
KATUSA's lack of pride in unit	5	11	11
Lack of initiative of KATUSA	16	9	10
Poor training of KATUSA	15	9	9
KATUSA's inexperience as soldiers	16	8	9
KATUSA's lack of mechanical know-how	17	9	9
Lack of discipline of KATUSA	4	9	9
KATUSA's lack of aggressiveness in offensive combat	7	8	8
Low morale of KATUSA	3	7	7
Lack of cleanliness of KATUSA	11	6	6
Poor health of KATUSA	8	3	4
Low physical stamina of KATUSA	5	0	0
Others (name them)	0	0	0

^aPercentages add to more than 100 because many respondents checked more than one problem. Notice that no entries were made in the category "others."

In spite of language difficulties 89 percent of respondents indicated that they spoke directly to KATUSA in English more or less frequently. Only 10 percent of the US troops indicated that they never spoke in English to KATUSA. Similar percentages indicated that they communicated through a KATUSA who spoke fairly good English. As question 43 revealed, methods of communicating that were most used by the respondents were (a) speaking directly to a KATUSA in English (40 percent), (b) speaking through a KATUSA who speaks fairly good English (26 percent), and (c) communicating directly to a KATUSA by means of gestures (26 percent).

Tables 15 and 16 show the difficulty Americans had in understanding most of the KATUSA in their units and how much difficulty they thought KATUSA had in understanding them.

These tables indicate first that there was no significant difference in the degree to which Americans understood KATUSA in the various types of communication, but it was felt that KATUSA understood simple routine and combat instructions more readily than ordinary English.

Second, they indicate that about one-third of the respondents experienced little or no difficulty in understanding KATUSA and making their instructions understood by KATUSA. The communication problem, though serious, appears to have been successfully overcome in a considerable number of instances. The language problem and methods of solution are treated extensively in ORO-T-356.⁶




Fig. 6—Methods of Communicating with KATUSA and Frequency of Use



American soldiers in Korea speaking about the language problems often mentioned how readily some KATUSA picked up English. The field investigators also talked to a number of ex-KATUSA with whom a conversation in English was relatively easy. It was presumed that these men had learned their English during the period of their service with the US Army because the demand for translators and interpreters in the ROK Army was so great that most Koreans who entered military service with a prior knowledge of English were usually assigned as interpreters.

This would suggest that among foreign nationals such as Koreans there are many who can pick up sufficient English for military service during a

Table 15

AMERICANS' UNDERSTANDING OF KATUSA

Responses	How much difficulty do you have in understanding most of the KATUSA in your unit when they are:		
	Asking for information in English (question 47; N = 3924)	Making reports to you in English (question 48; N = 3807)	Carrying on ordinary conversation in English (question 49; N = 3889)
	Percentage responding		
Very great difficulty	9	6	7
Great difficulty	14	13	13
Some difficulty	44	47	45
Little difficulty	29	28	30
No difficulty	4	6	5

Table 16

KATUSA UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICANS

Responses	How much difficulty did most of the KATUSA in your unit have in understanding:		
	Simple instructions in English (question 44; N = 3915)	Combat instructions in English (question 45; N = 3601)	Ordinary conversation in English (question 46; N = 3882)
	Percentage responding		
Very great difficulty	8	9	10
Great difficulty	12	16	29
Some difficulty	47	46	42
Little difficulty	30	26	17
No difficulty	3	3	2

tour of duty in the US Army. However, in learning a language, as in many other endeavors, self-interest is one of the best motivating forces. Therefore where conditions are conducive to developing such motives similar results may be encountered.

MILITARY PERFORMANCE

The previous analysis of the US troops' opinions of KATUSA military performance, because they were based on comparisons with Americans, appeared to suggest that unless KATUSA are like American soldiers they will be unsatisfactory soldiers. However, there are no facts on which to base such a claim, and there is absolutely no intention to imply validity in this concept.

On the other hand the lesson to be learned from this analysis is that military performance of the peoples of any nation may be expected to differ from that of Americans because it reflects social and economic mores inherited from generations of forebears as well as environmental factors. Educational level and economic status of KATUSA appeared to be reflected in the US opinions about KATUSA performance. Less apparently, KATUSA attitudes toward such concepts as freedom and initiative and their social status also had their effects. Special physical abilities reflected conditioning resulting from the country's topography.

Such characteristics, peculiar to individuals and their societies, are among those that make the KATUSA the soldier he is, just as they make the American the soldier he becomes. They contribute to the kind of military performance that may be expected of any nationals.

Since individuals of all nations differ, and military performance reflects these differences, any program of integrating foreign nationals into US Army units overseas should not be set up with the expectation that their performance will parallel that of American soldiers. Also, since the combination of characteristics that make up KATUSA are unlikely to be found in other nationals, results directly comparable to those in Korea should not be expected elsewhere in the world.

Investigators considering the feasibility of integration programs in other countries should not be dissuaded merely because their findings indicate that the military performance of the local nationals may not come up to that of Americans, or KATUSA. On the contrary it may be found that in place of some of their deficiencies indigenous personnel may possess other valuable resources that Americans do not have. The experience in Korea revealed that the development of KATUSA physical stamina through years of conditioning to the local terrain along with their greater familiarity with it, and their ability to identify the enemy, complemented American deficiencies in these respects. Similarly, utilization of other local nationals may afford these or other advantages resulting from their individual or group characteristics.

The reliability of recommendations as to the feasibility of KATUSA-like programs in other countries would depend a great deal on the extent to which those making such evaluations take into account the many personal and group differences that are likely to effect such programs. The lessons learned in Korea should be considered only as indicative in this connection. However,

if plans for programs of this kind take these matters into account, there is good reason to believe that military capabilities of integrated foreign nationals will be used to the best advantage in furthering world-wide peace.

EFFECT OF ATTITUDES OF INTEGRATED PERSONNEL

The analysis of the US and KATUSA attitudes toward integration suggests two conditions of service toward which they had differing views that appear to have favorably affected the program. The mutually satisfactory arrangements that US soldiers made with KATUSA, i.e., arranging with KATUSA to perform certain duties, appear to have been made possible by the different conception each group had of so-called "dirty" details. This seems to have helped the program run more smoothly.

Also, some Americans felt that the favorable material conditions in the US Army as compared with those in the ROKA would have a disruptive effect on the morale of Korean soldiers on their return to the ROKA. However, these conditions did not have the predicted effect because of the Korean pride in their own army, even under less favorable conditions.

It is apparent, however, that any integration program would be less effective if the differences that distinguish US troops from those of other nations did not work out harmoniously. Prudent planning therefore does not leave this happening to chance. Successful integration depends in large measure on satisfactory human relations between the groups involved.

POSSIBLE PROBLEMS IN KATUSA-LIKE PROGRAMS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES

During the investigations for this study many problems that did not directly appear in the Korean experience but that might well arise in other countries were suggested to the investigators. Unless one were familiar with the individual and group characteristics of all peoples it would be impossible to suggest a complete list of such problems. However, by drawing on the experience of individuals with such backgrounds as attachés and those in foreign assistance programs, problems peculiar to certain countries could be identified and appropriately related to the question of the feasibility of a KATUSA-like program on a country-by-country basis.

For example, although KATUSA strongly favored Kimche they were willing and able to adapt themselves to American food after a brief period of adjustment. However, it is reasonable to anticipate that the peoples of some other nations might for religious or strong cultural reasons be unwilling to give up their habitual use of a special cheese, wine, or bread. Peoples of other countries are similarly restricted in their use of meat from certain animals, e.g., pork or beef, and others might require fish on certain days. Although the logistical aspects of these problems do not appear insurmountable, they could hamper the success of such programs unless they are recognized in plans for integration.

Aside from the cultural differences between the peoples of different countries, variance in physiques can be troublesome. The stature of the Koreans made it difficult to supply them immediately with the proper sizes of clothing.

It has already been pointed out that the M1 rifle was regarded as a large and awkward weapon for people with the small physique of Koreans. Other peoples, however, might be even a little smaller, or so much larger that they would not be at all adaptable to a weapon of this size. Such conditions might have extremely adverse effects on the combat effectiveness of integrated troops. Problems of this type were experienced in rearming the French troops in WWII.¹⁸

Certain customs on the other hand may appear impossible to overcome. It would not be conducive to good relations between Americans and troops with whom they are integrated if the latter were permitted to bring with them les dames de compagnie. On the other hand, those Moroccans who consider this custom essential to their military service would hardly be expected to perform adequately if deprived of this privilege.

Finally, as previously noted, the KATUSA program was instituted when the situation was critical and desperate measures were justified. However, if plans are made for integrating other foreign nationals, and, as it is to be hoped, the conditions were not so serious as in Korea, then the feasibility of such programs may rest primarily on the ability to make the necessary diplomatic arrangements. This, and the other possible problems in KATUSA-like programs discussed above, are only suggestive of a few of those that investigators might find necessary to consider in evaluating the feasibility of such programs in specific countries.

Applications to Future Situations

Under international conditions that require planning and readiness for US participation in limited or brush-fire wars in remote areas of the world, it is to be expected that local national military forces may require assistance in the form of intervention by US Army units to beat back overwhelming forces of powerful aggressors. Integration of local nationals in US Army units so employed offers a practical expedient with military and political advantages.

Military assistance and advisory programs have the purposes of enabling target countries to resist Communist military aggression. However, even though these programs are strengthening many countries, it may be anticipated that aggression in force will not be attempted against them unless it is considerably greater than the aided countries can resist alone. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that US Army units may again be called on to fight on foreign soil in defense of invaded territory, despite our hope that we will not be involved in another situation like Korea. When such situations arise in the future, integration of local nationals into US units will need to be considered again. The experience in Korea, analyzed and reported here, can be useful in making plans for and decisions in such situations.

Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESULTS

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QUESTIONNAIRES

Primary Questionnaire Administered
to Americans and Canadians

QUESTIONNAIRE ON USE OF KATUSA'S

The results of this questionnaire will be used in a study of the best ways to use native troops in combat.

One of the ways of using native troops is as KATUSA's. In the following questions you will be asked for information about how KATUSA's have been used and how they have performed, and you will also be asked for your opinions about some of the ways in which they should be used.

Your knowledge and your opinions are valuable. Answer the questions carefully, using your best judgement. Most questions will have a number of different possible answers printed underneath them. Select the one answer which to you seems to be the best one. Place a check on the line in front of this answer.

Here is an example:

Question: Which of the following best describes what KATUSA's are?

- | | | |
|--|--------------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Americans who supervise Korean labor | 22-1 |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2. | Korean soldiers used in U.S. units | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Korean soldiers used in ROK units | 3 |

For this question the correct answer is the second one: Korean soldiers used in U.S. units. Therefore a check has been made on the line next to this answer.

The numbers to the right of the answers are for statistical purposes and will be used in counting up the results. Do not pay any attention to them. But be careful to make your check marks clearly so that the results will be counted up right.

For questions which do not have lines, write the answer in the space provided.

DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE. All answers will be kept confidential. You will be asked some questions about your unit and your job. This is so that we can tell what infantry riflemen, for example, think about KATUSA's, what squad leaders think about KATUSA's, and so forth. No individuals will be identified.

Fill in the following information about yourself. Put checkmarks on the proper lines.

1. Your rank

- 1. Private or Pfc 5-1
- 2. Corporal 2
- 3. Sergeant 3
- 4. Warrant Officer 4
- 5. Company grade officer 5
- 6. Field grade officer 6

2. Your race or ethnic group

- 1. White 6-1
- 2. Negro 2
- 3. Spanish-American 3
- 4. Oriental 4
- 5. Other (name it) 5

3. Region (or country) in which you were born

- 1. Northern State 7-1
- 2. Southern State 2
- 3. Midwestern State 3
- 4. Southwestern State 4
- 5. Western State 5
- 6. Outside of U.S. 6

4. Region (or country) in which you lived most of your life

- 1. Northern State 8-1
- 2. Southern State 2
- 3. Midwestern State 3
- 4. Southwestern State 4
- 5. Western State 5
- 6. Outside of U.S. 6

5. Years of schooling you completed

- 1. Less than 6 years 9-1
- 2. 6 - 8 years 2
- 3. 9 - 12 years 3
- 4. 13 - 16 years 4
- 5. More than 16 years 5

6. Your present Army status

- 1. Regular Army 10-1
- 2. Reserve 2
- 3. Selectee 3

7. Your total length of active service in the Armed Forces

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| <u> </u> 1. Less than 6 months | 5 |
| <u> </u> 2. 6 months - 1 year | 6 |
| <u> </u> 3. 1 year - 3 years | 7 |
| <u> </u> 4. More than 3 years | 8 |
| | 9 |

8. Your total length of service in Korea

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. Less than 6 months | 11-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. 6 months - 1 year | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. 1 year - 1½ years | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. More than 1½ years | 4 |
| | 5 |

9. Your total length of service with present unit

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| <u> </u> 1. Less than 1 month | 6 |
| <u> </u> 2. 1 month - 6 months | 7 |
| <u> </u> 3. 6 months - 12 months | 8 |
| <u> </u> 4. More than 12 months | 9 |
| | 0 |

10. Name and designation of your unit

Company _____	11-
Regiment _____	12- 13-
Division _____	14- 15-

11. Your exact position in unit (for example: Rifle squad leader, Supply sergeant, Light machine gunner, S-1, Battalion Commander, etc.)

16-
17-

12. Compared with Americans, how do KATUSA's perform as fighters? Are they better, about as good, or worse?

KATUSA's are

- | | |
|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. Much better fighters | 18-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. A little better | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. About as good as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. Not quite as good | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. Much worse fighters | 5 |
| | 6 |

13. Do KATUSA's maintain their weapons better, about as well, or less well than Americans?

KATUSA's maintain their weapons

- | | |
|--|------|
| <u> </u> 1. Much better than Americans | 19-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. About as well as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. A little less well than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. Much less well than Americans | 5 |
| | 6 |

14. Do KATUSA's season to combat and acquire combat skills more readily, less readily, or about as readily as American soldiers?

KATUSA's season to combat and acquire combat skills

- | | | |
|--------------|--|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more readily than American soldiers | 20-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more readily than American soldiers | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as readily as American soldiers | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less readily than American soldiers | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less readily than American soldiers | 5 |
| | | 6 |

15. In hand to hand combat, can you count on KATUSA's to hold their ground better, about as well, or less well than Americans?

KATUSA's hold their ground

- | | | |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better than Americans | 21-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as well as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less well than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less well than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

16. Are KATUSA's more aggressive in attack than Americans, about as aggressive, or less aggressive?

KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more aggressive in attack than Americans | 22-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more aggressive than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as aggressive as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less aggressive than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less aggressive than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

17. Judging from your experience, do KATUSA's use good judgement and common sense in tough spots more than Americans, as much as Americans, or less than Americans?

KATUSA's use good judgement and common sense in tough spots

- | | | |
|--------------|------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more than Americans | 23-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as much as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

18. In carrying out a dangerous combat mission, would a unit with some KATUSA's in it be more likely to succeed, less likely to succeed, or about as likely to succeed as an all-American unit?

A unit with some KATUSA's in it would be

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more likely to succeed than an all-American unit | 24-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more likely to succeed | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as likely to succeed | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less likely to succeed | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less likely to succeed | 5 |
| | | 6 |

19. In combat, is the morale of an outfit with KATUSA's in it higher, lower or about the same as the morale of a unit without KATUSA's?

An outfit with KATUSA's in it would have

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much higher morale | 25-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little higher morale | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About the same level of morale | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little lower morale | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much lower morale | 5 |
| | | 6 |

20. Do KATUSA's tend to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat more, less, or about as much as Americans?

KATUSA's tend to go to pieces

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more than Americans | 26-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as much as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

21. Are KATUSA's more likely to break under mass attack than Americans, about as likely to break, or less likely to break?

Under mass attack, KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|---------------|-------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more likely to break | 27-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more likely to break | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as likely to break | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less likely to break | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less likely to break | 5 |
| | | 6 |

22. How do KATUSA's and Americans compare in carrying out orders to the letter?

KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better than Americans | 28-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About the same as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little worse than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much worse than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

23. Comparing KATUSA's and Americans would you say that KATUSA's are more reluctant to engage the enemy, less reluctant to engage the enemy, or about the same as Americans in this respect?

KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|---------------|--|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more reluctant to engage the enemy than Americans | 29-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more reluctant to engage the enemy | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About the same as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less reluctant to engage the enemy | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less reluctant to engage the enemy | 5 |
| | | 6 |

24. Do KATUSA's use their weapons and ammunition more effectively, less effectively, or just about as effectively as Americans?

KATUSA's use their weapons and ammunition

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more effectively than Americans | 31-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more effectively | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as effectively | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less effectively | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less effectively | 5 |
| | | 6 |

25. Comparing the rifle marksmanship of KATUSA's and Americans, would you say that KATUSA's are better, about as good, or worse than Americans?

As marksmen, KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better than Americans | 32-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as good as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little worse than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much worse than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

26. Comparing KATUSA's and Americans as bayonet fighters would you say that KATUSA's are better, about as good, or worse than Americans?

KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better bayonet fighters | 33-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better as bayonet fighters | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as good as Americans as bayonet fighters | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | Not quite as good as Americans as bayonet fighters | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much worse as bayonet fighters | 5 |
| | | 6 |

27. In a withdrawal in combat, do KATUSA's hang on to their weapons and equipment better, worse, or about as well as Americans?

KATUSA's hang on to their weapons and equipment

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better than Americans | 34-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | About as well as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little worse than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much worse than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

28. Do KATUSA's seem to do better, as well, or less well than Americans at jobs requiring teamwork?

KATUSA's show

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better teamwork than Americans | 35-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better teamwork than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about the same teamwork as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little poorer teamwork than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much poorer teamwork than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

29. Do KATUSA's seem to be better at patrolling and scouting than Americans, just about as good, or worse than Americans?

On patrolling and scouting missions, KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much better than Americans | 36-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little better than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as good as Mmericans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | Not quite as good as Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much worse than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

30. Considering differences in schooling, do you think KATUSA's are more intelligent, less intelligent, or about as intelligent as Americans?

KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more intelligent than Americans | 37-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more intelligent | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as intelligent | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less intelligent | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less intelligent | 5 |
| | | 6 |

31. Do you think KATUSA's have more, less or just about as much physical stamina and endurance as Americans?

KATUSA's have

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more stamina than Americans | 38-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more stamina than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as much stamina as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less stamina than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less stamina than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

32. Would you say that KATUSA's keep themselves cleaner, less clean or just about as clean as American soldiers?

KATUSA's keep themselves

- | | | |
|--------------|---|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much cleaner than American soldiers | 39-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little cleaner than American soldiers | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as clean as Americans | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less clean than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less clean than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

33. On the whole, are KATUSA's more effective in combat, less effective, or just about as effective as American soldiers?

In combat, KATUSA's are

- | | | |
|--------------|--|------|
| <u> </u> 1. | Much more effective than Americans | 40-1 |
| <u> </u> 2. | A little more effective than Americans | 2 |
| <u> </u> 3. | Just about as effective | 3 |
| <u> </u> 4. | A little less effective than Americans | 4 |
| <u> </u> 5. | Much less effective than Americans | 5 |
| | | 6 |

34. In which of the following jobs do you think KATUSA's could function almost as efficiently as U.S. personnel?

- | | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Combat demolition man | 41-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Field artillery crew member | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Tank cannoner | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | Rifleman | 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. | Combat engineer | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. | Heavy mortar gunner | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. | Medical aidman | 42-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. | BAR gunner | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. | Ammo bearer | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10. | Forward observer | 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. | Signal wireman | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 12. | Ordnance repairman | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13. | Motor mechanic | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 14. | Radio repairman | 8 |
| | | 9 |

35. Check the problems, if any, which have created major difficulties in your unit:

- | | | |
|------------------------------|---|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Poor training of KATUSA's | 43-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Poor health of KATUSA's | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Low physical stamina of KATUSA's | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | KATUSA's inexperience as soldiers | 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. | Low intelligence of KATUSA's | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. | KATUSA's inability to speak English | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. | KATUSA's inability to understand English | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 8. | Lack of initiative of KATUSA's | 8 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. | KATUSA's lack of mechanical know-how | 9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 10. | Lack of discipline of KATUSA's | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. | KATUSA's lack of aggressiveness in offensive combat | 44-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 12. | Lack of cleanliness of KATUSA's | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13. | KATUSA's tendency to "bug-out" under attack | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 14. | Low morale of KATUSA's | 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 15. | KATUSA's lack of pride in unit | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 16. | Others (name them) | |

36. If American replacements are available, when should KATUSA's be used?

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | KATUSA's should not be used at all | 45-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | KATUSA's should be used regularly, but only for overstrength | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | It makes no difference whether Americans or KATUSA's are used to fill a few openings in the normal strength of the unit | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | KATUSA's should be used regularly to make up a part of the normal strength of the unit | 4 |
| | | 5 |

(a) Give your reasons:

46-

37. If no American replacements were available for your unit, when would you want to have KATUSA's as replacements?

- | | | |
|-------|---|------|
| ___1. | I would never want to have KATUSA's in the unit | 47-1 |
| ___2. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 40% of its men | 2 |
| ___3. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 25% of its men | 3 |
| ___4. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 15% of its men | 4 |
| ___5. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 5% of its men | 5 |
| ___6. | I would want KATUSA's if the unit were full strength | 6 |
| | | 7 |

(a) Give your reasons:

48-

We are going to repeat the last two questions, applying them only to KATUSA's who can speak English.

38. If American replacements are available, when should English-speaking KATUSA's be used?

- | | | |
|-------|--|------|
| ___1. | English-speaking KATUSA's should not be used at all | 49-1 |
| ___2. | English-speaking KATUSA's should be used regularly, but only for overstrength | 2 |
| ___3. | It makes no difference whether Americans or English-speaking KATUSA's are used to fill a few openings in the normal strength of the unit | 3 |
| ___4. | English-speaking KATUSA's should be used regularly to make up a part of the normal strength of the unit | 4 |
| | | 5 |

(a) Give your reasons:

50-

39. If no American replacements were available for your unit, when would you want to have English-speaking KATUSA's as replacements?

- | | | |
|-------|---|------|
| ___1. | I would never want to have English-speaking KATUSA's in the unit | 51-1 |
| ___2. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 40% of its men | 2 |
| ___3. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 25% of its men | 3 |
| ___4. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 15% of its men | 4 |
| ___5. | I would want them only if my unit had lost 5% of its men | 5 |
| ___6. | I would want English-speaking KATUSA's if the unit were full strength | 6 |
| | | 7 |

(a) Give your reasons:

52-

40. If KATUSA's are used in U.S. units, which of the following ways would be best:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Some KATUSA's in each U.S. squad | 53-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Kept in separate KATUSA squads | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Kept in separate KATUSA platoons | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | Kept in separate KATUSA companies | 4 |
| | | 5 |

41. If KATUSA's are used in U.S. squads, what should be the largest number in each nine-man squad:

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | One | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Two | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Three | 8 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | Four | 9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. | Five | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6. | Six or more | X |
| | | Y |

(a) Give the reasons for your choice:

54-

42. How often do you use each of the following ways of getting ideas across to KATUSA's?

(a) Official interpreter

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Often | 55-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Some | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Never | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | My company does not have an official interpreter | 4 |
| | | 5 |

(b) Through a KATUSA who speaks fairly good English

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Often | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Some | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Never | 8 |
| | | 9 |

(c) By speaking directly to the KATUSA's in English

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Often | 56-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Some | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Never | 3 |
| | | 4 |

(d) By using pictures or writing

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Often | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Some | 6 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Never | 7 |
| | | 8 |

(e) By using gestures or sign language

- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Often | 9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Some | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Never | X |
| | | Y |



43. Which of these ways do you use most?

- 1. Official interpreter 57-1
- 2. English-speaking KATUSA 2
- 3. Speaking directly to the KATUSA's in English 3
- 4. Pictures or writing 4
- 5. Gestures or sign language 5

(a) Why do you use this way most?

58-

44. How much difficulty do most of the KATUSA's in your unit have in understanding simple routine instructions in English?

- 1. Very great difficulty 59-1
- 2. Great difficulty 2
- 3. Some difficulty 3
- 4. Little difficulty 4
- 5. No difficulty 5

45. How much difficulty do most of the KATUSA's in your unit have in understanding combat instructions in English?

- 1. Very great difficulty 7
- 2. Great difficulty 8
- 3. Some difficulty 9
- 4. Little difficulty 0
- 5. No difficulty X

46. How much difficulty do most of the KATUSA's in your unit have in understanding ordinary conversations in English?

- 1. Very great difficulty 60-1
- 2. Great difficulty 2
- 3. Some difficulty 3
- 4. Little difficulty 4
- 5. No difficulty 5

47. How much difficulty do you have in understanding most of the KATUSA's in your unit when they are asking for information in English?

- 1. Very great difficulty 7
- 2. Great difficulty 8
- 3. Some difficulty 9
- 4. Little difficulty 0
- 5. No difficulty X

48. How much difficulty do you have in understanding most of the KATUSA's in your unit when they are making reports to you in English?

- 1. Very great difficulty 61-1
- 2. Great difficulty 2
- 3. Some difficulty 3
- 4. Little difficulty 4
- 5. No difficulty 5



49. How much difficulty do you have in understanding most of the KATUSA's in your unit when they are carrying on an ordinary conversation with you in English?
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Very great difficulty | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | Great difficulty | 8 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Some difficulty | 9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | Little difficulty | 0 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. | No difficulty | X |
| | | Y |
50. Are there any KATUSA's in your unit who are good enough soldiers and who know enough English to be non-commissioned officers in the U.S. Army?
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Yes | 62-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | No | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Don't know | 3 |
51. Are there any KATUSA's in your unit who are good enough soldiers to be NCO's in the U.S. Army if they knew enough English?
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | Yes | 4 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | No | 5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | Don't know | 6 |
52. If a KATUSA were a good enough soldier and knew enough English to be an NCO in the U.S. Army, how would you feel about serving under him?
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | I would not like it at all | 7 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | It wouldn't bother me too much, but I would rather serve under an American | 8 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | It wouldn't make any difference to me one way or the other | 9 |
| | | 0 |
53. How do new KATUSA replacements compare with new American replacements in their preparation for combat?
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. | KATUSA replacements are better prepared for combat than American replacements | 63-1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2. | KATUSA and American replacements are about equally prepared for combat | 2 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. | KATUSA replacements are more poorly prepared for combat than American replacements | 3 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4. | Don't know | 4 |
54. In what ways is the training of KATUSA replacements not as good as it should have been. (Write out your answer.)
- 64-
55. What special KATUSA training, if any, should be given in training centers or schools to Koreans who are going to serve as KATUSA's? (Write out what this training should be.)
- 65-

- ██████████
56. For the most part do KATUSA's tend to keep to themselves and not mix with the Americans in their units?
- ___1. Yes, KATUSA's tend to keep to themselves 66-1
 - ___2. No, KATUSA's do not tend to keep to themselves 2
 - ___3. I have not known enough KATUSA's to say 3
57. Do you think KATUSA's are treated fairly in U.S. units?
- ___1. Yes, KATUSA's are treated fairly 6
 - ___2. No, KATUSA's are not treated fairly 7
 - ___3. I have not seen enough KATUSA treatment to say 8
- (a) If you don't think KATUSA's are treated fairly, explain your reasons for thinking so.
58. Do KATUSA's tend to get more dirty details than the Americans in your unit?
- ___1. Yes, KATUSA's tend to get more dirty details 68-1
 - ___2. No, KATUSA's do not tend to get more dirty details 2
 - ___3. I have not seen enough KATUSA treatment to say 3
59. How do you like serving with KATUSA's in your unit?
- ___1. I like it very much 68-6
 - ___2. I think it's perfectly O.K. 7
 - ___3. It doesn't make any difference to me one way or the other 8
 - ___4. I don't mind too much, but I would rather serve with Americans 9
 - ___5. I don't like serving with KATUSA's 0
- X
60. Do you think that the KATUSA's in your unit would mind being transferred to ROK units
- (a) As replacements in established ROK units?
- ___1. Most would mind being transferred 69-1
 - ___2. Some would mind, some wouldn't 2
 - ___3. Most would not mind 3
 - ___4. I don't know how they would feel about it 4
- (b) As cadre for new ROK units?
- ___1. Most would mind being transferred 6
 - ___2. Some would mind, some wouldn't 7
 - ___3. Most would not mind 8
 - ___4. I don't know how they would feel about it 9
- (c) Give your reasons for thinking so.

70-

61. What are the hardest things for KATUSA's to learn about American ways? (Write out your answer.)

71-

62. What do KATUSA's like least about serving in U.S. units? (Write out your answer.)

72-

63. What do KATUSA's like best about serving in U.S. units? (Write out your answer.)

73-

64. Have you ever served in a unit which used the "buddy" system with KATUSA's?

- ___1. Yes, I have served in a unit which used the "buddy" system
 ___2. No, I have not served in a unit which used the "buddy" system

74-1

2
3

If your answer to question 64 is "Yes", answer the three following questions.

(a) If there are KATUSA's in a squad, do you think they should have American "buddies" or not?

- ___1. They should have American "buddies"
 ___2. It doesn't make any difference
 ___3. They should not have American "buddies"

75-1

2

3

(b) Give your reasons for thinking so.

76-

(c) What kind of a person makes the best "buddy" for a KATUSA?

77-

65. Have you, personally, ever had a KATUSA "buddy"?

- ___1. Yes, I have had a KATUSA "buddy"
 ___2. No, I have not had a KATUSA "buddy"

78-1

2
3

Supplementary Questions Administered to Canadians Only*

Question 1

- (a) Rank, name, number
- (b) Length of service in Korea
- (c) Employment in Unit

Question 2

- | | | |
|---|-----|----|
| (a) Have you ever employed KATCOMs to do your laundry? | YES | NO |
| (b) Do KATCOMs do all odd labour jobs in your company or platoon? | YES | NO |
| (c) Do you pay them to do personal favours? | YES | NO |

Question 3 (Royal 22e Regt only)

- | | | |
|---|-----|----|
| (a) Do KATCOMs learn French more quickly than they do English? | YES | NO |
| (b) On questions 38 and 39 of the American questionnaire for English-speaking KATCOMs substitute French-speaking KATCOMs. | | |

Questionnaire Administered to Ex-KATUSA

This is included in the next section together with the results of the questionnaire.

RESULTS

Table A1 gives the complete results obtained from administration of the primary questionnaire to Americans and Canadians and results from the supplementary questions administered to Canadians. These results are graphically summarized in Fig. A1.

Table A2 presents the entire questionnaire administered to ex-KATUSA and the results obtained.

In order to determine what effect, if any, varied experience with KATUSA might have on respondents, four groups were formed, divided according to degree of experience, and their responses were tabulated separately. The results are given in Table A3. The method of classifying respondents is described in the section following the table.

*These questions were prepared by Canadian Army Operations Research Team (CAORT) and administered only to Canadian troops. In addition the Canadian troops were instructed to interpret all questions in the main questionnaire referring to KATUSA and American (or US) troops as applying to KATCOM and Canadian troops.

Questions 2, 3, and 4, of the main questionnaire applied only to Americans and were omitted by the Canadians.

Only those Canadian troops that customarily spoke French were asked to respond to supplementary question 3a.

Table A1

RESULTS OF US AND CANADIAN RESPONSES TO KATUSA QUESTIONNAIRE

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED TO BOTH AMERICAN AND CANADIAN TROOPS									
Question 1					Question 6				
1	3100	68	37	20	1	1604	36	182	98
2	762	17	95	52	2	245	6	—	—
3	483	11	23	13	3	2575	58	4	2
4	7	0	4	2	Total	4424	100	186	100
5	130	3	21	11	Question 7				
6	29	1	4	2	1	118	3	1	1
Total	4511	100	184	100	2	2323	52	27	15
Question 2					3	1544	35	98	52
1	3512	78	— ^a	— ^a	4	429	10	58	32
2	669	15	—	—	Total	4414	100	184	100
3	228	5	—	—	Question 8				
4	49	1	—	—	1	2785	63	14	8
5	42	1	—	—	2	1232	28	120	65
Total	4500	100	—	—	3	315	7	43	23
Question 3					4	78	2	7	4
1	1701	38	— ^a	— ^a	Total	4410	100	184	100
2	1163	26	—	—	Question 9				
3	837	19	—	—	1	515	12	2	1
4	190	4	—	—	2	2699	63	14	7
5	332	7	—	—	3	888	21	33	18
6	261	6	—	—	4	165	4	139	74
Total	4484	100	—	—	Total	4267	100	188	100
Question 4					Question 10 ^b				
1	1775	40	— ^a	— ^a	Question 11 ^c				
2	1064	24	—	—	Question 12				
3	821	18	—	—	1	57	1	3	2
4	183	4	—	—	2	100	3	4	2
5	362	8	—	—	3	1392	34	60	34
6	251	6	—	—	4	1975	49	89	50
Total	4456	100	—	—	5	528	13	21	12
Question 5					Total	4052	100	177	100
1	181	4	8	4					
2	1014	23	81	43					
3	2660	59	73	39					
4	523	12	22	12					
5	114	2	4	2					
Total	4492	100	188	100					

Table A1 (continued)

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Question 13					Question 19				
1	374	9	51	28	1	198	5	13	7
2	688	16	28	15	2	394	10	19	11
3	2119	50	67	36	3	2076	53	83	47
4	710	17	26	14	4	838	21	40	23
5	329	8	12	7	5	431	11	22	12
Total	4220	100	184	100	Total	3937	100	177	100
Question 14					Question 20				
1	89	2	4	2	1	335	9	12	8
2	260	7	10	6	2	463	12	15	9
3	1554	40	67	38	3	1540	41	85	53
4	1423	36	70	40	4	944	25	31	20
5	579	15	24	14	5	467	13	16	10
Total	3905	100	175	100	Total	3749	100	159	100
Question 15					Question 21				
1	63	2	5	3	1	910	24	25	16
2	118	3	6	4	2	871	23	32	21
3	1274	34	65	45	3	1131	31	67	43
4	1235	33	46	32	4	433	12	19	12
5	1037	28	24	16	5	356	10	13	8
Total	3727	100	146	100	Total	3701	100	156	100
Question 16					Question 22				
1	96	3	8	6	1	129	3	14	8
2	209	6	8	6	2	334	8	29	16
3	1303	34	53	38	3	1475	37	63	35
4	1345	36	39	28	4	1336	33	48	27
5	783	21	31	22	5	786	19	24	14
Total	3736	100	139	100	Total	4060	100	178	100
Question 17					Question 23				
1	102	3	2	1	1	274	8	6	4
2	170	4	14	8	2	462	12	26	16
3	1274	32	63	38	3	1537	41	86	52
4	1416	36	56	33	4	944	25	31	19
5	979	25	33	20	5	500	14	14	9
Total	3941	100	168	100	Total	3717	100	163	100
Question 18					Question 24				
1	265	7	4	2	1	113	3	3	2
2	456	12	14	8	2	215	6	14	9
3	1585	40	66	40	3	1672	43	77	46
4	1033	26	49	30	4	1156	30	44	26
5	586	15	32	20	5	681	18	29	17
Total	3925	100	165	100	Total	3837	100	167	100

Table A1 (continued)

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Question 25					Question 31				
1	54	1	4	2	1	294	7	17	9
2	136	4	14	8	2	768	19	38	22
3	1733	46	73	45	3	1375	34	64	37
4	1236	33	47	29	4	1007	26	37	21
5	595	16	27	16	5	576	14	19	11
Total	3754	100	165	100	Total	4020	100	175	100
Question 26					Question 32				
1	144	4	6	5	1	80	2	11	6
2	322	10	6	5	2	263	6	20	11
3	1025	30	49	36	3	2200	53	81	45
4	1307	39	43	33	4	980	24	46	25
5	591	17	28	21	5	629	15	23	13
Total	3389	100	132	100	Total	4152	100	181	100
Question 27					Question 33				
1	218	6	5	3	1	40	1	2	1
2	452	12	16	11	2	119	3	8	5
3	1563	43	74	50	3	1543	42	80	49
4	732	21	31	21	4	1429	38	49	30
5	666	18	22	15	5	588	16	24	15
Total	3631	100	148	100	Total	3719	100	163	100
Question 28					Question 34 ^d				
1	168	4	21	12	1	393	9	9	5
2	338	9	29	17	2	708	16	11	6
3	1576	39	78	45	3	174	4	0	0
4	1332	33	33	18	4	2201	48	120	65
5	598	15	14	8	5	483	11	9	5
Total	4012	100	175	100	6	478	11	16	9
Question 29					Question 35 ^d				
1	249	7	19	12	1	415	9	61	33
2	641	18	26	15	2	165	4	4	2
3	1277	35	59	35	3	175	4	12	7
4	956	27	38	23	4	390	9	52	28
5	467	13	26	15	5	569	13	19	10
Total	3590	100	168	100	6	2081	46	131	71
Question 30					Question 35 ^d				
1	65	2	23	12	7	1883	41	133	72
2	203	5	18	9					
3	1386	34	84	43					
4	1482	36	55	28					
5	933	23	15	8					
Total	4069	100	195	100					

Table A1 (continued)

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Question 35 ^d (continued)					Question 41				
8	434	10	26	14	1	605	16	35	20
9	424	9	31	17	2	1725	44	65	38
10	388	9	30	16	3	1101	28	58	34
11	357	8	14	8	4	308	8	7	4
12	280	6	22	12	5	57	1	1	1
13	876	19	34	18	6	130	3	6	3
14	299	7	19	10	Total	3926	100	172	100
15	500	11	38	21	Question 42				
Question 36					(a) 1	585	16	29	17
1	835	21	75	39	2	1169	31	69	40
2	1090	27	44	24	3	922	24	22	13
3	748	19	29	16	4	1068	29	51	30
4	1307	33	39	21	Total	3744	100	171	100
Total	3980	100	187	100	(b) 1	1284	33	61	35
Question 37					2	2101	55	95	55
1	410	11	31	17	3	456	12	18	10
2	622	17	39	21	Total	3841	100	174	100
3	345	9	19	10	(c) 1	1247	33	63	37
4	319	8	12	6	2	2152	56	95	56
5	525	14	44	24	3	413	11	11	7
6	1574	41	40	22	Total	3812	100	169	100
Total	3795	100	185	100	(d) 1	375	10	14	8
Question 38					2	1534	42	49	30
1	481	13	40	27	3	1753	48	101	62
2	915	24	36	24	Total	3662	100	164	100
3	915	24	38	26	(e) 1	1101	30	67	40
4	1440	39	34	23	2	1947	52	89	53
Total	3751	100	148	100	3	674	18	13	7
Question 39					Total	3722	100	169	100
1	283	8	21	16	Question 43				
2	577	16	38	28	1	172	4	28	17
3	306	9	13	9	2	1026	26	45	27
4	287	8	6	4	3	1620	40	60	36
5	519	15	20	15	4	150	4	8	5
6	1590	44	39	28	5	1055	26	24	15
Total	3562	100	137	100	Total	4023	100	165	100
Question 40									
1	2916	72	125	70					
2	291	7	11	6					
3	183	5	20	11					
4	660	16	23	13					
Total	4050	100	179	100					

Table A1 (continued)

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Question 44					Question 50				
1	298	8	21	12	1	868	19	26	14
2	476	12	37	20	2	2021	46	120	66
3	1827	47	80	45	3	1585	35	35	20
4	1189	30	38	21	Total	4474	100	181	100
5	125	3	3	2	Question 51				
Total	3915	100	179	100	1	1693	38	76	41
Question 45					2	1293	29	69	38
1	314	9	32	18	3	1468	33	39	21
2	565	16	46	27	Total	4454	100	184	100
3	1669	46	68	39	Question 52				
4	930	26	24	14	1	1553	40	70	39
5	123	3	3	2	2	1561	41	69	39
Total	3601	100	173	100	3	732	19	40	22
Question 46					Total	3846	100	179	100
1	416	10	33	18	Question 53				
2	1107	29	64	35	1	197	4	6	4
3	1618	42	62	34	2	924	21	36	21
4	653	17	20	11	3	1290	29	74	44
5	88	2	3	2	4	2061	46	53	31
Total	3882	100	182	100	Total	4472	100	169	100
Question 47					Question 54 ^c				
1	328	9	19	10	Question 55 ^c				
2	550	14	33	18	Question 56				
3	1721	44	85	47	1	1625	36	129	72
4	1151	29	34	19	2	1418	32	41	24
5	174	4	10	6	3	1426	32	8	4
Total	3924	100	181	100	Total	4469	100	178	100
Question 48					Question 57				
1	242	6	22	12	1	3085	70	151	88
2	511	13	35	19	2	227	5	10	6
3	1773	47	82	46	3	1121	25	11	6
4	1065	28	36	20	Total	4433	100	172	100
5	216	6	5	3	Question 58				
Total	3807	100	180	100	1	286	10	21	12
Question 49					2	2214	75	148	81
1	256	7	20	11	3	446	15	12	7
2	509	13	39	23	Total	2946	100	181	100
3	1768	45	73	41	Question 58				
4	1161	30	38	22	1	286	10	21	12
5	195	5	6	3	2	2214	75	148	81
Total	3889	100	176	100	3	446	15	12	7

Table A1 (continued)

Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents		Response number	US respondents		Canadian respondents	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent		Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Question 59					Question 61 ^c				
1	251	7	10	6	Question 62 ^c				
2	744	21	35	19	Question 63 ^c				
3	982	27	46	26	Question 64				
4	1237	34	59	32	1	1790	54	62	38
5	398	11	30	17	2	1510	46	102	62
Total	3612	100	180	100	Total	3300	100	164	100
Question 60					(a) 1	1492	63	55	64
(a) 1	1629	36	88	49	2	558	23	26	30
2	835	19	31	17	3	324	14	5	6
3	433	10	22	13	Total	2374	100	86	100
4	1573	35	37	21	(b), (c) ^e				
Total	4470	100	178	100	Question 65				
(b) 1	938	21	53	34	1	1453	45	29	18
2	955	21	34	22	2	1752	55	129	82
3	544	12	19	12	Total	3205	100	158	100
4	2021	46	49	32					
Total	4458	100	155	100					
QUESTIONS ADMINISTERED TO CANADIAN TROOPS ONLY ^e									
Question 1 ^f					Question 2 (continued)				
Question 2					(c) Yes	—	—	46	26
(a) Yes	—	—	44	24	No	—	—	132	74
No	—	—	139	76	Total	—	—	178	100
Total	—	—	183	100	Question 3 ^g				
(b) Yes	—	—	19	12	(a) Yes	—	—	0	0
No	—	—	135	88	No	—	—	70	100
Total	—	—	154	100	Total	—	—	70	100

^aNot applicable. Canadians did not answer questions on race and region where born and/or brought up.

^bQuestion asked for name and designation of unit and was included for sample control only.

^cFree response.

^dPercentage based on 4545 US and 184 Canadian respondents.

^eSupplementary questions added by CAORT.

^fQuestion asked for name, length of service in Korea, and assignment, and was included for sample control only.

^gOnly the 22e Regt; i.e., those Canadian troops that used French were asked to respond to question 3(a).




Fig. A1—US and Canadian Ratings of Selected Military Performance Characteristics of Korean Augmentation Troops^a

Much below
 Little below
 About the same as
 Little above
 Much above

Korean troops rated in comparison with respondents.

^aCharacteristics reported represent those with a high and low score in each group.

Table A2

EX-KATUSA QUESTIONNAIRE WITH RESULTS OF RESPONSES^a

Question no.	Question	Answer	Percent
1	Were the American soldiers you served with friendly toward you?	Yes	97
		No	1
		No answer	2
2	How many months did it take for you to be fully accepted in your US Army unit?	Never	— ^b
		Less than 1 month	53
		1-3 months	30
		4-6 months	7
		7-12 months	4
		More than 12 months	1
3	Did the American soldiers often criticize you unfairly?	Yes	14
		No	78
		No answer	8
4	Did the American soldiers treat you like a man inferior to them?	Yes	2
		No	94
		No answer	4
5	Did the American soldiers often ridicule you, make you lose face?	Yes	10
		No	83
		No answer	7
6	Were the American soldiers intolerant of your habits, customs, ways of doing things?	Yes	3
		No	95
		No answer	2
7	Did they get angry when you couldn't understand what they said or meant?	Yes	13
		No	83
		No answer	4
8	Do you think ex-KATUSA's like America better than other Koreans do?	Yes	96
		No	1
		No answer	3
9	Do you keep in touch with any of the American soldiers with whom you served?	Yes	30
		No	70
		No answer	0
10	Should Koreans serving in US Army units be used in separate squads, be mixed in squads with Americans, or doesn't it matter?	Should be used in separate squads	8
		Should be mixed with Americans in squads	91
		It doesn't matter which way is used	1
11	Are the living conditions as good in the ROKA as in the US Army?	Yes	1
		No	98
		No answer	1
12	Do you like the food as well in the ROKA as in the US Army?	Yes	4
		No	91
		No answer	5

^aAll percentages are based on response of the 635 ex-KATUSA interviewed.

^bLess than 0.5 of 1 percent.

Table A2 (continued)

Question no.	Question	Answer	Percent
13	Do you have poorer clothing and equipment in the ROKA than in the US Army?	Yes	98
		No	0
		No answer	2
14	Did you have as good a time in your off-duty hours in the US Army as in the ROKA?	Yes	92
		No	2
		No answer	6
15	Are you worse off financially in the ROKA than you were in the US Army?	Yes	93
		No	1
		No answer	6
16	Which is better for Koreans: the kind of discipline used in the US Army, or that used in the ROKA?	US Army	95
		ROKA	3
		No answer	2
17	Are the methods of enforcement of rules in the ROKA harder on ex-KATUSA's than on soldiers who have never been in the US Army?	Yes	35
		No	55
		No answer	10
18	Do you get more dirty details in the ROKA than in the US Army?	Yes	78
		No	18
		No answer	4
19	Do you have as much confidence in your ROKA officers as your American officers?	Yes	44
		No	52
		No answer	4
20	Do you have as much confidence in ROKA enlisted men as you did in American enlisted men?	Yes	41
		No	58
		No answer	1
21	Altogether, everything considered, were you happier when serving in the US Army than you are in the ROKA?	Yes	98
		No	1
		No answer	1
22	Did you want to stay in the US Army rather than being transferred to the ROKA?	Yes	79
		No	19
		No answer	2
23	Do most of the Koreans now serving in the US Army want to be transferred to the ROKA?	Yes	— ^b
		No	96
		No answer	4
24	Are you peeved at being transferred out of the US Army?	Yes	25
		No	68
		No answer	7
25	Do you want to go back to the US Army?	Yes	81
		No	14
		No answer	5
26	Are you proud serving in the ROKA as you were in the US Army?	Yes	44
		No	48
		No answer	8
27	Was it hard for you to come back to the ROKA after serving with the US Army?	Yes	57
		No	36
		No answer	7

^bLess than 0.5 of 1 percent.

Table A3

COMPARISON OF OPINIONS OF KATUSA MILITARY PERFORMANCE
 ACCORDING TO DEGREE OF EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS
 (In percentage)

Question no.	Subject	Group A	Group B	Group C	Group D
12	Performance as fighters				
	Much better than Americans	1	1	2	2
	A little better	2	1	4	3
	About the same	35	31	39	35
	A little worse	48	51	47	48
13	Much worse	14	16	8	12
	Maintenance of weapons				
	Much better than Americans	13	8	5	9
	A little better	20	18	15	17
	About the same	44	47	53	54
14	A little worse	16	18	16	13
	Much worse	7	7	11	7
	Seasoning to combat and the acquiring of combat skills				
	Much more readily than Americans	3	1	3	2
	A little more	7	6	7	6
15	About the same	40	39	44	40
	A little less	35	38	35	37
	Much less	15	16	11	15
	Hold ground in hand-to-hand combat				
	Much better than Americans	2	—	3	2
16	A little better	3	3	3	3
	About the same	34	30	40	36
	A little worse	31	33	33	35
	Much worse	30	34	21	24
	Aggressiveness in attack ^a				
17	Much more than Americans	2	2	2	4
	A little more	7	4	6	5
	About the same	33	32	46	35
	A little less	35	39	32	37
	Much less	23	23	14	19
20-R-14	Good judgment and common sense in tough spots				
	Much more than Americans	3	1	4	3
	A little more	7	4	5	3
	About the same	34	30	41	31
	A little less	33	37	32	38
21-R-15	Much less	23	28	18	25
	Tendency to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat				
	Much more than Americans	8	10	7	9
	A little more	12	14	13	11
	About as much	39	42	43	42
21-R-15	A little less	26	24	25	25
	Much less	15	10	12	13
	Tendency to break under mass attack				
	Much more than Americans	26	27	20	23
	A little more	22	25	24	23
21-R-15	About the same	32	30	33	30
	A little less	11	10	15	13
	Much less	9	8	8	11

Table A3 (continued)

Question no.	Subject	Group A	Group B	Group C	Group D
22	Carrying out orders to the letter ^a				
	Much better than Americans	4	2	6	3
	A little better	8	7	11	9
	About the same	33	30	41	40
	A little worse	34	37	31	30
23-R-16	Much worse	21	24	11	18
	Reluctance to engage the enemy				
	Much more than Americans	8	8	8	7
	A little more	11	13	13	13
	About the same	42	39	45	41
24	A little less	24	26	26	26
	Much less	15	14	8	13
	Use of weapons and ammunition				
	Much better than Americans	4	2	3	3
	A little better	7	4	7	5
25	About the same	43	38	49	47
	A little worse	28	35	29	28
	Much worse	18	21	12	17
	Rifle marksmanship				
	Much better than Americans	2	1	2	1
26	A little better	4	3	6	4
	About the same	48	42	51	46
	A little worse	32	35	30	33
	Much worse	14	19	11	16
	Ability as bayonet fighters				
27	Much better than Americans	6	3	4	4
	A little better	11	8	12	9
	About the same	29	28	30	33
	A little worse	37	41	41	37
	Much worse	17	20	13	17
29	Hanging on to weapons in a withdrawal				
	Much better than Americans	9	5	7	5
	A little better	13	13	12	12
	About the same	42	40	48	44
	A little worse	18	20	21	22
31	Much worse	18	22	12	17
	Patrolling and scouting				
	Much better than Americans	9	6	7	6
	A little better	22	17	16	16
	About the same	32	35	41	38
33	A little worse	24	27	28	28
	Much worse	13	15	8	12
	Physical stamina				
	Much more than Americans	7	7	8	7
	A little more	21	19	17	18
33	About the same	34	34	36	34
	A little less	24	25	27	26
	Much less	14	15	12	15
	Over-all effectiveness in combat ^a				
	Much more effective than Americans	1	1	2	1
33	A little more	4	2	3	4
	About the same	44	35	51	39
	A little less	37	42	32	39
	Much less	14	20	12	15

^aReveals statistically significant differences between the groups.

[REDACTED]

Method of Classifying Respondents by Degrees of Experience with KATUSA

The degree to which individual respondents had had opportunity to observe KATUSA performance was judged by five criteria:

(1) Respondent's Length of Service in Korea.

(2) Degree to Which the Respondent Disqualified Himself. Specifically, two questions in the questionnaire had the explicit response, "I have not seen enough KATUSA's to say." These questions were: "For the most part, do KATUSA's tend to keep to themselves and not mix with Americans in their units?" and "Do you think KATUSA's are treated fairly in US units?" If respondents' degree of familiarity with KATUSA's was too small to permit them to answer questions such as these, they could be considered to have had but little opportunity to observe KATUSA military performance in more than isolated instances.

(3) Degree to Which Respondent Failed to Answer Certain Questions. Eight of the five-point-rating-scale questions required fairly specific knowledge of KATUSA performance. These questions concerned maintenance of weapons, carrying out of orders, rifle marksmanship, use of the bayonet, hanging on to weapons and equipment in a withdrawal, patrolling and scouting, cleanliness, and the effective use of weapons and ammunition.

(4) Respondent's Branch of Service. KATUSA were primarily used in the infantry, and the questionnaire was primarily an infantry questionnaire. Therefore, infantrymen should have had greater opportunity to observe KATUSA performance than noninfantrymen.

(5) Whether or Not the Respondent Had Ever Had a KATUSA "Buddy." The buddy system, widely used in Korea, is a system whereby a specific American soldier was assigned a specific KATUSA as a buddy; the American was given the responsibility of training and taking care of this buddy.

On the basis of an analysis of intercorrelations between these criteria, the respondents were separated into groups as follows:

Group A (Experienced Group). Consisted of respondents who had all the following characteristics: (a) more than 1 month of service in Korea, (b) did not disqualify themselves on either of the qualification questions (para 2 above), (c) answered five or more of the eight specific performance questions, (d) were infantrymen, and (e) had had KATUSA buddies.

Group D (Inexperienced Group). Consisted of respondents who had all the following characteristics: (a) disqualified themselves on one or more of the qualification questions, (b) answered less than five of the eight specific performance questions, (c) were infantrymen with less than 1 month of service in Korea, or noninfantrymen, and (d) had not had KATUSA buddies.

Because the buddy system was not used in all units in Korea, and because the number of American buddies in any unit was limited by the number of KATUSA in the unit, the foregoing grouping eliminates a number of respondents who had had no KATUSA buddies but who had otherwise enjoyed considerable experience with KATUSA. For this reason, a third group, Group B, was formed, consisting of respondents with all the characteristics of the respondents in Group A except that they had never had KATUSA buddies.

Some respondents who were otherwise inexperienced reported that they had had KATUSA buddies. Presumably many of these respondents were not

using the word "buddy" in the technical sense and simply meant that they had had good KATUSA friends (other evidence in the questionnaire responses also indicates this fact). These respondents evidently had more knowledge of KATUSA than the respondents in Group D. They were therefore placed in a final group, Group C (identical with Group D except for the possession of "buddies," and intermediate in experience between Groups B and D).

Thus there are four groups, labeled A, B, C, and D, in the order of their experience with KATUSA. Naturally the proportion of "no answers" is larger among the less experienced groups, but when these "no answers" are eliminated, and the substantive opinions of the groups are compared, the responses of the four groups turn out to vary by only a few percentage points on almost all 17 questions pertaining to military performance, and only 3 questions reveal statistically significant differences between the groups.*

In other words, insofar as differentially experienced respondents felt able to express their opinions about KATUSA performance, they expressed approximately the same opinions. It was therefore not necessary to discuss the opinions of the four groups separately in the analysis of KATUSA performance in the body of this report, and the opinions of all the respondents were combined. Table A3 shows the responses to each of 17 questions, for each of the four groups (A, B, C, and D).

Annex 1

CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH KATCOMs

While this study was being conducted in US units in Korea,† the Operations Research Officer of the Canadian Army—assigned to the Canadian Brigade in the British Commonwealth Division—expressed interest in administering the KATUSA questionnaire to Canadian Army personnel. He did so and submitted the completed questionnaires to ORO.

Although the sample was small—188 officers and men—and was not systematically selected either by random or other methods to provide the accepted requirements for tests of statistical significance, the responses were tabulated. They are reported in Table A1.

Although not conclusive, the results are interesting in that they so closely resemble the responses of US personnel (see Fig. A1).

Even differences between the viewpoints of officers and enlisted men were similar in the Canadian sample. The consistency or similarity between US and Canadian responses suggests that some credulity can be placed in the responses.

Two differences existed in the Canadian sample and situation. One was that a higher percentage of the Canadian questionnaires were completed by officers. The other was that Canadians' experience with KATCOMs was more recent. KATCOMs were first introduced into Canadian Army units in Korea in

* Statistical significance was determined by a chi-square test. The conservative 0.01 level of significance was used.

† Summer and fall of 1953 in US units.

May 1953.† Therefore Canadian experience with Koreans integrated in their units was quite recent. These KATCOMs were certainly more thoroughly trained in ROK Army training centers and schools (under US advisory assistance—K MAG) than the KATUSA integrated in US units in the early days of the war.

Furthermore, active fighting had been less extensive and less intense in Canadian units between May and the end of July than in many US units. Actions in Canadian units had consisted of patrol actions, and small-unit attacks—involving up to a company or two at a time during the period studied. In terms of their experience the Canadians reported their KATCOMs as fairly satisfactory soldiers.

*July 1950 in US units.

Appendix B

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLES

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CANADIAN UNITS

The 25th Canadian Brigade (part of the British Commonwealth Division) in Korea at the time of the survey (October 1953) was composed of three infantry battalions. One of these battalions consisted mainly of French-speaking Canadians mostly from the Province of Quebec. Although its officers were bilingual, only French was used in this battalion. However, because the questionnaire was printed in English, it was distributed only to those men in the unit who understood English.

The three units to which the questionnaire was administered were:

3d Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, recruited from Canadian areas peopled largely by English and Scotch stock.

3d Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, an elite group by tradition but the greenest Canadian troops in Korea.

3d Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment, largely French-Canadian, although having many English-speaking personnel who responded to the questionnaire.

KOREAN UNITS

The 635 ex-KATUSA to whom the questionnaire was administered in September 1953 were in the 21st and 25th ROK Divisions, having been rotated recently from US units within the past few months.

US UNITS

The KATUSA questionnaire was administered to units in six US divisions as follows:

2d Div—I, K, L, M, and Hq Co of 9th Regt; 2d Engr C Bn; and 2d Sig Co.

3d Div—A, B, and D Co of 15th Regt; I, K, and L Co of 65th Regt.

7th Div—B, C, and D Co of 31st Regt; E, F, G, and H Co of 32d Regt; 13th Engr Bn; and 57th FA Bn.

25th Div—1st, 2d, and 3d Bn of 35th Regt; 8th, 69th, and 90th FA Bn; 21st AAA.

40th Div—A and D Co, 223d Regt; F and H Co, 224th Regt; I Co, 160th Regt; 578th Engr Bn; and 625 FA Bn.

45th Div—A, E, H, I, and L Co, 180th Regt; 120th Engr C Bn; 45th Signal Co.

Table B1 breaks down the US sample by various characteristics.

Table B1

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE US SAMPLE^a

Individual status	Percent	Individual status	Percent
Branch of service		Region or country in which born	
Infantry	78	Northern state	38
Engineer	7	Southern state	26
Artillery	9	Midwestern state	19
Signal	6	Southwestern state	4
Rank		Western state	7
Privates	69	Outside US	6
Corporals	17	Years of schooling completed	
Sergeants	11	Less than 6 years	4
Officers	3	6 to 8 years	23
Length of service with present unit		9 to 12 years	60
Less than 1 month	11	13 to 16 years	11
1 to 6 months	63	More than 16 years	2
Over 6 months	26	Present Army status	
Race or ethnic group		Regular army	36
White	78	Selectee	59
Negro	16	Reserve	5
Spanish American	5		
Oriental	1		

^aTotal respondents, 4545.

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Appendix C

QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION

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CONSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF KATUSA QUESTIONNAIRE

The questionnaire was based on preliminary interviews with army, division, and regimental officers, who were queried about utilization practices with respect to KATUSA, about the problems created by KATUSA in US units, and about their opinions concerning the effectiveness of KATUSA as soldiers. In general the questionnaire was oriented to the evaluation of KATUSA as combat infantrymen and the problems they generated in infantry units. This was in accord with the predominant use of KATUSA as combat infantrymen. The characteristics described in many questions closely follow those used in the study of integrating negro troops (ORO-R-11).¹⁴

Opinions and attitudes of American combat personnel were elicited by means of a self-administered questionnaire. This questionnaire was filled out by a sample drawn from all the US divisions in Korea. Altogether, approximately 750 men per division were queried, usually in groups of 200 to 300 at a time by ORO analysts. After each questionnaire administration, group interviews were conducted with officers, selected NCOs, and/or privates from each of the units present. Each division was covered in the course of a day, and all divisions were surveyed within the course of a week, at the beginning of August 1953. This was shortly after the signing of the armistice.

Questionnaires were administered to all the members of each unit who could be made available for the study at the date and time designated for the administration. Troops with less than 1 month of service in Korea were not included in the sample. A few members of each unit who were engaged in essential details or who were sick or otherwise absent from duty were thus not included.

CONSTRUCTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF EX-KATUSA QUESTIONNAIRE

The ex-KATUSA questionnaire was prepared in advance by the project members in consultation with Professor Hay Nam Lee, the Korean research associate. The questions were designed to require only a show of hands by the ex-KATUSA in response to the verbal statement of each question in Korea. The questionnaires were administered to groups of 6 to 200 ex-KATUSA at a time. There were no ROK officers or Korean personnel present other than the ex-KATUSA and Professor Lee. Because of the conditions under which the questionnaires were administered and the nature of the results there is every reason to have confidence that they truly reflect the attitudes of ex-KATUSA. As a further check, extensive discussions of the questions and the meanings of the responses were conducted with the smaller groups of KATUSA and with selected members of the larger groups. (The questionnaires were administered orally because of the low level of Korean literacy.)



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Appendix D

POSSIBLE ADJUSTMENTS FOR BIAS

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Kinds of Bias Commonly Encountered

In a questionnaire survey of the type employed in this study two kinds of bias are generally encountered. The first is termed "attitude bias" and reflects the general tendency of the respondents to give their own group an advantage, in comparison with another group. The second, having to do with the phrasing of the questions, is referred to as "question bias."

Attitude and Question Bias

Although the officers responding to the KATUSA questionnaire were comparing "their" troops with KATUSA, they were not so directly a part of the group of "Americans" referred to in the questions as the enlisted men. Hence it is not too surprising that their responses bore out the theory that the tendency to favor one's own group normally gives results with a negative bias. All except one of the officers' ratings were higher than those of the enlisted men. This would suggest that the enlisted men's opinions regarding KATUSA are likely to be subject to negative bias, and judgments of the ratings reported should take this into account.

In an attempt to estimate the effects of different phrasing of questions three pairs of questions with somewhat similar content were included in the questionnaire. These questions are reported in Table 4, and an analysis of the results of responses to them is included in the section on KATUSA Military Performance. For one of these questions the results were close enough to suggest that the respondents, in fact, were thinking of the same subject when they responded, and the difference in results between these two questions could represent the possible bias that resulted from the question phrasing. Since the phrasing of most of the other questions was similar to the one from this pair with the lower score, it is possible that the responses to questions generally might have been overly conservative. This would suggest that in addition to allowances for attitude bias, judgments concerning KATUSA should be revised upward to reflect question bias.

In any event, the mean score on this question (2.26) placed the composite rating in the "inferior" category. The deviation of -0.74 from the theoretical mean of 3.0 could be considered as a measure of the degree of bias on this question. Although it would be unsafe to generalize this deviation as a general measure of bias of respondents, it is worth noting that it indicates the presence of a considerable negative bias and that allowance should be made for this sort of bias in interpreting responses to other questions in the study.

Intensity Bias

One further methodological problem raised in the polling technique with respect to the question bias is the matter of the "intensity function." It has been found that no matter how carefully the questions are constructed, attempts to divide a population into pro or con leads to distortion due to the intensities of feelings of the respondents. In this case this problem has been minimized by the use of the five alternative-response choices (rather than a mere yes or no choice). However, mention is made of this point because the results were analyzed on the basis of the mean scores computed by weighting the responses.

No correction or adjustment factor was applied to the raw data for any of the points mentioned previously. The reader may take these into account in the study of this paper as he sees fit.

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Appendix E

KATUSA UTILIZATION, SELECTION POLICY, TRAINING,
AND STRENGTH DATA

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UTILIZATION POLICY

A KMAG Instruction Memo set forth the following policy regarding utilization of KATUSA:

1. The Eighth Army provides KATUSA personnel with equipment, clothing, food, and medical care. KATUSA personnel also received the same gratuitous issue of Quartermaster supplies as did other UN troops. But the Republic of Korea was responsible for the pay of the KATUSA personnel. This pay was from another ROK appropriation than the pay of the army, and KATUSA personnel were not included in the ROKA troop basis or chargeable to its authorized strength. The pay was the same as that of ROKA.

2. US unit commanders included KATUSA personnel as a separate category in the daily PDS and morning reports. These commanders also had responsibility for the maintenance of service records, immunization records, and pay records of KATUSA personnel assigned their units. The permanent records of KATUSA personnel, however, were the responsibility of TAG, ROKA.

3. KATUSA personnel were not subject to the US military laws. Disciplinary control and courts-martial jurisdiction over KATUSA personnel were exercised by the ROKA, to whom offenses were reported and if necessary the offenders delivered.

4. KATUSA personnel were enlisted personnel. There were officers who were classified KATUSA, but these were interpreter officers, liaison, administrative, and finance officers, who did not exercise command over the KATUSA enlisted personnel. Exception to this general statement were honor guard platoons and companies that were commanded by ROKA officers.

SELECTION POLICY AND TRAINING

A memo from Maj Gen C. E. Ryan to Lt Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, April 1953, indicates the process of selection of KATUSA in the latter part of the war.

Personnel for assignment to KATUSA are comprised of Korean soldiers who have had no active service other than 16 weeks of Infantry training. As a rule, the draftees with education and special aptitudes have been screened and diverted to a (ROKA) training school, after the completion of the first 8 weeks, for specialized training to fill the requirements of the administrative and technical units. Accordingly, those remaining are mainly able-bodied individuals qualified for combat duty, with little or no education or special civilian training. Replacements for KATUSA are selected from such a group.¹¹

Reports in ORO-R-4 (FEC), however, indicate that the KATUSA assigned in the early days of the war had practically no training:

The first group of KATUSA personnel was sent on 20 Aug 50 to EUSAK Organizations directly from the streets of Taegu and Pusan. These recruits did not receive any military training before being sent to the US troop units. Some military organizations held these replacements and gave them two or three weeks of training (familiarization with weapons etc.) as separate units under the direction of the organization's officers and enlisted men. Other organizations were forced to commit these raw recruits immediately. It is necessary to remember these different situations when evaluating the first stages of integration into EUSAK units.¹

EIGHTH ARMY CIRCULAR 176

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 301, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176

1 October 1953

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED
NATIONS FORCES

SECTION	SUBJECT
I	General Information
II	Employment
III	Procurement
IV	Training
V	Administration
VI	Accounting
VII	Supply
VIII	References and Rescissions

SECTION I

1. GENERAL. This circular incorporates in a single directive current instructions and policies of this headquarters concerning the employment, procurement, and administrative and logistical support of Korean Army personnel serving with United Nations forces. Unless stated otherwise, all instructions are equally applicable to all categories of personnel defined in paragraph 2 below. The term "Korean Army personnel" will refer to all three categories listed in paragraph 2 below.

2. DEFINITIONS. There are three separate categories of Korean Army personnel serving with United Nations forces in Korea:

- a. KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army). Personnel assigned and integrated into organizations of the UN forces in the same manner that US replacements are integrated into US organizations. There are no commissioned officers or warrant officers in this category.
- b. ROKA Liaison Personnel. Officer and enlisted technicians who are attached to UN organizations to accomplish specific missions, as shown in paragraph 4 below.
- c. ROKA Interpreters. Linguists attached to UN organizations who hold commissioned grade. They have no command responsibility or duties other than those of interpreters.

SECTION II

EMPLOYMENT

3. KATUSA. The broad objectives in the integration of KATUSA personnel are to increase the fighting capability of the unit to which they are assigned, and to train a nucleus around which ROKA units may be organized when UN forces depart Korea. The majority of KATUSA personnel will be assigned to combat jobs in infantry or combat support units. However, some KATUSA personnel will be assigned to service and service support units.

- a. KATUSA personnel will be integrated in US units the same as US replacements. They will not be organized into separate units of any size or into guard detachments. Any such units currently organized will be disbanded.
 - b. KATUSA personnel will not be permanently assigned as laborers, cargo carriers, houseboys, KP, or to other non-military tasks. This policy does not prohibit the rotation of KATUSA, as individuals, to those housekeeping tasks or guard and security details to which US personnel are detailed by unit duty roster.
 - c. Unit commanders will not assign KATUSA personnel duties which require access to or the handling of classified material except on the "need to know" (paragraph 17 b, AR 380-5) basis only for training materials, nor will they be employed in the army postal system, except in the distribution of KATUSA mail.
4. ROKA LIAISON PERSONNEL.
- a. All personnel of this category are attached to using units by ROKA orders for the purpose of accomplishing specialist tasks, such as:
 - (1) Administration of KATUSA
 - (2) Finance for KATUSA
 - (3) War crimes investigation
 - (4) Real estate procurement
 - (5) Operations, to effect coordination between adjacent, subordinate, and supported units.
 - b. ROKA liaison personnel will not be employed for any purpose other than that for which they were attached.

5. ROKA INTERPRETERS. These officers are attached to using units by ROKA orders, upon request of this headquarters, for use in interpretation and translation duties only. They will not be assigned to other duties. Interpreters will not be considered as interpreters for any individual but for the unit to which they are attached. Interpreters are required to submit a report twice each month to ROKA to reflect their activities. The existing critical shortages of interpreter officers and the limited future procurement of these specialists make it necessary that US commanders and advisers institute a program whereby the better qualified interpreters will conduct special courses for those who are considered below standard in an effort to improve the lesser qualified individuals.

6. STATUS AND STANDARD OF PERFORMANCE. ROKA liaison and interpreter officers will receive the same courtesy and consideration as is accorded all other officers of the United Nations forces and will maintain the same standard of duty, performance, and conduct.

SECTION III

PROCUREMENT

7. PROCUREMENT OF KATUSA PERSONNEL. Distribution of KATUSA personnel to using units will be made on the basis of bulk allotments established by this headquarters. Therefore, under normal conditions, requests for such personnel need not be submitted. If there is a critical need for KATUSA personnel, requests will be submitted to this headquarters in the same manner as described in paragraph 8, below, for ROKA liaison personnel.

8. REQUESTS FOR ROKA LIAISON PERSONNEL.

- a. Requests will be forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: KGP, through command channels. Corps, divisions, and groups will consolidate requests.

Requests of other units will be forwarded direct to this headquarters. Requests will indicate:

- (1) Number required
- (2) Type of service or duty to be performed
- (3) Justification. If ROKA personnel are desired for administrative support of KATUSA personnel, the justification will show the number of KATUSA for whom administrative and financial services are to be provided and the units to which KATUSA are assigned. ROKA administrative and finance personnel are essential in organizations having KATUSA personnel to assure that KATUSA records are properly maintained in accordance with ROKA requirements.

- b. The following table will serve as a guide in submitting requests for administrative personnel.

US UNIT	(ROKA ADMIN PERS)	
	Officer	EM (Sergeant)
Combat division, separate RCT, brigade, or group headquarters	1/500 EM or major fraction thereof	2 plus 1 for ea 200 in excess of 300 or major fraction
Divisional regiment, division artillery, separate battalion other than artillery, or separate company		1 when KATUSA in excess of 25 assigned
Corps headquarters company		1 when KATUSA assigned
Nondivisional separate battalion	1 when KATUSA in excess of 200 assigned	1 when KATUSA assigned
Other	Submit requirements to this headquarters	

- c. The following table will be used as a guide in determining the finance personnel required to provide necessary finance service for KATUSA personnel.

Number of KATUSA Personnel*	ROKA Finance Personnel	
	Officer	Enlisted
500-1000	1	3
1000-3000	1	5

*When less than 500 KATUSA personnel are attached to a unit, finance service will be obtained by appointing United States army officers as Class A agents to the nearest ROKA disbursing office.

- d. The use of ROKA officers and noncommissioned officers for the control of KATUSA personnel is prohibited, except as prescribed by this circular.

9. REQUESTS FOR ROKA INTERPRETERS. Interpreters are procured by ROKA from civilian and military sources, by advertising in Korea publications, announcements in ROKA units, and through recommendations of advisory and other UN personnel. There is a critical shortage of these specialists within this command, as procurement sources

have been unable to meet the increasing demands. Commanders are urged to recommend suitable KATUSA personnel for appointment as interpreter officers. Eighth Army units desiring ROKA interpreters will submit requests to this headquarters, ATTN: KGP, including a detailed justification for the attachment of such personnel. Requests will be consolidated at this headquarters, and forwarded to the Chief, KMAG, for necessary action. Requirement for control of KATUSA is not considered sufficient justification for the attachment of interpreters under the current situation. Upon procurement of interpreter personnel by KMAG, this headquarters will notify units concerned.

SECTION IV

TRAINING

10. ROKA LIAISON AND INTERPRETER PERSONNEL. Specialists and technicians are considered adequately trained for the performance of the duties for which they have been selected and assigned. Therefore, no specific training program need be developed for them other than that suggested in paragraph 5, above. They will be encouraged to participate in the training given KATUSA personnel (paragraph 11, below) if the pressure of their primary duties permits. Under no conditions will participation in training be permitted to interfere with the performance of primary duty.

11. TRAINING OF KATUSA PERSONNEL.

- a. Fillers. Fillers normally receive sixteen weeks' basic training at the ROKA Replacement Training Center. This training is generally the same as that given US troops. Training in technical subjects such as map reading and communications is minimized.
- b. Leaders. Leaders normally receive eight weeks' additional training at the ROKA Replacement Training Center. This training is similar to the United States leaders' course, but the ROKA enlisted man is taught to be a squad or platoon leader.
- c. Training by United States Army Units. The following subjects will be included in training programs of US Army units for newly assigned KATUSA personnel. Additional subjects, as considered necessary by the unit commander may be included.
 - (1) Subjects applicable to both combat and service units.
 - (a) Orientation to include:
 1. Organization of the unit
 2. History of the unit while in Korea
 3. Operation of KATUSA in the unit
 - (b) Essential English military terms. The command "HALT" and password system must be fully explained. Korean soldiers have been shot because they did not understand the system.
 - (c) Weapons familiarization.
 - (d) Field sanitation and personal hygiene; to be stressed, as ROKA standards are not the same as those of US troops.
 - (e) Technical subjects such as:
 1. Map reading
 2. Radio-telephone procedure and use
 3. Intelligence
 - (f) TI&E subjects as approved by this headquarters.

- (2) Subjects applicable to combat and combat support units only:
- (a) Tank-infantry tactics
 - (b) Review of American squad tactics
 - (c) Patrolling night and day, and patrol reporting
 - (d) Technique of making final assault and closing with the enemy
 - (e) Reorganization and consolidation of objective against counterattack
- (3) In service and service support units, on-the-job training in MOS positions which can be used as a nucleus for cadre of similar type ROKA units.

SECTION V

ADMINISTRATION

12. PERSONNEL RECORDS. The maintenance of service records (ROKA AGO Form 2300-4), immunization records, and pay records for KATUSA personnel will be the responsibility of the commander of the unit to which the individuals are assigned. Records will bear the serial number of the individual concerned, and a permanent copy of each record, except the immunization record, will be maintained by the Korean Army. Due to language and administrative differences between US and ROKA forces, ROKA personnel should assist in performing the administration. Such personnel may be obtained in the manner prescribed in paragraph 8, above.

13. CORRESPONDENCE. Correspondence on Korean Army matters will be forwarded through command channels in sufficient copies so that the original and two carbon copies will arrive at this headquarters, with additional copies for intermediate headquarters. Direct communication with the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea or Headquarters Republic of Korea Army in reference to Korean Army personnel by commands other than this headquarters is not authorized. All correspondence must include the serial number of the individual concerned since the ROKA filing system is by serial number and not by name.

14. DISCIPLINARY MATTERS.

- a. Korean Army personnel will not be considered as persons subject to military law within the meaning of Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Unless acting under the direct supervision and control of authorized United States military authority, in line of duty, at the time of the commission or omission of an act or incident giving rise to a claim for damages to property or injury or death, ROKA personnel will not be considered as military personnel (AR 25-25, AR 25-70, AR 25-80, AR 25-90, and AR 25-100).
- b. Disciplinary control and courts-martial jurisdiction over all Korean Army personnel will be exercised by Republic of Korea military authorities, to whom offenses will be reported and, if necessary, the offender delivered in accordance with paragraph 27, below.

15. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. United States chaplains will provide Korean Army personnel, so far as possible, to the equivalent of the services rendered for United States Army personnel. There are some Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, among the South Korean forces. Their religious and spiritual needs can be cared for in an adequate manner by their participation in American religious services, and through the cooperation of Korean ministers and Christian missionaries. For those not of the Christian faith, every effort should be made to see that they receive spiritual ministrations and counsel from religious representatives of their respective non-Christian denominations.

16. **CASUALTY REPORTING.** Casualty reports on Korean Army personnel serving with US units will be submitted in the manner prescribed in current regulations for US Army personnel. Reports will be prepared on FEC AGO Form 241A and routed to this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-C, for forwarding to The Adjutant General, ROKA.

17. **DECEASED KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL.** Remains of deceased Korean Army personnel will be turned over to ROKA agencies with tags indicating name, grade, service number, organization, cause of death, and location at time of death. Personal effects will accompany remains.

18. **DETACHED SERVICE.** KATUSA personnel placed on duty with United Nations units, attached to United States units for operations, will be considered as being on detached service. All administrative matters will remain the responsibility of the United States organization.

19. **MEDICAL.** Korean Army personnel serving with US units will receive outpatient medical care from the dispensary or aid station servicing the US unit to which they are assigned or attached. They will be evacuated through US medical channels. All necessary medical care enroute will be provided by US medical facilities, including emergency surgery at mobile surgical hospitals. They will be transferred from US medical channels to ROKA hospitals or ROKA evacuation channels as soon as economically feasible.

- a. **Records.** Upon evacuation from the division clearing company, or medical facility serving non-divisional units, personnel will be dropped from the morning reports of units concerned as evacuated to unknown hospital. US Army hospitals receiving or disposing of ROKA personnel who are serving with US units will forward admission and disposition sheets to the US unit concerned. When transfer to ROKA medical facility is known or presumed, personnel records will be forwarded to Hq ROK Army through this headquarters; otherwise they will be retained by the unit. Such transfer to ROKA medical facility can be presumed in the following circumstances:
 - (1) Expiration of a period of 10 days after evacuation from division clearing station, without receipt of report of admission to US medical unit.
 - (2) Expiration of a period of 10 days after report of disposition from US medical unit, without receipt of report of admission to another US medical unit.
 - b. **Return.** If return of the individual is desired after completion of hospitalization, the following entry will be made in the individual's records: "Request return of _____ to _____, US Army, on completion of hospitalization."
 - c. **Immunization.** Korean Army personnel are under the same immunization program as US troops. Current Eighth Army directives and TB MED 114 apply. Upon joining a US unit, all Korean Army personnel will be immunized against the following diseases, unless acceptable records evidence such immunization within the preceding six months: smallpox, typhoid, cholera, typhus, and tetanus. Duplicate records of immunization will be prepared for each individual on WD AGO Form 8-117. One copy will be kept with personnel records, and one copy will be retained by the individual.
20. **PAYMENT OF KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL.** All Korean Army personnel serving with UN organizations will receive finance service from the ROKA finance officer designated to service the organization.
- a. The manner of payment is similar to that used for US personnel. US Army officers will be appointed Class A agents to the appropriate ROKA disbursing officer in the same manner as Class A agent officers are appointed for paying US personnel. These Class A agents are required to make the usual return of payrolls and cash to the ROKA finance office.

- b. ROKA finance personnel required by UN organizations to maintain KATUSA finance records may be obtained in the manner described in paragraph 8 above.

21. MAIL. Korean Army personnel serving with US units are entitled to the free mailing privilege and are authorized to use Army-Air Force postal channels within Korea subject to the conditions listed below:

a. Requirements.

- (1) Only letter mail will be handled.
- (2) The name of the writer, service number, and organization will be shown in the return address.

b. Procedures. [Rescinded, see Change 2.]

- (1) APO 102 will be the concentration point for all mail from Korean Army personnel serving with US units to civilians in the Republic of Korea and all mail from civilians to such personnel received by ROKA through post offices in provinces closer to Taegu than Seoul.
- (2) APO 301 will be the concentration point for all mail from civilians to Korean Army personnel serving with US units received by ROKA through post offices in provinces closer to Seoul than Taegu.
- (3) Unit mail clerks will separate ROKA mail from other outgoing mail, face and tie it in bundles, and dispatch it to the appropriate APO.
- (4) All such mail received from organizations by APOs will be placed in separate pouches from other mail, with a drop tag attached and labeled "Republic of Korea Soldiers' Mail," and dispatched to APO 102, which will deliver such mail to the Republic of Korea representative.
- (5) Letters addressed to Korean Army personnel serving with US units will be accepted at APOs 102 and 301 only. Mail must bear the censor stamp, be tied separately, and labeled to the unit address prior to delivery to the APO.
- (6) Upon receipt, unit mail clerks will make delivery to addressees.

- c. Undeliverable Mail. Mail that cannot be delivered because the addressee is listed as missing, deceased, hospitalized, or for any other reason, will be so indorsed and forwarded to the Adjutant General, Republic of Korea Army, for disposition.

22. LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

- a. General. The leave policy for ROKA personnel has been established in ROKA AR 600-115. In general the policy is as follows:

- (1) There are four types of leave: convalescent, reward, emergency, and ordinary.
- (2) Leave of 10 days or more may be spent at home. Lesser periods will be spent in a rest area controlled by division or corps.
- (3) Commanders of regiments, groups, or higher headquarters may grant leaves.
- (4) [Rescinded, see Change 4.] While on leave outside of a rest area, subsistence allowance will be paid by the ROKA disbursing officer who normally pays the unit in accordance with current allowances for the time on leave. In the event the individual goes AWOL from leave, the allowance will be forfeited.
- (5) Authority for leave must be published in special orders. The address or area where the individual may be located must be included in the orders. Two copies of leave orders for each individual must be forwarded through this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-A, to The Adjutant General, Republic of Korea Army.

- (6) Individuals may be recalled from leave for cogent reasons or misconduct. They will not forfeit the unused portion of their leave.
- b. Convalescent Leave. Convalescent leave is awarded by hospitals for medical reasons in the same manner as awarded by US units. It is not chargeable to accrued ordinary leave.
- c. Reward Leave. Reward leave is given to those individuals who have earned a Korean (or equivalent) award. It is not chargeable against accrued leave. The amount of leave authorized for each award is as follows:
- (1) Distinguished Military Service Medal 1st Class (comparable to Medal of Honor) - 20 days.
 - (2) Distinguished Military Service Medal 2d Class (comparable to Distinguished Service Cross) - 10 days.
 - (3) Distinguished Military Service Medal 3d Class (comparable to Silver Star) and 4th Class (comparable to Bronze Star) - 5 days.
 - (4) Outstanding meritorious service not recognized in accordance with (1) through (3) above - 5 days.
- d. Ordinary leave of ten days may be authorized on the same basis as R&R to Japan for US personnel; i.e., if it normally takes ten months for a US soldier to become eligible for R&R, KATUSA personnel serving in the same unit would become eligible for leave every ten months. Not more than 5% of KATUSA personnel in a unit may be granted leave at one time. In units where KATUSA strength is less than twenty, not more than one man may be on ordinary leave at one time.

23. **AWARDS AND DECORATION.** United States military decorations are awarded to friendly cobelligerent forces as prescribed in AR 600-45 and current Eighth Army directives. Commanders are encouraged to provide reward leaves for KATUSA personnel who are decorated for valorous or meritorious service. To preclude actions which may require revocation, awards of the Purple Heart and Combat Infantry Badge are not authorized for Korean Army personnel. Recognition for wounds received in action may be awarded by the Republic of Korea Army as certified by ROKA liaison (administrative) officers of the US units.

24. **ISSUE OF UN SERVICE MEDAL.** The United Nations Service Medal is authorized for issue to KATUSA personnel assigned to US units.

25. **WEARING OF US ARMY INSIGNIA.** KATUSA personnel are authorized to wear on their left shoulder the appropriate shoulder insignia of the US organization to which they are assigned or attached. They will wear on the right shoulder the distinctive KATUSA shoulder patch, to be issued as soon as available. The wearing of any other US Army insignia, grade, collar ornaments, or badges by Korean Army personnel is not authorized.

26. **PROMOTION AND DEMOTION OF KATUSA PERSONNEL.** KATUSA may be promoted on the first day of March and September. However, promotions from private to private first class after completion of three months' service may be made without regard to normal dates specified for promotions. The following procedure and criteria will govern:

- a. Time-in-grade (waivers will not be granted).
- (1) Private to private first class - 3 months
 - (2) Private first class to corporal - 6 months
 - (3) Corporal to sergeant - 6 months
 - (4) Sergeant to staff sergeant - 9 months
 - (5) Staff Sergeant to Technical Sergeant:

- (a) More than five years ROK Army service to include a minimum of one year in present grade, or
 - (b) More than two years ROK Army service to include a minimum of two years in present grade.
- (6) Technical Sergeant to Master or First Sergeant:
- (a) More than six years Army service to include a minimum of two years service in present grade, or
 - (b) More than three years Army service to include minimum of three years service in present grade.
- b. Authority to Promote.
- (1) Private to private first class by company or battery to which individual is assigned.
 - (2) Corporal, sergeant, and staff sergeant by regimental, separate battalion, comparable or higher authority.
 - (3) Technical sergeant, master or first sergeant by the Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Army.
- c. Recommendations. Recommendations for promotion to Technical Sergeant, Master Sergeant and First Sergeant will be forwarded through this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-PA, to the Chief of Staff, Republic of Korea Army, Taegu, Korea. Orders announcing promotion to these grades will be published by Headquarters, Republic of Korea Army.
- (1) Recommendations to these grades will not be made for promotion of personnel having one or more of the following disqualifying features:
 - (a) Attained 50 points or less in NCO ability examination (ROKA administered). See Change 1
 - (b) Those who are under investigation at the present time.
 - (c) Those who have been punished by disciplinary action.
 - (d) Those who have been hospitalized more than 60 days for sickness.
 - (e) Those who did not report to new unit within 2 weeks after the date of the special order transferring them.
 - (f) Those who have been convicted by court-martial.
 - (g) Those who did not return from leave within one week after expiration of such leave.
 - (h) Those classed as stragglers without proper reason.
 - (i) Absent without official leave for more than one week.
 - (2) Recommendations for promotion to these grades should contain:
 - (a) Grade, serial number, name, date of last promotion or demotion, length of time in grade and recommended grade.
 - (b) Commander's estimate of performance in the grade and position for which recommended for promotion.
 - (c) Description of any meritorious service, as applicable.
 - (d) Performance in present grade and position, and any other information pertinent to the particular recommendation which the commander desires to submit.
 - (3) In exceptional cases waivers of eligibility requirements may be forwarded for consideration.

- d. Changes in Grade E-7. Recommendations may be submitted for temporary changes of master sergeants to first sergeants or vice versa so that grades may conform with assigned duties. Upon reassignment, the enlisted man concerned will revert to original grade.
- e. Vacancies. Except as qualified by these regulations, commanders, in promoting KATUSA personnel, will not exceed the normal ratios and grades per duty that exist under US Army policies. Promotion of KATUSA personnel will not be a deterrent to promotion of US personnel.
- f. Reduction. Authority for reduction due to misconduct or inefficiency is vested in the promoting authority. Personnel in the grade of corporal or lower will be reduced to private. Personnel in grade of sergeant or higher grade may be reduced to an appropriate intermediate grade.
- g. Orders. Orders promoting or demoting KATUSA personnel will be forwarded by letters of transmittal as follows: three copies to ROKA headquarters, one copy to this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-PA.
- (1) When more than one person is affected by an order, a copy will be forwarded for each individual concerned.
 - (2) All promotions are permanent. Orders will so state and make no reference to temporary promotions.
- h. ROKA liaison and interpreter personnel may be promoted by ROKA headquarters only. Recommendations should be forwarded through this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-PA. An interpreter cannot be promoted beyond the rank of captain.
27. RETURN OF KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL TO THE KOREAN ARMY.
- a. All Republic of Korea Army enlisted personnel who are thirty-five (35) years old will be reported for discharge only when such request for report is made by the Republic of Korea Army Headquarters. Korean computations which indicate that a person is one (1) year old at birth will be used.
 - b. Commanders may request permission at any time to reduce the number of ROKA personnel assigned or attached to their organizations. Individual replacements for returned KATUSA personnel will not be made available. Replacements for returned ROKA liaison and interpreter personnel should be specifically requested.
 - c. Requests for divisions and their attached units will be consolidated and forwarded to this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-P. Nondivisional units will forward requests through command channels. Requests, which may be forwarded by any means of communication, will include the following:
 - (1) Name, rank, and serial number.
 - (2) Category of personnel (paragraph 2 above).
 - (3) Balance of Korean Army personnel on hand by category (after release is completed).
 - (4) Location of personnel to be released.
 - (5) Recommended dates of release.
 - (6) Type of transportation to be used.
 - (7) Reasons for release.
 - (8) Name and grade of US officer or noncommissioned officer in charge when return is for disciplinary reasons.
 - d. Upon receipt of the above information, this headquarters will notify the commander of the releasing unit as soon as possible for the following:



- (1) Date and time of release.
- (2) Destination and receiving unit. Normally all KATUSA personnel returned for disciplinary action will be transferred to the 1st ROKA Replacement Battalion at Taegu.
- e. Upon receipt of above notification, the commander of the releasing unit will:
 - (1) Issue written orders containing name, grade, and serial number of personnel to be transferred. Authority for transfer as shown in order will be the notice of approval from this headquarters. Orders will be prepared in sufficient copies to furnish three copies to the receiving unit at time of turnover, and one copy to this headquarters through channels after transfer is completed.
 - (2) Complete entries in service records and other pertinent informational records relating to the transferred personnel. Service records and allied papers to include three copies of orders returning KATUSA to ROKA will be furnished receiving unit by the officer or noncommissioned officer in charge. When a KATUSA is returned for disciplinary reasons, a statement of the facts and circumstances surrounding the violation certified by the KATUSA's unit commander will accompany the individual's service records.
 - (3) Provide adequate transportation and, when necessary, guards from the point of origin to destination.
 - (4) Provide for adequate messing facilities enroute in all cases when normal travel time is greater than four hours. Provide for shelter if required.
 - (5) Designate in special orders the US officer or noncommissioned officer in charge of the movement. Movements involving more than fifty persons will be commanded by a US commissioned officers.

f. [Added by Change 3.]

28. IDENTIFICATION OF ROKA PERSONNEL.

- a. KATUSA Personnel will be identified by a special KATUSA identification card now being prepared by ROKA.
- b. ROKA Liaison and Interpreter Personnel. Upon reporting to UN units, ROKA liaison and interpreter personnel will be directed to report to the unit adjutant general or adjutant and submit one copy of their orders. The adjutant general or adjutant will provide them with identification showing, in English, name, rank, serial number, parent organization, organization to which attached, and purpose of attachment. Upon termination of the attachment, the identification card will be returned to the issuing agent. Pending distribution of standard identification cards for this purpose, cards will be reproduced locally in accordance with the following form:

NAME _____

RANK _____ SN _____

ORGN _____

ORGN TO WHICH ATCHD _____

PURPOSE _____

SIGNATURE _____ COUNTERSIGNED _____




SECTION VI
ACCOUNTING

29. **PERSONNEL DAILY SUMMARY REPORTS.** Separate totals will be rendered on personnel daily summary reports showing the status of KATUSA personnel, and giving the same information as for US personnel.

30. **MONTHLY STRENGTH REPORT.** A monthly report, accounting for all ROKA personnel serving with UN forces, will be prepared as of the 14th day of each month and submitted so as to reach this headquarters, ATTN: KAG-S, not later than the fourth day following the date for which prepared.

- a. **Personnel to be Reported.** Each report will show separate figures for each category of personnel defined in paragraph 2 above.
- b. **Personnel not to be Reported.** Members of the National Police, Korean Services Corps, indigenous guards, and employees will not be included in the report submitted in accordance with these instructions.
- c. **Reporting Agencies.** A separate report will be submitted by each US Army organization which submits a US Army morning report. Each such report will account for all personnel defined in paragraph 2 above who are assigned or attached, or operating under the direct control of the organization concerned. In addition, a separate report will be submitted by corps and division headquarters for each organization other than US operating under the control of the corps or division concerned. For example, the report for the French infantry battalion will be submitted by the 2d Infantry Division.
- d. **Form of Report.** Whether the report covers one or more individuals, a form similar to Inclosure 1 will be used. Pending distribution of printed forms by this headquarters, this form will be reproduced locally. Negative reports are to be submitted when applicable. When a negative report is submitted, either the prescribed blank form or a brief letter citing the Reports Control Symbol may be used.
- e. **Reports Control Symbol.** Reports Control Symbol KAG-13 (R1) is assigned this report.

31. **MORNING REPORTS SUBMITTED TO ROKA HEADQUARTERS.** ROK Army Regulation 345-400, 10 June 1952, prescribes the ROKA policy for the daily submission of morning reports to Korean Army Headquarters. English translations are provided US units required to submit morning reports for assigned KATUSA and attached ROKA personnel.

- a. Morning reports will be submitted by the following:
 - (1) Infantry regiment for all assigned or attached units.
 - (2) Division artillery for all assigned or attached units.
 - (3) Division headquarters for all assigned or attached units other than those specified in (1) and (2) above.
 - (4) Separate regimental combat team headquarters for all assigned or attached units.
 - (5) Corps headquarters for all assigned or attached units other than those specified in (1) through (4) above.
 - (6) Each headquarters reporting directly to Eighth Army for all assigned or attached units other than those specified in (1) through (5) above.
- b. Reports will be prepared by the attached ROKA liaison (administrative) personnel, assisted by US personnel as necessary, and signed by the adjutant general or adjutant.

- c. Initial reports will include the following:
- (1) List of units having Korean personnel for whom the report is being submitted.
 - (2) Roster by unit (to include companies, detachments, or similar units) of all assigned KATUSA and attached ROKA personnel. Roster will include name, rank, and serial number.
- d. Subsequent reports will include changes in units for which the report is being submitted as well as individual changes.
- e. In the event that all Korean personnel are relieved from assignment or attachment to a reporting headquarters, the following entry will be made on the report recording the final transfer: "All Korean Army personnel relieved, no further reports will be submitted."
- f. Strength recapitulations on morning reports prepared as of the 24th of month should balance with those reported in the special monthly reports submitted in accordance with paragraph 29 above.
- g. All morning reports will be in the Korean language, and will be submitted to The Adjutant General, Republic of Korea Army, Taegu, Korea.
- h. AWOL personnel may be dropped from unit rolls thirty (30) days after the individual left the unit. Individual records will be forwarded with a letter of transmittal to Hq ROKA through this headquarters.
[See Change 1]

SECTION VII
SUPPLY

32. KATUSA PERSONNEL.

- a. Republic of Korea Army will issue minimum essential clothing to KATUSA personnel to accompany individuals enroute to join US units. Minimum essential clothing has been determined by ROKA as follows:

<u>Summer (15 April to 15 October)</u>	<u>Winter (16 October to 14 April)</u>
1 ea belt, web waist	Same as summer issue; however,
1 ea buckle, belt web waist	substitute socks wool, drawers
1 ea cap, HBT	winter, and undershirt winter
1 ea jacket, HBT	for like items of summer issue
1 ea trousers, HBT	Add following:
1 ea pr shoes, rubber training	
1 pr socks, cotton	1 pr gloves, cotton
1 ea drawers, cotton	1 ea overcoat, wool, OD
1 ea undershirt, cotton	

- b. KATUSA personnel will receive rations and other supplies, except pay, on the same basis as US personnel.
- c. When transferred from one US Army unit to another, KATUSA personnel will retain all items of clothing, individual equipment, and individual arms which have been issued.
- d. When separated from a US Army unit to join a ROKA unit or to return to ROKA for discharge, KATUSA personnel will retain the items or substitutes listed below, provided they are in the possession of the individual. All woolen OG-108 clothing in the possession of KATUSA personnel will be withdrawn prior to their departure from US units. This clothing will be replaced with one pair of wool OD trousers and one each wool OD shirt by the losing unit if required:



<u>AMOUNT</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
1 pr	Boots or shoes
2 pr	Socks, cushion sole
1 pr	Trousers wool OD or trousers HBT as appropriate
2 ea	Drawers wool or cotton
1 ea	Cap field cotton or HBT (as available)
1 pr	Gloves (if required)
1 ea	Belt, web, waist w/buckle
1 ea	Shirt wool OD or jacket HBT as appropriate
2 ea	Undershirts wool or cotton
1 ea	Overcoat, jacket M43, raincoat or poncho (as available and as required)

33. ROKA LIAISON AND INTERPRETER PERSONNEL. Initial and continuing supply for ROKA liaison personnel and interpreter officers, to include clothing and necessary items of personal equipment, is the responsibility of the Republic of Korea Army.

- a. In emergencies, when certain items of clothing and equipment are not immediately available from Republic of Korea Army but are required for the performance of a specific mission or duty, such items may be provided by US organizations on a temporary loan basis. Clothing and equipment will be returned to the organizations from which drawn upon receipt of the required items from Republic of Korea Army. This matter will be given special attention to assure that the loan privilege is not abused.
- b. ROKA liaison and interpreter personnel will be extended billeting privileges commensurate with their grade when it is not practicable for them to occupy ROKA facilities.

34. LOSS OR DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT. Equipment issued to KATUSA personnel, which is lost or disposed of by means other than fair wear and tear, will be dropped from the unit property record by report of survey action under SR 735-150-1. If circumstances surrounding the loss indicate improper conduct or illegal disposition of the property, the individual will be returned to the Korean Army as "undesirable" for disciplinary action under paragraph 26 above. This policy will be thoroughly explained to newly assigned KATUSA personnel at replacement companies and reiterated by company commanders at regular intervals.



SECTION VIII
REFERENCES AND RESCISSIONS

35. REFERENCES.

- a. Letter, this headquarters, AG 430 KQM-S, "Gratuitous Issue of Comfort Items for KATUSA," 2 February 1953.
- b. Eighth Army Circular 161, 1952.
- c. Eighth Army Circular 105, 1953.

36. RESCISSIONS.

- a. Section III, Eighth Army Circular 46, 1953.
- b. Paragraph 2, Section VI, Eighth Army Circular 65, 1953.
- c. Section IV, Eighth Army Circular 2, 1953.
- d. Eighth Army Circular 167, 1952

KAG-PA 200

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

PAUL D. HARKINS
Major General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

ROY N. WALKER
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Report of Korean Military Personnel

DISTRIBUTION:
A, BB, CC, D, E, F, G

Cir 176

REPORT OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS [REPORTS CONTROL SYMBOL KAG-13 (R-1)]

UNCLASSIFIED

ORO-T-363

1. Unit for which prepared	2. Date for which prepared	3. Security Classification
4. Major command (Eighth Army)	5. Sub-command (division, corps, etc.)	

6. STRENGTH SECTION: Category of personnel	Officers							Enlisted							AGGREGATE		
	Col	Lt Col	Maj	Capt	1st Lt	2d Lt	WO	Total	1st Sgt	M Sgt	T Sgt	S Sgt	Sgt	Cpl	Pfc	Pvt	Total
a. KATUSA (asg)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X									
b. ROKA LIAISON PERSONNEL (atch) (see item 7 below)																	
c. INTERPRETER OFFICERS	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

7. ROKA LIAISON PERSONNEL (item 6 b above)			
Purpose for which atch	Number involved		
	Officers	Enlisted	Total
a. For combat operations			
b. For administration			
c. For financial activities			
d. For war crimes			
e. For real estate activities			
f. For other (specify)			
g.			

8. REMARKS (Use when considered necessary to explain any items shown elsewhere on the report)

9. I certify that this report is correct	Name and title (typed or printed)	Signature
--	-----------------------------------	-----------

Note: Disregard spaces above marked with an "X"

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Inclosure 1 to Eighth Army Cir 176, 1953

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 301, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

CHANGE NO. 1

24 December 1953

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176
(1 Oct 53)

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

1. Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is amended to delete paragraph 26 c (1) (a). Present policy no longer requires an individual to attain a score of 50 in the NCO ability examination.

2. Paragraph 31 h, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is rescinded and the following substituted:

“AWOL personnel will be dropped from unit rolls fifteen (15) days after the individual has departed the unit. Individual records will be forwarded with a letter of transmittal to Headquarters Republic of Korea Army through this headquarters.”

KAG-PA 200.3

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

T. L. SHERBURNE
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

DAVID H. ARP
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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Ch 1 to Eighth Army Cir 176, 1953

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 301, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

CHANGE No. 2
CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176
(1 Oct 53)

23 February 1954

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

Section V, paragraph 21 b, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is rescinded and the following substituted:

"b. Procedure.

- (1) APO 102 is the concentration point for all mail of the following categories to and from Korean Army personnel serving with U. S. units:
 - (a) From such Korean Army personnel to civilians in the Republic of Korea.
 - (b) From Korean civilians to such Korean Army personnel, which is received in ROK Army post offices in provinces closer to Taegu than to Seoul.
 - (c) From such Korean Army personnel and addressed to other Korean Army personnel, which is received by U. S. APOs closer to Taegu than to Seoul.
- (2) APO 301 is the concentration point for all mail of the following categories to and from Korean Army personnel serving with U. S. units:
 - (a) From Korean civilians to such Korean Army personnel, which is received in ROK Army post offices in provinces closer to Seoul than to Taegu.
 - (b) From such Korean Army personnel and addressed to other Korean Army personnel, which is received by U. S. APOs closer to Seoul than to Taegu.
- (3) Only APO 102 and APO 301 will accept mail addressed from civilians to Korean Army personnel serving with U. S. units. This mail must bear the censor's stamp, be tied separately, and labeled to the unit of address prior to delivery to APO 102 or APO 301 by the Republic of Korea representative.
- (4) Unit mail clerks will separate ROK Army mail from other outgoing mail, face and tie it in bundles, and dispatch it to their serving APO.
- (5) All such mail received by APO's from organizations will be placed in separate pouches from other mail with a drop tag attached labeled 'Republic of Korea Soldier's Mail,' and dispatched to APO 102 or APO 301, as appropriate. Such mail received at APO 102 or APO 301 will be turned over to the Republic of Korea representative.
- (6) Upon receipt of mail for such personnel, unit mail clerks will make delivery to the addressees in the usual manner."

KAG-PA 200

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

T. L. SHERBURNE
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

DAVID H. ARP
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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ORO-T-363

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 301, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

CHANGE No. 3

12 March 1954

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176
(1 Oct 53)

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

Paragraph 27, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is amended to add:

- "f. Orders returning KATUSA to ROKA control will indicate the MOS in which the KATUSA has received training. In those cases where a group of twenty or more KATUSA are returned to ROK Army control, Chief KMAG will be included in distribution of orders issued; such orders are to be forwarded by Eighth Army Courier to Chief KMAG, ATTN: G1, for use in planning ultimate ROK Army assignment."

KAG-PA 200

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

T. L. SHERBURNE
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

DAVID H. ARP
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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[REDACTED]

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HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 301, c/o Postmaster
San Francisco, California

CHANGE NR 4

6 April 1954

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176
(1 Oct 53)

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

Paragraph 22 a (4), Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is rescinded since its provisions are not applicable to KATUSA personnel.

KAG-PA 200

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

T. L. SHERBURNE
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

DAVID H. ARP
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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117

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

HEADQUARTERS
 EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY
 APO 301, c/o Postmaster
 San Francisco, California

CHANGE NR 5

7 September 1954

CIRCULAR
 NUMBER 176
 (1 Oct 53)

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

1. So much of paragraph 26, Section V, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953, as reads, "KATUSA may be promoted . . . specified for promotions." is rescinded.

2. Paragraph 26 a, Section V, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 is rescinded and the following substituted:

"a. Time-in-grade (waivers will not be granted)

- (1) Private to private first class - 3 months.
- (2) Private first class to corporal - 8 months.
- (3) Corporal to sergeant - 10 months.
- (4) Sergeant to staff sergeant - 12 months.
- (5) Staff sergeant to technical sergeant - 24 months.
- (6) Technical sergeant to master or first sergeant - 36 months."

3. Paragraph 26 e, Section V, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953, is rescinded and the following substituted:

"e. Vacancies. The number of NCO's in a unit will be limited in each grade to the following percentages of assigned KATUSA strength:

- (1) Master or first sergeant 1.5%
- (2) Technical sergeant 3.0%
- (3) Staff sergeant 7.4%
- (4) Sergeant 11.6%
- (5) Corporal 17.2%"

4. RESCISSION. Letter, Headquarters Eighth Army, AG 220.2 KGP-P, "Promotion of KATUSA," 6 June, 1954.

KAG-PA 200.3

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

JOHN C. OAKES
 Brigadier General, General Staff
 Chief of Staff

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
 Colonel, AGC
 Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:
 A, BB (less items 7, 11, & 13),
 CC, D, E, F, G

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY (FORWARD)
APO 301, San Francisco, California

CHANGE NR 6

9 December 1954

CIRCULAR
NUMBER 176
(1 Oct 53)

KOREAN ARMY PERSONNEL WITH UNITED NATIONS FORCES

Paragraphs 30c and d, Section VI, Eighth Army Circular 176, 1953 are rescinded and the following substituted:

"c. Reporting Agencies. A separate report, accounting for all personnel defined in paragraph 2, above, who are assigned, attached, or operating under the direct control of the reporting organization, will be submitted. Organizations responsible for submission of reports are as follows:

- (1) Each US Army TOE and TD organization.
- (2) Each US Army Headquarters (corps, division, group, etc) will prepare a separate report for each United Nations organization under the operational control of that headquarters.

d. Form of Report. A form similar to Inclosure 1 will be used. Negative reports are required and may be submitted in letter form. Negative reports submitted by a headquarters will list all individual units for which a negative report is applicable."

KAG 220.3

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL TAYLOR:

OFFICIAL:

DWIGHT E. BEACH
Brigadier General, General Staff
Chief of Staff

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

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STRENGTH

The strength of the KATUSA for the period 31 July 1950 to 31 July 1953, broken down by month and combat assignment, is given in Table E1.

Table E1

KATUSA STRENGTH,¹³ 31 JULY 1950-31 JULY 1953

Month-end	Koreans attached to US Army		Month-end	Koreans attached to US Army	
	Total	Combat		Total	Combat
1950			1952		
Jul	—	—	Jan	9,847	5,513
Aug	11,433	E 11,433	Feb	9,354	5,023
Sep	19,231	18,787	Mar	9,129	4,798
Oct	22,702	21,072	Apr	8,999	4,668
Nov	23,099	21,322	May	8,894	4,563
Dec	16,197	14,966	Jun	10,915	6,695
1951			Jul	11,593	7,266
Jan	14,726	13,188	Aug	12,072	9,578
Feb	12,240	11,128	Sep	14,662	11,661
Mar	14,728	10,506	Oct	13,916	10,290
Apr	14,230	9,739	Nov	15,521	11,940
May	13,341	9,151	Dec	16,520	12,042
Jun	12,718	8,509	1953		
Jul	12,193	7,984	Jan	16,445	12,708
Aug	11,873	7,664	Feb	17,464	14,261
Sep	11,633	7,302	Mar	18,179	14,589
Oct	11,439	7,108	Apr	22,140	16,875
Nov	11,390	7,059	May	23,922	18,066
Dec	10,400	7,069	Jun	22,761	17,829
			Jul	21,917	16,821

[REDACTED]

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Appendix F

KATUSA OPINIONS ABOUT THE M1 RIFLE AND THE CARBINE

DISCUSSION

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[REDACTED]

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DISCUSSION

Because of the fact that many Americans who deal with Korean soldiers speak of the difficulty that Koreans have in handling the M1 rifle and learning rifle marksmanship, it was considered useful to ask the sample of ex-KATUSA for their preferences with respect to these weapons and the reasons for their preferences. Some of the ex-KATUSA expressed an equal preference for rifle and carbine, but the large majority preferred the carbine. The preferences were:

Weapon	Preference, %
M1 rifle	34
M1 carbine	1
M2 carbine	74
No answer	1

These answers should not be taken to indicate that the M1 rifle is preferred over the M1 carbine. The real choice is between rifle and carbine, and those who prefer the latter overwhelmingly prefer the automatic M2 carbine; the M1 carbine is therefore essentially left out of consideration.

The reasons given for the preference for the carbine were that the M1 rifle was too large for people of Korean stature, and that the difference in weight between rifle and carbine made the latter a much handier weapon. Emphasis was placed on the difference in weight. The automatic feature of the carbine was also admired. But the M1 rifle was highly respected for its greater range and its lethality.

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