OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES Fort Monroe, Virginia

16 November 1951

C16702-19

SUBJECT: Dissemination of Combat Information

ATTNG-64 350.05/28(DOCI)(C)(16 November 51)

TO: See distribution

Inclosed extracts from command reports are forwarded for your information, evaluation and any necessary action in accordance with SR 525-85-5.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES:

1 Incl Extracts from sources 157 thru 182

P. C. CASPERSON Major, AGC Asst Adjutant General

ARI TION PER 1952

DISTRIBUTION: (Over)

UNCLASSIFIED

и.139.р Сору No. <u>136</u>

	GEORET	LINIC		
DISTRIE	JTION: 2	UNU	LASSIF	ILU
Copy No				
	Department of the Army			
1-3	ACOFS, G-1, Pers			
4-6	ACOFS, G-2, Intel			
7- 21				
22-41				
42-43	Chief of Military History			
44-53	CCMLO			
54- 63	COFORD			
64-73	CSIGO			
74- 83	∞ FT			
84- 93	COFENGRS			
94-103				
104-113				
114-118	COFPSYLLR			
-	Office, Chief of Army Field Fo	orces		
119	Deputy Chief of Staff	2000		
120				
121				
122-132				
133				
134	RD			
	Commandants			
135-137				
	Command & General Staff Coll	ege		
140-141	The Armored School	-080		
	The Artillery School			
111-115	The Infantry School	•		
1/16-1/17	Army General School			
	Asst Comdt, The Arty School, A	&GM Br		
	Presidents	Liteon Di		
350	AFF Board No 1			
151	AFF Board No 2			
152				
	AFF Board No 4			
	00, AFF Arctic Test Branch			
Informat	ion copies:	Co	opy No	
Copy No	<u>₩-₩-₩-₩-₩</u> ₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩₩	20	05-206	TAC, Langley AFB, Va
155 156	CINCEUR	20	07-208	
	Office, Chief of Army Field F		·	Gp, Air Comd & Staf
157– 158	Inspector Secretariat			Sch, Air Univ,
159	Information			Maxwell AFB, Ala
	G3(64)	20	09-210	•
160-179				Ground Sch, Souther
160 - 179 180	AG Records			Pines, NC
180	LG Records Extra Copies			
180	Extra Copies	2]	11-212	Comdt, Counter-
180 181 -1 90		2]	11-212	
180 181 - 190 191- 192	Extra Copies Commanding Generals	2]	11-212	Intelligence Corps
160-179 180 181-190 191-192 193-194 195-196	Extra Copies Commanding Generals First Army Second Army	2]	11-212	Intelligence Corps Sch, Fort Holabird,
180 181 - 190 191-192 193-194	Extra Copies Commanding Generals First Army Second Army Third Army	2]	11-212	Intelligence Corps
180 181-190 191-192 193-194 195-196 197-198	Extra Copies Commanding Generals First Army Second Army Third Army Fourth Army	2]	11-212	Intelligence Corps Sch, Fort Holabird,
180 181-190 191-192 193-194 195-196	Extra Copies Commanding Generals First Army Second Army Third Army Fourth Army Fifth Army	21 UNCLASS		Intelligence Corps Sch, Fort Holabird,



OFFICE, CHIEF OF ARMY FIELD FORCES Fort Monroe, Virginia

C16702-/9

EXTRACTS OF COMBAT INFORMATION

SOURCE:

Command Report - 1st Cav Div

DATE: March 1951

Source No. 157

The Commanding General directed that all vehicles in the Division be marked at the highest position possible in addition to the normal markings on the front and rear bumper of each vehicle. The step was taken in order to easily identify units to which the vehicles belonged and thereby expedite traffic control of convoys. The constant presence of either mud or dust obliterated bumper markings. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * * *

Pressure from higher headquarters continued on searching for, reporting and evacuating captured enemy material. The problem now became one of coordination between the reporting and evacuating agencies. It has been found that items were reported incorrectly, both in types and quantities, and were therefore impossible to evacuate as requested. When large ammunition dumps were found, it was particularly hard to make initial inventories and final evacuation agree. There was also the problem of who was going to evacuate these items when found in large quantities; units were responsible for evacuation to the limit of their capabilities, but these were soon exhausted. The Division was meeting the problem by detailing transportation to ordnance for such recovery while the units remained responsible for guarding the dumps. No solution has yet been reached to balance the daily reports and the monthly technical service captured material reports. (RESTRICTED)

Once again a critical shortage of oxygen and acetylene existed. It was often impossible to perform maintenance on vehicles without these items. It was never possible to keep much oxygen and acetylene on hand because, as in the present case, so many vehicles pile up on the deadline awaiting arrival of oxygen and acetylene, that the new stock is immediately dissipated. (RESTRICTED)

(Over)

UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51)

	UNCLASSIFIED 2	
	of maintaining the Division ment were magnified by the maintenance section of the system that enabled one pl	in accomplishing the tremendous task 's vehicles and other Ordnance equip- rapid advances of the Division. The Ordnance Company, by using a leap-frog atoon to remain in place for a longer , increased its production a great
OURCE:	Command Report - 6th Medium	Tank Bn
DATE:	March 1951	Source No. 158
		ritically regard the width of a road heavy vehicles. (RESTRICTED)
OURCE:	Command Report - 70th Tank	Bn (Heavy)
DATE:	April 1951	Source No. 159
	sides of ridge of Hill 278, assault by 1st Platoon tank coming under fire from 3d P treated to the opposite sid	atoons of Company "B", from opposite placed fire on entrenchments. Upon is, the Chinese ran over the ridge, Clatoon tanks. Many Chinese then re- le and once again came under the deadly This continued until all Chinese on RESTRICTED)
OURCE:	Command Report - 6th Medium	1 Tank Bn
DATE:	April 1951	Source No. 160
	were conducted from ten (10 territory. Artillery Forwa	April 1951, five (5) tank patrols (1) to fifteen (15) miles into enemy and Observers, and in some cases, Air panied the patrols and achieved (TED)
	* * *	* * * * * *
		UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET



The major problem involved in the rotation program is reconciling the low state of training of replacements received as compared to the highly skilled rotatees returned to the ZI. As long as replacements are received in relatively small groups, they can be intregrated into tank crews on the line and trained by the old crewmen. This method of training would least effect the combat efficiency of the organization. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * * * * *

It has been found that M-32 recovery vehicles with radial engines are inadequate for towing M-46 tanks due to their lack of power. The M-32 recovery vehicle with a Ford engine performs admirably. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE:

Command Report - Aviation Section EUSAK

DATE:

May 1951

Source No. 161

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That SR 385-10-43 be amended to clarify distinction between major and minor aircraft accidents.

2. Future personnel planning should include greater availability of trained and qualified Army aviators so as to permit a rotation of flying duties.

3. That the replacement stream provide a flow of school trained aircraft mechanics.

4. All limited standard aircraft should be returned and only one model of aircraft for each class i.e., rotary, two (2) and multipassenger fixed wing, should be used.

5. Engineer pilots, helicopter qualified should be provided for Engineer units. (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

3

CURITY INFORMA

OCAFF Form No 73

_

SOURCE:	Command Report - 630	d FA Bn
DATE:	May 1951	Source No. 162
		replacement personnel appears to be very satis- ity are draftees with fourteen (14) weeks basic TIAL)
SOURCE:	Command Report - 920	d Armd FA Bn
DATE:	January 1951	Source No. 163
	ineffective officer 30 minutes or more, bumper, were caused build-up of vehicles indicated that too m vehicles and let cir was a justifiable of yet these halts caus	lumns were caused by inconsiderate drivers and supervision. On two (2) occasions, halts of affecting miles of vehicles packed bumper to in each case by one disabled vehicle and the s three (3) abreast trying to pass. Evidence many officers were prone to sit back in their rcunstances work themselves out. In neither case ostacle found for the halting of the column, sed the column to build-up from Ayang-Ni to ance of about ten (10) miles, and critically
		tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED)
OURCE:		tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE: DATE:	affected the evacuat	tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED)
	Affected the evacuat Command Report - 60t April 1951 Recommend that assigned to this com processing of major this mission, using	tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED)
	affected the evacuat Command Report - 60t April 1951 Recommend that assigned to this com processing of major this mission, using from the direct supp (RESTRICTED)	tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED) th Ord Gp Source No. 164 an Ordnance Artillery Vehicle Park Company be mmand to combat load, control issue and complete items. Currently, field depots are performing qualified mechanics and inspectors detailed
	Affected the evacuat Command Report - 60t April 1951 Recommend that assigned to this com processing of major this mission, using from the direct supp (RESTRICTED)	tion of units from Seoul. (RESTRICTED) th Ord Gp Source No. 164 an Ordnance Artillery Vehicle Park Company be mmand to combat load, control issue and complete items. Currently, field depots are performing qualified mechanics and inspectors detailed

LIBITY INFORMATION CEUDEN

3. 397

أعتقده

ASSIFIED

SOURCE:	Command Popont let and Meintenerse Dr. (Duer)
	Command Report - 1st Ord Maintenance Bn (Prov)
DATE:	April 1951 Source No. 165
	Several items of unserviceable equipment were received during the period, indicating sabotage, carelessness in assembly, and faulty manufacture. Examples are:
	1. 155-mm Howitzers - right hand studs on both wheels.
· · · ·	2. Vehicle, tank recovery, M-32 - gas tanks full of oil; ground electrode broken off close to base, and center electrode broken off close to porcelain on spark plug.
	3. Vehicle, armored, utility, N-39 - leak in differential oil cooler.
	4. Engine assembly for M/T Vehicle - main bearing oil seal leaking very badly.
	5. Carriage, motor, multiple gun, M-16 - inlet gas line filled with lead.
	6. Tank, M-4A3EC - fuel system and gas tanks full of water. (SECRET)
SOURCE:	Command Report - X Corps Artillery
DATE:	May 1951 Source No. 166
	During the month of May the Artillery with X Corps used VT fuze with 26 percent of the ammunition expended. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE:	Command Report - Aviation Section (EUSAK)
DATE:	April 1951 Source No. 167
	REQUIREMENTS FOR 1-19 PROPELLER MODIFICATION
	Request consideration be afforded the matter of developing a two (2) position propeller for use on the L-19 aircraft in order UNCLASSIFIED

to increase the speed. To minimize the damage from enemy fire it is essential that the aircraft be capable of developing speeds which will limit the duration of exposure to such fire. In addition, a much greater time is required to accomplish courier missions than would be the case if a faster cruise were available. (CONFIDENTIAL) * * * * * * * * * * * 1-19 PARKING BRAKE MATERIAL FAILURE Malfunction of the parking brake of the L-19 aircraft has recently developed. It has been found that an excessive build-up of pressure when releasing the parking brake has caused failure of the brake housing. It is believed that improper parking brake setting by the pilots is the primary cause of the malfunction; however, the units have been advised to disconnect the parking brake in order to prevent future failures of this nature. It is recommended to the aviation units that the control lock be used in lieu of the parking brake when securing the aircraft. (CONFIDENTIAL) SOURCE: OCAFF Observer Team Source No. 168 DATE: 12 October 1951 The Corps G3 Air stated that in his opinion the Division G3 Air was not in a position to properly advise the division commander on air support matters while stationed in the FSCC. As a result, commanders and G3s were selecting the targets and the G3 Air merely acted as a forwarding agency for the requests. He felt that the Division G3 Air adequately fulfilled his role as a coordinator, but not as an air advisor to the commander. (CONFIDENTIAL) Command Report - 38th Inf Regt, 2d Inf Div SOURCE: Source No. 169 April 1951 DATE: REORGANIZATION AND RECEIPT OF REPLACEMENTS Except for the first six (6) days of the month, the regiment was in reserve, yet the regiment had a total of 204 non-battle casualties. This was an excessive number. It was found that over NCLASSIFIED OCAFF Form No 7° (Revised 15 Oct 51)

Fro

6

100 of the non-battle casualty cases were men who joined the regiment since the February 12 action and, as pointed out in the March evaluation report, the majority of these replacements came from ordnance, quartermaster, and engineer units and truck companies located in rear areas. Although these recent replacements made up only 30% of the regimental strength, they accounted for 50% of the non-battle casualties. Also during the month the regiment had seven (7) self inflicted wounds, five (5) of which were men who had joined the regiment since 12 February. Stragglers were numerous during the first six (6) days of the month and the main offenders were new men who had become exhausted or lost; or, never having received infantry training before, became confused and lacked confidence in themselves. (SECRET)

TNFORMATTC

* * * * * * * * * *

A great number of cases came up where enlisted men had physical defects, such as bad eyesight not corrected by glasses, severe flat feet, disturbances from old wounds and other similar defects that rendered the men unfit for duty in an infantry regiment. These men were given a new profile but still remained in the regiment after several attempts to have them reassigned to jobs in rear areas. Medical channels would not handle such cases, as individuals were not sick but only had physical defects. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Again during the month, while the regiment was in reserve, a group of replacements was received from every branch of service but the infantry. Men from ordnance, transportation, engineer units etc, had not had any training with the infantry since their basic training days two (2) or three (3) years ago. In addition, many of the new replacements were unfit physically for assignment in an infantry unit. As a result these individuals were a "drag" on the rest of the outfit. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * *

INFORMAT

* * * * * * * * * *

It is sincerely believed that greater emphasis should be placed on the physical profile. A warm body is not enough in a combat unit and is frequently a handicap rather than a help. Soldiers lacking in stamina and/or bourage are best employed elsewhere. (CONFIDENTIAL)

UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51)

8		
UNCLASSIFIED		
SOURCE:	Command Report - 192d Ord Bn	
DATE:	April 1951 Source No. 170	
	Many of these replacements were re-profiles without previous experience in Ordnance. This necessitated an intensive program of on the job training. (CONFIDENTIAL)	
SOURCE:	Command Report - 226th Ord Base Depot & 2d Log Comd (C) Ord Sec	
DATE:	April 1951 Source No. 171	
	The Control Point at the 1st Ordnance Maintenance Battalion (Prov) was given authority to turn away organizational vehicles being submitted for repair or turn-in if organizational maintenance had not been performed to meet the required standards. Roadside "spot check" inspection teams were put into operation. These teams operated at fifteen (15) different points. Two (2) teams were manned daily to cover the greatest number of available vehicles. These inspections have been instrumental in decreasing the organizational deficiencies from an unsatisfactory rating to a satisfactory rating of 2.41 deficiencies per vehicle during the month of operation. Contact teams visited organizational motor pools for the prime purpose of reducing the number of vehicles on deadline. The teams were hampered by the lack of adequate transportation and could only carry a limited amount of spare parts and sub-assemblies to the using units. Despite this fact, they accounted for a twenty-five percent reduction in the number of deadlined vehicles in organization motor pools. (RESTRICTED)	
SOURCE:	Command Report - 38th Inf Regt - 2d Inf Div 1-31 May 1951 Source No. 172	
DH I Di	While wires and mine obstacles were excellent in slowing down the first waves of enemy, their inclination to utilize column attacks made these obstacles effective only against the first few waves. (RESTRICTED) ********** UNCLASSIFIED	
	SECONDECEMBER	

The use of artillery in support of patrols proved very effective. A forward observer moved with each patrol. As the patrol advanced, the FO would periodically call for a registration. As a result, when the patrol ran into the enemy, there was no time lag between the adjusted fires and the "fire for effect." It is recommended that all patrols probing deep into enemy territory use this system, for maximum enemy casualties. (RESTRICTED)

Patrols departing from various company areas would have to be guided through the minefield. By observering these departures the enemy could ascertain the safe lanes in the minefield. To offset this, a certain portion of the minefield would be disarmed just prior to daylight and the patrol would pass through the area just as if there was nothing there. This proved to be very effective in deceiving the enemy. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * * * *

Our greatest asset was the bunker-type emplacement with overhead cover. This overhead cover should be thick enough to withstand our artillery "VT" fires. Time and time again the Chinese would penetrate our positions only to be repulsed by artillery "VT" fires which we called on our position. In addition, it was learned that if possible, bunker-type emplacements should have apertures in all directions. Then the enemy cannot assault the position from flank or rear without being detected. Also, these bunkers should be constructed for three (3) men to insure maximum firepower as well as a feeling of security among the men. (RESTRICTED)

The use of tactical wire in conjunction with minefields did much to stem the Chinese. However, it is felt that a 6-strand (toward enemy) double apron fence is the most effective barrier. (RESTRICTED)

It is recommended that in operating over difficult terrain, the 3.5 rocket launcher be replaced by a light machine gun to increase the firepower. At no time during the past month was the 3.5 rocket launcher used when the same mission could be accomplished by the 57-mm recoilless rifle. A 3.5 rocket launcher ammunition bearer is only able to carry a few rounds due to the weight. As yet, suitable targets for the 3.5, such as tanks, have not been encountered. The


UNCLASSIFIED

* * * * * * * * * *

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51)

10

CEOPE1



When the tank battalion is employed in the unusual manner of Operation Punch (the force was dispatched daily and recalled daily) it is recommended that time and an assembly area be provided to accomplish refueling, replenishment of ammunition and required daily maintenance. During the first two (2) days of Operation Punch the task force was assigned a segment of the main line of resistance which had to be occupied by dark. The unit was recalled so late that resupply and maintenance, with its inevitable noise and movement, had to be conducted on the forward positions. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * * * *

On 12 February, while tanks were traveling over very rough terrain during the regrouping and movement to a rear area (about fifty miles) approximately thirty (30) tanks developed oil cooler fan trouble. Also two (2) final drive shafts were broken and three (3) transmissions were burned out, making a total of approximately thirty-five (35) tanks in ordnance at one time out of fifty-eight (58) in the battalfon. Since parts were not available for the oil cooler fans, the 30th, 2d, 4th, 21st and 703d Ordnance, working as a team, rebuilt clutches and fans to get the tanks back into action. The total number of tanks for duty at the end of the month was fifty-four (54). (CONFIDENTIAL)

Much trouble was experienced with the auxiliary idler mounting bolts being sheared off. Inspections with a subsequent follow-up proved that crew members were not tightening these mounting bolts. Since correcting this we have had no such failures. (CONFIDENTIAL)

* * * * * * * * * *

Contraction in the states

Quarterly checks on the M-46 have proven that the fan tower units become loose and should be tightened monthly. Also that many gas tank leaks develop in places impossible to see without pulling the power-pack. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: Command Report -151st Engr C Bn DATE: April 1951 Source No. 174 The matter of shipping men to the Zone of Interior for discharge or emergency leave is being delayed due to the fact that soldiers UNCLASSIFIED OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51)

SE

CURIT

12

	may not depart Korea without their military pay card, and the finance office is located 110 miles away. There should be provisions for forwarding the records to the next finance office without holding up the soldier concerned. (CONFIDENTI.L)
SOURCE:	Command Report - 68th Alin Gun Bn
DATE:	May 1951 Source No. 175
·	RECOMMENDATIONS
	That the replacements for the unit include non-commissioned officers of all grades.
	That the replacements sent to units in Korea from those in Japan be of an equitable cross section of personnel and not those who have undesirable disciplinary records.
	That specialists, who have been trained in a particular anti- aircraft MOS by extensive schooling, be assigned to antiaircraft units - not to Infantry or Field Artillery units where the special- ization cannot be used. (RESTRICTED)
	•
SOURCE:	Command Report - Hq Japan Replacement Training Center 8042d Army Unit
DATE:	May 1951 Source No. 176
	Replacements continued to arrive with personal, medical and supply records in far from perfect condition. This resulted in the expenditure of several thousand man-hours of work correcting deficiencies which existed prior to departure from the Zone of the Interior. As an example, 11,464 immunizations were needed by the first 23,615 men processed at the Initial Receiving Point during the month. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE:	Command Report - Sth Cav Regt
date:	February 1951 Source No. 177
	In retreating from the hill, the enemy was caught in a cross- fire from a tank platoon which had previously been sent out to

	p *** -	SECURITION
		UNCLASSIFIED
	* 1	reconnoiter the area from the rear. Heavy enemy casualties resulted. (RESTRICTED)
		* * * * * * * * *
		Throughout the entire campaign there has been a complete lack of aerial photographs for use by the ground elements. The few air photographs that have been received were delivered too late to be of material value to the unit. It is recommended that a photomap service be established so as to deliver the required information within twenty-four (24) hours. (CONFIDENTIAL)
	SOURCE:	- Command Report - 5th Cav. Regt
	DATE:	March 1951 Source No. 178.
		Comments on Winter Clothing Ski socks - wear out too easily on the heel.
		Shoe Pacs - approximately 25% of the shoes rip at the seams near the instep.
	ŝ	Overcoat, field - Too heavy and long for active troops.
		Parka - Best liked in the field. It is light and warm. Does not restrict movement.
		Gloves - Should be designed with a free trigger finger and lined for warmth.
	an a	(CONFIDENTIAL)
		n transfer for the first of the second se An example of the second sec A second secon
<i></i>		
	\$	UNCLASSIFIED 13
	AFF Form 1 vised 15 Oc	

	UNCLASSIFIED	ner surveyener the survey
-		14
SOURCE:	Command Report - Hq Japan 8042d Ar	Replacement Training Center my Unit
DATE:	April 1951	Source No. 179
مرجع أ لم مهامة أمر مع من من عن عن من		
	necessity of posting form inspections, continued. standard mineographed iss ships from Camp Stoneman fifty pounds. Time studi as a result of statements inspection was not econom in collection of \$1043 fr Recommendation was made t of Interior ports of emba 191; the form to be a min	processing of replacements, due to s 189 and 191 to date prior to showdown The collection of forms 446, 447 and non- ue and turn-in slips so posted from six and Fort Lawton weighed seven hundred and es showed that the return to the Government of charges following posting and showdown ical, as 1034 manhours of posting resulted om enlisted men in one shipment. hat a single form be substituted, at Zone rkation, for the forms 446, 447, 189 and seographed list of clothing and equipment ier, receipted by him and witnessed by an
ssensionata ant Siak ,	officer. (RESTRICTED)	
No Liko or rok 2 ¹ 1 - Marin Marina ri	and 1919 - Maria Abada Balan ing kanalakan sa	
SOURCE:	Command Report - 187th At	n RCT
DATE:	July 1951	Source No. 180
	the Battalion Pioneer and Antitank and Mine Platoor will have received limite minefields (AT and AP); r trapping of all type mine of explosives; engineer r of wire entanglement and construction purposes.	is conducting a four (4) week course for Ammunition Platoons and the Regimental • Upon completion of the course, the units d instruction in the following: Laying of ecording minefields (AT and AP); booby fields; proper handling and use of all types oad reconnaissance; booby traps; employment trip flares; use of native materials for t is felt that familiarization with this cided benefit for the respective battalions
•		
	UNCLASSIFIED	a and a second and a A second a se
OCAFF Form (Revised 15 Oc		



SOURCE: DATE:	Command Report - 96th QM Bn April 1951 Source No. 181
	Plugs and bungs for POL drums are lost at an excessive rate. Twenty-five percent of emptied drums are returned without them. During the month 180,000 each of plugs and bungs were needed to replace those which were lost, but only 100,000 of each were received. A stock on hand made up the difference. Either resupply must be increased, or loss must be decreased. (RESTRICTED)
SOURCE:	38th Inf Regt - Critique of Battle for Hill 1243
DATE:	3 September 1951 Source No. 182
•	At the very outset a serious error was made by the lead company. It had failed to clear paths through the minefield surrounding its defensive position. This meant that much of the effect of the heavy preparation for the attack was wasted. When the unit did go through the field, however, it did the job well. It cleared multiple lanes on a broad front, thereby preventing the enemy from stopping our advance by bringing fire to bear on a single point. (RESTRICTED)
. ¥	**************************************

	* * * * * * * *
*	UNCLASSIFIED 15
OCAFF Form (Revised 15 O	

16

INEOS

CURITY

The supporting artillery fire left little to be desired. This was due primarily to two reasons: Good forward observers and accurate shooting. The forward observers with lead companies were each allowed to control two guns of the battery directly, and in this way "walked the fire" ahead of them during the movement of the infantry. By far the best feature of infantry-artillery coordination was the close support by the artillery, allowing the infantry to "lean into it." When heavy small arms fire was received from the enemy, company commanders quickly backed off from the scene and put heavy concentrations of HE and VT on the area, and then charged back again. It worked. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * * *

hir support played a negligible role in this attack. As usual, in this type of terrain, it was found that strafing was of practically no value, rocketing of limited value, and napalm the only really effective weapon. But even the napalm drops were quite inaccurate. Several major defects in technique were revealed; .defects which need correcting before we can get maximum use from air support. First, the mosquito dominated the control of the air by telling it when and where to strike. Granted that an air observer may occasionally spot a target of opportunity which is of greater value than that seen by the ground commander, the latter undoubtedly knows best what is holding up his advance and should, in the majority of cases, be allowed to influence the conduct of his battle. Another serious defect lies in the lack of close timing between the fires of the air and the artillery. Upon learning that air was due or in the vicinity, the artillery immediately suspended its firing so as not to endanger the aircraft. And then again for minutes and sometimes hours after the strike was finished, the artillery liaison officer could not ascertain whether or not the air attack was indeed finished. At one crucial time during the attack no artillery was available for 2¹/₂ hours; 15 minutes of which were actually consumed by an air strike. The need for better coordination is obvious. (CONFIDENTI.L)

* * * * * * * * * *

The new replacements reacted fairly true to pattern: A few performed very well, but the majority have to learn by experience before the bravery that is in them can be demonstrated. Outstanding deficiences which need more emphasis in training are their failure to recognize the sound of friendly supporting fire (email arms and recoilless as well as mortar and artillery), ignorance of the basic principles of first-aid, and unfamiliarity with the automatic rifle and the hand grenade. As a general rule they were in poor physical condition. (RESTRICTED)

OCAFF Form No ⁷ (Revised 15 Oct 51,

UNCLASSIFIED

Shell Reports submitted during this action were practically nil. This is a serious deficiency which needs more emphasis in training. Our troops were subjected to long periods of shelling. It must be stressed that enemy guns can be silenced by our artillery if there is sufficient data available. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * *

The battalion surgeons and company aid men handled medical evacuation in a superb manner. But among the men in ranks too little knowledge of first-aid was displayed. In two instances men bled to death who might have lived had their comrades known where and how to apply tourniquets. Inother serious error developed: Riflemen of one company went to the aid of the wounded in such large numbers that at one time over half the company was engaged in carrying or assisting wounded to the rear. More training is required to indoctrinate men to the fact that the wounded are the problem of the aid men. It is natural and quite understandable that a man wants to help his comrade. But he must be impressed with the fact that it is vitally necessary to keep the attack moving; that only in this way does he assist and hence protect those still fighting. Lack of trained medical replacements was perhaps largely to blame. In order to help overcome this deficiency a 10% over-strength has been assigned the Medical Company at the expense of riflemen for the battalions. It is believed that this will serve not only to augment the strength in order to better cope with peak loads, but will make a greater number of men available for centralized training in medical subjects. (RESTRICTED)

* * * * * * * * * *

Perhaps the most serious defect of all in medical evacuation was the total ineffectiveness of evacuation by helicopter. The long hand-carry of evacuaes resulted in the death of several porsons who might otherwise have lived. The refusal of helicopter pilots to land (reportedly because of rarefied atmosphere at the 3500 ft elevation, as well as for a host of other reasons given which do not appear to be valid to the laymen) have made for general dissatis-, faction among infantrymen. The "pilot's choice" whereby the pilot can decide whether or not it is safe to land does not set well with the fighting soldier. He would prefer to have higher authority survey the conditions, decide whether or not a reasonable risk is involved, and then order the pilot to go in or stay out accordingly.

UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFF Form No 73 (Revised 15 Oct 51) OCAFF Form No 73

17

TOUR INTORNATION

The reasoning is self-evident — the infantry officer does not have a choice of "safe" or "unsafe" objectives, his mind is made up for him by higher authority. True, the helicopter did transport a number of wounded from the collecting station back to the rear. But the loss of life occurred during the long carry to the collecting station - often as much as 24 hours - and not from there on back. It appeared that speed was less essential in getting a man to better medical care once he got some care other than that possible on the front line. (RESTRICTED)

18

ATION

* * * * * * * * * *

1.2.8

Individual sand bags were found to be convenient receptacles in which to carry ammunition and other supplies, thus discarding the extra weight of the outside packaging and crating. This gave two strings to the bow: not only were the supplies more easily handled, but the bags themselves were available for immediate use. (RESTRICTED)

UNCLASSIFIED

OCAFE Form No 7[°] (Revised 15 Oct 51,