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18

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES
Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATTNG-26 350.05/1(DOC)(C)(17 Jan 53)

17 January 1953

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

ARMY WAR COLLEGE
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2. Copies are furnished to other military agencies to keep them informed concerning theater problems from the front line through the logistical command.

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4. Combat information EXTRACTS herein which are applicable to training at the company-battery level also appear in Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS.

AWC LOG # FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

53- 1-201-~~18~~ 1976 760924 OM
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1 Incl
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604 thru 639
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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Aviation Section

DATE: October 1952

Source No 604

(SECRET)

TACTICAL NIGHT FLYING. - 1. A tactical weakness of Army aviation has always been the cessation of activities after sundown. One of the operational activities of this section has been the monitoring and encouraging of experimental tactical night flights. To date, these flights have been carried on chiefly by I Corps Artillery and the 7th Infantry Division.

2. Flights are conducted either on bright moonlight nights, or with artificial aids such as searchlight illumination or radar fixes. Searchlights seem to be effective only as navigational or reference aids. Radar promises the best and simplest method on dark nights. The facilities of Detachment No 2, 608th AC&W Squadron, USAF, are used because Army sets lack sufficient flexibility to scan the entire sky both horizontally and vertically. Army aircraft fly over an enemy gun or vehicle while under radar control and the pilot asks for a fix. The observer reports the nature of the target and the radar team immediately telephones the coordinates and target to the fire direction center. The results of the fire are then observed, but adjustment of the fire is difficult; only surveillance has been accomplished to date by this method. Only under full moon conditions has artillery been adjusted successfully on single targets other than those large enough to require area fire.

3. No final conclusions have been reached as to the feasibility of night tactical flying. Experimental flights will be continued to afford material for more complete evaluation of night flying operations.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st FA Obsn Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 605

(CONFIDENTIAL)

SCR-784. - One trouble has arisen in the SCR-784 recently emplaced in the Commonwealth Division sector which has been solved by operating minus one tube. With the elevation anti-hunt tube in its socket, hunting occurs in elevation. When the tube is removed, the set functions properly and no hunting occurs. This same trouble occurred in one other SCR-784 in this theater previously, when normal operation was also achieved by removal of the anti-hunt tube. After several months with the tube removed, the antenna

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again started hunting in elevation. At that time the elevation anti-hunt tube was inserted and normal operation once again was achieved. The radar repairmen together with the assistance of the 16th SRMU cannot find an explanation for this trouble, which to date has occurred in two SCR-784's employed in this theater.

SOURCE: Command Report - 13th Engr Combat Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 606

(CONFIDENTIAL)

IMMEDIATE OVERHEAD COVER FOR INFANTRY. - During this period, Company A made several experiments in providing immediate overhead cover for infantry to permit the reorganization for counterattack. The cover was designed to withstand VT artillery fire on the position. The effort was made along the lines of a sapling mat which could be either braced and carried flat or rolled as a carpet and placed immediately over a foxhole to support up to five layers of sandbags. The experiments involved the use of suspended M3 mines over dummy positions and results indicated no break in the mats and a maximum penetrating effect of two layers of sandbags.

SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division

DATE: June 1952

Source No 607

(RESTRICTED)

AIR SUPPORT. - A regiment of the 9th ROK Division, supported by the 73d Tank Battalion(-) received continuous air cover and close air support during their attack in the * * * Valley on 22 June.

During this exceptional operation the air support was directed by the tank battalion commander by the use of VHF radios and Tactical Air Control Parties.

Two VHF radios were installed in the battalion, one of which was with the battalion headquarters tank of the assaulting company. One TACP was with each radio. One flight of continuous air cover was on call for ground strikes when needed and the battalion commander was authorized to call in available air support from other areas. To facilitate control, air strikes called for by either the tank or infantry elements were channeled through the battalion commander and the TACP's.

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Covering flights were relieved each hour. Flights not receiving requests for strikes during their hour of cover were instructed to attack critical air targets in the area after they were relieved. Thus no combat loaded planes returned to base without performing a mission. It was determined that frequently more damage was done during these critical target strikes than during close support missions.

Recommend that similar air cover and close support be employed more frequently, especially in conjunction with tank attacks so far forward of the MLR that artillery support is not available.

(RESTRICTED)

TRAINING OF SCOUT DOGS. - The 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon has been hampered somewhat by insufficient training of the dogs in the ZI for the tactical situations encountered in this theater.

The dogs have been trained primarily for reconnaissance type patrols, where the dogs are continually moving. Ambush patrols in which the dogs are participating require the animals to remain in one place and often in one position for as long as eight hours.

Many dogs have been lost to the platoon because they were not accustomed to perform under heavy artillery and mortar fire. Flash, sound and concussion of exploding shells causes the dogs to become tense and excited.

The majority of the patrols in which the dogs are used are night patrols. On these missions the animals are able to overcome the barrier of darkness by means of their keen sense of smell and thus aid immeasurably the members of the patrol.

Recommend that additional intensive training be given at the War Dog School, Camp Carson, Colorado emphasizing the three conditions mentioned above. If this were accomplished, it would assist trainers and handlers in the combat zone in that the dogs would be trained from the beginning under these conditions and would be less difficult to condition and handle in a combat zone.

The 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon is the only unit of its type in the Eighth Army area. Thus, personnel and dogs from this unit are assigned numerous patrol missions with other divisions of the Army. This situation

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couples the hardship of long trips to and from these missions to that of the patrol actions themselves.

Therefore, recommend that one Infantry Scout Dog Platoon be assigned to each Infantry Division in Korea.

(RESTRICTED)

M29 PERSONNEL CARRIERS FOR REGIMENTAL TANK CO. - A minimum of two personnel carriers, M29, or similar vehicles should be available for the use of the regimental tank company. In muddy weather and mountainous terrain, wheeled vehicles are not always able to resupply ammunition to tanks on position and often times it is impractical to resupply a point which can be reached by wheeled vehicles. The Personnel Carrier, M39, is not sufficiently maneuverable for this purpose.

The "Weasel" is highly maneuverable, has sufficient traction for steep inclines, and sufficient flotation to prevent excessive damage to roads. At the same time it is capable of transporting necessary payloads without undue danger of becoming bogged down.

SOURCE: Command Report - 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion

DATE: July 1952

Source No 608

(RESTRICTED)

USE OF HELICOPTERS IN ARTILLERY SURVEY. - A test of the practicability of helicopters in artillery survey was completed early in July. The five day test initiated late in June proved the effectiveness of the helicopter. Especial effectiveness is shown in the operations of reconnaissance, recovering of survey stations, policing of survey stations, flagging of survey control points, and occupation of survey points by instrument parties. Immediate results of helicopter transportation are to leap-frog areas where use of paths is denied by marked and unmarked mine fields; by-passing of slopes difficult or impractical to climb; transportation of equipment difficult to pack up steep slopes; and almost total elimination of travel time which at present consumes 60% to 80% of expended man hours. This means of transportation also reduces the effective field party to a helicopter, one pilot, and one survey specialist. The present strength of an instrument field party is four to six men and at least one vehicle. In one instance nine survey points in a distant area were recovered and flagged in three hours including travel time. All materials and equipment were carried in the aircraft or lashed to the under carriage. A normal party would have consisted of four men transported

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in a 1/4-ton vehicle and consumed three hours to reach this area. The personnel would be quartered with another unit and take approximately one week to find routes of approach and search for markers in an area of rice paddies and tidal mud flats. Another one-half day would be consumed in returning. Thus, approximately 250-man hours and extremely hard wear on the vehicle would be required normally as against 6-man hours and 3 hours of normal use on the helicopter. Considering the hazards of mine fields, climbing of formidable hills (some reaching heights of 3000 - 4000 feet), losses and wear on equipment, fatigue on personnel, and reduction of personnel needed in the field, it has been recommended that two helicopters, pilots and necessary maintenance equipment and personnel be added to the T/O&E of this observation battalion. Numerous other missions within the battalion sphere of operations can be effectively assigned to these aircraft.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMBAT TESTING OF NEW SOUND RANGING SET. - It is understood that a new version of a sound ranging set is undergoing tests by AFF Board No 1. A great opportunity for supplementing these tests by combat tests in Korea exists and the new set should be airlifted to Korea without delay in order that such combat tests can be undertaken. It is proposed that a team of technicians accompany the set to Korea and that the combat test be conducted in a manner similar to that anticipated for the AN/MPQ-10 radar set.

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(CONFIDENTIAL)

NEED FOR HEAVIER CALIBER ARTILLERY (240-MM OR LARGER). The need for heavier caliber weapons is becoming more apparent as the summer wears on. The passage of time appears merely to allow the enemy to dig himself deeper into the hills. In view of these circumstances, recommend that heavy caliber weapons (of the 240-mm variety or larger) be sent to the Korean theater. Certainly, it is difficult to visualize a more ideal situation for the employment of heavy weapons than exists at the present time in Korea. In this connection, it is proposed that, if the present manpower ceiling prevents the assignment of 240-mm batteries or battalions, the weapons be issued to selected field artillery battalions in addition to their present weapons on the basis of one or two per battalion. Recipient battalions could easily train their gun crews in the use of such weapons, and could fire the weapons as likely targets presented themselves. Believe that field artillery battalions in Korea would welcome the opportunity of augmenting their fires.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr Combat Group

DATE: March 1952

Source No 609

(RESTRICTED)

SPECIAL IMPROVISATIONS. - Twelve very practical expedient mechanical sand spreaders built from salvage 1/4-ton vehicle rear ends were developed by this group and proved most valuable in sanding icy roads during the past winter. Essentially, the spreader, which was pulled behind a sand truck, consisted of a 1/4-ton vehicle rear end towed so that the differential housing faced upward. On the housing at the point where the drive shaft is normally connected, a sand spreading blade was attached. A smaller hopper concentrated the sand for most efficient spreading action.

As the truck towed the spreader, the sand spreading blade rotated in a horizontal plane, spinning sand centrifugally from the blade tips over the road. The hopper was hand-loaded by personnel riding in the sand truck.

(RESTRICTED)

EXCAVATION PROBLEMS IN FROZEN GROUND. - During the coldest part of the winter of 1952, units were required to conduct excavations in ground that was frozen to a depth of between two feet in compact clay and six feet in loose gravel. Experimentation with physical eruption equipment such as shovels, graders, dozers, and even rooters produced unsatisfactory results. As the frost became deeper none of these pieces of equipment could operate. Various methods such as burning gasoline and diesel fuel were tried while attempting to eliminate the frost but these were not successful. Demolition was finally found to be the answer. Holes were blasted through the frost using shaped charges. These holes were then charged with left-over propelling charge increments obtained from nearby artillery units. Since these excess increments are normally burned, their use in this manner was considered an economical utilization of supplies and materials. The holes were charged with twenty to twenty-five pounds of black powder and primed with a quarter of a pound of C-3. The resultant pushing effect of the black powder caused excellent fracture and allowed earth moving equipment to operate in zero temperatures.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Battalion (M)

DATE: April 1952

Source No 610

(RESTRICTED)

DOUBLE-DRUM TYPE WINCH FOR TANK RECOVERY VEHICLES. -

Recommend that the future tank recovery vehicle include a double-drum type winch of the capacity and length of the present M26 transporter winch. As a temporary expedient, it would be exceedingly helpful to have a winch of this type mounted on present M32 tank recovery vehicles whose present winch lacks both length and capacity of the M26.

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(RESTRICTED)

TANK DOZERS. - Recommend that serious consideration be given to decreasing the number of dozer blades authorized a tank battalion. One tank dozer per company is believed more than adequate. The use for this M3 dozer is not only limited, but the problem of where to mount two of them on tanks in the company is a matter of local determination and concern. The company commander does not want his tank's mobility diminished; neither does he want his FO tank nor a platoon leader's tank occupied with dozer blade and accompanying missions. Consequently, two platoon tanks become special purpose or dozer tanks, although there is no real necessity for such tank dozers per company. Two per battalion would be adequate to meet and accomplish proper tank dozer missions.

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(RESTRICTED)

OVM EQUIPMENT. - Recommend that tank-mounted radio sets lose their identity as T/O&E Signal property and be included in OVM. Under the present system property records require additional posting and readjustment - as well as slight confusion - when tanks are evacuated or are replaced with radios already mounted in the replacement tanks.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 15th AAA AW Bn(SP)

DATE: June 1952

Source No 611

(RESTRICTED)

O&E CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS, LIGHT AA. - Recommend: 1. That one caliber .30 machine gun be mounted on M16 to cover the area directly in front of track.

2. That each battery be provided with one generator, E-3, 3.0 KW. This generator is required for showing of training films, film strips and for general lighting purposes.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engr Combat Group

DATE: June 1952

Source No 612

(RESTRICTED)

RECRUITING POLICIES. - During the past two years a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the Army re-enlistment program, without appreciable results.

If a larger re-enlistment bonus could be paid; it would have a greater appeal because of the monetary gain. At present there is a \$300 mustering-out bonus given to discharged veterans. In comparison, the re-enlistment bonus is much less attractive, ranging from a minimum of \$40 for a two year re-enlistment to a maximum of \$360 for a six year enlistment.

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AWARDS. - Present emphasis on increasing the number of awards has tended to reduce the value of the awards.

Basing awards upon a given percentage of rotation personnel gives awards to many people for just doing their normal everyday work. Such was not the original intent of these awards.

All awards should be more closely scrutinized and quality of achievement should come before quantity of awards.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 409th Engr Brig

DATE: May 1952

Source No 613

(RESTRICTED)

STANDARDIZATION OF ENGINEER HEAVY EQUIPMENT. - Recommend that engineer heavy equipment be standardized as far as possible to permit interchange of attachments and spare parts, i. e., crane or shovel booms to fit power plants of any manufacturer (within each capacity range), engine beds to fit any motor of required horsepower, etc.

SOURCE: Command Report - 552d Engr Base Depot

DATE: May 1952

Source No 614

(RESTRICTED)

SPARE PART SUPPORT FOR NEW MODELS OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. - Considerable difficulty in spare parts support for new items of engineer equipment shipped to Korea is being experienced. It developed that spare parts support for some equipment cannot be anticipated by less than six months. Suggest that shipping of new models of equipment, not heretofore used in Korea, be discontinued unless spare parts support can be furnished immediately after receipt of such items.

SOURCE: Command Report - 226th Ordnance Base Depot

DATE: July 1952

Source No 615

(RESTRICTED)

TRAINING OF ORDNANCE REPLACEMENTS. - Replacement personnel sent to this command have not been trained in the ammunition field and this factor is having a serious effect upon the proper operation of the depot. Action should be taken to qualify both officers and enlisted men in this field of Ordnance prior to shipment overseas. Recommend that a personnel survey be conducted and report of findings sent to proper authority in an effort to correct this condition.

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SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Aviation Section

DATE: March 1952

Source No 616

(RESTRICTED)

FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT FOR UNITS HAVING ARMY AVIATION.

Applicable T/O&E's or TA's of all units having aviation should be amended to allow additional fire fighting equipment for fighting aircraft fires. For units having ten or more aircraft, a crash fire fighting truck of Air Forces 0-11 should be authorized. Additional fire extinguishers of CO₂ 15 lb capacity and carbon tetrachloride of 2-gallon capacity should be added to authorizations for all units having one or more aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Report - 409th Engr Brigade

DATE: July 1952

Source No 617

(RESTRICTED)

POL STORAGE TANKS. - Recommend that POL storage tanks be equipped with both pressure and vacuum valves. Without valves the vapor loss caused by higher temperature can be large during warm weather. Relief valves are built to open with excessive pressure caused by the increased temperature in a closed tank. The pressure valve holds the vapor loss to a minimum while still maintaining a safe pressure in the tank. The vacuum valve is a safety device insuring that the closed tank does not collapse while being drained. There is a possibility of inexperienced personnel forgetting to open the relief hatch while draining a tank, causing the outside atmospheric pressure to collapse the tank.

SOURCE: Command Report - 10th Field Artillery Bn

DATE: June 1952

Source No 618

(RESTRICTED)

SEQUENCE OF FIRE COMMANDS BY FO. - Recommend that when coordinates are used by an FO to establish location of a target, the sequence of commands be modified so that identification of the observer is immediately

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followed by "coordinates" instead of "azimuth." "Azimuth" should be the next element after "coordinates." Further, recommend that location be given by first indicating the grid square and then giving the complete coordinates thus: "FO 36, Fire Mission, coordinates 18-24 square, 186-245; Az 5000 etc." The grid square must be located before the target grid can be fixed in place. Commands in the sequence recommended can be repeated by the S-2 and plotted by the HCO without the delay occasioned by the conventional sequence.

SOURCE: Command Report - 116th Engr Combat Battalion

DATE: July 1952

Source No 619

(RESTRICTED)

RECONNAISSANCE OFFICER, ENGINEER COMBAT BATTALION.

Recommend that the T/O&E position of reconnaissance officer be upgraded to Captain. The importance of this position requires the assignment of one of our very best engineer officers.

SOURCE: Command Report - 49th Field Artillery Bn

DATE: June 1952

Source No 620

(RESTRICTED)

CONFIRMATION OF DOCTRINE. - The experience of this battalion in the past eight months has indicated that any battalion is better off to adhere strictly to doctrine and procedures outlined in Army manuals. Different procedures, particularly in gunnery, had been used prior to that time. In each incident where procedures were changed, the results were not satisfactory. The battalion is attempting to follow manual procedures to the letter. This effort has reflected a big improvement in the speed and accuracy of fires.

SOURCE: Command Report - 17th Inf Regt

DATE: June 1952

Source No 621

(RESTRICTED)

M39 PERSONNEL CARRIER FOR EVACUATION. - Recommend: That the M39 be modified to provide capacity for six litters inside the vehicle or

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the development of a light, fast, armored, tracked vehicle to permit rear door loading of litter patients; that each regiment be equipped with four such vehicles, thus allowing one for each battalion and one at regimental collecting stations. These vehicles would be assigned to regimental tank company for maintenance.

SOURCE: Command Report - 31st Inf Regt

DATE: April 1952

Source No 622

(RESTRICTED)

INFANTRY SERVICE COMPANY WRECKER. - It is recommended that the 2-1/2-ton truck presently used in service company as a wrecker, be replaced by a 4-ton wrecker or similar vehicle. The present 2-1/2-ton wrecker is too light to perform the duties required in the field. It will not efficiently pull another 2-1/2-ton truck which is loaded, nor will it lift a 2-1/2-ton truck. The overload which results from using a light weight wrecker in the field is uneconomical. Since 1 January the 2-1/2-ton truck used as a wrecker in the organization has required the replacement of the intermediate axle and assembly, the transmission, the clutch, and the engine. In addition; the clutch and brakes require much more adjustment than the average 2-1/2-ton truck. The present light wrecker is not equipped with swinging booms and the present winch is too light. These deficiencies prevent use of the wrecker to maximum advantage.

The current 4-ton wrecker would be sufficient to perform the jobs required by the regiment. This truck was designed primarily as a wrecker and has none of the shortcomings of the modified 2-1/2-ton wrecker.

SOURCE: Command Report - 64th Tank Battalion (Medium)

DATE: July 1952

Source No 623

(RESTRICTED)

TANK FIRE TO PROTECT BRIDGES. - On 27 July a total of 96 rounds of 90-mm HE ammunition was fired in an attempt to break up floating rafts which might damage the vital White Front and Babicz bridges which span the Imjin and Han-tan Rivers. Although the rafts were difficult to break, they were weakened by the tank fire to the extent that they disintegrated when they struck the fenders protecting the bents. Engineers charged with preservation of the bridges gave much credit to the effectiveness of the 90-mm firing.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 151st Engr Combat Bn

DATE: April 1952

Source No 624

(RESTRICTED)

STANDARDIZATION OF ENGINEER EQUIPMENT. - Recommend that thought be given on the highest level to the possibility of procuring only one type of any given piece of engineer equipment. For example, instead of having many different kinds of three-fourth yard shovels, issue only one kind. This could be carried out in all other kinds of equipment including graders, tractors, air compressors and rock crushers.

SOURCE: Command Report - 3d Transportation Military Railway Service

DATE: July 1952

Source No 625

(RESTRICTED)

LOSS OF LEAVE CREDITS. - Many personnel are losing leave credits through no fault of their own. Recommend that an adjustment be made so that leave time can accrue over sixty days or else monetary compensation be made in lieu thereof.

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MAIL SERVICE. - 1. The air mail service during July was exceptionally poor since mail was not received by this headquarters for five or six-day periods.

2. Boat mail does not seem to receive any special handling. Four and five weeks is the normal time for delivery in Korea from the time that it is delivered to the carrier in the United States. It is recommended that this service be speeded up.

SOURCE: Command Report - 2d Engr Combat Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 626

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DEFICIENCIES OF THE US ARMY STANDARD SANDBAG. - The following excerpts are from a survey covering the deficiencies of the US Army standard handbag.

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a. Average life of US Army standard sandbag is entirely dependent upon condition and use.

b. Discussion of types of sandbags:

(1) The gunny type sandbag, non-treated, 500 per bale, has shown poor holding qualities. Effects of weather are such as to render this type of sandbag unsuitable for issue in this theater. The bags rot very quickly. They are not easily checked due to the large number per bale, and the bindings have a tendency to split. This makes combat loading and hauling very difficult. The sandbags have no protection from the weather while in bales. Consequently the bales contain from 75 to 98 per cent unserviceable bags due to rot. The gunny sandbag is easy to fill and stack. Many of this type sandbag lack strings.

(2) The Hessian type sandbag, treated, 200 per bale, appears to be the best available in this theater. This sandbag will not deteriorate in outdoor storage, and the bindings are such as to insure that the bags will reach destination properly packed. Furthermore, the data concerning the dates of manufacture and shipment is a great help to supply agencies in issuing the oldest bag first. This assures users a serviceable item when received. The 10" x 28" bag is easy to fill and shows no rot effects during the period of use. This bag is easily overfilled, causing poor stacking qualities.

(3) Sandbags should definitely be treated with a fungicide to resist rot. The ideal measurements are 13" x 26". A bag of such construction would facilitate stacking and storage. Sandbags should be protected from the effects of weather while in the bale. Nylon fiber as a replacement for jute would also produce a superior bag.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps

DATE: April 1952

Source No 627

(RESTRICTED)

MINE PLOW. - Considerable time and effort has been devoted to developing an efficient mine detector or locator. Detection by means of water and air have been tried, but due to supply or compressor failures, have been rejected as not practical. Mechanical means such as rollers or thrashing chains have been experimented with for years, but have generally

run into a heavy mine that damages the detonating mechanism or detonates an igniter connected to a mine which explodes under the tank itself. The 38th Infantry Regimental Tank Company has developed an idea on a mine plow which seems to overcome the above difficulties.

This mine plow operated similar to that used for plowing up a field for planting. It turns the earth up in front of each track to a depth depending on the length of teeth, and guides the dirt or objects in the dirt to the outside of each track so that there is no direct contact between the mine and tank. A booby trapped mine would be rendered less effective as the mine would be moved away from the track prior to the operation of the igniter and less damage would be done to the tank due to distance of the mine away from the track. The mines rolled to the side of the track can be disarmed, or marked and detonated later.

The mine plow consists of two teeth mounted on a dozer blade in such a manner as to be easily detached or swung back over the blade when not required.

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CAL .50 CO-AXIAL MG FOR TANK. - A modified cal .50 co-axial MG is needed for tanks in use in Korea for the following reasons:

1. Present static situation requires more accurate firepower at ranges of 1,000 to 2,500 yards.
2. Present cal .30 co-axial MG mounted in the medium tank, M4A3E8, lacks the necessary accuracy and power at the greater ranges.
3. Research has proven that a cal .50 co-axial MG should be mounted in tanks, as in late models of all types of tanks.

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ARMORED REGIMENT. - Observation in Korea leads to the recommendation that an "Armored Regiment" be formed. This regiment would be commanded by a full colonel who would have equal representation on the staff level with infantry commanders and who would obtain fuller support for armor.

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SOURCE: Command Report - 7th Infantry Division

DATE: July 1952

Source No 628

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SWITCHBOARD BD-91-D FOR ARTILLERY BATTALION FSCC. - The battalion commanders of field artillery battalions in direct support of infantry regiments are responsible for the co-ordination of the artillery fires for the regimental commander.

The Fire Support Co-ordination Center, located at the artillery battalion command post, is the agency by which these artillery fires are co-ordinated. Therefore, normal wire communications and alternate lines should be maintained between the FSCC and liaison parties with the infantry battalions, the regimental command post, the countermortar radar section, the battalion observation post, and the firing batteries.

In addition, wire communication must link the FSCC with the regimental mortar company, tactical air control party, AAA units supporting the regiments and with adjacent and supporting artillery battalions.

Presently, there are no switchboards authorized in the T/O&E for the artillery battalion FSCC.

To insure that vital wire communications are properly maintained between the FSCC and the aforementioned elements, recommend that two switchboards, BD-91-D, be added to the T/O&E of the FSCC of the field artillery battalion. The BD-91-D is a 24-drop, magneto-type board.

In a normal tactical situation it would be advantageous to employ two boards of this size when a battalion displaces. In such displacement a forward FSCC is usually organized to provide for the needs of units already displaced. When the operation is complete the forward and rear FSCC's merge, forming one co-ordination center. In this situation one switchboard could be kept at each FSCC and combined when the FSCC's finally merge.

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SCOUT DOG PLATOON - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN T/O&E. - The personnel and equipment allotted by T/O&E to the 26th Infantry Scout Dog Platoon does not permit the platoon to adequately perform its tactical mission. The T/O provides for a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, one veterinarian technician, eighteen handlers, and twenty-seven dogs. To

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enhance the efficiency of the platoon and to increase its ability to meet the needs of the infantry units in a division, there should be an increase in the number of dogs and handlers in the unit.

Recommended that the T/O for the scout dog platoon be changed to include: a platoon leader, platoon sergeant, twenty-seven handlers one of whom would be the veterinarian technician, twenty-seven working dogs, and six replacement dogs. The additional dogs and handlers would permit full coverage of the infantry units in a division. If six replacements were added to the T/O, the platoon would have dogs on hand to take the place of any working dogs that suddenly become unfit for duty. This organic replacement system would almost completely abolish the tremendous cost of transporting a few dogs at a time to the unit.

Together with these changes in organization the following changes in equipment are recommended:

1. Instead of the 18 wrist compasses allotted, the number of lensatic compasses be increased from two to twenty-one per platoon.
2. A carpenter kit should be added for repair of dog kennels. No tools are available in the platoon for this purpose.
3. The mission in which the platoon is normally employed does not require extensive use of binoculars M13A1, therefore the eight binoculars now authorized should be reduced to three.
4. The trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo now authorized is not necessary for the successful movement of the platoon and should be removed from the T/E.
5. Experience has indicated that the three 2-1/2-ton trucks, 6x6, cargo meet the needs involved in movement of the platoon's organic personnel and equipment.
6. The patrol missions undertaken by the unit require handlers and dogs to travel to far flung locations in the division and often corps sectors. Since the platoon has no vehicles except the three 2-1/2-ton trucks, four 1/4-ton trucks, 4x4, should be authorized each platoon to provide one per squad and one for platoon headquarters.
7. The allotment of tenso kennel chains, choke chain collars, and leather harnesses (medium) should be increased from 36 to 54 per platoon. These items are in constant use, frequently need repair and at times are found to be beyond repair.

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COUNTERFIRE PLATOONS. - From past experience with the counterfire platoon, the following recommendations are offered for consideration:

1. Personnel and equipment are not adequate to accomplish the platoon's assigned mission. Recommend that an addition of eleven men be authorized; this will give the platoon one additional counterfire squad of six men; four assigned drivers and one assistant platoon sergeant. Recommend authorization of three 3/4-ton trucks w/trailers and one 1/4-ton truck in lieu of present three 1/4-ton trucks w/trailers.
2. With the additional counterfire squad, recommend that one complete set of GR6A sound locating equipment be authorized.
3. Recommend that a manual or text book be written on the tactics and techniques of the counterfire platoon. More detail information is needed if personnel are to accomplish the mission of the counterfire platoon.

SOURCE: Eighth Army Artillery Information Bulletin #15

DATE: September 1952

Source No 629

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ROK ARTILLERY EXPANSION PROGRAM. - The ROK artillery expansion program has reached the point where ROK field artillery groups, formed and trained at The Korean Artillery Training Center, are given 60-90 days battle indoctrination and advanced training in the 5th US Field Artillery Group before attachment to a ROK division. The final stage in this process was initiated on 30 June when the 1st ROK Field Artillery Group, consisting of a headquarters and headquarters battery and two 105-mm howitzer battalions, joined the 9th ROK Division. With the already assigned organic light battalion, a ROK direct support battalion was thereby provided for each ROK regiment for the first time. The group headquarters became the division artillery headquarters. Additional groups, similarly constituted, will now become available at the rate of one every four weeks until each ROK division has one.

Upon completion of training, the medium battalions being formed by US divisions will become the general support battalions of the ROK divisions, along with the 4 ROK medium battalions already in action. The new medium battalions have received half of their heavy equipment and most of their personnel, and are making rapid progress in training. Most of them fired combat missions within five weeks of being formed.

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SOURCE: Command Report - I Corps

DATE: July 1952

Source No 630

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DEFENSE AGAINST COUNTERATTACK. - In recent operations, where friendly forces have taken and occupied positions formerly held by the enemy, the enemy's reaction has been strong and violent. During these operations the enemy has proven his ability to effectively mass his artillery and mortar fires and to commit limited objective attacks or counterattacks up to regimental strength with little or no warning.

Because of the enemy's reactions and capabilities, it is necessary in the planning of operations, where we expect to take and hold ground, to ensure that friendly forces have the capability of immediately organizing and fortifying the position once it is secured. To do this it is necessary to plan for adequate fortification materials, tools, and equipment to be carried with the assault force or to follow the force immediately on position. The soldier must be prepared to "dig in" once he is on the objective in order to protect himself from enemy artillery and mortar fires and to prepare fighting holes from which to defend newly won positions. Such items as tactical wire, sand bags, timbers, and demolitions should follow closely behind the assault force and move onto position at the first opportunity. With this equipment hasty fortifications can be prepared to meet the onslaught of the enemy counterattacks.

Experience has shown that without the equipment and tools with which to establish adequate defense measures, it is difficult and costly in casualties to withstand the pressure of the enemy's counterattacks. Where adequate measures have been taken, and fortifications have been constructed, the friendly forces have been able to hold their newly won positions with a minimum number of casualties.

SOURCE: Command Report - 31st Inf Regt

DATE: May 1952

Source No 631

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M16 AS ORGANIC EQUIPMENT FOR INFANTRY REGIMENT. - Since April 1951 this regiment has had a special authorization for three M16's

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(quadruple .50 caliber machine guns electrically operated on a half-track vehicle). These weapons have been used continually since that time and have proven invaluable.

The M16's have been employed very effectively in support of attacks, since they can maneuver rapidly, bring fire on enemy positions from the flank or rear, while personnel receive some protection from the armor of the vehicle. This weapon is highly accurate and may be used in very close support of the attacking troops.

On the defense the M16's have been used in support patrols and to add depth to defensive positions. In addition, these weapons can deliver accurate, long range fire on friendly tanks in order to prevent the enemy tank-killer teams from approaching the tanks.

The uses mentioned above are in addition to the M16's primary role of defense against low-flying aircraft.

Recommend that four M16's with necessary operational and maintenance personnel be included in the T/O&E of the infantry regiment.

SOURCE: Command Report - Eighth Army, Section I

DATE: May 1952

Source No 632

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DEVELOPMENT OF PIER CELLS TO FACILITATE PORT OPERATIONS. - The port of PUSAN contains an LST beach, and four numbered piers and a large quay with 23 deep water berths, for an average of five working berths for each pier. Each pier is a separate installation; each pier has a pier superintendent, pier and stevedore officers with enlisted staff working around the clock. The T/O&E of a major port authorized one pier superintendent, two pier officers, two stevedore officers, and one cargo security officer. The basis for this T/O&E is that these officers are supervisory only; port companies will provide the operating personnel. Each type "A" port company is authorized five officers: a company commander (Captain), an operations officer (Lieutenant), and three platoon officers (Lieutenants). There are four port companies assigned to 7th Major Port; however, two are operating at the outports. The six port officers plus the three platoon officers from each of the two port companies, or a total of twelve, cannot operate all piers around the clock. At present there are 23 officers working on the piers; this requires that the difference of 11 officers be obtained from other branches and sections of the port, thus reducing the efficiency of those branches and sections.

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Recommendation: That study be initiated for the Chief of Transportation on the development of nominal pier cells, with possible augmentation, for the operation of one pier at an overseas port. By use of cells, a unit ordered into a port such as PUSAN could ascertain in advance from intelligence the number of piers to be worked, and would then request the desired number of cells be added to its organization. As additional piers or outports are developed, additional cells could be made available without interference with the organization or operation of the main port. Each cell would be a self-contained unit: a pier superintendent for over-all direction of activities; pier officers for supervision of labor, warehousing, port clearance, traffic control, and internal organization (including security); and stevedore officers in charge of ship discharge and loading, checking, preparation of rough stow plans, ordering of ship and dock gangs, assembling of gear necessary to work slips, loading to transportation units, rail cars, barges, etc. The enlisted personnel would be divided into office and pier assignments, typing, filing, and manifest clerks, movement control clerks on truck, rail car and/or barge utilization and dispatch, berth foremen, operations gear locker gangs, supervision of ship and berth gangs, and the numerous assignments incident to pier operations.

Equipment could be provided as organic to the cell or drawn from port companies. Mess and supply personnel would not be required since cell members could mess with the major headquarters to which attached.

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IMPROVEMENT OF OPERATIONS OF VHF BATTALIONS. - In the operation of a VHF battalion, the carrier terminal and radio relay stations must be synchronized in all respects. This could be accomplished most efficiently by personnel working under the operational control of a single unit.

Recommend that in future planning for operational functions of VHF battalions, consideration be given to the entire circuit system including radio relay and carrier terminals. This recommendation is being implemented in EUSAK except where the VHF carrier equipment is only a small portion of the total carrier equipment at a given installation.

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PROVISION FOR QUALIFIED INTERPRETERS. - In operations where US units have been required to provide close support for units whose personnel do not speak English, the lack of qualified interpreters has been the biggest obstacle to training progress and operational efficiency.

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Recommend that in future operations where US units are required to provide close support for units whose personnel do not speak English, prior planning provide for the supplying by the supported unit of qualified interpreters at each echelon where they will be needed.

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DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO GRANT SECRET CLEARANCE. - Officer replacements have generally not been previously cleared for access to classified information prior to arrival in Korea.

Recommend that the commanding general of an Army in the field be delegated the authority to grant clearances for access to classified material and information up to and including SECRET to all officer personnel without reference to National Agency check as currently prescribed and that such clearance be withdrawn upon transfer of the officer from Korea.

SOURCE: Command Report - 73d Tank Battalion (M)

DATE: July 1952

Source No 633

(RESTRICTED)

NEED FOR A TRACKED VEHICLE FOR EVACUATION OF WOUNDED. - Due to the type of terrain over which units of the United States Army have been operating in this theatre, there is a need for a tracked vehicle which can be used in the evacuation of wounded from the front lines under shell fire. By the use of such a vehicle wounded could be evacuated to the nearest medical aid station or to the nearest road not under enemy artillery fire, where the wounded could be transferred to conventional type ambulances. Lack of a suitable vehicle has necessitated the adoption of a field expedient. In this battalion the M39 personnel carrier has been utilized with great success. When the battalion has not been committed it has loaned its M39's to the infantry regiments for their use in medical evacuation.

Some of the advantages of using a tracked vehicle for evacuation of wounded are as follows:

1. The ability to traverse terrain ordinarily only accessible to litter bearers.
2. Conservation of manpower because of vehicles ability to transport more than one casualty at a time.

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3. Comparative smoothness of ride over rough terrain.
4. Speed of travel, cross country, which reduces the period of time the wounded are without medical attention.
5. Light armor for protection against small arms fire.
6. Light weight of vehicle makes it possible to operate over the present road net with a minimum of damage to the roads.

A vehicle should be designed which would be equally successful in the dual role of personnel carrier and evacuation vehicle. In the design of such a vehicle the capabilities of the M39 should be considered as well as these additional points.

1. Increase the size of the vehicle to allow for the equipment which must be carried and yet leave room in the passenger compartment for litters. This could be accomplished by lengthening the vehicle and providing strap holders on which litters could be strung to provide for a double bunk effect.
2. The addition of a top and the providing of a rear entrance. This would give the additional protection needed against artillery and mortar fire and make for greater ease in loading and unloading the vehicle, both for wounded and other personnel.
3. Raising the height of the vehicle. While this makes a higher silhouette and consequently a better target to enemy fire, the additional height is necessary for its dual mission. Personnel normally carried in the vehicle would be cramped for headroom. While raising the height would give the necessary room for the upper row of litters when the vehicle is used for medical evacuation.

If such a vehicle is constructed, recommend that the T/O&E for the medical detachment of the tank battalion be amended to authorize two such vehicles and the T/O&E of the medical company of each infantry regiment be amended to authorize four such vehicles.

SOURCE: Command Report - 40th Infantry Division

DATE: July 1952

Source No 634

(RESTRICTED)

SECURITY CLEARANCE. - This section has been confronted with a problem relative to security clearances. Final results on requests for

National Agency Checks and Background Investigations on National Guard personnel which are now being received were initiated approximately one year ago. These National Guard personnel have been returned to the zone of interior for discharge. Many US personnel similarly awaiting clearance for several months have also returned to the ZI.

Recommend that requests for investigation be conducted on officers, warrant officers, and Regular Army enlisted personnel only. A further recommendation is that US enlisted personnel occupying a position of trust be granted an interim clearance to SECRET based on a files check, and that DD Form 398 (in duplicate) be filed with the interim clearance certificate in the individual's 201 file. In the case of National Guard units presently in an inactive status, personnel should be cleared prior to the activation of that unit.

With an approximate 70% turn-over of personnel in this division, it is necessary to clear a great number of replacements who have been placed in sensitive positions. With the large volume of clearances to be initiated and processed, the work load is such that there is a definite lack of administrative personnel to process clearances.

Recommend that personnel be screened for possible utilization in a sensitive position and that requests for clearance be initiated prior to the individual's departure for an overseas station.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps, G3 Section

DATE: July 1952

Source No 635

(RESTRICTED)

REPLACEMENTS. - During the past few months, in numerous instances, replacements furnished units assigned and attached to this corps have lacked training in the military occupational specialties they were assigned to fill. Often replacements were not trained even in allied fields. Apparently, the numbers of trained military specialists being produced in our schools and training systems are insufficient to replace losses, or unanticipated demands are being met by diversions. When excessive losses are experienced in units, it is appreciated that diversions and deviations from the most desirable assignments may be necessary to maintain combat units at effective strength. There have been, however, no unexpected heavy losses in combat in the past few months; in the main units have been subjected only to those losses incident to normal service such as expiration of term of

service or completion of tour of foreign duty. Our personnel system has been established to provide qualified replacements for anticipated losses, but these results are not being attained in this corps.

Recommend that the personnel replacement system be surveyed to insure that it provides qualified replacements needed.

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ENEMY PRISONER CAPTURE ATTEMPTS. - There were several reports of hostile use of concussion grenades or remote-controlled mine fields, apparently as a device to stun or temporarily shock friendly soldiers to facilitate their capture.

SOURCE: Command Report - 980th Field Artillery Bn

DATE: August 1952

Source No 636

(RESTRICTED)

REASONS GIVEN BY NONCOMS FOR FAILURE TO REENLIST. - Eighty-nine first three grade noncommissioned officers are due for rotation to the zone of interior within the next forty-five days; seventy-one do not plan to reenlist. The principal reasons stated by these men for not reenlisting (among those who would ordinarily be expected to reenlist) are:

1. The insecurity of grade and MOS including the possibility of being forced to qualify for an unfamiliar MOS or face reduction in grade.
2. The feeling that the Army broke faith with them in the extension of their enlistments.
3. The prospects of spending the future as a replacement in a pipeline with no hopes of unit or even branch of service stability.
4. The present promotion policy.

SOURCE: Command Report - 19th Engineer Combat Gp

DATE: July 1952

Source No 637

(RESTRICTED)

TECHNICAL RATINGS OF NCO'S. - The discontinuance of technical ratings for enlisted men who do specialized jobs in the Army has had a

degrading effect upon the standards and military requirements of line NCO's. Men who are crane and shovel operators, heavy equipment mechanics, carpenters, or drivers, receive NCO ratings of corporal and sergeant because of their ability to perform a special type of job. These men are good in their particular work and deserve the extra pay given by the ratings, however, most of these technicians lack military background and leadership abilities which line NCO's must possess.

Many instances are found where NCO's who are technicians are placed in charge of groups, because of their rank, to perform certain military duties; however due to their lack of leadership qualities they poorly discharge their missions and thereby create a lack of confidence in those serving under them.

In the stampede to give equal rank for equal pay, which eliminated technicians and specialist ratings, the Army has crippled its NCO backbone. Recommend that the specialist rating be re-established.

SOURCE: Command Report - 57th Field Artillery Bn

DATE: July 1952

Source No 638

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HOIST AND TOWING EQUIPMENT FOR FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERIES. -

Experience has indicated that some type of hoist mounted on a vehicle would save considerable time, and speed up operations in moving and emplacing guns, and in handling vehicles that are incapacitated and/or overturned: The one authorized wrecker is not always readily available to each battery to meet its immediate need speedily. Recommend that appropriate T/O&E's be amended to authorize the following equipment for each battery: Second echelon tool set No 7, hoist and towing stock No: 41T3545-16.

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SWITCHBOARD BD-96 FOR FSCC. - The direct support artillery battalion commander is the co-ordinator of all fires for the regimental commander. Thus his FSCC located at the artillery battalion command post must be in communication with all units concerned. These units include in addition to the units normally having communications, the regimental heavy mortar company, TAC party, AAA AW platoon, searchlights, and adjacent and supporting artillery units. The normal communications needed are with the

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organic liaison parties with the infantry battalions, the supported unit, division artillery, countermortar radar section, battalion observation post, and alternate lines to these installations. To provide the facilities recommend that a 30-drop switchboard would provide more lines of communication which are essential in a regimental FSCC for a high degree of efficiency.

SOURCE: Command Report - IX Corps

DATE: April 1952

Source No 639

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TANK TRACK HOLDING DEVICE. - The first step of track throwing is the "blowout" or increase of slack of the track between the last road wheel and the sprocket, which takes place on the inner track during a turn. This more readily permits foreign matter to be carried up between the track and hub, thus forcing the track away from the sprocket teeth. Then, lateral movement of the track, due to the turn, quite often causes the track to be thrown.

Three track holding devices (10-in wide, 11-in long, and 1-in thick) were installed on the outside sprocket of an M46 tank and operated 520 miles without failure. Special tests were conducted in a sand bin and in mud, with the tracks excessively loose and the auxiliary tension wheel raised clear of the track. Maneuvering, under these conditions, caused the tracks to be forced clear of the sprocket teeth and laterally against the holding devices.

On the basis of these tests, recommend that the track holding device be considered satisfactory as a field fix when the vehicle must operate with loose tracks, and terrain conditions are such that track throwing can easily take place.

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