SCRAPPY – 8th
CAVALRY REGIMENT
By Joe
Christopher, Tucson, AZ
Let’s visit about Nogun-ri for a minute and get unpleasant stuff out of the way. A few have misread my remarks or maybe I wasn’t clear. First: I am not for the Koreans who seek redress, nor am I accusing anybody of anything. A few men are confessing and making statements, which appear in newspapers and TV news. They condemn themselves.
Many think that
Nogun-ri was just another, in heat of battle "oops
I’m sorry" kind of thing. Everyone who
has been in combat in any war knows that those things often happen. War is like that. That was not the case at Nogun-ri.
A digest of
confessions printed in newspapers and shown on TV follows: These are not accusations but freely admitted
information by the confessors: Strafing airplanes killed large numbers of
refugees whom GIs had rousted from nearby villages because the North Koreans
were coming. Survivors, perhaps 300,
nobody knows for sure, took refuge under the end of a bridge. These were old men, women of all ages,
children and babies. There were very few
young men.
Suspecting
there were North Koreans among them, a unit of the 7th Cav held them under the bridge as prisoners for part of
that day. They had plenty of time to
search the refugees and weed out those with weapons, radios, and uniforms under
white clothes. This was not done.
Late in the
day, somebody said that somebody said, "we have orders to shoot all civilians
trying to come through our line." So
they did. Firing took place over two
days or so, sparing no one except a few that managed to slip away in the
dark. The confessors tell in horrible
detail how it went on and on, with screams, moaning, crying, and pleading.
Of course the
GIs who still survive that shameful slaughter blame commanders who are now
dead. Where were these guys while the
officers were still living? Why did they
wait 49 years to ease their burdened hearts?
Is it because that final records check is coming up?
It wasn’t but a
few years before Nogun-ri, that German and Japanese
war criminals were tried for the same thing.
It seems that many people can rationalize away such things as long as
our own men do it.
Many of us were
only a few miles away from Nogun-ri, coping with the
same problems. Our frustrations and
losses caused by North Korean soldiers didn’t drive us to mass murder South
Korean civilians. For those who call me
a wimpy, bed wetting, sniveling liberal because I am sickened by this tragic
event, or think that all is made better by tears and apologies: I say I am not sniveling. I am disgusted.
But that’s not
my beef either.
What I object
to, are confessions and statements to news media, which in turn smears the 1st
Cavalry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division Association. One of these men is an officer in the
association.
Dick Whalen, G
Co., Rotterdam Junction, NY, Ed and Ann Galligan, Bay
Village, OH and Wayne Houchin, Louisville, KY, send
newspaper clippings about Nogun-ri. They go into more detail then my poor
synopsis, much worse than we care to review here. Many newspapers (Arizona) did not carry these
accounts, so I depend on contacts in the outside world. I will carry these clippings with me to
Killeen for the association board meeting in February.
Let’s see what’s in the letterbox and maybe sort through
some of this stuff piled on my desk:
From Frank Harris, A Co., Austin, TX, we get copies of 8th
Cav war diary from 18 July 50 to 30 July 50. Gee Frank, this is good stuff. Thanks a lot.
It mentions verbal orders (from who?) to allow refugees to pass through
the line during daylight hours at certain checkpoints. Frank tells, "but when a lot of people rush
at your line you don’t have much time to think.
Mistakes are made."
You’re right
Frank. Of course, people fleeing for
their lives usually are in a hurry and maybe don’t know what the rules
are. However, the situation at Nogun-ri was not like that at all. It could be added that events and thought
processes at that time were confused and chaotic as well as disorganized and
calamitous (and that was in headquarters).
Also, without time for indoctrination and motivation, occupation troops
in Japan were snatched out of a laid back life and dumped straight into combat
within a few days. When told that a
roadblock had set up behind us, I had no idea what that meant. Many men blamed all Koreans for their
misfortune. We also got some of the most
stupid information, like, "The enemy has ran out of food and ammunition and
will start surrendering at any time.
Don’t shoot until you give them that opportunity." I assure you I heard this drivel at a platoon
briefing. Is it any wonder they kicked
our butts all the way to the Pusan perimeter. NO, they did not surrender.
This part of
the War Diary that Frank sent also covers F Co, parts of H Co, and 71st
Tank Bn being separated from SCRAPPY WHITE for a
couple of days and thought to be lost.
Some of you know how seven M-24 tanks bogged down in deep rice paddy mud
while circling around roadblock or ambush knoll. It wasn’t even a hill. Four tanks did get through to the road, but
took off for Yong dong without helping the infantry who then hiked over hill
and dale, with wounded, for three days to contact battalion and regiment. Communications were as bad as information
about the enemy. Frank, I wish this copy
of the diary included 3 Aug. That day,
as different elements were withdrawing south to the Pusan
Perimeter just beginning to form, Fox Co attacked and wiped out an ambush on
the west side of the Naktong River. Our gallant Company Commander Lt MATTA and
one Trooper were lost in that otherwise successful action.
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