

OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES Fort Monroe, Virginia

ATING-64 350.05/43(DOCI)(C)(21 APR 2)

21 April 1952

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

TO:

See distribution

LIBRARY ARMY WAR COLLEGE PERIODICALS SECTION
APR 28 1952
COPY(

1. In accordance with SR 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information, the inclosed EXTRACTS are forwarded to Department of the Army, Army Field Forces and the Service Schools for evaluation and necessary action. It may be appropriate, in certain cases, for these agencies to take action upon a single extracted item; in others, it may be desirable to develop a cross-section of accumulated extracts on a particular subject before initiating action; and often, the extracted item serves to reaffirm our doctrines and techniques.

A. Des

2. Copies of Dissemination of Combat Information are forwarded, with Department of the Army approval, to information addressees for use at the headquarters of the installation or activity concerned to keep them informed concerning theatre problems from front line through the logistical command.

3. These EXTRACTS are derived from reports which are classified SECRET. For the greater convenience of the user, this Office downgrades each extracted item to the lowest classification compatible with security. No effort is made to paraphrase or delete any portion of the extracted remarks, so that none of the original intent is lost.

4. Generally, the EXTRACTS which pertain to training appear under the classification of RESTRICTED. For combat information of training value at the Company-Battery level, addressees are referred to Army Field Forces TRAINING BULLETINS, which are also published under the classification of RESTRICTED.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

ellon

P. C. CASPERSON Major, AGC Asst Adjutant General

UNCLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF THEO 760924 ON 1976 BY Laters

l Incl Extracts from sources 309 thru 328

DISTRIBUTION:

(Over)

1.10

52/4-133-5

COUPITY INCODING -CATTA 1.5 • UNCLASSIFIED •

		0	
		2	
DISTRIBU	UTION:		
	ACOFS, G-1, DA		
	ACOFS, G-2, DA		
	ACOFS, G-3, DA	l ea Pres, AFF Boards	
	ACOFS, G-4, DA	1 CO, Arctic Test Br	
	CCMLÖ Cofencers	OCAFF	
	COFPSYWAR	1 DCOFS 1 Gl	
	CSICO	1 4,000 62	
	COFT	14 03(60)	
	Chief of Mil History	2 04	
10 2	TOMG	5 RD COL	- 27 F
	TSG State of the second st	1. 189 Cm1	
	TAG		19 0 5
	COFORD	1 Med	(181) (2-5)。
	Condts	1 Ord	
3	Army War College	1 = 314 QM 1 = 1 = 51 S1g	
2	Army Gen Sch	1 Sig	in the tensor provide the second s
	CG ¹ B	1 AG	en regite
	The Armd Cen		
2	The Arty Cen	l Ch	
2 199	The Inf Cen	l Info	
⊨ 2 – 3 P	The AAA&GM Cen	1 PM	
		(1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,	r
	furnished;		2114) • • • • • • •
70 5		ropean Cond, Far East, CG's, Trie	
	cific, US Army, Carib	Austria, US Army, Alaska, US Army	, Pa-
		el Cen, Hq, US Atlantic Fleet, No.	rfolk
م لير دوري (مرد)	Va, APIN: Grd Forces	off	
2 £ 5 j	Supt, USMA	 A start of the start start start 	
	Chief Ammy Advision Co	, Air Comd & Staff Sch, Air Univ,	Maxwell
	AFB, Ala	The state of the second se	
- ** 3 * ** 1	TPMG (2 - Comdt, The Pr	ovost Marshal Gen Sch)	· · ·
	CG, CIC Cen		•
	Condt, Marine Corps Sch		
	Comdt, USAF Air-Ground	Operations Sch	
2 ea	CG's Continental Armies		
- 4 - 4	Army AA Cond		
	TAC		
2 1 (CO, Mountain & Cold Wea	ther Ing Comd	
	Chief, AFF Human Resear		
	OCAFF		
4	Insp Sect	ά μ.	
20	C5(64)		
l	AG Records	· · · · ·	
	42.		
	TINC	LASSIFIED	

OT

	OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORC	æs
	Fort Monroe, Virginia	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
	EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION	r
SOURCE:	Command Report - 176th Armored Field Arti	llery Bn
DATE :	December 1951	Source No. 309
	FIRE DIRECTION CENTER	•
	This Battalion's T/OE 6-166N provid for housing Battalion FDC. Personnel car are inconvenient and preclude a complete This handicaps efficient operation of FDC requiring a solit between two (2) or thre cold weather.	riers by nature of their size installation in one vehicle. by either over-crowding or
	An alternate provision of present T/ This is satisfactory only in a stable or Where sudden or rapid changes of position is "bottlenecked" by the unwieldy install tables, and tentage required by a normal	semi-permanent situation. are required, the movement ation of wires, radios,
SOURCE:	Compand Report - 937th FA Bn	
DATE:	October 1951	Source No. 310
	VT FUZE FOR 155: M GUNS	
	Fuze VT for this weapon is not avail from past experiences the need for more a FIDENTIAL)	
SOURCE :	Command Report - IX Corps	
DATE:	November 1951	Source No. 311
	AIRCRAFT TON-BAR	•••••
	It is recommended that an aircraft to rently used as a field expedient by units made an item of T/OLE for all aviation see	in Korea, be manufactured and
INCLOSURE	UNCLASSIFIED (Over)	
OCAFF Form No (Revised 15 Oc	73 ASSURITY INCOMMATION	52/4-133-5

ti kan

T

19

. #

USE OF UP TO FARM TARGETS White phosphorous smoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The wide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) SOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn		
bf advantages over taxing or ground handling by manomer alone, particularly under advorce weather conditions. Towing reduces to a minimum the danger of noming by while moving the aircraft on muddy, marky, or rock parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propal- lars and winds Helds caused by firing mud, sand, and gravel. The right tow-has has node the problem of hoding aircraft into ervotants a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two man, but driving the towing whiche and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would othertise require five or more en. The tow-bar now in use is nade of two pieces of angle iron each nime fact long, joined at one end to form a WW. The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient watchers to make possible ary alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the aper for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing, whiche, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the airward Landing gear. "This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SE OF UP TO HARK TARK SES White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the offuse the photyphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits rabes it diffie it to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLICENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc.) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEFED	an an taon 1997 ang	
bf advantages over taxing or ground handling by manomer alone, particularly under advorce weather conditions. Towing reduces to a minimum the danger of noming by while moving the aircraft on muddy, marky, or rock parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propal- lars and winds Helds caused by firing mud, sand, and gravel. The right tow-has has node the problem of hoding aircraft into ervotants a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two man, but driving the towing whiche and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would othertise require five or more en. The tow-bar now in use is nade of two pieces of angle iron each nime fact long, joined at one end to form a WW. The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient watchers to make possible ary alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the aper for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing, whiche, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the airward Landing gear. "This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SE OF UP TO HARK TARK SES White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the offuse the photyphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits rabes it diffie it to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLICENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc.) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEFED		
bf advantages over taxing or ground handling by manomer alone, particularly under advorce weather conditions. Towing reduces to a minimum the danger of noming by while moving the aircraft on muddy, marky, or rock parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propal- lars and winds Helds caused by firing mud, sand, and gravel. The right tow-has has node the problem of hoding aircraft into ervotants a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two man, but driving the towing whiche and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would othertise require five or more en. The tow-bar now in use is nade of two pieces of angle iron each nime fact long, joined at one end to form a WW. The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient watchers to make possible ary alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the aper for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing, whiche, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the airward Landing gear. "This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SE OF UP TO HARK TARK SES White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the offuse the photyphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits rabes it diffie it to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLICENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc.) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEFED		
bf advantages over taxing or ground handling by manomer alone, particularly under advorce weather conditions. Towing reduces to a minimum the danger of noming by while moving the aircraft on muddy, marky, or rock parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propal- lars and winds Helds caused by firing mud, sand, and gravel. The right tow-has has node the problem of hoding aircraft into ervotants a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two man, but driving the towing whiche and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would othertise require five or more en. The tow-bar now in use is nade of two pieces of angle iron each nime fact long, joined at one end to form a WW. The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient watchers to make possible ary alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the aper for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing, whiche, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the airward Landing gear. "This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SE OF UP TO HARK TARK SES White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, the offuse the photyphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits rabes it diffie it to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLICENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc.) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEFED	· ·	Torring of sirenaft he vehicles has been found to offer a number
<pre>particularly under advorce weather conditions. Toring reduces to a infinum the danger of newing by while moving the aircraft on muddy, andy, or rocky parking areas. It has reduced the damage to propal- lers and windshields caused by flying rud, sand, and gravel. The ingld tor-ber has made the problem of keating aircraft into revenents a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two men, be driving the toring vehicle and one directing the driver, can round handle an aircraft that would otheritise require five or more ten. The tow-bar new in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each inte feet long, joined at one end to form a WW. The aver is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alternation necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the driver down- ward through the toring vohicle, and a pin is driven down- ward through the order of each are to be droved through the toring ings of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) Extended the white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to borfuse the pilots art cause an alternation in an effort to borfuse the pilots and cause an alternation of riendly forces. The induce of white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to borfuse the pilots art cause an alternative on friendly forces. The induce of white phosphorous is all infanty mortars and tank mits males it difficient to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (EXERTICTED) KOURCE: Command Report # lst FA Obsr En NATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERNATIONY INTENLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they wight obtain (sourd reports, etc.) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEED</pre>		
 hindnum the danger of neeting by while moving the aircraft on mukdy, sandy, or rocky parking areas. It has reduced the darage to propellers and windshields caused by flying rud, sand, and greenl. The rigid tow-bar has made the problem of 'moling aircraft into revolutions a comparatively single one. On an extremely muddy field, two men, bee driving the towing vohicle and one directing the driver, can ground handle an aircraft that would otherwise require five or more ben. The tow-bar now in use is rade of two pieces of angle iron each nime feet long, joined at one end to form a "V". The area is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make yoasile any alteration necessary in the size "W". A ring is fastened to the teach for attachment to the plant be'end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICAED) KOURCE: Command Report - 20th 'inf Div inty KOURCE: Command Report - 20th 'inf Div inty KATE: Detober 1951 Source No. 312 SE OF WF TO MARK TARK ENS White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous shells by infantly mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (PESTRICTED) KOURCE: Command Report 7 1st M Obsr Bn KATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIATION INTERLIGENCE All OF's wre instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (spont serves, etc) magardless of whether or not they UNCLASSEFED 		
 Bendy, or rock- parking areas. It has reduced the damage to proveller are and windshields caused by flying nud, sand, and gravel. The rigid tow-bar has made the problem of 'ncling aircraft into revoluents a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two men, one driving the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would otherwise require five or more tene. The tow-bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each nime feet long, joined at one end to form a "V". The aver is fastened with bolts and sufficient vachers to make poorbie any alteration necessary in the size "W". A ring is fastened to the spec for attachment to the pintle of the towing volicie, and a pin is driven downward in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21th 'inf Div Arty NOURCE: Command Report - 10 tank targets for air strikes has several undestrable features. The energy understanding the meaning, rill often file white phosphoreus en our positions in an effort to ronfuse the pilots and cause an ainstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphoreus siells by infanity mortars and tank units males it diffic it to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report # 1st F1 Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUTERDATIONED INTERLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they right obtain (sourd reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFED 	and a start of the	minimum the danger of nosing up while moving the aircraft on muddy,
 Field tow-has has made the problem of hacking aircreft into reversents a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muldy field, two men, one driving the towing vehicle and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would otherwise require five or nore here. The tow-bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each nime feet long, joined at one end to form a "V". The area is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "V". A ring is fastened to the apex for attachment to the pinkle of the towing volicie, and a pin is driven downward to to the pinkle of the towing volicie, and a pin is driven downward to the pinkle of the towing volicie, and a pin is driven downward to be aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RISTRICUED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty NOURCE: Command Report - 1 is 1: Obsr Bh NOURCE: Command Report - 1 is 1: Obsr Bh MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERNATIVENT INTELLORINGE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they right obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED 		
 a comparatively simple one. On an extremely muddy field, two men, one driving the towing vohicle and one directing the driver, can pround handle an alrean?: that would othertike require five or more ten. The tow-bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each the feetlong, joined at one end to form a "W". The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "W". A ring is fastened to the apex for attachment to the pintle of the towing vohicle, and a pint is driven downward through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing rings of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) Source No. 312 SEE OF MP TO HARK TAK ENS White phosphorous shoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, till often fire white phosphorous on our positions in a effort to confuse the phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units mains it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report 7 lst PA Obsr Bn MATE: Iovember 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLICENCE		
Dec driving the toring vehicle and one directing the driver, can pround handle an aircraft that would otherhise require five or more nen. The tow-ter now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each nine feet long, joined at one end to form a WW. The apex is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "WW. A ring is fastened to the draw for attachment to the pintle of the toring, whiche, and a pin is driven downward through the end of each arm to be drouged through the toring rings of the aircraft landing gearThis tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report - 21/th 'inf Div Arty NURCE: Command Report * Ist Yet One mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, dill othen fire white phosphorous on our positions in an affort to confuse use of white phosphorous on our positions		
<pre>pround handle an aircraft that would otherwise require five or more en. The tow-bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each inder feet long, joined at one end to form a WW. The apex is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the apex for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing voltale, and a pin is driven down- ward through the end of each arm to be drouged through the towing write of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 2hth 'inf Div Arty MTE: Cober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SEC OF UP TO FARE TARK ETS White phosphorous shoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, iii often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to ponfuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds und other fires in the target area. (EESTRICTED) KOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bh MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIEVY INTELLIGENCE All Off's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFED</pre>	1000 - 1000 - 1000 1	
The tow-Bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each hime feet long, joined at one end to form a WW. The apex is fastened with bolts and sufficient vashers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size WW. A ring is fastened to the apex for attach- non to the pinkle of the towing validle, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be dropped through the towing rings of the airwraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) SOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source No. 312	1	
The tow-Bar now in use is made of two pieces of angle iron each nime feet long, joined at one end to form a "W". The aper is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "W". A ring is fastened to the area for attach- ment to the pintle of the towing vehicle, and a pin is driven down- ward through the end of each arm to be drouped through the towing rings of the aircraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) WHEE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Dotober 1951 Source Ho. 312 Source Ho. 312 Source Ho. 312 NURCE: Command report - 21/th inf Div Arty MTE: Dotober 1951 Source Ho. 312 Source Ho. 312 Source Ho. 312 Source the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous is and the between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NURCE: Command Report # lst FA Obsr Bh MTE: November 1951 Source Mo. 313 COUNTERDATIONY INTERLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFED		
 nine feet Long, joined at one end to form a "T". The arear is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "T". A ring is fastened to the apex for attach- nent to the pintle of the towing vohicle, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drough the towing rings of the aircraft landing gearThis tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) Source No. 312 Source No. 312 Source No. 312 Source in a first strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, white phosphorous moke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, white phosphorous shoke to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficil to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) Source No. 313 COUNTERDATION INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFED 		
 nine feet Long, joined at one end to form a "T". The arear is fastened with bolts and sufficient washers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "T". A ring is fastened to the apex for attach- nent to the pintle of the towing vohicle, and a pin is driven down- mard through the end of each arm to be drough the towing rings of the aircraft landing gearThis tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) Source No. 312 Source No. 312 Source No. 312 Source in a first strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, white phosphorous moke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, white phosphorous shoke to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficil to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) Source No. 313 COUNTERDATION INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFED 	•	The townbar now in use is made of two nieces of angle iron each
with bolts and sufficient wathers to make possible any alteration necessary in the size "V". A ring is fastened to the down for attach- nent to the pintle of the tornin, vchicle, and a pin is driven down- rard through the end of each arm to be dropped through the toring rings of the airpraft landing gear. This tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21th inf Div Arty NUTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 SEE OF UP TO HARK TARGETS White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficil to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (EXENTIONED) NOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERDATTENT INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they might obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they		
hecessary in the size "Y". A ring is fastened to the spex for attach- hent to the pintle of the towing vohicle, and a pin is driven down- ward through the end of each art to be droyed through the towing rings of the aircraft landing gearThis tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th 'inf Div Arty MTE: Detober 1951 Source No. 312 ISE OF UP TO MARK TARGETS White phosphorous moke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous 's bells by infantry mortars and tank under fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report 7 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	~	
hent to the pintle of the toring vehicle, and a pin is driven down-ward through the each arm to be dropped through the toring rings of the eiroraft landing gear. This tow-har has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty NOURCE: Command Report - 21/th inf Div Arty NTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 NTE: Detober 1951 Source Ho. 312 NTE: White phosphorous shoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The enery, understanding the meaning, rill often fire white phosphorous on our positions in a effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use o' white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units areas in the target area. (RESTRUCTED) NOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERDATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED	÷.,	
bf the aircraft Landing gearThis tow-bar has proven itself completely practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 21th Inf Div Arty MTE: Ctober 1951 Source No. 312 USE OF NF TO FARK TARKETS White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the plots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The vide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) SOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATIENT INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	e na successione en	pent to the pintle of the towing vehicle, and a pin is driven down-
Practical in the field. (RESTRICTED) NOURCE: Command Report - 2hth inf Div Arty NATE: October 1951 Source Mo. 312 VEX. OF UP TO FARM TARGETS Source Mo. 312 VEX. OF UP TO FARM TARGETS White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The wide use o' white phosphorous s'ells by infantry mortars and tank mits names it diffic it to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report 7 lst FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTENT INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they uight obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
KOURCE: Command Report - 2/th inf Div Arty MTE: October 1951 Source Mo. 312 VSE OF UP TO FARK TARGETS Nhite phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The nide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank mits nakes it difficilit to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRUCTED) KOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MTE: November 1951 Source Mo. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTENLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
MATE: October 1951 Source No. 312 USE OF UP TO FARM TARGETS Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use o' white phosphorous 'shells by infantry mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		practical in the field, (RESTRICAED)
MATE: October 1951 Source No. 312 USE OF UP TO FARM TARGETS Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use o' white phosphorous 'shells by infantry mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
MATE: October 1951 Source No. 312 USE OF UP TO FARM TARGETS Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use o' white phosphorous 'shells by infantry mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
MATE: October 1951 Source No. 312 USE OF UP TO FARM TARGETS Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use o' white phosphorous 'shells by infantry mortars and tank mits makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERENTIENT INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	SOURCE	Command Report - 21th inf Div Arty
ISE OF UP TO MARK TARCETS White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, till often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the phosphorous sights by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) KOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTENT INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The fide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) HOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTENLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	DATE:	October 1951 Source No. 312
White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The fide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) HOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTENLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
White phosphorous snoke to mark targets for air strikes has several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The fide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) HOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTENLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	• • • • •	
Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The fide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRUCTED) NOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTENT INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	DSE OF MP TO FARE TARE ETS
Several undesirable features. The energy, understanding the meaning, will often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The fide use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRUCTED) NOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTENT INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		White phosphorous spoke to mark targets for air strikes has
<pre>vill often fire white phosphorous on our positions in an effort to confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) KOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn WATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED</pre>		
Confuse the pilots and cause an airstrike on friendly forces. The ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) Command Report 7 1st FA Obsr Bn NATE: Command Report 7 1st FA Obsr Bn NATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTENLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
ride use of white phosphorous shells by infantry mortars and tank units makes it difficult to discriminate between the marking rounds and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED) WOURCE: Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn WATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	•	
ATE: Command Report * 1st FA Obsr Bn NATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED CAFF Form No		
KOURCE: Command Report * 1st FA Obsr Bn MATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERBATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED CAFF Form No	and a second	
ATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		and other fires in the target area. (RESTRICTED)
ATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
ATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	*****	
ATE: November 1951 Source No. 313 COUNTERPATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OP's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	SOURCE :	Command Report # 1st FA Obsr Bn
COUNTERBATTERY INTELLIGENCE All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED	DATE:	November 1951 Source No. 313
All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
All OF's were instructed to send in all items of intelligence they night obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED		
hight obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED CAFF Form No		COUNTERBATTERY INTELLIGENCE
hight obtain (sound reports, etc) regardless of whether or not they UNCLASSIFIED CAFF Form No		All OPIs more instructed to send in all items of intelligence them
CAFF Form No		
CAFF Form No		mente coorter (poure tobortes card taget atops of another of not only
CAFF Form No		LINCI ASSIFIED

C

. .

had made a location. This proved to be very successful in that it aided the CBI section at Corps Artillery to obtain a "fix" (when coupled with data from their other intelligence agencies.) (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

NCLASSIFIED

SILENCE FERIODS FOR FRIENDLY ARTILLEPY

Inadvertently, during one day in the period, the artillery of the Corps was unusually quiet whereas the energy was active in his usual manner. Because the sound tapes were only recording incoming artillery the percentage of locations made to all energy activity was extremely high. The use of "Silence Periods" for friendly artillery in order that Sound Ranging might be fully utilized has not been readily accepted by firing units during this war. This particular event, however, tends again to bring out its value. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * * *

SURVEY ACCURACY

One important deficiency noted in survey of Artillery batteries is lack of emphasis on accuracy. Although control is available in the area, unit survey officers have used their aiming circle compass needle for direction rather than carry it in from true control. Battery centers are sometimes observed to be "paced in" or inspected on the map 1/50,000. Some units have used inspected locations and aiming circle azimuth for direction as a general practice even though true control exists. One unit was going to turn in an aiming circle because it did not have a declination constant recorded on it. All of these problems can be solved by assigning officers to the job who have had survey training. Artillery Battalion Survey officers should inquire at Division Artillery or adjacent units about location of the SIG or what control is available in their areas. Hore emphasis should be placed on survey of deliberate occupation of position. The T/CE transit issued to each unit should be utilized in this case. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * *

VALUE OF OBSERVATION BATTALION

UNCLASSIFIED

It is recommended that more emphasis be given in schools and higher staff courses on the tactical use and value of the Observation Battalion. Actual results of World War II and Korean campaigns can be published as proof of its value. Credit also should be given to the five (5) non-target getting missions of the Observation Battalion such as Survey, Leteorology, Intelligence, Calibration of Friendly Artillery, and Registration and Adjustment of Friendly Artillery. (PESTRICTED)

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51)

	UNCLASSIFIED 14	
SOURCE :	Command Report - 64th Heavy Tank Bn	
DATE:	Cctober 1951	Source No. 314
	USE OF TANK FIRE IN ASSAULT	
	Throughout the past operations the t that the infantry units would not permit the attacking infantry as the tank comman many cases the infantry tended to conside were artillery with a large dispersion in velocity weapon with pinpoint accuracy. commander would place a large artillery, an objective and then lift the fire prior fantry instead of allowing the tanks to e the advancing infantry. In most instance tion to the flank of a ridge, down or up trying to advance and when the tanks were it was necessary for the tanks to sit and receive machine gun and grenade casualtie could have been taken under tank fire at (RESTRICTED)	the tanks to fire as close to der would have liked. In or the tank fire as if it istead of a direct fire, high In many instances the infantry tank and mortar barrage on to the advance of the in- continue to fire just ahead of es the tinks were in a posi- which friendly infantry was a forced to lift their fires watch friendly infantry as from enemy positions which
SCURCE:	Command Report - 21st ANA AN Bn	
DATE:	October 1951	Source No. 315
. andre die Statistick aufsteilige aufsteilige aufsteilige aufsteilige aufsteilige aufsteilige aufsteilige aufs	TIG ARMOR SHIELD	
	At present, only fifty of our sevent with the T16 Armor Shield. This shield h and has resulted in the saving of many li until such time as a full tracked, well a T16 shields be provided for all 116 half	as proven to be invaluable ves. It is recommended that proored vehicle is developed,
SOURCE:	Command Report - 7th Inf Div Arty	<mark>ਗ਼੶ੑਗ਼ਗ਼ਗ਼੶ਗ਼੶ਖ਼ੑੑ੶ਗ਼ਗ਼ੑ੶ਗ਼ਗ਼ੑਗ਼ਗ਼੶ਗ਼੶੶ਗ਼੶ਖ਼ੑਗ਼੶੶ਗ਼੶੶ਗ਼੶ਖ਼ਖ਼੶ਗ਼੶ਗ਼੶ਗ਼੶ਗ਼</mark>
DATE:	November 1951	Source No. 316
	COLORED SHOKE SHELLS	<u></u>
	Numerous occasions have arisen where shells using N-67 fuzes have proven inacc	
OCAFF Form (Revised 15 (

marking targets for air strikes. This has been largely due to the 1-67 fuze being erratic. It is recommended that a colored smoke shell which will burst similar to the white phosphorous shell be developed. White phosphorous has proven unsatisfactory in marking targets because the enemy has similar ammunition which can be fired on our positions to cause confusion when a target is being marked for an air strike. (CONFIDENTIAL)

INCLASSIFIED

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps

DATE:

October 1951

Source No. 317

ATTACK AGAINST FORTIFIED POSITIONS


1. General

The highlight of operations during the nonth was Operation "COM-FANDO". The energy had had ample time to fortify his positions and had taken full advantages of the opportunity. The defense works were not similar to a conventional "fortified position" such as might be encountered in Europe with concrete blockhouses, dragon's teeth, tank ditches, and barbed wire. The defense system resembled more nearly the Japanese "cave-type" defense of World War II which employed heavily protected earth and log bunkers, deep dugouts, tunnels, and a network of connecting trenches. Tactics of defense were to hold the bulk of the defenders of a strong point in the dugouts and bunkers during our artillery preparations; then, upon the lifting of the artillery, come out and man the fire trenches to meet the assault. This method was very successful because all positions were on the crests of very high and steep hills which operated to reduce the speed and momentum of the assault, and limited the ability of the assault troops to maintain assault fire while climbing the steep slopes. Early in the operation, it became apparent that ultimate success would require the utmost in aggressiveness and proper use of the supporting arms.

2. Planning

It was learned that the planning for an operation against this type of defense had to be much more thorough than during previous operations in the Korean campaign. For example:

a. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective must be made by the unit which will conduct the attack. Sufficient time must be allowed for the attacking unit to determine in detail the exact location of the energy strong point, his fields of fire, and adjacent points which must be neutralized by friendly fire.



b. Complete and detailed fire plans must be prepared, utflizing supporting weapons in the most effective nanner. If heavy artillery is to be used in direct support, the heavy artillery unit must be given adequate time for selection and preparation of positions. Air support, if used, must be arranged for in sufficient time to ensure proper preparation by the pilots and air controllers. If air support is essential to the success of the plan, then the plan must be sufficiently flexible to allow for delays due to weather conditions.

c. A reserve force should be held out whenever possible, to be committed at a critical time or when there is an opportunity for a successful exploitation.

3. Artillery Support

Operation "COLMANDO" provided ample opportunity for artillery units to apply the technique of assault fire and direct laying. Due to the nature of the energy's defensive works, this type of artillery support was found to be vitally necessary, in addition to normal high angle concentrations and harassing and interdicting fires. In accomplishing this type of close support, some difficulty was encountered by Corps Artillery units, particularly with respect to the movement into position, and the coordination with supported infantry units. The following are some specific comments and recommendations made by the participating artillery battalion commanders:

a. Reconnaissance. Prior to the selection of firing positions, a reconnaissance should be made with a representative of the supported unit, to permit detailed designation of preliminary targets.

b. Selection of positions. The type of terrain encountered by this operation prevented the use of assault fire from defilade positions in most instances. Therefore, in order to provide the type of fire requested, the artillery pieces had to be placed in positions on or near the tops of hills, with resultant exposure to counterbattery fire. Positions were selected to permit gun-target ranges of 1,000 to 2,500 yards. At these ranges, precision adjustment on the enemy bunkers was very satisfactory.

c. Occupation of positions. Engineers should be made available to construct trails to positions and to level the tops of hills. This is necessary to prevent canting of the piece.

d. Liaison. Some delay was encountered in establishing effective liaison between the heavy artillery units and the supported infantry units. The most desirable situation was to have a representative from * the infantry unit stationed at the artillery observation post; the fire of the heavy artillery being controlled by the observer of the light artillery battalion which normally supported the infantry unit. Controlled in this manner, the maximum support was obtained from the heavy artillery in the assault fire role.

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 5

UNCLASS

4. Air Support

As the operation progressed, certain inadequacies in the utilization of air support became apparent. They were:

a. In some instances, air strikes were requested on specific targets, with specific types of ordnance, on only a few hours' notice In these cases the air force found it difficult, if not impossible, to provide the type of support desired.

b. Instances were noted wherein air strikes were cancelled after the aircraft had reached the target area because artillery fire was being placed on the target. Precise control over both the aircraft and the artillery must be maintained by the ground commander in order that coordination can be properly effected between the two.

c. Some US units failed to utilize the available aircraft to the maximum advantage in close support of the ground attack. For example, at the time the ground attack was being pressed a ainst energy positions on one hill, without air support, the air support would be placed on energy positions on another hill several thousand yards away which was not under ground attack. While considerable damage can be inflicted on the energy in this manner, the shock and demoralization effect of the air strike is wasted unless the air strike can be followed up by a ground advance. As the operation progressed, however, all US units became more and more aware of the necessity for utilization of air strikes in close support of the infantry advance.

5. Conclusion

The principle lesson learned was that proper close coordination between all arms involved in the attack is a must. This requires meticulous planning in advance and tight control during execution. This is not a new lesson, but serves to illustrate the soundness of established doctrine and the importance of emphasizing it in training at all levels of command. (RESTRUCTED)

* * * * * * * *

ENERY ANTITANK MINES

The antitank mine was the most potent antitank weapon employed by the enemy. Of the forty-two tank casualties sustained by the Corps during the month of October, thirty-nine were caused by mines. Two friendly tanks caught fire and burned as a result of mine explosions.

The enemy attempted to destroy rather than mercly damage friendly tanks. An 146 tank of the 64th Heavy Tank Battalion struck a mine, which exploded under the rear of the right track. The 146 tank was

INFORMAT

OCAFF Form No 73 UNCLASSIFIED (Revised 15 Oct 51)

SECURITY INFORMATION

UNCLASSIFIED

flipped over, the gun tube and turret were blown off, and the tank landed upside down off the side of the road. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report - I US Corps Arty

Source No. 318

DATE: October 1951

EMPLOYIENT OF CORPS ARTILLERY

1. Operation "COMANDO" mounted during the first half of October was the first offensive action of I US Corps as a whole against resistance of a well prepared and determined energy since the middle of June. This action pointed up sharply the danger inherent in violating well established doctrines. In so far as they affected the employment of Corps Artillery these lessons are as follows:

a. PLANNING: Insufficient planning of artillery ammunition resupply at levels higher than Corps Artillery resulted in the development of a critical situation on the third or fourth day of the offensive. While none of the Ammunition Supply Foints were completely exhausted of any one type of artillery ammunition, the critical situation caused the attention of the Corps Commander to be distracted from other matters to the problem of artillery amunition resupply.

Artillery firing, like any other operation, should be carefully planned to yield the maximum results and yet, several times during the operation requests for additional artillery support in a preparation for an attack came to division or corps artillery fire direction centers too late and in insufficient detail for proper planning.

b. CENTRALIZATION OF APTILLERY CONTROL: It is well established artillery doctrine that in order to make maximum use of the ability of artillery to mass its fires throughout the battle zone, the control of artillery fires should be highly centralized as long as communications permit. This centralized control is especially essential during an attack on a prepared position.

During this operation, one division completely de-centralized control of its organic artillery and the control of all Corps artillery battalions having a general support-reinforcing role. At one time the S3 of one direct support battalion was trying, from his battalion FDC, to control the fires of two light and two medium battalions. This overloading of direct support FDC's probably caused such misuse of artillery as: the firing of battery of 155-mm howitzers on a mortar position at a rate of one (1) gun two (2) rounds per minute until 1100 rounds had been fired over a period of approximately nine (9) hours;

SECURITY INFORMATIC

CONFIDENTIA

OCAFF Form No (Revised 15 Oct 5.)

UNCLASSIFIED

or the firing of one battery one round every ninety seconds for over three hours. In several instances softening up fires were continued until the forward slopes of the objectives were pounded into a featureless mass. Volley after volley of artillery fire was observed on slopes that the enemy obviously had vacated. Apparently there was little or no surveillance of these fires. Ammunition was wasted and the capability of the artillery to hit remunerative targets was reduced by the number of weapons tied up on these unremunerative targets. Apparently it was a case of turning on the hose and letting it run until the gardener could get back to it.

UNCLASSIFIED

Another result of the decentralization of control was the insistance by supported units, to the direct support artillery, on certain fires even to specifying unit to fire, method of fire and amnunition to be used, rather than describing the target and requesting fire from a higher headquarters that might be able to better analyze the mission and if desirable bring considerable additional artillery to bear.

c. INTELLIGENCE: Counterbattery fires were very effective during this period but one of the best tools of the counterbattery Intelligence Officer, the shelling report, was dulled through neglect. Shelling reports received were scant in number and many of those received lacked essential details. This caused the loss of time and overloading of communications in order to try to fill in some of the essentials. Better training among the infantry and the field artillery forward observer teams is needed to point up the value to the infantry of proper and prompt shelling reports.

d. HASSING OF FIRES: At the beginning of Operation "COLLANDO" the artillery with the corps had been so disposed as to offer the opportunity to mass artillery fires on a scale hitherto unknown in Korea. Yet due to the decentralization of control instituted by one division much of this capability was wasted.

e. ASSAULT FIRE: Because of the strength of the field fortifications it was found that indirect fire by normal methods was ineffective against the bunkers, emplacements, and covered trenches with which many of the objectives were honey-combed.

During Operation "COTTANDO" the 204th FA Bn employed its 155-mm guns on Motor Carriage 140 in direct fire and assault fire against enemy fortifications with good results.

The 17th FA Bn received one self-propelled 8-inch howitzer on 14 October and between the 15th and 18th employed this weapon in both direct and assault fire against bunkers, trenches and emplacements. One novel employment of this weapon was to cut a trench through the top of a ridge thus exposing a communications trench on the reverse slope which was then interdicted by a machine gun and a recoilless rifle.

9...

OCAFF Form No 73 Revised 15 Oct 51)

UNCLASSIFIED

	The success of the assault fire can be measured by the state- ment of the Commanding General, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, "I attribute the success of this attack solely to the effective assault fire by the 204th FA Bar
	During much of the Cirect and assault firing one liaison air- craft was detailed to the sole mission of providing cover for the weapon by taking under immediate fire any energy weapon trying to fire counter- battery. The 17th FA Bn reports that, on at least one occasion, this air cover paid off by prompt snothering of the energy's fire.
	Careful planning, detailed reconnaissance and the provision of complete communications paid off many times in the resulting speed and efficiency of operation while the heavy artillery was in an exposed position. The communications net should be so planned as to make maxi- num use of the artillery forward observers with the rifle companies. For complete coordination a liaison officer from each assaulting bettalion of infantry should be stationed at the OP controlling the
	fire. A state of the second state of the secon
	2. RECONSIDATION: That there be no change made in field artil- lery doctrines as taught at the Artillery School but that means be found to bring to the attention of supported unit commanders the capa- bilities and limitations of artillery fires, to eliminate requests for impossible or wasteful fires. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE :	Command Report - IX Corps Arty
DATE:	December 1951 Source No. 319
	COLMUNICATION BETWEEN AIR FORCE AND ARLY PLANES
	Hany targets have been lost during the past year because of the inability of the army aircreft to talk to the mosquitos or fighter planes in their zones. On the few occasions when it was possible to talk to the fin Force mosquitos arcellon? meaults were obtained. With

IINCI ACCE

talk to the Air Force mosquitos, excellent results were obtained. With the Army planes now equipped with WHF radio, this communication would be possible by the designation of a cormon channel for all planes oper-ating within a corps sector. (RESTRICTED)

OGAFF Form No 74 (Remised 15 Oct 5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

> Å

i **j**e dije. Di je dije

		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
DATE:	Novomber 1951	Source No. 320
	ENERY TACTICS	
	The enemy allowed our patrol to advance y and permitted a portion of the objective to be resistance; however, once the patrol was on the position, he pinned the patrol down with an ac matic weapons and then placed mortar on the patrol inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking of which his mortar fire fell on all avenues of y	taken with only moderate he objective in an exposed courate crossfire of auto- atrol. As a result he lement. The accuracy with withdrawal from the objec-
	tive indicated pre-registored mortar fires,	(RESTRICTED)
SOURCE :	Command Report - 55th T Trk Bn	
DATE:	June 1951	Source No. 321
	POLICY FOR REPORTING TRUCK TOWNAGE The truck capacities set forth in par 221 accordance with the experience of this battal: headquarters. However, allowance must be made demanded by some higher headquarters. For in- to which this battalion was attached insisted filled the cargo capacity of a 25 ton truck be tons regardless of its actual weight. Thus a which filled a truck but weighed no more than as five. (5) tons. It is suggested than an Arm lished to report truck tonnage in somewhat the tonnage is computed; weight tons or measurement greater. (RESTRICTED)	ion as reported to higher here for the "padding" stance, one headquarters that any cargo which e reported as five (5) signment of floral wreaths 250 pounds was reported my-wide policy be estab- e same manner, as ship
	GASOLINE TANK TRUCK This headquarters wishes to recommend, the line tanker per light truck company. The pre- would be a great help but a tanker recessigned lons, still utilizing the basic design of the	sent 750-gallon tanker to carry about 1200 gal
	Would be far more practical. (HESTRICTED) ******* UNCLASSIFIED	

UNCLASSIFIED CONVOY FOR ATION Higher authority consistently specifies that trucks will be formed into convoys in multiples of five. Repeated efforts have been made to form then in multiples of four thus retaining the integrity of the squad formation of a truck company. To date all such efforts have been futile. Higher headquarters still depand convoys in multiples of five, usually ten trucks. (RESTRICTED) SOURCE : Command Report - 7th Cav Regt Source No. 322 November 1951 DATE: TACTICAL RUSE The following prearranged tactical device proved very effective during one engagement. A rifle company demonstrated during daylight hours on a patrol base. All but one rifle platoon withdrew at darkness. Prearranged artillery and mortar TOT's were plotted on top of the key ground of the patrol base. When enemy units made contact the rifle platoon withdrew secretly at top speed and in 12 minutes from time of first contact, called in friendly TOT's. Patrol investigation in the morning disclosed 135 enemy dead. The friendly patrol suffered no casualties. (CONFIDENTIAL) **** COLBAT OUTPOSTS OR PATROL BASES The potentialities of a patrol base should be carefully studied and a firm doctrine established, leaving little doubt in the commander's mind as to whether his advance units are combat outposts or patrol bases. (RESTRICTED) Command Report - 24th Inf Div SOURCE: Source No. 323 November 1951 DATE: ATTACK BY FIRE On 18 November, Operations Instructions were issued from Head. quarters 24th Infantry Division, ordering "Attacks by Fire" to be placed on enemy positions to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy and inflict UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY

OCAFF Form No ~~ (Revised 15 Oct 5.)

damage to his personnel. An "Attack by Fire" consists of a heavy volume of supporting fires, artillory, mortar, tank, end air, as. well as long range infantry direct fire weapons on a small tar of area for a brief period of time. The success of those attacks depends bargely on the suddon and violent initial strike of all weapons, which naturally require close timing and coordination. The targets must be carefully chosen in advance and have to be worthy of the great volume of fire that is expended during each brief operation. In order to achieve effective surprise, all supporting fires should be registered hours before the time of the actual strike. As the "attack" commences, all available weapon's must, be brought to bear simultaneously on the target area. Fortars and high angle artillery work the topographical crest and reverse slopes; 57-mm, 75-mm recoilless rifles, machine guns, quad .50 half tracks and tank fires, including the 90-mn gun, lay direct fire against forward slope targets. The period of intense fire, lasts approximately fifteen (15) minutes. The area covered should not be so bread as to make it difficult to achieve a high degree of saturation. (RESTRICTED)

ING LECTRO

SMIPHO WITH .50 CAL MO

The 50 cal machine gun was put to a new use by elements of the 24th Division during the month. A .50 cal machine gun, mounted with a telescopic sight was used as a sniping weapon. The weapon was found highly effective at ranges of up to two thousand (2000) yards. In one instance three (3) Chinese were killed and three (3) wounded at a range of sixteen hundred (1600) yards. (RESTRICTED)

SCURCE: Command Report - 15th FA Bn

DATE:

October 1951

Source No. 324

EMPLOYIENT OF ARTILLERY OBSERVERS

In spite of all the manuals, training directives and instruction that exist on the subject of effective employment of artillery observers, there is still a fendency more young and inexperienced infantry commanders to get their observers so far forward that they become pinned down and ineffective at the first reception of energy small arms fire. The basic principle that he be effective an artillery observer must be in a position to see and operate his communication equipment needs more stress in the training, not only of infantry commanders, but of artillery observers as well. (RESTRICTED)

13

S Production of the second second

UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51) OCAFE T

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE: Nove III.I. made way aroun illu type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove Nove Neve IETH for of t	e available to te accomplish unition in mon It has so fa uninating amm es. (CONFIDEN	MITION lency to find this is the this is the this is the this is the this is the	ght at night abating onem on maintain ar ons for on-ca ossible to ma	Source requires that y night probing mple stocks of all illuminatin aintain adequat shortages whic	attacks. One illuminating g fires.
IILM made vay armu illi type SOURCE: DATE: Nove HETH morr for of t	UTINATING ALL The CCF tend e available to to accomplish unition in mon It has so fa uninating arm es. (CONFIDEN	lency to fi o aid in con o this is to rtar position ar been impo- unition due	nbating enemy o maintain ar ons for on-ce ossible to ma	roquires that y night probing mple stocks of all illuminatin aintain adoquat	some means be attacks. One illuminating g fires. co stocks of
made way armin illin type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove Nove Netter for of t	The CCF tend e available to te accomplish unition in mor It has so fa uninating amm es. (CONFIDEN	lency to fi o aid in con o this is to rtar position ar been impo- unition due	nbating enemy o maintain ar ons for on-ce ossible to ma	y night probing mplc stocks of all illuminatin aintain adoquat	attacks. One illuminating g fires.
made way ammi illi type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove Nove Netter for of t	The CCF tend e available to te accomplish unition in mor It has so fa uninating amm es. (CONFIDEN	lency to fi o aid in con o this is to rtar position ar been impo- unition due	nbating enemy o maintain ar ons for on-ce ossible to ma	y night probing mplc stocks of all illuminatin aintain adoquat	attacks. One illuminating g fires.
vay annu illu type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Novo INETE for of t	e available to te accomplish unition in mon It has so fa uninating amm es. (CONFIDEN	o aid in con this is to rtar position the position the position due	nbating enemy o maintain ar ons for on-ce ossible to ma	y night probing mplc stocks of all illuminatin aintain adoquat	attacks. One illuminating g fires.
vay annu illu type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Novo <u>HETT</u> for of t	e available to te accomplish unition in mon It has so fa uninating amm es. (CONFIDEN	o aid in con this is to rtar position the position the position due	nbating enemy o maintain ar ons for on-ce ossible to ma	y night probing mplc stocks of all illuminatin aintain adoquat	attacks. One illuminating g fires.
type SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove <u>HETE</u> for of t	urninating armu es. (CONFIDEN	unition due			
SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove HETE for of t	nand Ronaut				TTP III GTT
SOURCE: Comm DATE: Nove HETE for of t	nand Ronant				
morr for of t	nano neport -	2lith Inf D	iv Arty	• • • • • • • • • •	er internetien en en en en daar e
morr for of t	ember 1951		 ▲ ▲	Source	No. 326 -
morr for of t	EOROLOGICAL DA	ጥል		Herbert and an	
for of t	3011013001207211 14		1 (A. 1967)	•	•
date equi this quar for	the division a sistently usat a it is sugges lpped with red s data. Shoul rters should h	intillery is ole, and ver sted that ea lio-sonde ou d this not ave radio-so coses during	s equipped, a ry necessary, ach division yuipment and be feasible, sonde equipment g good weathe	hich the headquare not satisfa , accurate, met artillery head personnel for , each corps ar ent to furnish er, and for ess	ctory. To secu eorological quarters be collection of tillery head- data to divisio
SOURCE : Comm	and Report -	I US Corps	ikeli di tuli interi∛ N		
DATE: Dece	ember 1951			Source	No. 327
MAID	VIENANCE EXPED	DIEMT		*****	
repl	t supply, but lace unservice	the 73d Ta able idler	nk Battalior who cls with	ne 139 Utility n worked out an worn out road had worn off,	expedient to wheels. When
	UNCLASSIFIED				
CAFF Form No Revised 15 Oct-5-/		A STATE OF A			

1

ŧ

not discarded but the remainder of the rubber was removed from the metal rim. The wheel was then bolted to the idler hub and served as a substitute for an idler wheel. The holes in the road wheel are spaced the same as the holes in the idler wheel; consequently there was no problem in bolting it to the hub. The 73d Tank Battalion reported satisfactory performance of this type of wheel. It was recommended that the wheels be used in pairs on the same idler hub since road wheels were slightly smaller than idler wheels. (RESTRICTED)

SOURCE :

Command Report - Survey of the Ved Dispensary Facilities in the Chunchon Area 3d Historical Detachment

INGENETED

DATE:

October 1951

Source No. 328

AREA MEDICAL DISPENSANDES"

IINCLASSIFIED

Department of the Army Circular Number 10 authorized the changing of certain unit dispensaries to area dispensaries to care for Army troops. The effect of this change in Korea has been to provide medical care for units which are spread out over large geographical areas. For example, the 728th Hilitary Police Battalion has platoons in various locations between TAEGU and SEOUL. Its organic medical service, functioning as a unit dispensary, cannot give adequate medical care to all platoons. Therefore, each platoon now receives medical care from the closest area dispensary. An additional result of this change has been to prevent commanding officers of engineer, ordnance, or cuartermaster units from limiting their unit medical detachments to serving their units only.

There Army troops are stationed in large numbers, it is proposed to have an area dispensary to care for all the troops in that area.

In WONJU, a troop population center, the small unit dispensaries are now being consolidated into one area dispensary. This results in economy of personnel and more thorough medical coverage in the area. (RESTRICTED)

15

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51) UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED OCAFE Form No 24 (Millionia 16 Oct 100 singer the states of